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This volume is the result of the close collaboration between the 
University of Naples ”L’Orientale” and the scholars organizing and 
participating in the postgraduate course Feminisms in a Transnational 
Perspective in Dubrovnik, Croatia. The contributions presented here 
use different conceptual approaches to theory, history and cultural 
texts, and to women’s lives, experiences and legacies, in order to offer 
their re-visions of the past and their prospects of the future as an act of 
feminist responsibility.
Disrupting Historicity, Reclaiming the Future is a complex, methodologically innovative, 
and valuable collection of scholarly works. Pointing to mimetic and absent places 
(themes, artefacts, female figures, suppressed Others, acts of resistance) within great 
historical narratives and the importance of a different kind of reading and researching 
of heritage, archived sociality, and the future, the essays collected here signal the 
potency of feminist epistemology to assume responsibility in the ‘re-semantization 
of the contemporaneity’. The texts show how, with which tools, and through which 
critical lenses, feminist epistemology gives answers to the overwhelming problems of 
modernity, having in mind the centrality of emancipatory values of women’s heritage 
and insight.
(Prof. Biljana Kašić, University of Zadar, Croatia)
The collected book of proceedings Disrupting Historicity, Reclaiming the Future represents 
a valuable publication that includes multiple perspectives, problems and concepts 
of feminist research (...) from a wide range of approaches: from analyzing historical 
materials, archives, new discoveries to an overview of the lives and works of female 
philosophers, the predecessors of gender studies, literary and film criticism, etc. Of 
particular, perhaps even decisive importance is that some of the authors speak and 
reflect on their own place in writing “from the European semi-periphery” and “from the 
ruins of disrupted, denied or instrumentalized socialist worlds”. With this they confront 
the growing dangers of the Americanization and Britishization of gender studies and 
bring to light phenomena that were forgotten “overnight”.  
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Disrupting Historicity, Reclaiming the 
Future
Silvana Carotenuto, Francesca Maria Gabrielli, Renata Jambrešić Kirin
Every writing or revision makes the ‘discovery’ all over again. 
(Hortense Spillers)
The aim of this volume is to intervene both in the ways women 
inherit the past and open up towards the future, mobilizing 
feminist epistemology and feminist legacy in order to establish 
the agenda of a hospitable Europe and a collaborative world, a 
humanistic university and a peer reading sisterhood instead 
of the fallacy of excellence and academic proficiency. It is the 
critical incentive for the authors of the contributions presented 
here – who use different conceptual approaches to theory, history 
and cultural texts, but also to women’s lives, experiences and 
legacies – to reveal the strategies that we have used and still use 
in historical and sociocultural locations in order to confront the 
‘foreclusionary structures’ of the grand narratives and to establish 
a more intimate relationship with the ghosts of a traumatic past 
and the promises of a future that cannot be fully anticipated. 
Although most authors focus on the theoretical reverberation of 
silenced, neglected and insufficiently explored women’s discourses, 
social criticism is the corollary of a shared endeavor – encouraged by 
the Dubrovnik feminist course1 – because, as Linda Nicholson notices: 
¹ The edited volume Disrupting Historicity, Reclaiming the Future consists of 
selected proceedings from three sessions of the postgraduate course Feminisms in 
a Transnational Perspective (held in May 2014, 2015, and 2016 respectively). This 
postgraduate course started in 2007 at the Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, 
an independent international centre for advanced studies, in order to connect 
feminist scholars and activists from the North and South of Europe with the idea 
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Social criticism without philosophy is not possible, and without 
social criticism the project of a feminist theory, which is committed 
at once to knowledge and to the emancipatory interests of women 
is inconceivable. Social criticism needs philosophy precisely 
because the narratives of our cultures are so conflictual and 
irreconcilable that, even when one appeals to them, a certain 
ordering of one’s normative priorities and a clarification of those 
principles in the name of which one speaks is unavoidable.2
This volume offers a constative, performative and eventful 
act of social criticism through the thoughts and practices, the 
arguments and forms of the presented essays. All and singularly, 
the contributions are organized around four areas of militant 
debate: ‘Herstories‘, ‘Foremothers‘, ‘Revisions‘, ‘The Future‘. 
The commitment is here declared through the engagement 
that ‘History’ must be, individually and collectively, changed 
in ‘Herstories’, inscribing a transformation in belonging and 
in plurality, the deviation of historical universality into the 
particularity and relevance of the tales that give voice to the 
female capacity to ‘disrupt’ the order, the norm, the patriarchal 
authority of the discourse, thus transforming the archive of the 
‘one’ and of the ‘unique’ into new and unexplored areas of future 
and productive encounters among women. It is the recovery and 
the discovery of what in/of their stories has been historically kept 
at the margin, a recovery and discovery that positions itself on 
the border (the essays revendicate their being ‘late’, ‘off-center’, 
‘outside’, ‘experimental’, ‘utopian’!) which becomes the liminal 
place where to illuminate the blind spots of History/city, in its 
normative project aimed at the invisibility and hypostatization of 
women – indeed, the opening essay of the volume deconstructs 
the ‘eternal present’ entrusted and imposed on women in their 
historical un-presence (Sanja Milutinović Bojanić).
It is a transformative capacity that unfolds in the section that 
follows: for the creation of ‘Herstories’, it is necessary to learn from 
our ‘Foremothers’, by creating and recreating, always already, 
legacies across times and experiences, by opening the Matriarchive 
of developing it into a transnational platform of exchanging knowledge among 
feminist teachers and students. During the twelve years of the regular program 
the course was attended by more than two hundred participants from all over the 
world and the papers presented within its frame have been published in five edited 
volumes (publications in English and Croatian/English languages are accessible at 
<https://zenstud.hr/izdavastvo/knjige/>).
² Linda Nicholson, ”Introduction”, in Feminist Contentions. A Philosophical 
Exchange, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Nancy Fraser (eds.), 
Routledge, New York and London, 1995, pp. 1-16. 
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of women – from Isotta Nogarola’s fifteenth-century Dialogue on 
Adam and Eve (Francesca Maria Gabrielli) to Jane Addams’ early 
oral history project among American disenfranchised women 
(Katherine Borland), from the life stories of Croatian women 
born between the 1920s and the early 1940s (Marija Ott Franolić) 
to the legacy of Yugoslav interwar women communists (Renata 
Jambrešić Kirin) – by inscribing on the page and in the world 
those matriarchal theories and actions capable of teaching us, 
now, in the present, how to carry ‘the burden of representation’ 
that history has bequeathed upon us (Brigita Malenica). 
If the set time of these openings of the female archive is the 
fifteenth century, the strategies operating in the volume’s analyses 
gradually reach the present, our contemporaneity, the actual 
emergence of technology, media, the culture of visuality, cinema, 
music. The ‘burden of representation’ is thus exposed to the 
epochal transformation, that is, to the invention of a complex and 
critical female philosophy in line with the theoretical teaching of 
Hannah Arendt whose life and thinking are specifically reclaimed 
here through their ‘rewritings‘or ‘Revisions‘: first, ‘across media’ 
by the German director Von Trotta (Lada Čale Feldman), and 
then in the musings around the ‘abject body’ by Julia Kristeva, 
Lidia M. G. Zerilli and Judith Butler (Iva Rogulja Praštalo). Here, 
while Margarete von Trotta’s biographical rendition of Hannah 
Arendt insists not so much on the philosopher’s own allegiances 
but rather on the feminist implications of her acting on the public 
stage, Arendt’s concept of theory and practice is juxtaposed and 
weighed within the consideration of feminist theory in relation to 
feminist activism and vice versa (Daša Duhaček). 
It is, once again, the question of how to intervene in the archive 
by producing revisions or poetics as practices, acts of interventions 
in our contemporary experience. Already in ‘Herstories’, the essays 
intervene in the critical debate with their proposal of a feminist 
political agency (Brigita Malenica), a feminist ‘New Historicism’ 
via ‘Virginity stories’ (Dubravka Dulibić Paljar) and ‘Witchcraft 
trials’ (Nataša Polgar), discussing the representation of woman 
as confined to a time-less time (Sanja Milutinović Bojanić), and 
articulating the dilemma of representation in the positing of a 
feminist academic unit (Brigita Miloš). In ‘Foremothers’ there 
is the revindication of the performativity – that matters – of 
women’s claims to agency and intellectual power across history.
Specifically, perhaps intrinsically aware of the necessity to acquire 
a common language of sensibility, the gaze and the heart open up 
in ‘Revisions’, to the dynamics of the experimental Yugoslavian 
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cinema (Petra Belc Krnjaić), and to the personal, generational and 
global resonances of pop music (Ana Fazekaš).
The time of the future – never to be defined in closure, always 
in its becoming and openness to what-comes (at the end of the 
volume, Svetlana Slapšak, in her analysis of female science 
fiction novels by Ursula Le Guin and others, speaks of ‘love’ for 
l’à-venir) – announces itself. Indeed, ‘The Future‘ is the time of 
the announcement, pregnant with promises (which are acts in 
themselves) and instances of the messianic, generative of the hope 
of a renovated encounter between the East and the West (Durre 
Ahmed); the invention of acts of hospitality, different from the 
implemented politics of rejection of Fortress Europe, towards 
the migratory experiences and the contemporary writings of 
women who know the diasporic sufferings of their peoples, and, 
together, the creative force of their survivals (Simona Miceli); the 
utopian writing practiced by the post-Yugoslavian literature in 
experimental forms and contents (Tijana Matijević); the generosity 
of spirit and flesh inscribed in the speculative science fiction by 
Nigerian-American Nnendi Okorafor (Silvana Carotenuto).
The circle of History is opened to be never closed again. On the 
threshold of time and space, these essays prove ‘strategical’ in that 
they can be read ‘vertically’ within the limits of their sections, but 
also ‘horizontally’ in the resonance and organicity of their thoughts 
and interconnected practices, in the militant lucidity of setting the 
nodal times for their necessary historical rewritings, thanks to the 
political and cultural offerings of their ‘other’ theoretical, political, 
epistemological and philosophical representations. Vertically and 
horizontally, these critical contributions are writing their own 
‘herstories’, learning from the experiences of the women who 
have thought, written and communicated strength and wisdom 
before us, offering their – ancient, almost without time, far-away, 
calling from intimate pasts – practices and poetics as essential 
signposts along the critical path that reaches out for the future, 
where, finally, they are able to read and write other fictions – what 
extraordinary freedom is inscribed in these future enouncements! 
– of times of peace, unconditional hospitality, political utopia, and 
transformative love.3
³ In her deconstructive feminist philosophy, Peggy Kamuf articulates the 
“heart of love: it is that which should be able to hold together in an essential 
relation the movement towards the animate as well as towards the inanimate, 
towards life as well as non-life, or death, and therefore towards that which can be 
preserved in life as well as that which has never had or no longer has any life as 
such to be preserved. At the heart of love, all these apparent oppositions would 
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In line with the epistemological project of feminism in a 
transnational perspective, a whole universe of women authors 
(Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak would speak of a ‘planet’), including 
both young and established researchers, delineates in this volume 
its determination and passion, fragility and strength, analysis 
and joy, to ‘disrupt historicity’ and, as the last act of our common 
responsibility, to ‘reclaim the future.’ In this universe, regardless 
of the authors’ theoretical concessions and reflexive perspectives 
(historical or future oriented), what matters is to rethink the 
question of gender and how it is constructed (in legal, national, 
religious, theoretical, literary, artistic, popular media discourses), 
advocating emancipatory interpretations of women’s agency and 
subjectivities “as a clue to how we live, how we have been living, 
how we have been led to imagine ourselves, how our language 
has trapped as well as liberated us; and how we can begin to 
see and therefore live-afresh”.4 In this sense, the radical critique 
proposed by Adrienne Rich, as well as her extraordinary po-ethics 
of ‘re-vision’,5 is central, bearing in mind that “‘Woman’ in history 
neither speaks (testifies), nor scrutinizes (renders judgment). She 
is denied the right to testify and pass judgment, thus denied the 
right to history. To the extent to which she is denied the status of 
witness, she is also kept within the bounds of the present” (Sanja 
Milutinović Bojanić). The authors use different women’s texts 
(artefacts, experiences, ideologies) from the (patriarchal) past 
be suspended, no longer or not yet in force, or already ruined, in ruins”. Peggy 
Kamuf, “Deconstruction and Love”, in Nicholas Royle (ed.), Deconstructions. A 
User’s Guide, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 153.
⁴ Adrienne Rich, “When We Dead Awaken. Writing as Re-Vision”, College 
English, 34, 1, 1972, p. 18.
⁵ ‘Poethics’, which proves essential for the writing and teaching of Adrienne 
Rich, is defined by Joan Retellack in the following terms: “A poetics can take you 
only so far without an h. If you’re to embrace complex life on earth, if you can 
no longer pretend that all things are fundamentally simple or elegant, a poetics 
thickened by an h launches an exploration of art’s significance as, not just about, a 
form of living in the real world. That as is not a simile; it’s an ethos. Hence the h. 
What I’m working on is quite explicitly a poethics of a complex realism” (Poethical 
Wager, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2003, p. 
26). It the could be said that all the essays presented in this volume, are engaged 
expressions of the ‘poethics of a complex realism’. Among several epistemological 
positions, the feminist re-vision is particularly fruitful, because, according to Rich: 
“Re-vision, the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old 
text from a new critical direction, is for us more than a chapter in cultural history: 
it is an act of survival. Until we can understand the assumptions in which we 
are drenched we cannot know ourselves. And this drive to self-knowledge, for 
woman, is more than a search for identity: it is a part of her refusal of the self-
destructiveness of male-dominated society”. Rich, When We Dead Awaken, cit., p. 
18.
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and/or (neoliberal) present in order to allow themselves to testify 
to the subjugations, confinements, limitations or subsistence, but 
also to the acts of subversion, disobedience and revolt that women 
perform and have performed in various historical gender regimes. 
Nowadays we are confronted with the spectres of globalized 
conservative counterrevolution and backlash against ‘gender 
ideology’. It is thus necessary more than ever to look backward 
and forward, testifying to the extent by which feminism has 
historically been and still today proves to be the precious form 
of resistance and insurrectionary power, capable of producing 
new figurations of the future. The ongoing struggle for protecting 
women’s civil, political and reproductive rights should include 
the pursuit of new modes of emancipatory self-knowledge 
(commitment to women’s agency and sense of selfhood), as well 
as the reappropriation of women’s histories in the name of an 
emancipated future. It is more important than ever to expand our 
horizons, invent feminist critical gestures, refine our competency 
of entering into the archival boxes and reclaim sociality ensured 
by virtual worlds. 
In their efforts to reveal trajectories, values, believes and hopes 
of minority subjects “without and outside history”, feminist 
scholars were among the first to call into question the white 
supremacist/patrimonial/colonial concept of His-story and its 
foundational role in Western thought. In recent years, not only 
women’s (transnational, cultural, social, economic) history but 
historicity itself has become one of the primary objects of feminist 
scrutiny. This has been part of a broader discussion about the 
‘affective turn’ in the Humanities, and the need to ‘queer’ the 
Euclidean notion of space and time according to the Deleuzian 
concept of assemblage, which is more attuned to experiences of 
the present as deprived of linearity, coherency, and permanency. 
Feminist perspectives on history/icity have been enriched by 
assumptions of postcolonial critique, marxist feminism, cultural 
studies, the history of emotions, psychoanalytic concepts. In The 
Fantasy of Feminist History, Joan Wallach Scott argues that it was 
with the help of psychoanalytic theory, which posits sexual 
difference as an insoluble dilemma, that she elaborated her 
argument about the mutable meaning of gender (roles, norms, 
practices, differences) through history and across socio-cultural 
contexts. The impossibility to hold meaning in place makes 
gender such ”an interesting historical object”, an object ”that 
includes not only regimes of truth about sex and sexuality but 
also fantasies and transgressions that refuse to be regulated or 
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categorized”.6 In questioning the standard parameters of feminist 
historiography, Scott advocates the (psychoanalytic) methods 
of looking for emotional investments of historical subjects that 
cannot be explained ideologically or empirically. As the authors 
of the articles included especially in the sections Foremothers 
and Revisions remind us, the archives must be transformed 
from bastions of patriarchal power run by the death drive into 
repositories of passion and empowerment, as well as feminist 
“discoveries”.
The feminist scholars collected in this volume articulate 
challenging responses to the question why it is important to 
disrupt historicity and undo patriarchal/colonial/hegemonic 
power paradigms in the name of a desirable future. The authors 
who speak from the European semi-periphery, from the ruins 
of disrupted, denied or instrumentalized socialist worlds, and 
classified archives, voice the urge to delineate and explain diverse 
trajectories, fragmented and zig-zag modernist timelines, and, 
together, to deconstruct or ‘disrupt’ official historiographies, 
national politics of memory, and hegemonic places of knowledge 
production. Some of the authors express the impasse between 
the need to historicize the particular conditions of women’s 
experiences and the ethico-political demand to strategically use 
an ahistorical notion of woman. All of them are exploring new and 
fruitful ways of challenging Western linear teleology and the uses 
and abuses of history it entails. With singular and metonymic 
theoretical pursuits and ethical interventions, they (re)discover the 
best of women’s intellectual heritage and create a bridge between 
history, theory, social criticism, and everyday activism so as to 
be able to understand the ruptures, fragmentations, interruptions, 
and zig-zag lines of modern temporalities while resisting all 
dogmatisms and forms of despair.
Let us conclude with a last note on why we consider that 
the feminist responsible task today is to reclaim the future. The 
action of ‘re-claiming’ is inspired by Judith Butler’s philosophical 
reading of the counter-figure of Antigone, the tragic woman who 
does not believe or act in view of an utopian future (the idea of 
an imagined perfection/salvation/integration in the future) but 
who engages with a specific form of ‘faithfulness’ (how could we 
do without the sense of the future, the proposal, the imagination, 
hope?) and ‘betrayal’ (do we still believe in the ‘empire’ or 
⁶ Joan Wallach Scott, The Fantasy of Feminist History, Duke University Press, 
Durham, 2011, p. 5.
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homogenous course of history, in the metaphysical notion of 
progressive time?). She knows that “the norm has a temporality 
that opens it to a subversion from within and to a future that 
cannot be fully anticipated”; her language is “the very language of 
the state against which she rebels and a politics not of oppositional 
purity but of the scandalously impure”.7 Inspired by the mimetic, 
transformative and excessive claim of Antigone, relying on her 
acts of disturbance and destabilization (of hegemonic power), 
the contributions included in this volume reveal the full spectre 
of (feminist) challenges and responsibilities in various disciplines, 
discourses and interpretations, motivated by the urgency to use 
their knowledge, positions and teaching skills for envisioning, 
imagining, hoping for a new future. 
The future is a sensitive zone of contestation: on the one hand, the 
materiality of contemporary and absolute danger is compromising 
our sense of the future, producing a global refusal and denial of 
what might appear on the horizon of the unexpected; on the other 
hand, the already-constituted norm/ality of generalized lack, fear, 
anguish, threat, precarity and unpredictability, cannot but reveal 
the ghost of a radical futurity that keeps haunting the present. We 
firmly believe that, between radical futurity and the apocalyptic 
future, there is room for a future that pronounces difference, 
responsibility, democracy, justice, and the task of hospitality 
towards the other as distinctly feminist concepts and practices.
7 Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim. Kinship between Life and Death, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2000, p. 21, p. 25.
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Herstories.....................................................
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On the Eternal Present 
Sanja Milutinović Bojanić
Summary
In addition to its teleological framework, the use of the word ‘history’ 
(especially) in the Western, Judeo-Christian world, includes a duality 
and intertwinement of two senses: sight and hearing (Benveniste). Their 
rivalry is that of two traditions, the Greek and Roman. The authority of 
the figures of witness and judge draws its origin precisely in the visual 
and aural ways of knowing. The epistemological thematization of history 
follows the same path, particularly when it comes to ‘woman’. Often mute 
and blind, she is never witness/judge to many crucial events. ‘Woman’ in 
history neither speaks (testifies), nor scrutinizes (renders judgment). She 
is denied the right to testify and pass judgment, thus denied the right to 
history. To the extent to which she is denied the status of witness, she is 
also kept within the bounds of the present. The teleological framework 
of history allows the female only the now. These claims are elaborated 
through a reading of the painting The Fountain of Youth (by Luca Cranach 
the Elder) and representations of this concept that emerge from this work 
of art. The woman of the past could use her senses only for the purpose of 
conserving or regenerating youth as time-less time, without testimony or 
judgment. Woman here is understood not in the literal sense of the word, 
but rather, as a metaphor for all those in history who could not leave trace 
of their authentic existence.
Prologue
“… But history, real solemn history, I cannot be interested in. Can 
you?”, Catherine Morland asks diffidently Miss Tilney in Jane 
Austen’s first novel Northanger Abbey (1803). And Miss Tilney replies 
shortly, “Yes, I am fond of history,” intensifying Catherine Morland’s 
uneasiness in searching ways to express her displacement:
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I wish I were too. I read it a little as a duty, but it tells me nothing 
that does not either vex or weary me. The quarrels of popes and 
kings, with wars or pestilences, in every page; the men all so good 
for nothing, and hardly any women at all – it is very tiresome: and 
yet I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must 
be invention (my italic). The speeches that are put into the heroes’ 
mouths, their thoughts and designs – the chief of all this must be 
invention, and invention is what delights me in other books…¹
***
How do we understand the historical value of the past and how 
is at all possible to understand the epistemic status of any past 
narrative, constructed on the foundation of a general historical 
matrix? It is not only a matter of the spun yarn of HIS-STORY as 
opposed to HER-STORY. Nor only of the female perspective that 
is supposed to complete the general and given idea of relations 
of power. It is not enough to merely shift from the margin of the 
system and framework of power to finalize a picture that always 
lacks objectivity. We are dealing with a centuries old machinery 
of meticulous argument construction that grounds the epistemē of 
history and modalities of memory of the so-called Judeo-Christian 
and Muslim world. History is not only information handed down 
unchanged and linear, from generation to generation; nor does any 
historical interpretation get indemnity through cultural process 
of accepting or rejecting certain narratives. In the Western world, 
within the last few decades, historians have come to recognize 
that historical epistemē comprises a record of human activities in 
every sphere of life, not just political developments.
Even in the more recent history of Western democracies, 
at moments when the paradigm of continuity and heritage 
(conservative and teleological by its very nature) was replaced 
by some revolutionary forms of creative energy (in turbulent 
periods of radical change), the axis of violent hierarchies has still 
been preserved, and has thus maintained the polarization and 
opposition of strong/weak, old/young, rich/poor, and of course 
male/female. It is established to the point of cliché that women 
en masse prepared and supported the French revolution as early 
as the salons of the Ancien Regime, as well as then spoke – such 
women as Olympe de Gouges or Madame Roland, Madame de 
Staël, Madame Clement-Hemery – from public pulpits and in 
revolutionary clubs, advocating its values. Still, by 1793 women 
1 Jane Austin, Northanger Abbey, Janet Todd (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, chapter 14.
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were expelled from debate clubs, as well as the military, and in 
1804, with the Napoleonic Code they lose their hard-won status 
as citizen. Thanks to one global historical event – as the historians 
around Patrick Boucheron at the College de France call the 1789 
revolution2 – in a very short span of four years, women, shoulder to 
shoulder with men, were active in the public sphere. In the words 
of Geneviève Fraisse,3 the French revolution simultaneously 
allowed and prevented the presence of women in public, as well 
as in civil society, while after the revolution, they unambiguously 
lose their political status, once again becoming, in the civil sense, 
subjugated. Still, for the sake of clarity of argument, let us leave 
aside the myriad shades of sexual difference and their implications 
in which it can never be understood as static, but precisely as 
a variable operational value. Moreover, by insisting on sexual 
difference, my intention is to indicate the oppressiveness that 
neither begins nor ends in sexuality, but is interwoven with and 
holding together class, race, ethnic and other forms of negative 
differentiations.
What are we actually talking about and could we find answers 
to why HIS-STORY prevails over HER-STORY in the case of 
linguistics and the archeology of the very word ‘history’? Does 
understanding this history, we have been handed down for several 
millennia allow us the freedom of departure from masculinized 
historicity?
Could not the profiling of the development and shift of 
epistemological paradigm of history and historicism contained 
in the historical systematizations of Gianbattista Vico, Michel de 
Montaigne, all the way up to Hegel and modern historicism, as 
well the various dynamics of historization, yield a pattern that 
prevents the abandonment of the matrix of the tenacious survival 
of HIS-STORY? Is a different form of development possible, 
some new contingency that would be neither a reflection in the 
mirror, nor a negative, nor Rorschach like imprint? Could a new 
historicism of the second half of the twentieth century, in its 
decentralized discourses of subaltern, postcolonial studies, not 
carry this change? Historical value of the past is nearly always 
reactualized in present political and ideological trends, and every 
glance backward renews that portion of the past repeated in 
² Patrick Boucheron, “Présentation générale”, in Histoire mondiale de la 
France, Patrick Boucheron, Nicolas Delalande, Florian Mazel, Yann Potin, Pierre 
Singaravélou (coordinateurs) , Le Seuil, Paris, 2017, p. 7.
3 Geneviève Fraisse, Muse de la Raison. Démocratie et exclusion des femmes en 
France, Galimard, Paris, 1995, p. 23. 
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history. More specifically, history does not of itself repeat; rather, 
persistent returns to certain constructions of significance and 
determination of meaning within history entrenches established 
narratives, further preventing emancipation from heroes and 
“quarrels of popes and kings”. It is very difficult indeed to oppose 
historical stereotypes and clichés with micro-narratives, consistent 
and brief stories that in their micro-materiality mark the points at 
which historicism is changed. It is difficult to thematize history 
without thinking of time as duration.
This text comprises two parts and deals with, on the one hand, 
the underlying paradigm of the beginning of Homeric (heroic 
or divine) discourse on history (crucially different from the 
one that appears with Herodotus), and on the other, a semiotic 
reading of the late Renaissance painting by Luca Cranach the 
Elder, The Fountain of Youth.4 The question is truly whether man 
has broken free of historical self-thematization that arbitrarily, 
beyond the reach of its epistemē, could interpret and narrate any 
phenomenon whatever. Thus, the heroic discourse on history, 
the divine/male gaze onto history, man and his world (as well as 
the world in general), draws into a strange relation as if toward 
a relic, and certainly into the matrix of nostalgia. Yet, since nostos 
álgos, the painful state of needing to return, appears with the 
very consciousness of the impossibility of return to the place 
from whence we all issued (one does not need either research on 
Freud who spoke of the womb as the first place of the unheimlich), 
nostalgia ought to always be tempered rather than fanned. 
Inevitably related to melancholia, nostalgia thus resonates heavily 
in man’s world and demands woman to behave in a way that time 
and place are not the issue of her reflection.
The example of a semiotic reading of the small-formatted oil 
on panel, The Fountain of Youth, will serve us to illustrate certain 
elements of epistemology of history that could uncover the 
foundational and resistant, ever on the razor’s edge of sexism and 
misogyny, missing from the understanding of the historicity of 
history. Yet, it is not the feminist point in such a reading that is 
crucial, but rather the awareness of a narrowness of field of vision 
that has in the history of Western civilizations completely excluded 
the gaze of the other (seeing the other from the point of view of 
Other) thus establishing the uniqueness of the male gaze which 
4 Lucas Cranach the Elder, The Fountain of Youth, DE_smbGG_593, in Cranach 
Digital Archive <http://lucascranach.org/DE_smbGG_593> [Gemäldegalerie, 
revised 2010] (03/2018).
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depicts world and women from a masculine and heterosexual 
point of view, and exhibiting women as objects of male pleasure.5
With this comparison between the heroic and divine of 
history and a small Renaissance painting, the text illustrates the 
problem of the perception of passing time and knowledge of past 
events, in order to reveal the phenomenon of the eternal present 
of perception and knowledge. What did knowledge of the world 
and its events consist of prior to Herodotus or Thucydides, or 
any number of other great systematizers of the past who have 
built their epistemological matrix into a continuous sequence of 
the past? My toolbox contains linguistic and semiotic elements. 
Regarding the motives that underpin the aesthetic analysis of 
the painting, my focus does not remain on description. It does 
not offer finished meaning, but puzzles over places of the 
obvious and stereotypical, providing in their stead questions 
with neither simple nor unified, certain answers. Aside from a 
standard compositional interpretation, it is not crucial to focus 
on the structure, configuration or color saturation of the chosen 
canvas. Even the fact that it is a painting and view bathed in 
light, offering serenity, cannot overlook the framework of the 
oblique and cunning intentions of the motif of eternity itself.
Connecting knowledge, perception and history with visual 
material, my goal, aside from showing their interconnection, is to 
reveal the invisible mechanisms always missing from frameworks 
of feminist epistemology of history, preventing its emancipation 
from traditional historical epistemē.
Archeology of Naming
Using a comparative method of internal reconstruction of 
a proto-Indo-European language,6 linguists have recognized 
two roots that connect knowledge and perception: *ĝneh3- and 
*weid-. Both have a great number of derivations. In general, the 
first leads towards a meaning of that which is knowledge, or 
better still, cognition [as in “(re)cognition of person,”], while the 
other to the meaning of that which is learning [as in “learning the 
facts”]. The root *ĝneh3- gives forms such as the Greek gignōsko 
(with the suffix *sķe/o) and Latin (g)nosco, as well as the Greek and 
5 On male gaze in visual arts, see Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema”, in Visual and Other Pleasures (2nd ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire England, New York, 2009, pp. 14-30. 
6 James P. Mallory, Douglas Q. Adams, The Oxford Introduction to Proto-Indo-
European and the Proto-Indo-European World, Oxford University Press, London, 
2006, p. 320.
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Latin deverbatives, -gnosis, that is, -nōtiō. In French, gnoséologie is 
defined as “étude des fondements de la connaissance”, [studies 
of foundations of knowledge] for which the English uses the term 
“epistemology”. Hence the French connaissance corresponds to the 
English knowledge.
On the other hand, *weid- is the root of the Latin videō (videre 
or French voir, to see), the Gothic witam, the German wisen, the 
English wit or Sanskrit vedā. The same root gives the Doric Greek 
aorist ídeĩn, the perfect woīda (“I know”). This last form suffered 
certain changes over time, first losing the diagamma (also known 
as the wau, which most resembles the contemporary Latin letter 
‘f’), after which it remains only oīda. The second change refers to 
the temporal dimension added in translation, since the first person 
singular of the indicative, oīda refers to an action begun in the past 
but with some connection to the present moment. This is a verb 
tense of present perfect that still exists in English. In French the 
translation would be in the present tense, thus turning the verb 
voir (to see) into sa-voir, that is knowledge. What I have seen in the 
past, I now know (j’ai vu avant, je (le) sais, maintenant).
To arrive at the form I seek to reconstruct, that is, the single 
form offering the experience of seeing [voir] that is accumulated 
into the form of knowing [sa-voir], let us recall the mentioned 
conjugation and the form that in the second person singular gives 
the word form oīsta. Using Grassmann’s law of dissimulation of 
aspirated vowels in Sanskrit and Ancient Greek,7 which states 
that when a single word features two successive aspirated vowels, 
they lose their aspiration, the word form oīsta can indeed be 
reconstructed back into its older form and root *hoīsta.8 At first 
glance it is perhaps not so easy to recognize that we are looking 
at the word history; however, looking at the deverbative histôr-
historos, meaning ‘one who knows’, or ‘one who knows something 
after having studied it’, it becomes clear that the word ‘history’ 
in Ancient Greek designates precisely what has been seen and 
accumulated into knowledge/cognizance of the facts.
Similarly, in his study, Dictionary of Indo-European Concepts 
and Society9 Émile Benveniste pays close attention to the 
7 Hermann Günther Grassmann (1809-1877) was a German polymath, renowned 
in his day as a linguist and now also admired as a mathematician. He was also a 
physicist, neo-humanist, general scholar, and publisher. His mathematical work was 
little noted until he was in his sixties.
8 Neville E. Collinge, The Laws of Indo-European, John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1985.
9 Emile Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. Pouvoir, droit, 
religion, vol. II, Minuit, Paris, 1969, pp. 173-174.
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etymological power of the word form ỉstō. The context of his 
analysis is specific, since it points to key elements that comprise 
Indo-European social world, meaning that the word form ỉstō is 
again studied alongside with the verb voir, to see, but touching 
on history only indirectly. As a linguistic archeologist, Benveniste 
studies the institution of the oath and its role in the construction 
of the hierarchy of power of community. The institution of the 
oath also issues from the root *weid-, and when dealing with 
the entwined problem of the witness and judge, Benveniste has 
reason to wonder about the difference in meaning between the 
two: “does ... ỉstōr refer to the ‘witness/témoin’ or the ‘judge/
juge’?”.10 He offers a clear answer: “The judge is not a witness 
... precisely because he is -istōr, an ocular witness, the only one 
who can pass judgment in an argument or debate”. Benveniste 
insists on the fact that “basic value of ocular witnessing follows 
from the very name of the witness, -istōr”.11
But what happens at the moment when there is no visual 
witness, yet histôr- is still summoned? What powers mark the 
witness who could also become arbiter and pass judgment? The 
word form -istōr acquires attributive meaning “which renders 
un-appealable judgment, cuts short the debate (neikos, dispute) 
about something that ought to be a question ‘de bonne foi’”. Thus 
in the Iliad, Ajax ask that Agamemnon be histôr,12 to decide 
who came first in the race organized by Achilles. Whatever 
Agamemnon’s role in the conflict between Ajax and Idomeneus, 
it is known that Agamemnon could not have seen with his own 
eyes who had the advantage. Consequently, it is patently clear 
that one with authority or one higher in the hierarchy is making 
the decision. Another example of the same contradiction is the 
famous scene with Achilles’ shield, claimed by two men each 
accusing the other of murder, and seeking a histôr. In her text 
about the role and function of the histôr, Evelyne Scheid-Tissinier 
writes: “Stepping into dispute (neikos), the histôr is not one who, 
by his intervention alone, can put an end to the differences by 
adjudicating between conflicting versions, but is, rather, the 
guarantor (for the present or indeed for the future) of what will 
have been agreed upon by the two parties”.13
10 Ivi, p. 174.
11 Ibid.
12 Homer, "Iliad", in Homeri Opera, translated by D. B. Monro and T. W. Allen 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1920, lines 18.482-87.
13 Evelyne Scheid-Tissinier, “A propos du rôle et de la fonction de l’ιστωρ”, 
Revue de Philologie, 68, 1994, pp. 187-208.
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Of course, everything is complicated with the arrival of 
Odysseus, who, keeping his anonymity despite the great pain he 
feels making him shed tears, allows in his presence the reciting of 
events in which he was himself participant and to which he was 
witness: ”I respect you, Demodocus, more than any man alive / 
surely the muse has taught you, Zeus’s daughter, / or god Apollo 
himself. How true to life / all too true ... you sing the Achaeans 
fate / all they did and suffered, all they soldiered throughout, / as 
if you were there yourself (autos pareon) or heard from one who 
was (akousas)”.14
Are not Odysseus’ mimicry of identity, his interrogation and 
turn, indications regarding the abandonment of a literal reading 
of history, since Odysseus actually recognizes in Demodocus the 
gift of the Muses who “for in no wise to all alike does he give 
pleasure / with this song. Ever since we began to sup and the / 
divine minstrel was moved to sing, from that time yon / stranger 
has never ceased from sorrowful lamentation; surely, methinks, 
grief has encompassed his heart”.15
The histôr is blind but loved by the Muses more than anyone 
else, since by stripping him of the gift of eyesight, they give him 
the power of mellifluous song. The art of epic storytelling, epic 
choice of heroic destiny has made that the blind singer see and 
know better than the participant himself in those historical events 
of which he sings. The clairvoyant, stripped of one of his basic 
means of perception, is inspired by Zeus’ and Mnemosyne’s 
daughters, the Muses – so he sees all. This seeing and knowing is 
similar with another word that brings together perception and 
knowledge/cognizance. ‘Evidence’ – following any dictionary – is 
a word that comes from the Latin evidens, -entis, “that which can 
be seen from afar”, something ex-videre or “beyond ken”.
As the warrant of epic poetry, the histôr did not necessarily 
know the facts, but was cognizant of what transpired. He gained 
insight based on intuitions given to him by the Muses.
It is noteworthy that Herodotus himself, considered the father 
of history, used the word histôr in the form it was used above all 
by doctors. We encounter this form mostly in Hippocrates’ On 
Ancient Medicine, in which histôrie simply represents research or 
findings of specific inquiry. Historié serves Hippocrates as a kind 
of ersatz link between what he sees and hears and speech, “logos” 
or autopsy. In other words, it becomes the connection between 
14 Homer, Odyssey, cit., lines 8.546-51.
15 Ivi, lines 8.538-545.
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simple testimony and fact established by inquiring with his own 
eyes. The authority of knowledge or skill that grounds the expert 
opinion of the doctor is certainly subject to time that erases almost 
all traces.
But this is when the mother of Muses, Mnemosyne, that is, 
memory, steps onto the stage.
The Fountain of Youth as Cure for Memory
A semiotic reading of Luca Cranach the Elder’s painting 
enables, by way of counterpoint, the illustration of, on the one hand, 
perception as sensory certainty, and on the other, the understanding 
of the flux of time, that is, the interruption and stopping of time 
with the intention of eclipsing the need for knowledge. Following 
the dynamic of representation, the sequence of appearance, the 
conventions of the genre that confirms the canon of a given style of 
painting, using a semiotic reading of this canvas, I will attempt to 
illustrate the previously presented elements of linguistic analysis 
of the production of history by providing a conceptual structure of 
female temporality.
Semiotics will be useful in this task, precisely because it does not 
insist on a inherited focus on established ideas about ways of seeing 
and understanding, but adds to the literal two-dimensionality of 
the painting a third dimension, allowing us to analyze the nature 
of time and thus the understanding of epistemē of history.
The painting is at Berlin’s Gemäldegalerie, one of the world’s 
most important collections of European painting ranging from the 
13th to 18th century. Property of Joachim II, Elector of Brandenburg, 
from the mid-16th century, and kept in his Kunstkammer until 
the early 18th century, it was displayed as a part of a collection 
designated for a public art museum. After the Wars of Liberation 
and the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the Prussian reformist monarch 
sought to transform Prussia from a predominantly military state to 
a cultural one. 
Luca Cranach the Elder painted The Fountain of Youth in 1549. 
Despite the claims made in 1943 by Gustav Friedrich Hartlaub 
– the German art historian known between the two world wars 
for his exhibit on new objectivity – that the sources of Cranach’s 
painting reach as far back as the French Middle Ages, the most 
likely inspiration for Cranach’s work was a scene in Castello della 
Manta in Piedmont. In the Salone baronale, a typical example of a 
Roman Gothic villa, there is a fresco, Fonte della giovinezza, painted 
at the beginning of the thirteenth century.
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The scene is one of the most commonly painted in the Middle 
Ages, depicting Herodotus’ brief note about a natural source 
of youth from Ethiopia (Aethiopia), land of “burnt faces”. Right 
away, in figure 1. by analyzing the basic elements comprising 
the specific motif of the source of eternal youth and rejuvenation, 
we can see the well-established reference to the exotic and secret 
powers that bring about a reversal: turning the white European 
man if not immortal then at least long-living. The occupying and 
patronizing spirit of colonization, even prior to the development of 
the technology of colonial power, can be easily read in Herodotus’ 
legend. A “soft primitivism” (and of course that we might here 
question whether it is possible to grade primitivism) leads us to 
the first circle of differentiation of values of Western civilizations.
In The Archaic Smile of Herodotus, Stewart Flory provides 
following indication: “Aethiopians possess certain amenities 
associated with soft primitivism: ‘a fountain of youth’ and certain 
‘table of sun’ (3.23.2), which supplies the people automatically with 
their diet of boiled meet (3.18)”.16 In his Histories, Herodotus writes:
When the Icthyophagi showed wonder at the number of the years, 
he led them to a fountain, wherein when they had washed, they 
found their flesh all glossy and sleek, as if they had bathed in oil – 
16 Stewart Flory, The Archaic Smile of Herodotus, Wayne State University Press, 
Detroit, 1987, p. 98.
Fig. 1: Fontana della 
giovinezza, Fresco, in 
Castello della Manta, 
Sala Baronale, XIII c., 
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and a scent came from the spring like that of violets. The water was 
so weak, they said, that nothing would float in it, neither wood, 
nor any lighter substance, but all went to the bottom. If the account 
of this fountain be true, it would be their constant use of the water 
from it, which makes them so long-lived. When they quitted the 
fountain the king led them to a prison, where the prisoners were 
all of them bound with fetters of gold. Among these Ethiopians 
copper is of all metals the most scarce and valuable. After they 
had seen the prison, they were likewise shown what is called “the 
table of the Sun”.17
Just like hunger for past, innocent, heroic times, the reference 
to “soft primitivism” of Oriental cultures carries a romantically 
longing look towards youth, eternity and narcissistic preservation 
of superficiality. Anything not present in this very moment 
and place is often warped, either though hyperbole or another 
metaphorical form, rendered unusual in order to be preserved as 
attractive. It is often falsified and supplemented. Indeed, special, 
ornate decoration is reserved for those elements whose simplicity 
and ‘primitivism’ remain fundamental to the understanding of 
the cycle of life and production. Entirely predictably, water, the 
element that ought to wash the weight of even the smallest misstep 
or crime, is necessarily permeable and light. It resists nothing; it 
is “so weak that nothing would float in it, neither wood, nor any 
lighter substance, but all goes to the bottom”. In other words, not 
only that nothing floats on the water, but also with it all lapses into 
oblivion. Water plays the role of the liquid that returns to a state of 
no experience, water recaptures innocence of ignorance. The motif 
of liquid washing is a constituent element of any initiation effort 
of acquisition of new or different states of consciousness, but also 
an expression of innocence, a state unblemished by experience. 
It is more than certain that Herodotus’ half mythological, half 
historical approach in narrating this episode – let us use an 
euphemism here – borrowed from other storytellers and collectors 
of fantastic and wondrous stories. History has a hard time untying 
the double bind of the tendency to tell what was seen along with 
what belongs to the domain of dreams. Indeed, in a case of biter 
bit, Herodotus cannot but mention Hecateaus in his Histories, 
on one occasion mocking him for his naïve genealogy and, on 
another, quoting Athenian complaints against his handling of their 
national history, all the while obscuring him as his main source. 
17 Hippocrate, Œuvre complète, L’ancienne medicine, vol. II, translated by Jacques 
Jouanna, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2003.
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We also read something like that in Porphyry in a quote recorded 
by Eusebius. Legend, however, tells that Hecateaus invented 
and embellished even more those events he did not experience 
first-hand. At least in the case of the fountain of youth, history 
entirely constructed its own reasons and origin of the acquisition 
of eternity. Looking more closely at this motif, problematizing the 
status of the female in the complicated historical epistemē indicates 
only to an extent the iceberg of a topic that reveals much more 
than only a simple status of the memory and gender-related 
temporalization. What can we read and what themes are evoked 
by looking at the canvas?
It is possible to read and interpret The Fountain of Youth from 
left to right. In the landscape details we can best see the bases of 
primitive perspective and the paintings relative depth. The whole 
can be divided into several semantic parts, each tied to specific 
terms. The axis and central part is composed of the fountain 
itself, and the source, completed by human hand. The frame and 
edges outline the border marking not only a change from one 
cosmic and aggregate element into another (soil/water; solid/
liquid), but personify a transfer from one life age into another. 
The fact that there is an established indexation of the spatiality, 
helps in understanding the relations that in certain positions 
ascribe negative or positive values. The stereotype of the habit 
of reading from left to right can here be clearly applied. The 
spatial distribution of the painting signifies that left is that which 
has passed, decay, old age, end of life; while on the right is the 
Fig. 2: Lucas Cranach 
the Elder, The 
Fountain of Youth, 
DE_smbGG_593, © 




Berlin, revised 2010] 
(03/2018).
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future (or the eternal present, a timeless now), movement, speed, 
companionship, grouping, seduction, and gathering.
 
The figures we recognize as old women, impaired women of 
various ages, certainly used up by life, brought on stretchers to the 
edge of the fountain. A plethora of movements and positions also 
indicate their need for someone to help, assess, evaluate them. We 
also see the figure of a priest who meticulously notes the changes 
in the physical appearance of each woman. It appears to be part of 
the ritual itself. The novelty introduced by Cranach is certainly the 
figuration of exclusively female bodies that bathe. It is precisely 
this exclusivity in the painting that allows such an interpretation, 
indirectly connecting the relinquishment of right to historié that 
woman and the female are never able to seize.
Fig. 5 and 6: 
Details from Lucas 
Cranach the Elder, The 
Fountain of Youth.
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Fig. 3 and 4: 
Details from Lucas 
Cranach the Elder, The 
Fountain of Youth.
Frozen in the present moment, stripped of eyes and ears that 
would otherwise be necessary to acquire the right to testimony 
and judging, and to a narrative about what is factual, what has 
transpired – woman plays a role only in the present. Not only is 
her existence limited to the present, but the only tense that can 
bring fulfilment and satisfy woman’s ascribed role is indeed the 
frozen present. Her purpose is fulfilled on the surface (of her 
body, no less), when, upon bathing in the fountain, she regains 
the right to be seduced anew and participate in social games. The 
layout of figures and events on the right portion of the painting 
indicate a potential and encouraging reproductive function of 
woman. A great number of young women is coupled with men. 
Yet, when alone (if they are at all allowed to be alone), they are 
obviously with child. The cretinization, stripping of solitude and 
functional dependence prevent the female figure from becoming 
its own independent subject. Exposed to the gaze of the other, 
she becomes akin to a marionette. And while the female figures 
on the right help and hold one another, on the left, they become 
vivacious, (more numerous), as well as more insouciant. The most 
far-reaching consequence of this difference in care and regard for 
one another lies in the obvious gradual stifling of specific solidarity 
of care when the woman returns (recapturing her state of eternal 
youth and absence of memory) into the state of the eternal present. 
By injecting her with the elixir of youth, it is as if she is also given 
the accompanying serum of oblivion that will materially and 
physically keep her in a state of superficial indifference.
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To give a sharp transposition of the elements present in 
the painting, in comparison to any composition that imitates 
Renaissance or classicist forms, a scene such as this as well as the 
message it carries could be found in any so called contemporary 
women’s magazine. By directing attention to the care of the body 
and its conservation in the struggle against aging, we see the 
promotion of the values of young, wholesome, near perfect bodies, 
fed on the fiction of eternity. The passing of time, the possibility 
of perception and understanding of the body as changing, as a 
variable constant, these are not considered positive values. In 
accordance with that, decay and gradual loss of the power to 
seduce are stigmatized, thus preventing any form of testimony or 
judgment. By philosophically problematizing the passing of time 
and the status of historicity of epistemē of knowledge, we return, 
as if in a magic circle, to the problematic of awareness of the role 
of the subject of history. 
Even if we were to willfully ignore the aesthetic and semiotic 
details that connect testimony and judgment with the senses 
of sight and hearing, it is clear that woman (as a metonymy of 
a figure rendered by history into a form of a beautiful object) is 
denied space in which she would, as Odysseus does, perform the 
turn required to be at once judge and witness of events in which 
she has participated. Although with Herodotus, history acquires 
the epistemological contours it still draws on today, Odysseus’ 
testimony and judgment change considerably the image of the 
world in which he has lived, prompting him to change, travel and 
cunningly adapt his life circumstances, thus, above all, extending 
his life. All this, of course, is not applicable in the case of the female 
subject of a historical event. Even if it presents an unavoidable 
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figure without which history would be absolutely unthinkable in 
its present form (such as Cleopatra or Queen Elizabeth I), these 
historical persons in their descriptions remain remembered for 
their so-called masculine, ruling and exclusive characteristics (the 
very ones that ensured their indubitable importance).
For us, however, the question of conditions under which the 
figure of the woman or the female could defeat the historicist 
heritage of masculine forms of history remains hypothetical. Can 
anything change if one agrees and continues the analytic of history 
that has always been determined by masculinized experience of 
testimony and judgment? Should we invent the representation 
of female eyes and ears, which would not be blind and deaf to 
history? Which is the history written onto their very bodies? In 
other words, can anything change if women follow the matrix of 
action established on a present tense frozen by male eyes and ears, 
only through a male gaze?
Here is how Jane Austen dramatized this question, and how 
two heroines of her conduct novel show the construction of epistemē 
of the past and historical:
Historians, you think, [said Miss Tinley] are not happy in their 
flights of fancy. They display imagination without raising interest. 
I am fond of history and am very well contented to take the false 
with the true. In the principal facts they have sources of intelligence 
in former histories and records, which may be as much depended 
on, I conclude, as anything that does not actually pass under one’s 
own observation; and as for the little embellishments you speak 
of, they are embellishments, and I like them as such. If a speech 
be well drawn up, I read it with pleasure, by whomsoever it may 
be made…18
18 Jane Austin, Northanger Abbey, cit., chapter 14.
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Lost and Found: Female Subjectivity and 




Economic and social changes in the 1970s, but especially the 
breakdown of real socialist states in Europe, fostered a radical change 
of the notion of political subjectivity. Furthermore, political and feminist 
theory have been confronted with a vanishing political subject, based 
on political identities, that could enable social movements to question 
current global inequalities, exploiting economies, and political practices 
from a clear political standpoint. The article reflects recent leftist and 
feminist debates on these dilemmas and on the complicity of feminism 
with neoliberal political economies. Asking how crucial the concept of a 
subject is for political agency, I discuss the accusation towards feminist 
theory of fostering the culturalization of the political. While describing the 
ongoing processes of depoliticization of social structures, the aim of this 
paper is to broaden the analytical lens on these phenomena. Referring to 
the political theories of Isabell Lorey and María Pía Lara, the core thesis of 
this paper points to the need for a repoliticized field of representation as 
a precondition to rearticulating a universal notion of political subjectivity 
from a feminist perspective. The concluding interpretation of Milo Rau’s 
theater play Compassion. The History of the Machine Gun thus aims to 
show that analyzing cultural representations still offers a fertile ground 
for discussing and expressing political collective imaginations and a 
common utopian ground for future political subjectivities.
After 1989: The Loss of Political Subjectivity?
In the wide historical context of globalization, the Fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 marked only one point in the long story of 
capitalist expansion efforts. The outsourcing of industrial work 
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and thus the proliferation of ecological pollution from Europe 
to Asia, were accompanied by the financialization of markets, 
the economization of society and the hegemony of the neoliberal 
political project – all of which gave the ongoing privatization of 
common goods a feeling of inevitability and political normality. At 
the same time, manifold socialist state-projects came to an abrupt 
end, concerning Soviet imperialism and its Socialist satellites on the 
one side, national liberation movements in Africa and Asia on the 
other, and non-aligned Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic mediator in 
between. Although the inner contradiction between emancipative 
politics and the autocratic rule of Communist Party structures 
was undoubtedly one of the core problems of the socialist political 
system, this fact alone does not explain its collapse.1 At the same 
time, the disappearance of socialist states in Europe marked the 
gradual loss of an emancipative notion of universal politics and, 
in particular, the total loss of a systemic and political counterpart 
for neoliberal thoughts and forced capitalist practices.
In view of these events, the main question for the following 
considerations is: where do feminist politics and theory stand after 
nearly three decades under post-socialist conditions? If feminism 
is still understood as a social movement that pursues the political 
objective to create a more democratic and equal global future, the 
political events of 1989 have to be considered in their paradoxical 
dimension for emancipative politics. On the one hand, formal 
democracy seemed to gain a wider global influence on states and 
societies in the 1990s while on the other, the universal dimension 
of political subjectivity underwent two opposite developments.
From the 1960s onwards, new forms of political agency, 
activated by women, people of color, indigenous people and 
ethnic or sexual minorities opened pathways for a wider notion of 
democracy. With the impetus of newly evolved social movements, 
their claim for political participation and full citizenship challenged 
the inequalities that are inherent to modern democracies. The 
crucial goal which these political projects had in common was to 
struggle for, formulate and live a universal right for political and 
social subjectivity and thus to change the conditions of the activists’ 
1 Rather, as Dieter Segert claims, the breakdown of the socialist state has to be 
analyzed as a more complex process of political transformation, de-ideologization 
and the challenge of modernization. Dieter Segert, Transformationen in Osteuropa im 
20. Jahrhundert, facultas, Wien, 2013; similarly Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions. 
The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge and New York and Oakleigh, 1999. All translations from German into 
English in this essay are mine.
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lives as well as to create more opportunities for others. The results 
were twofold: first, from this perspective democracy is no longer 
equivalent to democratic institutions and their representatives 
but is rather related to a way of living.2 The ascension of human 
rights to universalist principles for political rights is also closely 
related to conceptions of a universalist democracy that is not 
bound to nation states. Second, social movements brought cultural 
difference in conjunction with identity politics into political 
struggles for social justice. With 1989 and its aftermaths, it is no 
accident that ethnicity sounded the death knell for the working 
class. The violent breakdown of a multi-ethnic Yugoslavian state is 
therefore emblematic for this political occasion. To put it into more 
general terms, class differences, social justice and social structures 
vanished as relevant political arguments while culture remained 
and gained more significance.3 This led to a paradoxical situation: 
while social movements called for a universal implementation 
of citizenship, political subjectivity became culturalized and 
ethnicized at the same time. As a consequence, the current success 
of right-wing parties and the decline of the political left in Europe 
is borne by cultural difference as the crucial argument. On the 
other hand, these developments are again also reflected by leftist 
debates on a toothless and politically adapted feminism as result 
of a culturalized notion of the political.
Moreover, these processes are supported by the formation 
of new and renewed nation states in post-socialist Europe and 
the expansion of supranational institutions under a neoliberal 
governance regime. They constituted coexistent but not always 
congruent perceptions of the idea how to build new and how to 
transform existing democratic states. At the same time, neoliberal 
ideas joined forces with new political practices in stressing the 
necessary role of competitive elites and transparent, market ruled 
state bureaucracies, thus drawing an ideal of a slim, competitive 
and democratic state.4 These forces were timely for being applied 
to and tested on post-socialist states during transition. As critics 
point out, while proclaiming transparency and individual 
freedom through market rules, current theories as to public 
administration and institutional political practices produce new 
2 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age, 
University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles and London, 1984.
3 Michel Wieviorka, Kulturelle Differenzen und kollektive Identitäten, Hamburger 
Edition, Hamburg, 2003, p. 33.
4 Christoph Butterwegge et al., Kritik des Neoliberalismus, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2008 (2nd ed.). 
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informal ways of decision making by fostering expertocracy and 
lobbyism instead.
Neoliberal ideas of appropriate current statehood do not only 
conjure up a minimized welfare state however, they also imagine 
a strong state, where executive organs are to be strengthened.5 
In summary it can be said that the 1990s marked the triumph 
of neoliberalism, which succeeded not only in transforming 
statehood and democratic institutions but also society itself, 
all the more as informational politics displaced other forms 
of political articulation. Sociologists like Manuel Castells (in 
reference to Jean Marie Guehenno) concluded that the result of 
these transformations is a vanishing autonomous political subject, 
which is substituted by temporary coalitions.6 Sociologist Ulrich 
Beck described this phenomenon from the perspective of the post-
industrial individualization. In view of the decline of collective 
identities and the coercion to build and to perform an individual 
self, Beck stresses a renaissance of political subjectivity.7 From his 
point of view it is not the loss of the political that marks our times 
but its shifting to subpolitics, to new political fields and agents, 
to economics, experts, temporary civil movements as well as to 
individuals.8 Additionally, in this light this shift also implies a 
destabilizing of traditional left-wing/right-wing divisions.
Hence, 1989 has not only changed the bipolar system of global 
political power but also the concepts of statehood and of politics 
as well as the predominant patterns for expression of political 
conflicts. These changes were slight but radical. As a consequence, 
the ‘working class’ vanished as a political term and a legitimate 
political subject. Something similar applies to feminism, as during 
the 1980s the notion of women’s representation as a universal 
emancipative political subject was called into question.9 This process 
began in 1978, when several articles in the feminist journal m/f,10 
criticized the then prevalent concepts on the reasons for women’s 
suppression as prehistoric. Especially women of color challenged 
from within the predominant western feminist debates and their 
5 Ivi, p. 249.
6 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, vol. 2 of The Information Age. Economy, 
Society, and Culture, Blackwell, Malden, Mass. and Oxford and West Sussex, 1997.
7 Ulrich Beck, Die Erfindung des Politischen. Zu einer Theorie reflexiver 
Modernisierung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, pp. 152 and 155.
8 Ivi, p. 162.
9 Ernesto Laclau et al., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, Verso, London, 1985, pp. 1114-1122.
10 Ivi, p. 155; Adams, Parveen et al. (eds.), The Woman in Question: m/f, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990.
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notion of a universal female subject, as well as feminist post-colonial 
and poststructuralist feminist theorists. Judith Butler’s book Gender 
trouble was also published in 1989. Its critique of politics of identity 
has deeply influenced the struggle for a feminist claim of a universal 
female subjectivity. I would like to stress at this point that it is no 
coincidence that the above mentioned theoretical references are 
mainly from the late 1980s and the 1990s. In fact, a renaissance of 
political and sociological themes, debates and terms discussed two 
decades ago can be observed in attempts to understand the current 
crisis of democratic societies and the strengthening of authoritarian 
regimes.11 While at the eve of the 21st century two political identities 
that represented emancipative politics – working class and women 
– lost their discursive ground, at the same time ethnic, national and 
religious identities12 juxtaposed post-identitarian or post-national 
theories and political practices.
Today, the question of how to become a social and a political 
subject is no longer the same as when it was put forward in the 
past century by workers, women and colonized people. In the 
end, it was not only Margaret Thatcher but also the decline of 
the socialist state that made the triumphant breakthrough of 
neoliberal thought and practices in Europe possible. However, 
the implementation of neoliberal governmentalities cannot be 
separated from a post-industrial development of global economics. 
The influence of neoliberal economic theory on decision makers 
which grew steadily from the 1940s onwards, found its first peak 
in the 1990s and has since radically changed ontological notions 
of sociality and social justice. Liberal and bourgeoise perceptions 
of the human, of modern subjectivity, of individuality and 
freedom have not vanished but have been adapted to neoliberal 
requirements. Modern freedom, equated with the assurance of 
private freedom through judicial security and legal equality of all 
humans, have been substituted with an individualized freedom 
lived out in a risk-taking meritocracy, which is itself ruled by the 
market. From a neoliberal perspective, inequality is a necessary 
pre-requisite to achieve more efficiency. Political governance is 
no longer limited to state institutions but is accompanied by the 
internationalization of market principles and their coercive effects 
on every individual. Personal responsibility and – in Foucauldian 
11 Heinrich Geiselberger, “Preface of the editor”, in idem (ed.), The Great 
Regression, Polity, Cambridge, 2017, <http://www.thegreatregression.eu/preface-
of-the-editor/> (04/2018). 
12 Antony D. Smiths, The Ethnic Origin of Nations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, 
pp. 221-226.
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terms – self-guidance and self-governance have radicalized the 
image of a modern, autonomous and self-controlled subject. While 
until the 1990s a coherent identity was assumed to be an inevitable 
precondition for every individual person to act as a reasonable 
and autonomous subject, flexibility and adaptation of identities 
has become the postulated answer in present times.
A crucial point where these transformations intersect politically 
is the heightened significance of civil society in discourses on 
democratization processes, just as Ulrich Beck has anticipated 
more than two decades ago. Concurrently, the liberal notion of 
civil society as central political space, where interests and opinions 
should be expressed, was also adopted by neoliberal policies, as they 
forced the privatization of the welfare state and an informalization 
of political decision making. Critics of neoliberal policies point to 
the economization of the private sphere as well as of civil society 
and its effect on the subject as economic self.13 Also, institutions 
of civil society, especially NGOs were criticized for their role as 
a “Trojan horse for global neoliberalism”14 in fostering capitalist 
neo-colonialism.15 In the context of post-socialist Europe, notably 
women’s NGOs were the target of feminist criticism on neoliberal 
privatizations of welfare institutions, supported by imported 
concepts of “cultural feminism”16 or feminist anti-étatism and its 
privilege of “recognition over distribution”.17 A (not explicitly) 
feminist-critical, but rather more general forerunner is the critique 
of the impact of new social movements – and thus of feminism, too 
– on the stabilization of current capitalist neoliberal conditions. Luc 
Boltanski and Ève Chiapello formulated this thesis on discursive 
adaptations of anti-capitalist critique into a new capitalist practice 
in their work The New Spirit of Capitalism.18 They point to a fatal 
13 Butterwege et al., Kritik des Neoliberalismus, cit.; Gabriele Michalitsch, Die 
neoliberale Domestizierung des Subjekts. Von den Leidenschaften zum Kalkül, Campus, 
Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2006.
14 Tina Wallace, “NGO Dilemmas: Trojan Horses for Global Neoliberalism?”, 
Socialist Register, 40, 2004, pp. 202-219. 
15 James Petras et al., Globalization Unmasked. Imperialism in the 21st Century, 
Fernwood Pub., London, 2001; Joachim Hirsch, “The State’s New Clothes. NGO’s 
and the Internationalization of States”, Rethinking Marxism, 2, 2003, pp. 237-262.
16 Kirsten Ghodsee, “Feminism-by-Design. Emerging Capitalism, Cultural 
Feminism, and Women’s Nongovernmental Organizations in Postsocialist Eastern 
Europe”, Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 3, 2004, pp. 727-753, p. 728.
17 Nancy Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History”, New Left 
Review, 2, 2009, pp. 97-117, p. 113. See also Hester Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced. 
How Global Elites Use Women’s Labor and Ideas to Exploit the World, Paradigm Publ., 
Boulder, Coll., 2009; in critical response to Fraser: Nanette Funk, “Contra Fraser on 
Feminism and Neoliberalism”, Hypathia, 1, 2013, pp. 179-196.
18 Luc Boltanski et al., Le nouvel esprit de capitalisme, Gallimard, Paris, 1999.
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discursive process within social criticism, sparked by culturalist 
theories on social movements and their revolutionary moment in 
May 1968. From their perspective, a transformed notion of social 
justice is the fatal result for emancipative politics, as we don’t speak 
of exploitations anymore but of exclusions. Referring to Boltanski 
and Chiapello, Nancy Fraser also stresses that leftist and feminist 
“critique of state-organized capitalism” enabled the breakthrough 
of “‘project’ capitalism” and its “flexible networks”.19 In addition, 
the change in anti-capitalist critique weakened structural and 
critical analysis of social injustice while individual discrimination 
prevailed in social and gender theories.20
The feminist argument on the complicity of women’s NGOs 
with new global inequalities points to a fundamental dilemma of 
current democratic and also emancipative politics. Furthermore, 
the absence of the political articulation of sustained inequalities 
is connected to a loss of national political deliberation processes 
on the one hand, while on the other, national inequalities are 
inevitably entangled with global inequalities. The imagination of 
a universal feminist goal to fight for a more just and less violent 
future, not only addressing women but everyone who has to 
suffer from discrimination and suppression, has lost an obvious 
political subject in current ‘post-identitarian’ times. At the same 
time, through the integration of feminist claims and tools of 
gender mainstreaming European policies have also fostered 
feminist strategies and thus a further complicity with informal 
politics and the assurance of privileges.21 These considerations 
lead to the following questions: how can feminism deal with 
these complicities in unjust conditions? Which concepts does 
feminist theory offer for current and future political agency? Is 
the constitution of subjectivity crucial for political agency and do 
alternative concepts exist?
Culturalization and Epistemologization as Grave Diggers 
of Political Subjectivity
The above outlined current political dilemma is also part 
of hard-fought debates about the status of feminist theory, its 
19 Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism, cit., p. 109.
20 Günter Burkart, “Boltanski/Chiapello: Ein feministischer Geist im neuen 
Kapitalismus?“, in Heike Kahlert et al. (eds.), Zeitgenössische Gesellschaftstheorien und 
Genderforschung. Einladung zum Dialog, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, 2015, pp. 153-178.
21 Lisa Disch, “Representation”, in Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, 
pp. 781-802.
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epistemological foundation and its political implications. The 
criticism of a dominant culturalization of the political, expressed 
inside feminist debates, frequently raises claims for overcoming 
the de-constructivist legacy in feminist theory and practice. Inside 
German-speaking debates Rita Casale takes up the criticism of a 
still ongoing culturalization and the related epistemologization 
of the political in feminist theory.22 Concretely, she tackles 
Judith Butler’s criticism of subject theory and her influence 
on current feminist knowledge. Her main argument uses 
Regina Becker-Schmidt’s analysis of Foucault, which states him 
having substituted Freud’s unconsciousness through discourse 
understood as cultural practices in order to explain Western 
sexuality regimes. She also points to the feminist challenge of 
representational politics as the turning point for a lost notion 
of a feminist subject. Both, she suggests, culminated in Butler’s 
writings on gender and has resulted in an equation of subject and 
identity. I will use Casale’s criticism as starting point for my further 
considerations on political agency for two reasons: first, since she 
summarizes current feminist debates and elaborates them in her 
criticism of Judith Butler as many other authors do; second, she 
puts the subject as politically relevant term forward, which made 
me curious about her criticism and her notion of future feminism. 
This chapter takes a closer look at the point of the culturalization 
of the political and searches for further links to describe present 
social and political developments. Following the above outlined 
22 Rita Casale, “Subjekt feministisch gedacht. Zur Verwechslung von Subjekt 
und Identität in den Gender Studies“, in Anne Fleig (ed.), Die Zukunft von Gender. 
Begriffe und Zeitdiagnose, Campus, Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2014, pp. 
76-96; “Epistemologisierung und Kulturalisierung feministischer Theorien“, in 
Barbara Rendtorff et al. (eds.), 40 Jahre Feministische Debatten. Resümee und Ausblick, 
Beltz Juventa, Weinheim and Basel, 2014, pp. 150-161. Referring to an Italian 
analysis by Rosanna Rossanda and Antonio Negri, Casale sees 1968 as the crucial 
turning point for both, the political and theoretical developments. She juxtaposes 
Rossanda’s diagnosis of the social movement’s inability to build new forms of 
political representations with Antonio Negri’s positive interpretation of the new 
political practices as centered on the multitude. But for Casale, the multitude stands 
also for the replacement of the idea of equality with a prevalence for the idea of 
difference. While drawing that historical line, she comes to the conclusion that the 
generation of 68 must be held responsible for fostering neoliberal individualized 
and flexible practices and thus, for the erosion of solidarity. Moreover, in her 
perspective, feminism played a double role in furthering these political changes, 
first, as part of the new social movements and second, as a supporter of postmodern 
theoretical thinking. According to her, Judith Butler’s theoretical intervention in 
the feminist debates in the late 1980s has to be severely criticized for causing a shift 
from the philosophy of the subject and the question “how to become a subject” to 
identity as the fundamental source of the gender notion.
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delineation of a history of changed concepts of a universal subject 
and its political implications, I will refer to newer sociological 
approaches to stress the relation between discourse, economy, 
social practice and their political results for subjects.
Casale states that second-wave feminist theory interpreted 
representation as an “authoritarian system” embedded in 
institutions like state, church, family, etc. and for this reason 
refused it.23 This refusal joined forces with a new notion of the 
political that challenged the liberal separation between private 
and public under the slogan ‘the private is political’. She identifies 
this process as a de-institutionalization of politics that led to its 
culturalization and the domination of difference as political term.24 
In reference to Angela McRobbie she advocates a de-culturalization 
of feminist theory and a revival of political and social processes in 
feminist analysis. From her point of view, not a complete refusal 
of poststructuralism is necessary, but a critical analysis of terms 
like difference and gender; terms that were disseminated mainly if 
not exclusively through the popularity of Judith Butler’s writings. 
Casale closes her statement by asserting that these terms do not 
have the power to deconstruct the symbolical order anymore, 
rather they represent a current self-image of a “unrepresentable 
society”.25 And thus, as a side effect, the ubiquity of these terms 
supports neoliberal politics of informalization as they foster a 
fundamental invisibility of political and social structures.
Casale’s intervention into current feminist debates aims to 
highlight the shortcomings of feminist alternatives while she 
objects to Butler’s stressing the discourse as a core concept of 
the construction of social reality. She interprets Butler’s Gender 
Trouble as an implicit disconfirmation of classical feminist subject 
theories. At the same time, she brings forward Carla Lonzi and 
Luce Irigaray as central representatives of classical feminism. 
Casale asserts that Lonzi’s and Irigaray’s aim was not to question 
the subject as foundation of modern politics but rather to claim 
a new understanding of the subject. In contrast, because of her 
de-constructivist and linguistic approach to the subject, Casale 
insinuates that Butler is ignorant of the need for a transcendental 
notion of the subject. Therefore, as she argues, Butler misinterprets 
the question of the constitution of the subject with the question 
of the construction of identity. And thus, subjectivation is no 
23 Rendtorff et al. (eds.), 40 Jahre Feministische Debatten, cit., p. 156. 
24 Ivi, p. 159.
25 Ivi, p. 161. 
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longer understood as a process of individualization, but as one 
of identification. Casale sees this as leading to the predominant 
dismissal of structural aspects in feminist analysis, to the rejection 
of the symbolical order of sexes/genders and the notion of 
patriarchy in feminist theory.
Although Butler criticizes the exclusions of liberal 
representational politics, from Casale’s perspective the result 
of Butler’s linguistic concept of ‘iteration’ is a perpetuated 
connection of the subject to the same criticized representational 
logic. In addition, she notes a dangerous conditionality between 
subjectivation and the construction of identities, as it offers only 
multiplication of identities for a political strategy. Casale sees 
the origin of these processes in a poststructural error, that is, the 
transferral of difference – seen as epistemological principle – to 
social relations.26 She states that changing the social structures 
is no more the objective of political initiatives or parties. Social 
movements have rather shifted their focus on the fight for political 
and cultural autonomy. Therefore, the central political objective 
now seems to focus on the acknowledgment of several ways of 
life in political and cultural practices. In the end, her statements 
point to a necessary rethinking of feminist theory, as she asserts a 
reemergence of injustice and patriarchy and the need to return to 
a utopian feminist goal, including a re-adoption of the concept of 
women’s subjectivity. 
Although I will not relay Casale’s accusations against Butler 
with the detailed apology of her writings, I think it is important 
to recall briefly the vehement debates that have accompanied 
Butler’s publications since Gender Trouble. First criticisms 
mostly concentrated on the missing link to material corporality 
– perceived as linguistic monism – and the vanishing of a 
philosophical ground for feminist agency.27 Not only Bodies that 
Matter28 but also her following works have to be read as answers 
to this debate. Casale’s point continues these criticisms in large 
parts. But she also interprets Butler’s work in a not always 
comprehensible manner, for example when she insinuates that 
Butler ignores the constitution of subjects while focusing on 
26 Ibid.
27 E.g. Barbara Duden, Disembodying Women, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1993; Seyla Benhabib et al. (eds.), Der Streit um Differenz. 
Feminismus und Postmodernde in der Gegenwart, Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1994.
28 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”, Routledge, 
New York and London, 1993.
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constructions.29 Especially in this context, Casale seems rather 
to reflect the reception of a constructivist (German-speaking) 
‘Butlerian’ discourse among feminists, than Butler’s own 
arguments. Undoubtedly, especially Gender Trouble includes 
problematic elements, for although Butler aims to uncover that 
the notion of a modern subject is historically determined and 
thus points to the notion’s transformability, her own discourse 
at the same time leaves the impression to be unhistorical, as her 
linguistic approach opens an abstract horizon for the constitution 
of social structures.30 This criticism is a substantial point, not only 
if we are looking for opportunities for resistance but also for the 
transformations of current power relations. 
Resistance to power relations is also a central topic in Isabell 
Lorey’s theoretical considerations about gender, the constitution of 
the subject and political agency. Her acknowledgment of Butler’s 
deconstruction of the subject as a universalist term includes at 
the same time a profound as well as continued criticism on the 
lack of distinction between power relations and authority: while 
Butler relies on Michel Foucault’s concept of power as productive 
and constitutive for subjects, Lorey’s criticism points to Butler’s 
reinterpretation of power as normative relations and thus to a 
preference of authority in her analysis. In opposition to Foucault, 
who dissociates himself from juridical power models, Butler 
stresses that precisely these specific social mechanisms have a 
“universal effectiveness”31 and this fact, Lorey points out, leads to a 
paradoxical result, i.e. the construction of a symbolic ‘outside’ that 
creates a constitutional function for modern social relations and 
their system, which at the same time she criticizes. Another crucial 
effect of Butler’s juridical model is the unintended reaffirmation 
of the traditional subject32 as well as a missing distinction between 
legal and symbolic laws.33 While Butler is concerned not to 
reproduce the modernist autonomous and voluntarist subject, she 
eliminates the conception of self-relations. Thereby, her concept 
29 Casale, Subjekt, cit., p. 83.
30 Paula-Irene Villa, Judith Butler, Campus, Frankfurt am Main and New York 
2003, p. 149; Hanna Meißner, Jenseits des autonomen Subjekts. Zur gesellschaftlichen 
Konstitution von Handlungsfähigkeit im Anschluss an Butler, Foucault und Marx, 
transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2011.
31 Isabell Lorey, Immer Ärger mit dem Subjekt. Theoretische und politische 
Konsequenzen eines juridischen Machtmodells: Judith Butler, edition diskord, 
Tübingen, 1996, p. 69.
32 From this point of view, Casale rightly criticizes Butler to reproduce the 
criticized logic of representation.
33 Ivi, pp. 105 and 107.
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of subjectivation stresses the coercion of normative structures 
but does not allow resistant practices, that affirm non-intelligible 
subject positions. 
Hence, the core problem of Gender Trouble is not an implicit 
abandonment of ‘women’ as political subject – as Butler clearly 
argues for an open and transformative notion of both, women and 
subject, as discursive terms – but the narrowing of power relations 
to hegemonic normative laws and thus to institutionalized 
authority. Lorey’s own concept of subjectivation combines 
Butler and Foucault but broadens them. She speaks for a more 
complex model of subjectivation as “individual interconnection 
of discourses”, combining not only local and hegemonic power 
relations but simultaneously individual practices.34 In this 
manner, the individual is the origin for resistance and its practices 
while at the same time being defined as constituted through its 
peculiarity and universality. The feminist debate about equality 
and difference, which is closely connected to arguments on 
subject positions, loses its agonistic character in Lorey’s concept 
of an ambivalent subject as she contends both aspects.35
Lorey’s concept of subjectivation enables us to clear the 
above outlined current feminist debate about a lost notion of 
an emancipative subject from two perspectives, without totally 
discarding poststructuralism. Firstly, Lorey’s explanations show 
the productive but also problematic parts in Butler’s theory while 
her own definition of subjectivation and agency questions its 
critical range. Secondly, she makes clear that Butler’s performative 
pluralization of identities as answer to normative invocations of the 
subject remains limited in offering new options for transformative 
politics because of her juridical model. Concurrently, the central 
position of identities in subjectivation processes should not be 
read as universal and determining for the individual but rather 
as a current historical condition for subjectivation. While Butler’s 
options for transformative practices – capable to shift the normative 
framework of subjectivations – remains confined to resignification 
and performative iteration and its dismissal, Lorey opens up the 
horizon for individual agency. Thus, Lorey makes it clear that 
blaming Butler for fostering culturalization, epistemologization and 
the loss of a universal notion of subjectivity does not lead to a deeper 
comprehension of current political developments. Casale is right 
34 Ivi, p. 151.
35 In accordance to Lorey, the self has to be read as interconnection, produced 
by power relations constituted as actions on actions of others. Ivi, p. 153.
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when she points to the problematic influences of identity politics 
on current culturalized justifications of political differentiations. 
Moreover, the phenomenon of culturalization and its social and 
political meaning has to be scrutinized through a wider lens. At the 
same time, one must be aware of the fact that the history of feminist 
critical theory is closely bound up with the analysis of cultural 
representations and practices as part of power relations. 
From Culturalization to Representation: Power Relations 
in Post-Industrial Times
The aforementioned arguments on current culturalizations 
have to be seriously taken into account when we are looking for 
a transformed notion of the political, its origins and its results for 
political agency; but we also have to sharpen and widen our view 
at these phenomena. While I see the juxtaposing of terms without 
explaining their history and current meaning as a specific problem 
in Casale’s argumentation, another point in the whole discussion 
seems to me more striking: and that is the general absence of a more 
complex attempt to find social, economic and political reasons for 
the current crisis of a feminist – or more general – a democratic and 
emancipatory utopia. From my point of view, filling this heuristic 
gap is necessary, all the more as many current critical voices like 
Casale’s advocate a return to structures. Hence there can be no doubt 
that we have to face our own complicities with current social and 
political structures, as feminists as well as Western and/or Northern 
citizens in a post-socialist and globalized world. Confronted 
with rising social injustice and new affirmations of authoritarian 
political attitudes, parties and states, we are obligated to reconsider 
our feminist discourses, terms, theories as well as our practices. 
However, arguments based only on the feminist discourse can be 
misleading insofar as they overestimate the influence of feminism 
or of particular scientific theories like poststructuralism on society. 
Even if we look closer at the development of feminism since the 
1980s, we have to admit that the poststructuralist approach to social 
reality is only one of several tendencies that have emerged since 
then. Especially in Germany – but in other European countries, 
too – constructivism has been dominating the humanities for 
the last twenty years while radical feminism closed ranks with 
conservative attitudes.36 According to these insights, blaming one 
36 Ilse Lenz, “Die unendliche Geschichte?”, in Die Neue Frauenbewegung in 
Deutschland. Abschied vom kleinen Unterschied. Ausgewählte Quellen, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp. 11-28.
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intellectual tendency for a social and political development falls 
short of explaining political circumstances in present times. From 
a sociological perspective it seems more plausible that we are 
confronted with a fundamental shift in a social logic as effect of a 
radicalized modernist political process.
While Isabell Lorey finds a balanced approach to the modernist 
division into a universal and a particular social logic allowing her 
to foster a transformative concept of a resistant and emancipative 
subjectivity, sociological analyses from the last two decades testify 
a pushing back against universality as central idea to organize 
social and political collectivities. In his latest book The Society of 
Singularities sociologist Andreas Reckwitz summarizes multiple 
insights into the social transformations we are confronted with 
since the 1970s.37 There he seeks to formulate a far reaching social 
theory, to explain the processes of culturalization through the 
lens of cultural sociology. From this perspective, feminism and 
its political output is just one brick among many in the wall that 
is a post-industrial social reality in which we reside. As Reckwitz 
convincingly shows, the politicization of cultural identities, the 
central argument not only in Rita Casale’s polemic, is only one 
aspect in an ongoing process of culturalization. Whilst Ulrich Beck 
fostered the idea of a progressive modernist individualization in the 
1990s, Reckwitz pleads for ‘singularization’ as a more appropriate 
term to characterize present societies. His core argument is a 
reversion of the modernist logic from universality to particularity 
while he is also stressing that both concepts are inherent parts of 
modernist thinking.38 Thus, universality still plays an important 
role in the organization of modern societies although we are 
witnessing that it is put on the defensive. Historically, social 
principles like universalism, justice and equality and their political 
rise are closely bound to the era of industrial modernism and its 
statehood. The socialist state not only took part in this modernist 
principle but radicalized the concept of universality still more, 
claiming the accordance of representatives and represented alike. 
Whereas others blame new social movements for this 
development from universalism to singularization, Reckwitz 
detects post-industrial economy and technology as the main 
sources for the deep structural cut we are confronted with. 
In accordance to him, a new ‘cultural capitalism’ appreciates 
37 Andreas Reckwitz, Die Gesellschaft der Singularitäten. Zum Strukturwandel der 
Moderne, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 2017.
38 Ivi, p. 11.
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cultural goods while industrial goods are devaluated. In addition, 
this process is linked up with a profound conversion of labor 
and markets as well as accompanied by the digital revolution, 
producing a ubiquitous cultural machine.39 The acceleration 
perceived in the culturalization of sociality and its political 
consequences have thus to be analyzed through social structures, 
and here I agree with Casale. If we turn her claim sociologically 
and look at current culturalization processes under the lens of 
singularizations, an image of an inner revolution emerges, which 
points to culture as a system of valorizations. These valorization 
processes produce a relentless regime of permanent visibility. 
We should also be aware, as Reckwitz keeps insisting, that these 
structural processes of culturalization and valorization are not 
phenomena that represent a universal principle but are supported 
by a new transnational and academically educated middle class. At 
the same time, these changes affect society as a whole. In the end, 
there has emerged a new cultural class structure that replaced the 
leveled middle class, which shaped western fordistic as well as true 
socialist societies after World War II.40 An adjunct as ‘cultural class 
society’ suggests that now cultural and not coercively economic 
capital causes an appreciation or depreciation of subjects, life 
styles and its class representatives. Additionally, neoliberal 
state governmentality supports this logic of ‘singularization’ as 
valorization of the cultural particular by urbanization and public 
policy management tools.41 Therefore, political conflicts inside 
the nation state appear as cultural conflicts: the struggle for the 
right to represent society is now going to be crucial, especially in 
times that are experienced as crises of democracy and that in fact 
comprise a crisis of universality. 
After these insights into present transformations of social 
structures, it seems naïve to claim simply for a de-culturalization of 
feminism, all the more as we are bound to the same social logic we 
are criticizing: we, as socially and politically involved academics, 
are inevitably part of a new cultural middle class, whether our 
parents were of bourgeoise, proletarian or rural origin, whether 
we have personal histories of migration or not, whether we have 
much or little economic capital; and that is because we can play 
the card of cultural capital. At this point, let me turn to Maria 
Pía Lara’s discussion of current feminist debates about the 
39 Ivi, p. 16.
40 Ivi, pp. 273-285.
41 Ivi, pp. 371-393.
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culturalization of the political, as she adds an important aspect 
when putting forward the topic of representation. Her analysis 
clearly states that the problem of feminist epistemologizations 
of the political through subject theory is mainly connected with 
the question ‘who is allowed to speak for whom’. By giving this 
epistemic topic a prominent place in feminist debates, the necessary 
reconsideration of the question “whose voice from where and 
why should be heard” loses its political notion.42 Instead, we 
have to face now that especially representation as political topic 
underwent a culturalization and cultural essentialism overthrows 
the master: personal or collective identities are not pluralized 
and flexible for everyone, as Judith Butler postulates, but only 
for a culturally privileged middle class. This does not mean that 
hegemonic culturalized and post-industrial subjectivations stop 
at class borders. Rather, the individual social and psychosomatic 
effect of neoliberal subjectivations differs in accordance with 
the capital which subjects are able to reactivate. As a result, 
symbolic representations signify whether or not an individual 
or a group is able to take up valuable subject-positions: While in 
this symbolic order the yoga-shaped body of the academic middle 
class ranks highly, the body-building man has got depreciated as 
representative of a dull underclass masculinity. Heroic, working-
class masculinity has vanished as desirable social and political 
subjectivation together with the working class as a political 
vanguard.43 While it seems doubtful if mourning for working class 
heroism is in accordance with emancipative feminist politics, it 
should not be doubted that the devaluation of subjectivities does 
not agree with the aim of a just society.
Thus, through his cultural sociological perspective Reckwitz 
offers a comprehension of subjectivation as practice, understood 
as constituted through “implicit, mostly unknown, systematically 
diffuse … cultural codes resp. semantics and symbolical orders”.44 
42 María Pía Lara, “Das feministische Imaginäre“, in Brigitte Bargetz et al. 
(eds.), Kritik und Widerstand. Feministische Praktiken in androzentrischen Zeiten, 
Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen, Berlin, Toronto, 2015, pp. 151-167, p. 163.
43 See Reckwitz, Die Gesellschaft, cit., pp. 359-363. Thus, fixed collective identities 
offer a resistant practice to these depreciations. Although the rise of right-wing 
parties cannot be explained only through this analytic lens.
44 Paula-Irene Villa, “Subjekte und ihre Körper. Kultursoziologische 
Überlegungen”, in Julia Graf et al. (eds.), Geschlecht zwischen Struktur und 
Subjekt. Theorie, Praxis, Perspektiven, Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen and 
Berlin and Toronto, 2013, pp. 59-78, p. 59. Villa refers here to this book: 
Andreas Reckwitz, Unscharfe Grenzen. Perspektiven der Kultursoziologie, 
transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2008.
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At the same time, practice is situated in an individual situation 
but always related to discourses and their codes. According to 
Paula-Irene Villa the ‘practical turn’ in cultural sociology allows an 
analysis of subjectivation as a simultaneous process of constitution 
and construction.45 This approach has the advantage to situate 
the constitution of subjects in social interactions that (re)produce 
necessary social as well as individual conditions for individual and 
collective agency. As I see it, political subjectivity can be understood 
as part of an intertwined social logic of producing individual and 
collective subjectivity. Hence, political theory is one of many 
discourses that offer semantics and narratives for the constitution 
of political subjectivity in particular historical circumstances. 
Collective semantics thus play a crucial role for political agency 
as they offer a language and narratives to produce and to express 
shared ideas of political orders. In his theory of recognition, 
Axel Honneth emphasizes that the relation between individual 
experiences of injury and collective resistance has to be constituted 
through an “intersubjective framework for interpretations”.46
Similar to Honneth, Lara’s intervention in the debate about 
culturalizations in feminist theory points precisely to the 
importance of cultural representations not only for critical feminist 
analysis but also for emancipative political agency. Her theoretical 
and methodological approach to grasping the relation between the 
individual and the collective, as well as between social experience 
and political agency, is conceptual history in the sense of Reinhart 
Koselleck. From her point of view, the analysis of the “imprints, the 
modification and the position of particular concepts in the symbolic 
imaginary” leads to a comprehension of political revolutions.47 
Thus, the revaluation of political semantics is a practical key to 
open new horizons for political agency. Therefore, feminist critical 
readings of cultural representations of women were crucial for 
dismantling masculinist images of society and their universalist 
interpretations but also for opening a wide-ranging feminist 
imagination of political agency. Successfully redefined concepts 
like universality and democracy are important milestones on a 
feminist pathway to equality and emancipative political practices: 
“In symbolic actions [in the 1970s] fights for freedom were enacted 
as drama”.48 Obviously, Lara’s semiotic understanding of culture 
45 Villa, Subjekte, cit., p. 60.
46 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer 
Konflikte. Mit einem neuen Nachwort, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, p. 262.
47 Lara, Das feministische Imaginäre, cit., p. 159.
48 Ivi, p. 161.
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neither supports the above outlined sociological perspective on 
singularities nor a political one that focuses on identity politics. 
Instead, Lara offers a comprehension of political subjectivity that 
cannot be established through epistemology but through collective 
agency. A transcendental notion of the subject, like the one Casale 
is promoting, cannot be deemed a fertile ground for the political. 
Furthermore, the subject is the result of social and political agency, 
on the one hand. On the other, agency itself and the constituted 
subject are linked to a modern social imaginary and its normative 
symbolic frame. Lara’s position retains the importance of cultural 
representation of social semantics. The public space therefore still 
plays the predominant role for political struggles since that is the 
place where concepts like democracy and equal rights have to be 
overthrown and rearranged.49
Feminized Representations of Neoliberal Power in Neo-
Colonial Times
In the last part of this article, I would like to focus on the 
question of how women’s agency and their subjectivity is 
represented in current critical cultural practices as part of a 
public space, where imaginations of the political in general and of 
political subjectivity in particular are defined. In a wider spectrum 
of modern forms of cultural representations, theater has a specific 
place in representing the political. Plays are able to tell stories and 
arguments in a concentrated manner, as they offer narratives, 
explanations and argumentations on political conflicts. Especially 
since the bourgeois state-supportive and nation building theater 
mirrors the political discourse by representations of individual 
relationships and their conflicts. Canonically, Jürgen Habermas 
defined its role as being one of the central media in the development 
of a modern, bourgeois and political, public space.50 The immediate 
presence of the audience and its responsiveness offers a public 
space for the creation of an esthetic, social or political community. 
Performativity and narrativity, bound together and presented 
on the scene, offer collective imaginations of a universal moral 
ground of the community. At the same time, Hegel’s concept of 
an indispensable and previously bourgeois subjectivity is also a 
necessary part of Habermas’ new concept of public space: for only 
the modern autonomous subject allows the division of public and 
49 Ivi, p. 165.
50 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer 
Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1962.
DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE — 49
private space, of state and society, of family and state. From the 
19th century onwards, theater with its canon and reinterpretations 
is a central media of bourgeois self-reassurance.
Theater also offers the opportunity to react directly to political 
conflicts, however, and thus has the power to change perceptions, 
narrations and languages by its articulation of current complex 
social and political relations. From this perspective, Milo Rau’s 
theater play Compassion. The History of the Machine Gun seems to 
perfectly illustrate the connection between neoliberal colonialism 
and NGOs. Compassion was premiered at Berlin’s Schaubühne in 
2015 and continues Rau’s work on traumatic or highly debated 
political experiences. Rau uses the concept of reenactment as a 
performative device for the theater stage, confronting the audience 
with its own involvement in the emergence of political violence. 
Already in 2011, his staging of the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi 
by the Hutu (1994) in the play Hate Radio at Hebbel am Ufer (HAU) 
in Berlin attracted interest among theater people and critics. The 
play presented the call to systematic genocidal violence through 
the popular radio shows of the Kigali radio station RTLM, which 
functioned like an agitator for the genocide, while transmitting 
its mixture of pop-music, denunciation of hidden Tutsi, political 
pamphlets and incitements to murder.51 Political violence, a central 
motif in Rau’s work, soaks in by stage-managing documentary 
methods, that confront the audience with fragments from the 
real incident. Using a collage of testimonies and real locations 
combined with fictive characters and esthetic elements, the play 
does not simply re-enact an incomprehensible historical situation 
but compresses a historical experience into its fictionalization. 
Rau uses Sergej Eisenstein’s vanguard notion of truth as result 
of fiction, a truth that is not identical with scientific truth. With 
this reference to the Russian avant-garde he also distances himself 
from postmodern concepts of art and its political relativizations.52
In his play Compassion. The History of the Machine gun, the war 
in Rwanda serves again as point of departure. But looking through 
the lens of European involvement in NGOs in Congo, deciphered 
as cynical humanism, the play points at European entanglements 
and their violent consequences for the whole region. At the 
beginning of the play, Consolate Sipérius, a Belgian actress, tells 
the audience her story and talks about her memories of the murder 
51 Milo Rau, Hate Radio. Materialien, Dokumente, Theorie, Verbrecher Verlag, 
Berlin, 2014.
52 Ivi, pp. 159, 228, 243.
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of her parents in Burundi in 1993, which the murderers forced her 
to watch, and about her adoption in Belgium as a child. Her sheer 
existence references a European ignorance about the massacres in 
the neighborhood of Rwanda. While she talks about herself and her 
experience of discriminations in Europe, the audience discovers 
that she is worried to be engaged as actress only because of her 
blackness, and her fear comes true in the shape of Swiss actress 
Ursina Lardi, while Sipérius is sitting silently during the whole 
play in the shadow behind the white main character. Sipérius is 
reduced to her own story as European unconscious, while Lardi 
talks cynically about Syrian refugees as ‘hipster boys in Greek 
camps’ and her former engagement in a NGO called Teachers in 
Conflict in Congo. Intertwining several European biographical 
experiences with the Congolese violence, Milo Rau has the main 
character commit her own entanglement in the violence.
Hence, European humanitarian actions in Africa seem to be not 
only inefficient but they even make things worse as in the case of 
the perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide. NGOs not only helped Hutu 
to find an exile in the neighboring Congo but were also passively 
watching the massacre, when the Tutsi-Army came across the 
border from Rwanda to take revenge for the murders. In the end, 
telling this story and admitting that she felt satisfaction, Lardi 
states with tears in her eyes and a machine gun in the hand, that 
the question of life or death is decided by the fact, who owns the 
machine gun. The upsetting result is that after all these centuries of 
Imperialism and still ongoing economic exploitation of resources, 
Europeans are not capable to do anything helpful. Thus, Lardi 
visualizes through her tears the cynical humanism of Western 
politics as self-referred emotions. At this point there is no way 
out of this dilemma. When the play ends with Sipérius oversized 
smiling face at the video screen, talking about her Tarantinian 
revenge-phantasy, it seems that this reflexive moment does not 
lead anywhere, as we who are meant to confront ourselves with 
our responsibility are sitting in the audience and applauding. We 
have come full circle. 
Milo Rau’s Brechtian interventions in our European wellness-
consciousness evoke Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak’s claim for 
acknowledgement of our own complicities.53 Spivak’s post-
colonial contribution to poststructuralist debates has made the 
53 Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Toward a 
History of the Vanishing Present, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, 1999.
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potentiality of an emancipative subject much more complicated 
in present times. On one hand, she points at the complicities of 
Western leftist intellectuals with colonializing knowledges and 
their lack of reflection of their own dominant position when 
supporting agency but not representations of the suppressed. On 
the other hand, she also demonstrates how colonized societies 
themselves cannot read the signs of the subaltern, especially of 
subaltern women. Hence and most vitally, her de-constructivist 
approach hints at the necessity of “acknowledgment of complicity” 
as well as at the relationship between conceptual, aesthetic and 
political representation.54 Her radical notion of criticism, which 
at a first glance seems to miss a political or ethical ground to 
constitute a powerful subject, leads us to the core of recent debates 
about a missing utopia and thus a missing subject of change. To 
acknowledge complicity means to acknowledge that every critical 
agency has to take the risk of failure because we are always bound 
to the same structures we are criticizing.
In his essay “What to Do? A Critique of the Postmodern 
Reason”, Rau calls into question the auto-reflexive mechanism 
of the postmodern critique automatique, well-practiced in 
western cultural institutions.55 His polemic conclusion is that 
de-construction has replaced confrontation, improvement has 
replaced change and that our comprehension of the ungovernable 
global neo-liberal power fits our pseudo-criticism.56 From this point 
of view, it seems that post-modernity is everywhere at work since 
the decline and fall of communism and its claim for universalism: 
not only in post-politics and their PR-strategies, in the big and 
small global economies or in the topsy-turvy logic of right-wing or 
conservative populism but mostly in our leftist consumer critique 
and our self-satisfied reflective self-criticism.57 Finally, there is a 
striking moment when Rau puts his finger on our complicity with 
political and economic power and with neoliberal globalization 
against the backdrop that we are lacking an answer on new right-
54 Disch, Representation, cit., p. 794.
55 Milo Rau, Was tun? Kritik der Postmodernen Vernunft, Kein and Aber, Zürich, 
2013, pp. 40, 50-51.
56 Ivi, pp. 54-55.
57 Two years later, in an interview Milo Rau relativized his obsession with 
the “postmodern” critique as outdated and too excessive. Instead he put forward 
the term “cynical humanism” in order to describe present political circumstances 
with their double-edged and in the end disastrous outcomes. Rolf Bossart, “Was 
ist zynischer Humanismus?”, 2015, <https://www.hundertvierzehn.de/artikel/
was-ist-zynischer-humanismus-ein-gespraech-ueber-macht-und-ohnmacht-der-
zukunft-von-milo-rau>.
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wing populism. But what would be an appropriate answer to 
the Leninian question “What to do?” and its de-construction of 
the current critique-culture, particularly after poststructuralist 
criticisms of the modernist subject and of identity-politics? What 
can we do against global injustice and exploitation combined 
with our neoliberal self-subjection? Milo Rau’s answer remains 
Hegelian and Leninian when claiming a “utopian dialectics”58 
that unites “revolt and social justice”59 by constructing a new 
sociality, a new global realism. His play Compassion continues this 
furiousness, pointing at us, the bourgeois audience.
But why does Milo Rau choose two women to represent our 
European complicity and failed subjectivity through our gaze on 
African grievances? It is easy to draw a connection between Rau’s 
play and the above-mentioned feminist debate about women’s 
complicities with current political neo-colonizations: women seem 
to perfectly represent hypercritical humanitarianism, neoliberal 
complexities in power relations, failed political agency after one 
century of emancipation and at the same time, women represent 
the new emancipative claims, now coming from Africa. Isn’t Milo 
Rau just right because Western women are simply the easiest prey 
for capitalist complicities and neoliberal technics of self-guidance 
while still breaking their back to be recognized as serious subjects? 
Is our mis-agency simply the result of ‘second postmodernism’ 
and European ‘cynical humanism’, embedded in feminist NGOs? 
Is the only way out a renewed sense of dialectics and, in addition, 
a Hegelian subjectivity as Rau seems to suggest?60
From a feminist stance, one answer could be to accuse Milo 
Rau of evoking a masculinist action program for a new leftist 
utopian heroism, while relying on Lenin as totalitarian humanist 
and utopist as well as anarcho-voluntarist revolutionizer. Rau’s 
apology of modernist voluntarism must be suspected to mask 
the androcentric ground that nourishes the modernist tradition 
of thought and its masculine autonomous and active subjectivity. 
Subsequently, illustrations of women as agents of NGOs, who 
embody the “cynical humanism” of our days, can be read as being 
caught in the old trap of gendered representations. Why do women 
in post-socialist times have to represent the post-modern death of 
the subject as well as the neoliberal entanglement in a net of invisible 
58 Rau, Was tun?, cit., p. 66.
59 Ivi, p. 64.
60 Bossart, Humanismus, cit. The accusation of a de-politicization of global 
politics and its replacement through humanism, i.e. in other words NGOs, is a 
central argument in Boltanski’s and Chiapello’s above cited book.
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power relations? Are we confronted with a renewed burden of 
representation that gives the immateriality of social reproduction 
a female body? We should also ask – in view of women carrying 
images of sociality and collectivity since the ancient cultures, 
especially in nation-building processes61 – whether the neoliberal 
disciplined and self-responsible still fit this logic of representation? 
What do these images tell us about gendered subjectivities? Is it 
not fallacious to point to gendered representation again – and 
thus to cultural formations of a toothless current criticism and its 
hypocritical compassion with the victims of global violence and 
poverty? Would this suspicious interpretation last if we used the 
heuristic tool of making the author unknown?
Again, María Pía Lara’s methodological lens can help us 
out: according to her, political anticipation is necessary to 
enable political agency; this approach offers an interpretation of 
humanitarian work as substitute for an emptied social imaginary, 
caused by a leftist welfare policy. Her conclusion, in accordance 
to Boltanski and Chiapello, is that these kinds of politics have led 
to a loss of consciousness of the significance of social movements 
as necessary agents for social transformations.62 This conversion 
of the political imaginary results in a shift of perception towards 
the underprivileged, who were imagined as passive subjects 
while neoliberal subjects are perceived as flexible, performance-
orientated, and thus as active and successful. The relation between 
Sipérius as Europe’s backyard and Lardi as humanist missionary 
in Africa mirrors these subject positions. The gendered dimension 
of this relationship can be found on a metonymic level, as Sipérius 
represents the effeminate Africa and Lardi a masculinized Europe, 
while the racist colonial discourse of hyper-masculinized African 
masculinity as well as the universal European androcentrism is 
replaced by neoliberal valorizations of active and passive. This 
difference makes solidarity between these two women unlivable. 
There seems to be no collective or shared imaginary that would 
lead to a prospective common agency.
Instead, urinating Lardi remains lonesome in the moment of 
watching helpless atrocities while revanche promising Sipérius has 
become the representative of the exploited African continent. By 
changing the position of active and passive of these two characters 
their subjectivation was not simply turned around but a historical, 
nostalgic shift from neoliberalism to vanguard modernity was 
61 Nira Yuval Davis, Gender and Nation, Sage, London and Thousand Oaks, 1998.
62 Lara, Das feministische Imaginäre, cit., pp. 156-157.
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achieved. This shift imagines a modernist subject as described 
above; but there is still no collective visible. It’s the lonely heroine 
who anticipates rebellion and resistance but whilst the resistance 
of Sipérius aims at an autonomous subjectivity, Lardi’s emotional 
convulsion indicates also resistance to the situation. Lardi’s 
leaking tears and urine can be read as bodily resistance against 
the power relations and her own complicity. Her resistance is 
not a result of a preceding subjectivity but of her body as a self-
willed part of the individual. The derailment of the body thus can 
be read as starting point for a new political subjectivity, as it has 
the power to actuate changes and shifts within a representational 
system. This bodily resistance must be combined with a change of 
our social imaginary through a struggle with meanings of political 
concepts and collective subjects. We have to face the question 
of how the concept of universality as a motor for democratic 
processes can be renewed under current social and political 
conditions which are fostered by economies and technology. How 
can we begin to be resistant against a government of singularized 
individuals, produced in an ongoing implementation of the 
particular as a hegemonic social logic, while we are part of the 
same cultural machine that produces exactly these singularized 
subjects and collectives? Lorey calls attention to the fact that the 
struggle for enlarged identity concepts is a struggle about the 
position of the individual, fought as struggle for the right to be 
different and as critique against those conditions that separate 
her from others:63 “We do have the opportunity to reject the 
modes of subjectivations that govern us”.64 Finally, the individual 
resistance opens the horizon for new collective practices of 
resistance, identified in a renewed importance of assemblies, as 
Judith Butler puts forward65 or Lorey calls to attention, a new 
notion of a democracy as presentist.66 We, as feminists, have the 
duty to support emancipative practices through our own practice 
and writing, and thus to rearticulate political subjectivity as the 
feminist utopian horizon.
63 Ivi, p. 157.
64 Ivi, p. 158.
65 Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2015.
66 Isabell Lorey, “Non-representationist, Presentist Democracy”, 2011, <http://
transversal.at/transversal/1011/lorey/en> (04/2018); I. Lorey, State of Insecurity. 
Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015; idem, “Die Wiederkehr 
revolutionärer Praxen in der infinitive Gegenwart”, in I. Lorey et all, Foucaults 
Gegenwart. Sexualität – Sorge – Revolution, transversal texts, Wien and Linz, 2016, 
pp. 77-111.
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Thoughts on Being Late: 
(Re)presentational Case Study of 
Rijeka’s Center for Women’s Studies
Brigita Miloš
Summary
In my proposal I address one of the numerous dilemmas that have 
arisen during the process of setting up of the Center for Women’s 
Studies (CWS) at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka, 
the dilemma of representation. In the context of this paper the word 
‘representation’ needs to be understood in terms of voicing, promoting or 
standing for and my approach to it consists of two lines of argumentation. 
First, positioning of the CWS as an academic unit in the actuality of post-
feminism or the problem of late beginning. Second, positioning of the 
CWS in the local context or the problem of beginning late. Concluding 
remarks point towards the slippery ground of proxy-situations, but 
likewise, to the position of new figural possibility. 
On Motivations
The most frequent remark I have heard after missing the 
conference on the feminist future I intended to participate in, 
and on which this volume of proceedings is based, was: “It could 
have happened to anyone”. By all means that is true, but not a bit 
comforting. After my more or less successful dealing with not at 
all flattering thoughts about my scheduling (and other) skills, the 
fact of being out of time (and space) – of being late – started to 
reveal itself as a core metaphor and the primary incentive of my 
paper. 
The primary intention regarding my paper consisted in 
summing up a plethora of conversations, suggestions, thoughts, 
dilemmas, considerations and decisions related to the process 
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of establishing the Center for Women’s Studies of the Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka, Croatia.1 
Although not entirely without thoughts on the concept of 
‘being late’, the presentation was to be made without much 
attention (or at least with an unwillingness of admission) to the 
fact that setting up the Center was done within (in spite of?) 
some unfavourable preconditions. The condition of time, in 
its linear sense of succession, irreversibility and progress(ion), 
begs particular emphasis. Put more concretely: the fact of being 
some half a century late in building the Centre had not initially 
been one of my main concerns. Since the intent has by chance 
(and in an irony of life, to be sure) been changed, I have found 
myself in an atmosphere of ‘being late’ in more than just one 
sense of the word. Various forms of ‘being late’ just fit into each 
other smoothly, opening up a new angle of approaching the 
topic. This newly discovered perspective shifted the initial idea 
of collecting and sorting out all the different argumentations 
regarding the aims, goals or purposes of the Centre, subsumed 
under the question of “how was it done?”, into an essay on “when 
(and where) was it done?”. The fact of ‘being late’ opened up 
the possibility of thinking through the circumstantial features 
of Rijeka’s Centre for Women’s Studies by asking questions 
such as: what is it that an academic unit such as Rijeka’s Centre 
1 The specificity of Rijeka’s Center is the fact that it is the only centre of this 
kind within the academic institutions of the Republic of Croatia. It has been 
founded three years ago and primarily functions as a research unit. It has no 
legal personality; and it is an integral part of the Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences in Rijeka, just as all other scientific and research centres in this institution. 
The professional and research projects that Rijeka’s Centre is implementing to date 
are the core of its activity. Eventual opening of the Rijeka Centre’s educational 
program will largely depend on the University’s budget policy, the Centre’s 
(successful) involvement in infrastructure management and lobbying for its 
activities within the administrative and managerial levels of the institution(s) of 
which it is an integral part (the Faculty of Humanities and the University of Rijeka). 
Although there have been courses in the Croatian higher education curricula that 
include themes and issues from the field of women’s or gender studies, it must 
be stressed out that there is no separate, academic verified programme in the 
mentioned scientific area in the present moment. But there are legitimate Gender 
studies as one of the segments of the Croatian scientific classification system, as 
one of the results of the long-standing (institutionalising) efforts form the part 
of the gender/woman studies researchers in Croatia. In that sense, it must be 
highlighted in this article the Centre for Women’s Studies in Zagreb. Although 
not a part of the academic setting, the Zagreb Centre not only successfully fulfils 
the emptiness of the above mentioned educational segment, offering the only 
educational programme in the field of women’s studies in the Republic of Croatia 
at the moment but is also recognised as a leading institution regarding feminist or 
gender issues in the local context.
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represents in the (local) academic milieu as well as in the (local) 
social surrounding at the beginning of the 21st century? Are 
today’s centres for women’s studies a sort of pale versions of 
(progressive academic) units of the (mid) 20th century? Or are 
they maybe just helplessly passé? What does it mean to come to 
a certain end (the Centre) on the (many times proclaimed) end 
of a certain matter (the death of feminism(s))? What is it that the 
Centre stands for today? Is the term ‘proxy’ a plausible notion 
to describe various representative phenomena encompassing 
an academic women’s studies unit at the beginning of the 21st 
century? Is it too late to indicate the future using the feminist 
pointer?
There are many ways to address the proposed dilemmas, 
and I have chosen to focus on the notion of ‘standing for’ or 
‘representing’. My choice is heavily grounded in the belief 
that academic endeavours are never deprived of or dissociated 
form the broader public and political realm. They constitute 
a functional and vital part of those fields, and as a public 
speaking/acting subject, the academy traditionally occupies 
a place of power and authority, engaging respective areas of 
problems or interests together with numerous other social 
factors. Therefore, my stake here is in the representational as 
political or at least publicly recognised as proactive/prosocial.
The notion of standing for or representing within the 
frame of feminist theory in general, exceeds the limits and 
purposes of this paper. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the usual conceptual/epistemological divergence of the term 
representation consists of its understanding as an aesthetic 
feature and/or as one belonging to the discourse of politics.2 
As Lisa Disch stresses in her entry “Representation”, the 
complexity of relations between political and aesthetic/semiotic/
cultural representation opens up a new space of their mutual 
and intertwined investigations.3 Those inquiries emphasised 
the importance of contextual correlations consistent with and 
constituted for various types of representative practices. In that 
regard, she compares three approaches: “feminist discussion 
on vamps (cultural representation) with visibility (historical 
2 See for example Ray Chow, “Gender and Representation”, in Misha Kavka 
and Elisabeth Bronfen (eds.), Feminist Consequences. Theory for the New Century, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 38-57. 
3 Lisa Disch, “Representation”, in Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, 
pp. 781-802. 
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representation) and voice (political representation)”.4 In the case 
of cultural and historical representations Disch writes:
 
[f]eminist historians have made important contributions 
to theorizing representation both by representing women 
through writing “women’s history” and also by historicizing 
the categories (such as “woman” and “lesbian”) through which 
women have been represented. They have analyzed sexual 
difference not as a basis for men’s and women’s different roles 
but as a force that helps to stabilize hierarchies of class and 
race. Such insights, like those of feminist film theorists, were 
pathbreaking not only for scholars who work on women and 
gender but beyond.5 
The part I find closest to my agenda is the third one, i.e. the 
voice (political representation), so I shall focus on presenting 
the third part of Disch’s analyses. 
Even though they might be seen as a sort of rhetorical 
deciphering or the ‘confessing animal’ in action, the following 
lines are an attempt to clarify the ‘opt for political’ of this 
paper. Although a form of an explanation of the political aspect 
of my paper shall, hopefully, arise from my proposed analyses, 
I nevertheless would like to highlight a somewhat broader 
perspective which, in a way, potentiates my analysis. When 
speaking about ‘politics’ and feminism, Linda Zerilli reflects on 
the notion of politics understood as a “(mere) means to an end” 
or the instrumentalist conception of the politics (the concept 
close and connected to identity politics), and writes:
 … to think about feminist politics outside a means-ends 
instrumental idioms is not to relinquish the idea that political 
activity can strive for and achieve certain goals. …. it is to 
question the view, first, that the attainment of the goals exhausts 
the meaning of feminist politics and, second, that to act politically 
we must be able to control the outcome of our actions, foretell 
in advance what their consequences will be. This view of politics 
as excluding unpredictability forgets that whenever we act, we 
do so into a context of other human wills and intentions that we 
can never fully know in advance. We can never know in certainty 
how other political actors will take up our actions; political action 
always exceeds political actors’ predictions and control.6 
4 Ivi, p. 782.
5 Ivi, pp. 790-791.
6 Linda Zerilli, “Politics”, in Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Feminist Theory, cit., p. 644.
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On the Insights into the Voice7
Disch opens up the third part of her analysis by discussing 
the case of Sojourner Truth and (her famous) call of being a 
woman. The question of who rightly represents, is reformulated 
as follows: “The concern is not to ask who speaks for a ‘we’ 
but to interrogate how that ‘we’ is pictured and to analyse 
the possibilities and constraints on action that produces such 
picturing”.8 Further, she distinguishes three different approaches 
upheld by feminist theories of political representation in research 
or in relation to aesthetic representation. The first and often 
unavoidable author when representation is in question is Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak. Disch elaborates on her essays in “History” 
as a rethinking and repackaging of two earlier essays, “Can the 
Subaltern Speak?” and “The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading 
the Archives”, which parse the problem of representation into 
its historical, aesthetic, and political elements. Spivak maintains 
that, first, vertreten (political representation as speaking for) and 
darstellen (material or constitutive representation as picturing, 
depicting, portraying)9 are complicit. Second, she affirms that this 
“complicity” or “identity-in-difference” is the “place of practice”. 
The “complicity” of political and aesthetic representation is that 
acts of political representation follow the more or less explicit 
constitution-by-picturing of the subject to be represented:
This picturing might take place figuratively, by means of rhetoric; 
cartographically, by mapping a terrain; or symbolically, by way 
of identifying with a hero from the present or past. Regardless 
of the medium, the intersection of picturing and speaking for is 
the “place of practice” because it is in and through Darstellungen 
(competing representations of the represented) that Vertreter 
(would-be representatives) vie for political authority, and it is by 
proposing counter representations that intellectuals and activists 
challenge hegemonic subject formations.10 
There might be a considerable ethical burden on those intellectuals 
who claim that “(t)here is no more representation (vertreten); 
there’s nothing but action”.11 Disch’s second and third of proposed 
7 The second section of my paper is an at length presentation of Disch’s 
argument, which serves as the background for developing my own thesis. 
8 Disch, Representation, cit., p. 792. 
9 Spivak refers to the two possibilities as "proxy" and "portrait". 
10 Disch, Representation, cit., pp. 793-794.
11 Ivi, p. 794. Spivak argues that the left-wing intellectuals’ attitude towards the 
non-representation of subalterns, which comes as a result of the post-structuralist 
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approaches have been developed from a theoretical focus on 
contemporary political institutions and policy-making, and the author 
names them the “descriptive” representation and the “constitutive” 
representation. The descriptive theories are characterised by a 
political imperative of merging aesthetic and political representation 
(unlike Spivak who insist on keeping the two distinct, but recognises 
their relationships). The term symptomatic of this approach is “a 
politics of presence”, i.e. “the notion that representation will be 
legitimate as long as it makes present the “social characteristics” 
of the represented, together with its preferences and interest in the 
body of representative”.12 The main criticism of this approach is the 
so-called “dilemma of difference” or “no-win situation in which 
differential benefits in an attempt to remedy discrimination that is 
already based on (naturalized) difference risk reinforcing “negative 
stereotypes”; but “refusing to acknowledge these differences may 
make them continue to matter in a world constructed with some 
groups, but not others, in mind”.13 Among supporters of a “politics 
of presence,” two innovations have occurred: 
... first, to break with the liberal principle of individual representation 
and argue, rather, for the representation of marginalized groups. 
.… A second innovation specifies precisely in what contexts and 
for what functions descriptive representation is useful. .… Whereas 
the debates over descriptive representation have focused on 
representation by formal institutions of government, scholars of 
political representation have recently turned their attention to the 
contributions made by …. extraparliamentary representation ...14
The author here pays special attention to the notion of the 
“velvet triangle” as a mode of governance that ”links ‘feminist 
bureaucrats, trusted academics and organized voices in the 
women’s movement‘ together in developing policy on women and 
gender” and falls within the EU’s speciality/feature.15 As Disch 
critique of the Subject, is problematic on several levels. The first level relates to the 
implicit nomination of the “subaltern” as politically cunny or ”self-knowing”. The 
other deals with the proclaimed act of renouncing the need for representation as the 
one that seizes the position claimed to be denounced. The third level of the problem 
that Spivak sees is the insufficiency of such theoretical will or attitude in the face 
of malicious modern ideological subject-formations. In that sense, Spivak cites an 
example of the microcredits for women in underdeveloped countries, offered by the 
World Bank as a version of the creation of a financialised, gendered subject.
12 Ibid.
13 Ivi, pp. 794-795.
14 Ivi, pp. 795-796.
15 Ivi, p. 796. The internal quotation is from Alison Woodward, “Building Velvet 
Triangles: Gender and Informal Governance”, in Thomas Christiansen and Simona 
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points out quoting Sabine Lang, it “suggests a more fluid, less 
rigidly shielded exercise of power among feminist institutional 
and non-institutional political actors” but at the same time it also 
tends to privilege the participation of ”specific formalized kinds of 
women’s movement actors: those formally organized as NGOs”16
who are both able and willing to compete for EU funding to 
pursue agendas that the EU defines. The consequence is that 
the EU has not simply presented a forum that is hospitable to 
the representation of women’s interests; it has shaped both the 
organizational structure and priorities of feminist politics in ways 
that are strikingly at odds with the decentralization, informality, 
loose coordination, and spontaneity of grassroots feminist 
organizations.17
The third approach Disch presents is the “constitutive” 
approach. She stresses that it appears as an elaboration of the 
already mentioned criticism of the descriptive approach. It builds 
on political theorist Michael Saward’s notion of the “representative 
claim,” a provocative theorization of the “aesthetic moment in 
political representation” that emphasizes how both elected and 
nonelected representatives “construct verbal and visual images” 
of their constituencies. Saward’s conceptualization does not merge 
the aesthetic and political as in descriptive representation; rather, 
it seeks to foreground the work that aesthetic representation does 
for political representation. Constituency images or depictions 
are significant in two ways. First, they form constituencies by 
soliciting their identification with a portrait that accords with a 
specific political project or initiative. Second, they put forth a bid 
to define what is at stake in a political contest. That is, claiming 
makes constituencies visible as something that is implicitly being 
juxtaposed against something else.18
Transported into the field of global governance, as done 
by Judith Squires, operating under the notion of “constitutive 
representation of gender” (CGR),19 it aims to capture “another 
Piattoni (eds.), Informal Governance in the European Union, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2004, pp. 77-78. 
16 Disch, Representation, cit., p. 796. The quotations are from Sabine Lang, 
“Women’s Advocacy Networks. The European Union, Women’s NGOs, 
and the Velvet Triangle”, in Victoria Bernal and Inderpal Grewel (eds.), 
Theorizing NGOs: States, Feminism, and Neoliberalism, Duke University Press, 
Durham, NC, 2014, pp. 267, 268.
17 Disch, Representation, cit., p. 796. 
18 Ivi, pp. 976-977.
19 CRG has been made to complement the notion of the substantive 
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significant facet of [the] representative process” in which “female 
politicians and femocrats each engage in representative claims-
making ... constructing the group that they claim to represent 
and articulating their interests in ways that are both enabling and 
constraining”.20 In CRG analyses, claims regarding interests are 
understood to solicit gendered subjectivities rather than to follow 
from them, and the analyst focuses not on how well institutions 
serve women’s interests, but rather on how a particular 
construction of women’s interests affects who is empowered and 
who excluded.21 Disch finds that the
constitutive representation, which emphasizes that acts of 
representation help to engender that for which they purport merely 
to stand, is an important breakthrough in linking the politics of 
representation (cultural, historical, and political) to the politics of 
knowledge and strategies for social justice. It destroys once and for 
all the alibi that cultural production and knowledge production 
in academic disciplines are innocent with respect to the creation 
and reproduction of racial, sexual, and gender (and other) group 
identities. And it sheds light on the complicity between such acts of 
representation and the social relations of inequality.22 
On Voicing the Scene: Framings 
What of the three described invariants would best fit as a 
conceptual and terminological frame (toolkit?) for setting the 
accurate scene for (making sound of) an academic feminist unit at 
the beginning of the 21st century in Croatia?
Starting with the last, constitutive approach, I have to emphasise 
Disch’s observation regarding the qualitative novum of this 
mode of thinking about representation, expressed in her words 
on the importance of the ”breakthrough in linking the politics 
of representation ... to the politics of knowledge”.23 Although 
the term “the politics of knowledge” is much broader than 
academia or scientific community, the fact that extraparliamentary 
representation (as a form of gender representation much appreciated 
within the constitutive representational approach) does not include 
or even mention any form of academic endeavour within the field 
representation of women (SRW). SRW analysis has focused on the question of 
whether female parliamentarians represent women’s interests. 
20 Judith Squires, ”The Constitutive Representation of Gender: Extra-Parliamentary 
Re-presentation of Gender Relations”, Representation, 44, 2, 2008, p. 188. 
21 Disch, Representation, cit., p. 797.
22 Ivi, p. 799.
23 Ibid.
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of women’s or gender issues, is a bit discouraging. In Squires’s 
paper (extensively quoted by Disch), one can find the precise list of 
possible agents of nonparliamentary representation and they are: 
‘women’s policy agencies’, ‘national machineries for the 
advancement of women’, or the ‘gender machinery’ within state 
bureaucracies that deal with women’s policy issues or gender 
equality. These agencies take many forms, including stand-
alone government ministries, offices within the head of a state’s 
department, quasi-autonomous state agencies. .... The growing 
significance of these extra-parliamentary institutions is framed 
by wider processes of state reconfiguration in which the formal 
powers and policy responsibilities of the state have been ‘reshaped, 
relocated and rearticulated‘ ... This reconfiguration entails both 
the up-loading and down-loading associated with multilevel 
governance and the lateral-loading and off-loading entailed in 
the shift in power across states spheres, from elected bodies to 
the courts or executive agencies of government, and from state 
spheres to civil society organisations, including the market, family 
and community.24 
Is, therefore, Disch’s observation on “the breakthrough in 
linking the politics of representation to politics of knowledge 
production”25 to be understood as invoking (for subjects such as 
newly established centers for women’s studies)? Is it also to be 
understood as a call for more precise or situated analyses of the 
constitutive linkage between university, politics and gender? Or is 
it, on the other hand, simply the case that academic units somehow 
do not count as policy-makers at all in this approach? Alternatively, 
and in theoretical dialogue with the descriptive approaches, are 
those units already embedded into the “velvet triangle” under 
the name of ‘trusted academics’ and by that fact just inserted into 
some or other invariant of substantive representation? Disch’s 
analysis does not provide a definite answer to these questions and 
the discontent of not fitting into the (re)presented picture remains. 
It would be interesting to think over how it is that one of the most 
noticeable knowledge production units – such as academia – is not 
a constitutive part of the process of constitutive representation. 
24 Squires, The Constitutive Representation of Gender, cit., pp. 192-193. The internal 
quotation ‘reshaped, relocated and rearticulated‘ is from Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen 
Beckwith, Dieter Rucht, ”When Power Relocates: Interactive changes in Women’s 
Movements and States”, in Lee Ann Banaszak et al. (eds.), Women’s Movements 
Facing the Reconfigured State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 
2003, p. 2.
25 Disch, Representation, cit., p. 799.
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Could it be that the area of academic endeavours is perceived as 
having some particular stance toward power and politics, as in the 
sense of being ‘out’ of the field? As unusual as it may sound, this 
notion might be shown plausible not only by the mere fact of being 
left out of the list of possible representative agents, but also from 
the perspective of the constitutive representation argument itself. 
According to Squires, the core of the constitutive representation 
argument consists of “the analyst [focusing] not on how well 
institutions serve women’s interests but, rather, on how a particular 
construction of women’s interests affects who is empowered and 
who excluded”.26 Formulated like this, the argument/claim reveals 
at least three notions that might direct the trajectory of thoughts 
regarding academia, power and polity-making processes. 
The first one emphasises a disinterested analyst, capable of 
objective or at least accurate grasp of interest or interests of the 
other/others or the construction of (those and other) interest(s), 
as well as of the fact of who is in or out of the process. Such tacit 
requirements imposed on an analyst are in a way similar to the 
generally presumed position of a scientist as an impartial and 
objective observer – a position shown to be dubious many times 
over. The second notion arises from the fact that the analyst’s 
attention is focused on the process of (representational) power 
impact (on how a particular construction of women’s interests 
affects who is empowered and who excluded), making the 
institution’s (political and ethical) structure secondary to the 
analytic interest. What captures my attention in such a setting is 
the fact that what constitutes the outcome value of the constitutive 
approach is an effect of power shaped as the insight into being 
included or excluded from a specific situation. In that respect, 
the question of why the power effect would be the issue of 
concern here (and the ultimate arbiter of effective action), and 
not, for example, the morphology of the agent(s) providing 
(for) the action, seems to be an important one. Thus, the focus 
on the (power) effect (efficiency) blurs even more, the structure 
of power/structural power as a relevant (and responsible) agent 
of social or policy-making dynamics. In that regard, if the focus 
is not on how well institutions serve women’s interest, but on 
how they shape some kind of political arena, then it seems that 
the question of moral and political stance (as well as the one of 
policy-making power) might be posed. For if the main goal is 
to denote how some traits are constructed and how this kind of 
26 Squires, The Constitutive Representation of Gender, cit., p. 188.
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construction influences the surroundings, then the question of 
institutional responsibility is somehow left unaddressed. If the 
focus is on how the construction of interests includes or excludes, 
it seems that the most praised fact extracted from such a position 
is the detailed knowledge about modus operandi of some sort of 
(representative) entity (or the know-how). The ‘know-how’ and 
the political-of-representation are hardly evenly equated, if for no 
other reason than because of the fact of being merged into various, 
often contradictory and competitive, social fluxes, influences and 
interests.27 Furthermore, if institution/organization is a proxy, as 
a device of representation, and if a proxy is revocable, then the 
institution is revocable. But for such an account, one would need 
to think about the productive structure, not just the effect the 
structure eventually produces. Taken otherwise – with the (mind) 
settings based on non-focality towards institutional ‘identity 
claims’, my analysis holds no weight whatsoever. 
The constitutive and descriptive28 representation are akin 
in their being tool-like theories mostly used (in strictu senso) in 
political theory of representation, and unlike Spivak’s account, 
they tend to merge the ‘portrait’ and the ‘proxy’ of representation. 
My inquiry into Rijeka’s Centre for Women’s studies with 
Spivak’s account of representation in agenda starts from the 
premise that Rijeka’s Centre for Women’s studies is a local 
representation/proxy of feminism within the local academic (and 
non-academic) setting.
What would the account to support this claim be like? I propose 
the following: The Centre’s establishment as an academic unit, 
as well as Centre’s activities are Darstellungen “in and through 
which the Vertreter (the would-be representative – or the Centre 
qua Centre) vie for political authority by proposing counter 
representations that challenge hegemonic subject formations”.29
Even if the proposal stands on a descriptive level, problems 
arise on several different strata. First, establishing and naming a 
particular academic unit as Women’s Studies at the beginning of 
the 21st century probably evokes and provokes different thoughts 
and emotions. One of them, probably, the sense of hopeless and 
27 When, for example, Pope Francis speaks up on the problem of violence 
against women, this does not make him a feminist, although it definitively 
places him onto the rich and lively field of women’s rights debates. 
28 As mentioned before, one theory (constitutive) stems from the other 
(descriptive), as an enhanced version. Therefore, the general presented remarks 
are interrelated. 
29 Disch, Representation, cit., pp. 793-794.
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sad outdatedness for there have been so many turbulences and 
changes on the (feminist theory) scene in the last decades that such 
an act may not be other than obsolete. The name ‘gender studies’, 
for example, is more up to date, a bit more politically correct and, 
last but not least, more promising of funding and budgeting (given 
that there is a European gender mainstreaming policy,30 but there 
is no European ‘feminist policy’). And it would have needed the 
same theoretical explanatory effort for letting the gender topics 
enter feminism (Centre for Women’s Studies), as would have been 
required for the feminization of gender issues. However, it seems 
that the principle of ‘genderization’ is a more acceptable option 
than any representational ‘substantialization’.31 On the other 
hand, as noted in various places, the term ‘gender’ often functions 
as a proxy of ‘female’.32 Maybe an analysis of gendering academic 
centres for women’s studies from the initial point of constitutive 
theory of representation would have been an interesting project 
(and, just as a curiosity, note the easy, ‘naturalised’ and prolific 
proxy of the term ‘gender’-as-female/woman in all of the cited 
texts of constitutive theory). Of course, there are more ‘cohabitant’ 
ways which strive to define the above mentioned difference. So, 
for example, Maria do Mar Pereira in her writing on the academic 
institutionalisation of gender studies (mostly in Europe) gathers 
three distinct names (feminist studies, women’s studies, gender 
studies) under the highly functional (and especially so for the 
main purpose of her study) acronym WGFS.33 Milica Antić Gaber34 
suggests another analytic approach. The author is drawing the 
possible (but not firm or defined) line between women’s and 
gender studies by emphasising the divergence between their 
focuses of epistemological, scientific attention. In the case of 
women’s studies, Gaber highlights the generic masculinity as a 
norm and alledged neuter (epistemological) position, while, on 
30 Cf. <http://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/gender-equality-strategy>.
31 For a recent expression of the ‘name and content’ debate between women’s/
feminist and gender scholars, see: “Feminist resistance and resistance to feminism 
in gender equality planning in Finland”; <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10
.1177/1350506817693868>. 
32 See for example Judith D. Auerbach, “Gender as Proxy”, Gender and Society, 
13, 5, 1999, pp. 581-583.
33 See Maria do Mar Pereira, ”The Institutionalisation of Gender Studies and 
the New Academic Governance: Longstanding Patterns and Emerging Paradoxes”, 
in Heike Kahlert (ed.), Gender Studies and the New Academic Governance, Springer 
VS, Wiesbaden, 2018, pp. 179-200.
34 Milica Antić Gaber, ”Mapping women’s and gender’s studies in the academic 
field in Slovenia”, CEPS Journal, 7, 2, pp. 9-27.
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the other side, there is a vast and not gender neutral area of female 
experiences, interest, knowledge and perspectives that functions 
as the core substance of women’s studies. Gender studies, on the 
other hand, research in a slightly different surrounding. They 
emphasise the relational character between man and women in 
some specific (social) context, as well as various power relations 
outcomes that might result from some gender settings. Except 
for the proposed difference, the mentioned part is indicative 
for another reason. Namely, there is an authorial footnote after 
the explanation denoting the author’s awareness regarding 
the existence of more than two genders, and the fact that “this 
awareness has entered WGS with transgender studies. The focus 
of this paper is, however, only on WGS“.35 
Except for the tensions between representation and 
nomination, there has been (at least) one more sticking point 
within my premise. I will try to ex-pose it in the form of ‘ifs’. If 
the CWS is an academic proxy of feminism, and if feminism is 
an epistemological, cognitive, emotional and effective stance/
action that is ‘for everybody’, and if it is a fact that in feminism’s 
definiendum is always already inscribed in the receptiveness 
to a range of fields and sensitivities of/to otherness, and if the 
intellectual-cultural heritage (and contemporariness) of feminism 
consists of polyphony, multipositionality, or at least binarity – 
“post-Kantian and anti-Cartesian, liberal and socialist, pro-porn 
and anti-porn”36 – decentralised to the point of no single feminism 
even existing, but only feminisms, even post-feminism or post-
feminisms – and if it is the case that CWS has the responsibility 
– understood in Spivak’s terms where it signifies not only the 
act of response that completes the transaction of speaker and 
listener, but also the ethical stance of making discursive room for 
the Other to exist – and so, if this is a plausible description of the 
state of affairs, then one has to ask what actually is it that CWS 
are proxying? What would be these centres for which they would 
stand? All of them, including Rijeka’s.
Even at the level of bare information-provider (if we dethrone 
the term ‘proxy’ and descale its meaning from, let us say, the one 
it procures from Spivak’s understanding of the vertratung, and 
instrumentalised it on the level of the technological proxy - server 
35 Ivi,p. 14.
36 Mieke Bal, “Unfolding Feminism”, in Misha Kavka and Elisabeth Bronfen 
(eds.), Feminist Consequences. Theory for the New Century, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2001, pp. 321-353.
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(making posthuman feminists rejoice), that is, a technological 
circuit that mediates between the client and the host server, 
which is ‘faster’ and better protective of the final user – even 
then it would be difficult or impossible to do the laundry list of 
‘requested’ contents. So, if CWS proxy feminism, and if feminism 
is (or even exceeds) all that is mentioned, then the centres are 
supposed to proxy ‘all-that is-mentioned’ (and then some). This 
may be achieved at the level of some sort of theoretical possibility 
or necessary academic abstraction/categorization. But at the level 
of concrete political representation or of lived experience, I do 
not think that being a proxy for feminism(s) (today) is possible. 
In other words, it is possible that the centres for women’s 
studies are doomed to metonymical concubinage, a pars pro toto 
liaison with the signifier ‘feminism’. If naming serves “a policing 
function”,37 then the name ‘feminism’, within the context of the 
actual academic women’s studies unit, proliferates all the more 
confusion and uncertainties. 
Furthermore, as Nancy Fraser puts it, “as the discourse 
becomes independent of the movement, the latter is increasingly 
confronted with a strange shadowy version of itself, an uncanny 
double that it can neither simply embrace nor wholly disavow”.38 
It goes without saying that Fraser hereby opens a perhaps not yet 
sufficiently highlighted problem – the old / new field of duality 
between feminist activism and feminist theory; the problem 
particularly resonant within the mostly theory-clad walls of the 
Academy. 
In other words, Fraser’s notion opens up a whole new aspect 
of the problem(s) CWS Rijeka faces. A little media anecdote will 
bring my paper to its second part, dealing with positioning of 
the CWS in the local context, i.e. how and where to ‘posit’ Rijeka 
within the narrative of feminist (and not just feminist) activism 
in the Republic of Croatia or the surrounding region. For if the 
academic form of feminist endeavours arrives in Rijeka (too) late, 
what about the non-academic ones, those less theory-oriented, 
directing necessary social need towards all? If the focus of the first 
part of this writing was on the word beginning, notwithstanding 
various obstacles this beginning faces at the moment (and it is 
quite certain the moment will be prolonged), then the second one 
37 Camilla Griegers, Becoming-Woman, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1997, p. 4.
38 Nancy Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History”, New Left 
Review, 56, 2009, pp. 97-117. 
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tries to highlight more contextual, and in a way, more situational 
issues. The two mentioned situations/parts are by no means 
separated or independent one of the other. Just the opposite, 
they are intertwined and related textures of meaning, purposes, 
operations, agents, contexts. Their separation in this manner here 
is more a necessity of text as succession than ‘representation’ of 
particularly conceived reality. 
The famous answer offered by Canada’s Prime Minister, when 
asked on the ratio regarding the number of women and men in his 
cabinet, was “because … it’s 2016”. Short, ‘catchy’ and definitively 
not applicable globally (despite the fact that the ‘matter of 
chronological time’ should associate/highlight in this very case 
some notions of emancipation; globally achieved women’s rights, 
even ‘common sense’ gender mainstreaming accomplishments). 
Such mentioned (presupposed) indicators of gender equilibrium, 
when required at the level(s) of political (substantive?) re-
presentation as in the case of Canada, serve here as a ‘memento of 
the future’. 
Anecdotal frivolity aside, the example serves as illustration of 
the contextual surroundings of the Centre. Neither is Trudeau a 
feminist par excellence, nor are the immediate surroundings of the 
Centre anti-feminist, yet the fact of feminist-affirmative politics 
makes it easier to pursue various (academic) feminist agendas 
within a particular society. The social (and political) climate 
regarding feminism in the Republic of Croatia is rather more 
cold than mild, and when considered within the more narrow 
focus – Rijeka and its region – burdened with the absence of any 
organised and goal-oriented manner of feminist political/public 
activism. 
A kind of disconnectedness (peripherality) from what we might 
call the socio-political centres or scenes (even taking a historical 
perspective, since Rijeka was not an example of a ‘feminist’ city 
even in former Yugoslavia; in fact, the centre locations have not 
changed much in the last 25 years), resulted, to some extent, in 
overcautious approach to the various ‘new’ possibilities. On 
the other hand, the currently known / proclaimed local milieu 
of tolerance and diversity might well be the consequence of 
the reticence towards various forms of engagement or the 
depoliticisation of the context at work. Of course, all of this is true 
not only for Rijeka, but the immediate Centre’s surroundings, 
manifesting as ‘novelties’, both constitutive and constraining for 
the novum. (And not just non-academic ones.) Still, going back 
to the media anecdote, Gordana Bosanac’s words best encompass 
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the situation in light of these conditions of the Centre’s agency. In 
her writing about the reasons for feminism, she states: 
Almost every public speech, accidental or intentional, incidental 
or deliberate, humorous or serious, uses the word “feminism” 
as if it were something clear as day to just anyone. As if it were 
the word whose perfectly clear meaning comes to everyone who 
speaks, absolutely everyone who speaks, by the mere fact the 
word is uttered.39 
And even if this is the unfortunate common way of comportment 
(though distinguishable in degrees), in the milieu with some 
more or less formal women’s or gender, theoretical or activism 
oriented, but by all means established and recognizable agencies/
formations, by the mere fact of such established entities (being 
proxies), there is also a greater possibility of re-acting and even of 
en-acting and therefore the fact of becoming institutionalized is, 
as far as I am concerned, highly important and necessary.
My intention here is not to claim that establishing formal, 
especially academic, units leads to more just life situations, or 
that some kind of ‘inserted’ field of knowledge could in one 
swoop erase layers of suspicion, ignorance or uninterest. Still, 
if for no other reasons than academic etiquette or customs, i.e. 
forms of social interaction, women’s studies issues could become 
those taken into consideration, those that skip another dismissal 
or labelling as ‘inadequate’. The position of ‘inadequate’ or 
peripheral/liminal-knowledge, and added to it the position 
of proxy for such knowledge, is functional on several levels. 
For example, the marginality of feminist theory within the 
academic system; marginality of Rijeka in the geo-political or 
social sense, marginality understood in terms of novelty, overall 
unimportance-as-commodification in the context of a neo-
liberal (academic) stance towards knowledge with its market-
oriented sustainability preferences (what to do with a dubiously 
‘lucrative’ academic unit in times of fewer and fewer funds for 
gender research?).
The contextual cacophony in the case of Rijeka’s Centre, as 
any other of its kind, in the sense of an academic unit, is further 
complicated by the notion of perceiving women-studies issues 
as an academic field. In that respect, there lies not just the policy 
of actual, present-oriented proxying or voice-making of one’s 
39 Gordana Bosanac, Visoko čelo. Ogled o humanističkim perspektivama feminizma, 
Centar za ženske studije Zagreb, Zagreb, 2010, p. 36. Translation mine.
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own, but also a necessary grounding and contextualizing into the 
so-called history of the field. (As a member of the Department 
of Cultural Studies in Rijeka I could say that the heritage of 
anti-disciplinarism, famously proclaimed by Stuart Hall, is not 
always a notion or situation that is easy to deal with, nor that 
this kind of scientific (anti-)commitment is per force a notion that 
guarantees all too necessary cohesive upholding outputs within a 
certain scientific field. In a word, I believe that a careful handling 
of the consensus about what the field consists of is also a proxy 
situation.) 
If Disch is right when she writes that the problem of voicing 
or proxying is always something that is most powerfully posed 
form the margins, and this is the concluding remark of my paper, 
then in addition to celebrating a rather good starting position of 
Rijeka’s Centre, a northern Adriatic novum could contribute to the 
formation of some sort of ardently caring devices of knowledge 
or, as Spivak would say, places of practice. Because there is always 
the possibility that too much love can bring about fatal changes. 
For, if time is a category in which humans learn, then to begin 
at the ‘end’, that is, now, always means considering all that has 
already come, all that is known thus far. And this request is not 
important here for reasons of adhering to the notion of the so-
called scientific ethos or Eros of totality of knowledge, nor due to 
a compulsive urge to neatly sort facets of thoughts, facts or ideas, 
nor is the point even the genealogical picturing of new scientific 
dwarfs sitting on mother-giant’s scientific shoulders; the main 
reason for careful (maternal!) handling and approach to this field 
of human knowledge in Rijeka’s specific case, is the simple fact of 
being let into the strong and rigid field of scientific legitimation 
very late or through the back door.
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Virginity Stories: From Virgin Martyrs to 
Virginal Heroines in Nineteenth-Century 
Croatian Literature 
Dubravka Dulibić-Paljar
The question of chastity, both of mind and body, 
is of the greatest interest and complexity. 
(Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas)
Summary
This essay aims to explore female virginity by tracing its changes and 
modifications as well as by analyzing a variety of its successive forms 
and types through their typical and specific manifestations. Precisely, it 
will trace different versions of female virginity, starting with the High 
Middle Ages and virgin martyrs legends, up until the creation of the 
figure of the virginal female heroine in the late 19th century romantic 
novel. Therefore, the main intention of this presentation is to trace along 
the well known paths of studies on virginity topics, while putting the 
following question on the agenda: how does virginity – as a changeable 
and socially constructed category rather than an anatomical category or 
the fact of intact body – in all those various  situations, become capable 
to disrupt as well as confirm the culturally conventional  gender 
roles and stable meanings of gender (femininity and masculinity)?
Above All, Be Pure: Virginity as a Narrative of Female 
Autonomy
In her speech “Professions for Women”, delivered before 
the London branch of the National Society for Women’s Service 
on January 21, 1931, Virginia Woolf gave a description of the 
Victorian ideal of women and female perfection which would 
later become famous. In a deeply ironic way, Woolf portrays 
the well-known figure of ’angel in the house’ (named after the 
Coventry Patmore’s narrative poem): the image shows an ’angel’ 
as a lovely, almost childishly charming wife, who commits 
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herself fully and with pleasure to the care of the family. Woolf 
describes her in the following manner:
She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. 
She was utterly unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts of 
family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she 
took the leg; if there was a draught she sat in it – in short she 
was so constituted that she never had a mind or a wish of her 
own, but preferred to sympathize always with the minds and 
wishes of others. Above all – I need not say it – she was pure. 
Her purity was supposed to be her chief beauty – her blushes, 
her great grace.1 
Before a woman can write, argued Woolf, she must 
symbolically ’kill’ the ’angel in the house’; that angelic ’phantom’ 
who always appears whisperingly while she is writing: “Be 
sympathetic, be tender; flatter, deceive; use all the arts and wiles 
of our sex. .... Above all, be pure”.2 For Woolf, these metaphorical 
murderous musings were a way to construct a space for female 
artistic autonomy. As Elaine Showalter said, it was a “fight for 
one’s emotional independence against the smothering embrace 
of the Angel”,3 which will remain a key theme of women’s 
literature and feminist literary study of the 19th and early 20th 
century. At the same time, the nature and origin of ’the angel in 
the house’, which is in spirit and name a typical formulation of 
middle-class ideology of the 19th century, have a much longer 
tradition. The innocent virgin-woman, who is always capable 
of remaining chaste and modest, gentle and docile, but also 
strong and persistent in her internal humility and piety, is a 
well-known figure in Western literature. What is also known 
is the idea of a particular social and moral value which was 
commonly attributed to female sexual chastity and purity. 
Therefore, Gilbert and Gubar’s valuable comments on Victorian 
angel allude to it with specific clarity when they summarize the 
literary history of ’the angel in the house’: “Nevertheless, there 
is a clear line of literary descent from divine Virgin to domestic 
angel, passing through (among many others) Dante, Milton, 
and Goethe”.4 However, this does not mean that this notion 
1 Virginia Woolf, “Professions for Women”, in Virginia Woolf, Collected Essays, 
vol. II, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1967, pp. 284-289.
2 Ivi, p. 285.
3 Elaine Showalter, “Killing the Angel in the House. The Autonomy of Women 
Writers”, The Antioch Review, 32, 3, 1972, pp. 353-339.
4 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic. The Woman 
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of certain stability, seemingly maintained by those topics of 
female perfection over time, should be simply understood as an 
expression of some sort of assurance of universal and timeless 
experience of the female ’angelic’ nature or ’eternal feminine’ 
virtues (of modesty, chastity, purity, gracefulness, gentleness, 
compassion or complaisance). On the contrary, this complex of 
female virtue undoubtedly evokes not only different historical, 
moral and fictional structures of Western society but it also takes 
on distinct significance and position within them. As Gilbert and 
Gubar remind us:
In the Middle Ages, of course, mankind’s great teacher of purity 
was the Virgin Mary, a mother goddess who perfectly fitted the 
female role Ortner defines as  merciful dispenser of salvation . 
For the more secular nineteenth century, however, the eternal 
type of female purity was represented not by a madonna in 
heaven but by the angel in the house.5 
But at the same time, this complex of female virtue 
permits the possibility of the continued existence of certain 
interrelated elements on the basis of which – and always again 
in accordance with different and variable patterns – the figure 
of the angelic woman has been constantly reformulated as a 
highly spiritualized and beautiful woman who was perennially 
and unavoidably completely “self-less, with all the moral and 
psychological implications that word suggests”.6 
Therefore, if we conceive the figures of ’angels in the house’ 
as phenomena that far exceed the Victorian ’angelology’ 
boundaries, it might seem appropriate to classify other literary 
practices besides its characterization. Hence, one could notice 
that the Croatian novel by the 19th century had developed a 
“literary repertoire of characters and types”7 where an ’angel’ 
became the central figure. In novel after novel, the presence of 
the ’angel’ highlights the cultural obsession with the fantasy 
of ’pure womanhood’ (while excluding any concretization 
of female sexuality from all romantic scenes) and highly 
sentimentalized idea of ’home as a sanctuary’. As a famous 
Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, 1984, p. 20. 
5 Ibid.
6 Ivi, p. 21. 
7 Krešimir Nemec, Tragom tradicije, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb, 1995, p. 58. All the 
translations from the Croatian language into English are by Ivan Missoni, who has 
also carefully edited this paper, for which I thank him wholeheartedly. 
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romance novel by August Šenoa, Zlatarevo zlato (The Goldsmith’s 
Treasure), describes its heroine: “Anyone would be tempted 
to say that she was a saint who had come down from an altar 
among the common folk and to bring joy to the hearts of her 
sad people”.8 Furthermore, Eugen Kumičić’s Olga i Lina (Olga 
and Lina) and Josip Eugen Tomić’s Melita, among others, offer 
similarly compelling examples of the figure of the “household 
saint”.9 In the deeply moralized structure of these characters, 
one could thus doubtlessly trace all those characteristic features 
of the angelic women of nineteenth-century Western literature 
to which woman only as a faithful and obedient wife and 
devoted and self-sacrificing mother possessed a unquestionably 
high moral value for society. Moreover, one might claim that 
this expression of ’pure womanhood’ seems to indicate that 
woman could behave ethically only by adopting those virtues 
which were conceived as exclusively feminine. Or, as Gilbert & 
Gubar famously synthesized such established beliefs concerning 
suitably modest female behaviour, “women who reject the 
submissive silences of domesticity (could only) have been seen 
as terrible object”:10 as a ’monster woman’ (or ’demonic woman’ 
or ’femme fatale’). In other words, they constituted a highly 
stylized type of female character with whom literary angels 
were often ambiguously juxtaposed in the nineteenth-century 
literature.11 
Yet, in spite of this prominence of the angel/demon 
dichotomy in literature, there was also another significant 
type of female character; not so common and broadly present, 
and far less conventional and predictable in its articulation of 
literary femininity. The character in question was inaugurated 
by Ivan Perkovac’s short story Stankovačka učiteljica (A Teacher 
in Stankovac),12 and continued to develop throughout August 
Šenoa’s novel Branka,13 and Ksaver Šandor Gjalski’s novel Đurđica 
Agićeva.14 As we shall see later in more detail, all these narratives, 
8 August Šenoa, The Goldsmith’s Treasure, translated by Neven Divjakinja, 
Spiritoso, Zagreb, 2015, pp. 26-27.
9 Kremišir Nemec, “Čuvarica ognjišta, svetica, vamp. Slika žene u hrvatskoj 
književnosti 19. stoljeća“, in Stipe Botica et al. (eds.), Zbornik zagrebačke slavističke 
škole, FF Press, Zagreb, 2002, pp. 100-109.
10 Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic, cit., p. 79. 
11 For a detailed explanation, see Nemec, Čuvarica ognjišta, svetica, vamp, cit., 
pp. 102-104.
12 Ivan Perkovac, Djela, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb, 1968. 
13 August Šenoa, Branka, Alfa, Zagreb, 2008. 
14 Ksaver Šandror Gjaski, Đurđica Agićeva, Branko Đovanović, Beograd, 1964. 
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in predominantly didactic manner, focus on ordinary daily life 
of a young, modest woman – a teacher – whose intention was to 
contribute with her work to the enlightenment of the neglected 
common people living in the Croatian countryside. Such agenda-
driven narratives also reflected social and political problems 
that preoccupied Croatian society during the last decades of the 
nineteenth-century. Namely, their central focus was on the issue 
of teachers’ celibacy, which had been legally implemented in the 
Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia in 1888. By prescribing a school act, 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s legislation, in accordance with 
prevailing Western legal regulation, prohibited married female 
teachers from being employed, while imposing a choice between 
marriage and vocation on already employed female teachers.15 At 
the same time, legal celibacy had already during its preparation, 
as well as throughout its implementation, stirred numerous 
public debates. Supporters of the Act directed their attention to 
several questions: firstly, can women’s professionalisation even 
be synchronized with the so-called innate female tendencies 
towards the household sphere; secondly, can one talk about any 
positive social effects of married women’s work; thirdly, what 
were the moral implications of introducing female sexuality 
to the public domain (eg. the question of decency of pregnant 
teachers in girls’ classrooms). If we summarize them, it is not 
difficult to discern from their background those prevailing 
beliefs about the ’sensitive and delicate’ feminine nature which 
had ushered the women of the time so ’naturally’ to a home and 
family leaving public action out of reach of women’s abilities. 
Bearing in mind that Ivan Perkovac, as enthusiastic reader of 
John Stuart Mills’s The Subjection of Women, was known among 
the domestic cultural milieu as a staunch opponent of legal 
celibacy, it would centrally not be difficult to recognize in A 
Teacher in Stankovac (in the character of a young selfless teacher, 
“an idealist”) the hallmark of his political engagement.16 This 
becomes even more evident by acknowledging the power of 
conviction with which Perkovac championed for literature 
to be socially engaged and directed towards the goal, which 
was essentially inseparable from the central ideological 
15 For a fine discussion of female teacher celibacy, see Dinko Župan, Mentalni 
korzet. Spolna politika obrazovanja žena u Banskoj Hrvatskoj (1868-1918), Osijek and 
Slavonski Brod, 2013 and Jasna Šego, “O ženama u ’Viencu’ i o liku učiteljice u 
trima književnim tekstovima 19. stoljeća”, Kroatologija 2, 2011, pp. 141-160. 
16 For a detailed discussion on Ivan Perkovac political engagement, see Šego, O 
ženama u Viencu, cit., pp. 141-160. 
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preoccupation of the generation of Croatian writers emerging 
in the mid-19th century – the idea of creating a modern civil 
nation. On the other hand, such a notion of socially engaged 
function of literature will also be fundamental to Šenoa’s 
ideological and literary programme of ’tendentious’ literature 
(where his principle acceptance of ’emancipation’ and the 
wider social benefit of that ’novelty’ gained its place),17 which 
is probably where his motivation stemmed forth, ten years after 
A Teacher in Stankovac (1871), to deliberately rewrite the same 
story into Branka (1881), in the center of which, as expected, lies 
the question of choice between marriage and teacher’s vocation. 
Even though they seek different resolutions to their respective 
plots, which will in Šenoa’s novel in fact take on the shape of 
an “ideal romance”,18 both texts (as well as partly a third one, 
a novel by Gjalski) had developed convictions that women can 
and should independently and directly (not only indirectly 
through the ’head of the family’) participate in the development 
of society; that the chosen method of female public activity is the 
professionalisation of female intrinsic maternal characteristics; 
and that it is a necessary prerequisite for achieving a woman’s 
self-fulfilment in private as well as in public sphere is her (as 
greater as possible) separation from the area of sexuality. 
Consequently, we are presented with heroines in whose 
biographies there is room for their intellectual and social 
autonomy. Heroines who are educated and are striving to be 
self-sufficient (at least before marriage!) and who in that process 
can be inclined to overcome passive and submissive positions of 
stereotypical ’angelic’ femininity, which is in turn made possible 
by their role as ’modern’ (employed!) women. However, such 
effects of ’modernity’ and ’emancipation’ are not constructed by 
typical means of contemporary narrative discourse. Moreover, it 
would be difficult to look for characteristics of a new structural 
model of fictional female characters to which domestic literary 
criticism when writing about late nineteenth-century literature 
referred to as “women on the path to self-consciousness, a 
subversive woman who breaks through patriarchal, moral and 
class barriers,”19 while the Anglo-Saxon tradition would know 
17 For a discussion on Šenoa’s views on the ‘woman question’, see also Šego, 
op. cit., pp. 141-160.
18 Janice Radway, Reading the Romance, The University of North Carolina Press, 
North Carolina, 1991, pp. 133-134.
19 Nemec, Čuvarica ognjišta, svetica, vamp, cit., p. 101. 
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them as “new women”.20 This was a type of female character 
which will thus, by moving away from the inevitable presence of 
the literary conventions of either idealisation or demonisation of 
womanhood which had permeated the 19th-century literature, 
represent a fairly rare and radical new literary occurrence of the 
“emancipated, intellectually superior woman” which opposes 
“the conventions which the puritanic sociality imposed on a 
married woman, in society and in everyday life”.21 Instead, it 
would appear that in the text which we are to scrutinize more 
closely not only can these new literary strategies be discerned, but 
also certain old and inherited yet still vital elements pertaining 
to the literary discourse which had traditionally been utilized 
to express heroic female agency, and was distinct for its chaste 
female heroine full of audacity. In such a heroine, virginity, 
courage, and beauty were tightly bound together. Such were 
for example the Renaissance and Baroque noble armed maiden 
of romance epic poems, not to mention early Christian virgin 
martyrs and their exceptional heroic virginity, recounted by 
numerous legends that have widely circulated in premodern 
and early modern Europe. In other words, the female figures 
whose virginity has always been closely connected with the 
possibility of transgressing the conventionally accepted norms 
of female behaviour.
This significant characteristic of such type of archaic discourse 
is also used by the heroines of the 19th century novels. Of course, the 
frame of narrative situations is now positioned in the everyday life, 
far from the world of mythical fantasy, Amazonian womanhood 
and Christian miracles. Nonetheless, one could observe the 
persistence of certain themes and certain types of images, as well 
as the constant presence of a particular type of narrative strategies 
whose purpose was to enable virginity to perform a certain type 
of female behaviour, different from the one that requires modesty 
and humility, obedience and passiveness as a virtue, and yet again 
such that excludes any possibility that this type of behaviour 
could be assessed as morally negative. Therefore, if we accept 
the existence of such shared characteristics (which would not be 
constant but historically changeable) one could pose a question 
(that should serve as the guiding principle of this discussion): in 
which ways can virginity in all those different situations become 
20 See Gillian Sutherland, In Search of the New Women. Middle-Class Women and 
Work in Britain 1870-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. 
21 Nemec, Čuvarica ognjišta, svetica, vamp, cit., p. 107. 
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the form that disrupts as well as conforms to the culturally 
conventional women’s gender role and stable meanings of gender 
(femininity and masculinity)?
The situations that I am about to analyse are shaped by literary 
texts stemming from different historical epochs. I will commence 
with a virginal hagiography and medieval drama entitled Muka 
svete Margarite (The Passion of Saint Margaret),22 continue towards 
Renaissance pastoral drama and Mavro Vetranović’s play Lovac 
i vila (The Hunter and the Fairy),23 and conclude with August 
Šenoa’s nineteenth-century romance novel Branka. These texts 
are part of the corpus of national literature, even though the 
legend of Saint Margaret of Antioch, like other virgin martyr’s 
legends, was highly popular throughout the medieval Christian 
world, as well as pastoral is a classical genre of Renaissance 
literature, while Šenoa’s romance novel adopts some typical 
characteristic of the 19th century romance fiction and discourse 
of romantic love. There are also other types of literary virginity 
in this time frame, but I have chosen these three because they are 
each distinct but also mutually related. Namely, the chosen texts 
faithfully represent genres traditionally thought to be ’female 
literature’, since apart from other established genres they were 
meant for the female audience, their main characters were 
females, and the plot confirmed the importance of issues which 
society commonly associated with women, referring to female 
virginity, marriage and marital morality. Yet, there is more to 
this. Since those genres allowed for the expansion of female 
characters, they opened space for various scripts of female 
agency, be it conventional ones, which implied feminine agency 
characterized by the accentuated feminine traits that were quite 
peculiar to the already familiar occurrences such as the ’angels 
of the house’ of the 19th century, be it unconventional scripts 
which experimented with various forms of female behaviour 
and where sometimes appeared virgins who “can do things that 
others can’t do”.24 
22 Muke svete Margarite, in Hrvatsko srednjovjekovno pjesništvo. Pjesme, plačevi i 
prikazanja na starohrvatskom jeziku [texts critically prepared and reviews written by 
Amir Kapetanović, Dragica Malić and Kristina Štrkalj Despot, the author of the 
concept and preparatory studies Amir Kapetanović], Institut za hrvatski jezik i 
jezikoslovlje, Zagreb, 2010, pp. 792-865.
23 Mavro Vetranović, Lovac i vila = Drugo prikazanje također složeno po neznanu pisaocu. 
Govoru lovac i vila, in Antun Djamić (ed.), Dva pastirska prizora Mavra Vetranovića, Građa 
za povijest književnosti hrvatske, 29, JAZU, Zagreb, 1968, pp. 212-229. 
24 Michael Dolzani (ed.), Northorp Frye’s Notebooks on Romance, vol. 15, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto and Buffalo and London, 2004, p. 236. 
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For this reason, I have chosen these texts.25 Such a choice has 
however determined the further course of this paper. Namely, the 
intent to follow these phenomena from the relatively contemporary 
19th century reaching as far back as the Middle Ages necessarily 
involves a certain amount of generalization and deliberate neglect 
of particular (whether historical, genre-related or biographical) 
closer determinants of these phenomena. Besides that, this intent 
also requires a step further into the past: in order to understand the 
foundations of virginity characteristic of medieval legends about 
virginal martyrs, with the aim to demonstrate that it can be traced 
in succeeding texts, it is necessary, at least briefly, to reflect on the 
patristic exegesis of virginity, which has laid the foundation for later 
Christian comprehension of virginity, both religious and secular.
"So that virginity may be lost even by a thought”:26 
Patristic Commentary on Virginity
I will say it boldly, though God can do all things He cannot raise 
up a virgin when once she has fallen. … Let us fear lest in us also 
the prophecy be fulfilled, “Good virgins shall faint”. Notice that 
25 Such a choice also implies a deep inspiration by numerous studies dedicated to 
the examination of various either historical or fictional situations which show what 
’women out of their place’ can do. Most of those studies were concerned with late 
antique and medieval period, such as Gillian Cloke, This Female Man of God . Women 
and spiritual power in the patristic age, AD 350−450, Routledge, London 1995; Elizabeth A. 
Castelli, “ ’I Will Make Mary Male’. Pieties of the Body and Gender Transformation of 
Christian Women in Late Antiquity,” in Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub (eds.), Body 
Guards. The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity, Routledge, New York and London, 
1991, pp. 29-49; Salih Sarah, Versions of Virginity in Late Medieval England, D. S. Brewer, 
Cambridge, 2001; Natalie Zemon Davies, “Women on Top”, in Lorna Hutson (ed.), 
Feminism and Renaissance Studies, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 156-
186. Some of them offered highly compelling interpretations of Renaissance women, 
like Margaret L. King, “Virgo et Virago. Women and High Culture”, in Women of 
the Renaissance. Women in Culture and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
andLondon, 1991, pp. 157-214; Pamela Joseph Benson, The Invention of the Renaissance 
Woman. The Challenge of Female Independence in the Literature and Thought of Italy and 
England, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1992, and especially 
Thelma S. Fenster, “The Defences of Eve by Isotta Nogarola and Christine de Pizan, 
Who Found Themselves in Simone de Beauvior’s Situation”, in Pamela Joseph Benson 
and Victoria Kirkham (eds.), Strong Voices, Weak History. Early Women Writers and 
Canons in England, France, and Italy, The University of Michigan Press, 2005, pp. 58−78, 
and Marina Warner, Joan of Arc. The Image of Female Heroism, University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999. In the effort for my own study, focused on 
merely a few chosen literary texts belonging to different time periods, to draw on (at 
least to a certain extent) those vast experiences of previously conducted research, I 
sincerely hope that it will prove to be a modest, but useful contribution to them.
26 Jerome, Ad Eustochium, translated by W. H. Fremantle, in The Principal Works 
of St. Jerome, NPNF 6 Second Series, Hendrickson Publishing, Peabody MA, 1893, 
reprinted 1994 − Ep. 22 ad Eust. 5.
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it is good virgins who are spoken of, for there are bad ones as 
well. “Whosoever looks on a woman,” the Lord says, “to lust after 
her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart”. So 
that virginity may be lost even by a thought. Such are evil virgins, 
virgins in the flesh, not in the spirit; foolish virgins, who, having 
no oil, are shut out by the Bridegroom.27 
In his famous letter Jerome cautions the virgin Eustochium that 
virginity might be lost even by the libidinous thoughts, bearing 
in mind Mathew’s words: “Do not commit adultery” (Mt 5.28). 
That letter, which came to be known in Middle Ages under the 
general title De virginitate,28 while Humanism, together with other 
Jerome’s ascetic writings, will read it as a conduct book for young 
girls,29 was addressed towards the Roman Christian community, 
especially to its consecrated virgins.30 The letter contains certain 
clarifications on the values of Christian virginity as well as various 
practical guidelines, advice and opinions on ascetic living. Jerome 
instructs Christian Roman virgins that virginity is not only a 
condition of the intact body, but also of the purity of spirit. 
Moreover, virginity is, he states, primarily a matter of the spirit, 
not of the body. “A virgin is defined as one that is holy in body 
and in spirit, for it is no good to have virgin flesh if a woman be 
married in mind”, stressed Jerome.31 
Similar thinking about virginity originating from Paul’s 
teaching in 1 Corinthians 7 on sexual renunciation and the necessity 
of both bodily and spiritual integrity (“the unmarried woman and 
the virgin are anxious about the affairs of the Lord, so that they 
may be holy in body and spirit”, 1 Cor 7.34) is also found in other 
patristic writers. As was expounded by scholars such as Katheleen 
27 Ibid.
28 See Jane Barr, “The Influence of Saint Jerome on Medieval Attitudes to 
Women”, in Janet Soskice (ed.), After Eve. Women, Theology and the Christian 
Tradition, Collins Marshall Pickering, 1990, pp. 89-102. 
29 See, for example, Juan Luis Vives, The Education of a Christian Woman. A 
Sixteenth-Century Manual, Charles Fantazzi (ed. and trans.), University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2000. 
30 Just like other patristic writers, Jerome wrote letters that were not only read 
by their recipients but also copied and widely circulated as religiously instructive 
writings. As Susanna Elm had noticed, “[those] letters were written with the solo 
and clearly stated intention of regulating and ’normalizing’, and were understood 
as such by their addresses to women are in fact educational devices for Scriptural 
instruction”. Susanna Elm, ’Virgins of God’. The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 14-15. 
31 Jerome, Adv. Helvidium de Perpetua Virginitate B. Mariae, translated by W. H. 
Fremantle, in The Principal Works of St. Jerome, NPNF 6 Second Series, Hendrickson 
Publishing, Peabody MA, 1893, reprinted 1994 − Adv. Helv. 20.
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C. Kelly in Performing Virginity and Testing Chastity in the Middle 
Ages, “although the writings of Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and 
others do not furnish us with an ideologically uniform, internally 
consistent body of thought on the subject of virginity” and there 
was not a singular and monolithic interpretation of virginity in the 
early Church, in general there was little disagreement and certain 
notions on the nature of virginity were common to all orthodox 
ascetic authors.32 Moreover, these notions prompted Kelly to 
assert that by comprehending virginity as primarily a spiritual, 
not a physical category, the Church Fathers “reconfigured the 
limits of the physical body”;33 by placing virginity between the 
constructed, immutable chastity (which will be established by 
means of strictly prescribed rules of virginal behaviour) and 
equally constructed, mutable body, virginity was in fact defined as 
a process which occurs both outside the body and within the body. 
Furthermore, as was frequently emphasized by scholars of early 
Christianity, despite the fact that fighting temptations of the flesh 
was in the center of Christian asceticism, for Orthodox Christian 
writers asceticism was never a mainly dualistic phenomenon, 
which undermines the body as evil in an antagonism towards the 
soul which is good.34 Instead, early Christian ascetics commonly 
claimed that soul and body were closely related and that “this 
effect was not just in the direction of the soul reigning in the 
body”.35 Rather, what would in fact prove decisive in determining 
Christian asceticism was the acceleration of the conviction that 
the exaltation of the soul could only be reached through the 
purity of the body. Or in Peter Brown’s words, it was “the belief 
that abstinence from sex was the most effective technique with 
which to achieve the clarity of the soul”.36 This brings us back to 
the premise which is constantly being under examination when 
discussing virginity: if it was primarily placed in the spirit (or inner 
self or in will), then virginity can by the same be disrupted by the 
weakness of the alienated spirit (self or will). That is to say, if a 
32 Kathleen Coyne Kelly, Performing Virginity and Testing Chastity in the Middle 
Ages, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 4. See also Elizabeth A. Castelli, “Virginity and 
its Meaning for Women’s Sexuality in Early Christianity,” Journal of Feminist Studies 
in Religion, 2, 1, 1986, pp. 61-88; and Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading Renunciation. 
Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1999. 
33 Kelly, Performing Virginity, cit., p. 7. 
34 Elm, Virgins of God, cit., p. 14. 
35 Clark, Reading Renunciation, cit., p. 33.
36 Peter Brown, The Body and Society. Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in 
Early Christianity, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, p. 78. 
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virgin behaves in a way unbefitting a virgin, then her intact body 
would become nullified, and she would be deprived of virginity. 
This raises the following questions: what kind of virgin (and a 
virgin is always an embodiment par excellence of female virgin) did 
the patristic authors consider a true virgin of God? What kind of 
demeanour did they consider appropriate for a virgin? And how 
were they able to recognize a virgin of God at all?
Some of the answers to these questions are proposed by early 
Christianity historian Elizabeth A. Castelli, noticing that the Greek 
Church Fathers of the fourth century, such as Gregory of Nyssa, 
Methodius, and Chrysostom often used the notion of andreia 
(spiritual courage) to describe the spiritual skills of extraordinary 
Christian women or to indicate that a woman who possesses 
andreia is like a man (masculine), implying that andreia is not a 
virtue inherent to women, but can be acquired by ascetic training. 
Therefore, Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, commences the vita of his 
sister Macrina, later known as Saint Macrina, by stating: “A woman 
is the starting-point of the narrative, if indeed a woman; for I do 
not know if it is proper to name her who is above nature out of 
[the terms] of nature”.37 Furthermore, we can find very similar 
claims in the vita of the virgin Olympia where John Chrysostom 
marvels how this Constantinopolitan virgin surpasses many men 
in virtue: “Don’t say ’woman’ but ’what a man!’ because this is a 
man, despite her physical appearance”.38 
Such a constitution of female virginity, which entails the process 
of ’becoming male’ is a compound result of several phenomena. 
In the first place, virginity was accordingly seen as an ability of 
overcoming the boundaries of the body, as the liberation from the 
’world’, from the constraints of the existing human nature, since 
virginity in particular, and ascetic life in general, was understood 
and signified as a state of freedom.39 In other words, the ability 
of a person to become to self-improved, to be transformed into 
“a pure vessel of divine will, and so create the possibility for 
communication with the divine through some form of unio 
mystica”.40 As Elizabeth A. Castelli has shown in her inspiring 
study “ ’I Will Make Mary Male’”: Pieties of the Body and Gender 
Transformation of Christian Women in Late Antiquity,” this also 
concerns the manner in which early Christian writers interpreted 
37 Vita Mac. I: 14−17. Quoted in Castelli, Virginity and its Meaning, cit., p. 75. 
38 Vita Olymp. 3. Quoted in ibid. 
39 For more detailed examinations of the issues encapsulated here, see Castelli, 
Virginity and its Meaning, cit., pp. 65-78. 
40 Elm, Virgins of God , cit., p. 14.
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Paul’s New Testament proclamation of the new standards of social 
behaviour (“there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in 
Christ Jesus”, Gal 3.28), as given opportunity for all human beings 
(both men and women) to reach the state of perfect maleness, 
or to ’become male’.41 So, the process of ’becoming male’ in 
the interpretation of early Christian ascetic writers denoted 
an opportunity to ’improve the self’ in order to attain a higher 
spiritual state. Namely, the fact that ’maleness’, as a designation of 
generic humanity, was used as a standard measure of wholeness 
and finality, also entails the belief that ’femaleness’ is closely 
linked with imperfection and incompleteness, as well as with sin, 
sexuality, sexual difference; all the phenomena which were from 
the aspect of early Christian authors seen as consequences of the 
original sin, with which women were inextricably linked. To put 
it differently, all of the above mentioned explanations underline 
not only the link between female virility and freedom, but also 
the repercussions of that link: the fact that ascetic renunciation 
incorporates virility as its pivotal feature implies that ascetic 
women, primarily virgins, stand apart by their difference from 
women (as ’women’), in the same manner as for Christian authors 
a woman was perceived as a human being who unlike ’men’ (but 
also unlike ’virgin’) was inherently ’weak’: she was associated 
with the Fall and sin, whereas the ’virgin’ was released from the 
role intended for the ’woman’ through the Fall: sexuality, marriage 
and childbirth (Gn 3).
Something else is also quite important. When Christian writers 
of the fourth century, like Jerome, Ambrose, or John Chrysostom, 
in their moral education of Christian virgins emphasize the 
difference between the ’woman’ and the ’virgin’, they equally imply 
that such a difference must have a certain form of subordination 
to a specific set of codes of conduct. A true virgin (virgin not only 
in body but also in mind), instructs Ambrose his ascetics female 
readers, must stand out for her reticence, modesty, shyness, 
and above all, quietness,42 while other patristic writers, as John 
Chrysostom, in his afterwards much quoted epistle On Necessity 
of Guarding Virginity, also strictly warn their female readers that 
41 Castelli, I Will Make Mary Male, cit., p. 30. See also Barbara Newman, From 
Virile Woman to Womanchrist. Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature, University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1995; Elizabeth A. Clark, “Ideology, History 
and the Construction of  Woman’ in Late Antique Christianity”, Journal of Early 
Christian Studies, 1994, pp. 155−184; Cloke, This Female Man of God, cit., pp. 34-42. 
42 Ambrose, De Virginitate, translated by Mons. Jozo Marendić, in Sv. Ambrozije, 
Spisi o djevičanstvu, Sypmposion, Split, 2001, pp. 129-130. 
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talkative a virgin unavoidably will become a lustful and sinful 
woman. “When a virgin learns to discuss things frankly with man, 
to sit by him, to laugh in his presence, to disgrace herself in many 
other ways, the veil of virginity is destroyed, the flower trampled 
underfoot”,43 stressed John Chrysostom. Nevertheless, it would 
be completely inaccurate to understand this stress on virginal 
behaviour, which at its center contains the appropriate ways of 
action with a propensity for forming conventionally characteristic 
female virtues (obedience and submission, self-effacing modesty 
and persevering chastity) as something opposed to the virile 
structure of virginity. On the contrary, we are quite far from that. 
As a matter of fact, commitment to the idea that spiritual weakness 
is associated with femininity, and strength with masculinity, 
that overcoming one’s passion is a characteristic of men, and 
exceptionally rare for women, that virginity is ultimately a state 
of liberty and liberation from all the conditionalities of this world 
are all features in accordance with which occurs the general 
acceptance of the virile nature of virginity in the early Christian 
exegesis of the New Testament teachings on virginity.
On the other hand, those general features of early Christian 
thought have found their expression in hagiographic literature 
of the time. Within it two types of virginity can quite commonly 
be discerned: virago and virgo. Virago, femina virilis, miles (woman 
acting like a man), a female hero distinguished by self-control, 
strong will, moral strength – all virtues which have traditionally 
been considered as male virtues, have already been included in the 
earliest hagiographic literature on martyrdom of early Christians. 
The masculinity of those Christian heroines was manifested in 
direct conflict with the traditional understanding of sexuality, 
marriage, and family, and constituted an expression of a culture 
which was aimed at breaking away from all the old Roman values, 
modes of behaving, and forms of living incompatible with Christian 
teachings.44 The virgo type is chronologically younger and appears 
in post-Constantine Christianity along with the rise of Mary’s cult 
and the spread of asceticism in the Christian world which was 
manifested in various treatises on virginity (de virginitate), some of 
which were mentioned on the previous pages. Hence virgo entails 
that virginity in order to attain both spiritual and moral progress 
43 Quoted in Kelly, Performing Virginity, cit., p. 11.
44 See Stephanie L. Cobb, Dying to be Men. Gender and Language in Early Christian 
Martyr Texts, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 92-116; and Brent D. 
Shaw, “The Passion of Perpetua”, Past and Present, 139, 1993, pp. 3-45.
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must be achieved by dedicated efforts in perfecting those virtues 
which were commonly considered to be essentially feminine, 
and modelled on Mary’s sublime virginity. As Barbara Newman 
remarks, “The virago was an honorary male, aspiring to the 
unisex ideal, while the virgin aspired to the highly gendered ideal 
embodied in the Virgin Mary”.45 However, in spite of this need for 
sharp contrast of these two types of female virginity, it also becomes 
apparent that some of the essential characteristics of virility had not 
only appeared earlier but also remained constant in the stylization 
of the female virginity. Namely, in order for a ’woman’ to become 
a ’virgin’ – modest, self-effacing, obedient, silent, shy – she must 
possess the ability to control herself which was irrevocably denied 
to a woman and naturally attributed to a ’man’. Therefore, virginity 
– both virago and virgo – is inevitably essentially connected with 
virility. And yet, it is another matter that this profoundly virile 
structure, when it comes to virgo stylisation of virginity, was often 
veiled by distinctively female virtues and morality.46 
On the other hand, if based on the paradigm of this two types 
of virginity we tried to capture the various forms of virginity, 
from virgin martyrs to virginal heroines of the 19th century 
novel, we can notice that over time an increasing feminisation 
of virginity occured, both religious and secular. This process 
will be particularly noticeable in late-medieval female religious 
texts and practices, in view of their accentuated appropriation of 
the Virgin Mary cult and the mystical forms of spirituality, and 
especially in the subsequent Renaissance interest in elaborate 
arranging of the secular sphere of life which places emphasis on 
gender differentiation and the establishment of strictly regulated 
categories of manhood and womanhood, together with the cult 
of highly aestheticised angelic femininity that will come later to 
be increasingly recognized as an ’angel in the house’.47 In that 
respect, the use of virility as a virtue will gradually disappear from 
discourse remaining related only with ’extraordinary women’, 
those which have been regarded as ’exceptions to their sex’ and 
45 Newman, From Virile Woman to Womanchrist, cit., p. 5. For a comprehensive 
overview of the literature on the thesis about the virago (masculine) and virgo 
(feminine) concept of virginity (with extensive bibliography), see Salih, Versions of 
Virginity, cit., pp. 9-15; 41-46. 
46 Cf. Salih, Versions of Virginity, cit., p. 15. Salih’s observations are so penetrating 
that they are worth quoting: “It is easy to recognise the militant virgins are evincing 
the instability and constructedness of gender, but I would suggest the bridal virgins, 
though less dramatically, have a similar effect. They do not, after all, collapse back 
into undifferentiated femaleness, but enact a particular inflection of femaleness”.
47 Especially relevant here is King, Virgo et Virago, cit., pp. 157-214
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also, as Margaret L. King points out, “aroused admiration as well: 
precisely because their achievements were manly!”.48
Virginal Hagiography: The Passion of St. Margaret
Hagiographic legends of early Christian virgins-martyrs were 
mainly formed in the early medieval period, from the fifth to 
the eighth century. Transmitted over the centuries by means of 
Latin language and various vernaculars, versified, and sometimes 
dramatised, like the Croatian drama about the virgin-martyr 
Margaret of Antioch, they received intensive reception in the West 
during late Middle Ages. Their popularity was often associated 
with the literary habits of late-medieval audiences, shaped by 
chivalric romance, which might have resonated well with the 
dynamic plots of such Christian stories of virginity, brimming 
with various spectacular and fantastic elements, although the 
deeper reason for their well-likeness could be sought in their 
evoking the symbolism of essential Christian mysteries. As Karen 
Anne Windstead notes: “As women who transcended their gender 
to become manly, the virgin martyrs evoke the mystery of God 
made men. Their bodies, torn and made whole, replicate the 
mystery of God made man. The paradox of the virgins’ triumph is 
distilled in their emblems, where instruments of torture designed 
to erase identity are used to proclaim identity”.49
The symbolism of virgin birth, incarnation and the Eucharist, the 
tree of life and death, just as the powerful antithesis of Eve – New 
Eve: the redemption of Woman by the Virgin, strongly pervades 
the hagiographic legend of Margaret of Antioch.50 Although 
extensively expanded in the West, this legend was originally 
formed within the Greek hagiographic context, sometime in the 
fifth century.51 In Croatian medieval literature it can be traced back 
to the 13th century, while the protograph of that Croatian Catholic 
play probably emerged in the 14th century.52 These chronological 
data may not have been so important had it not been noticed that 
late-medieval editions of this legend in relation to the older Latin 
48 Ivi, p. 191. 
49 Karen Anne Winstead, Virgin Martyrs. Legends of Sainthood in Late Medieval 
England, Cornell University Press, Itacha and London, 1997, p. 12. 
50 See Eduard Hercigonja, “Latiničko prikazanje Muka svete Margarite i 
hrvatskoglagoljska hagiografskolegendarna tradicija”, in Na temeljima hrvatske 
književne kulture, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb, 2004, pp. 234-281.
51 See Mary Clayton and Hugh Magennis, The Old English Lives of St. Margaret, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 7-24; 24-41.
52 See Hercigonja, Latiničko prikazanje, cit., pp. 234−281; Dragica Malić, “Zašto 
Margarita  nije Marulićeva?”, Colloquia Maruliana, 19, 2010, pp. 185-218.
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and the original Greek context do not emphasize the feminisation of 
the young virgin’s character. Namely, the tale has the conventional 
plot structure of virgin martyrs’ legends. As in the case of many 
legendary lives, a young noble virgin defies marriage in order to 
preserve virginity and Christianity. The character is depicted as 
mostly virago type: Margaret is eloquent, brave and fearless. She 
is also characterized by prudence, stability, strength and self-
restraint. She is exceptionally assertive and highly aggressive. And 
yet, these components of physical aggressiveness are suppressed in 
later redactions of the legend, while the Latin hagiographic context, 
dominated by a submissive character of Marian virginity, does not 
know the components of physical activity of the martyrological 
protagonist that is typical for original Greek context.53
On the other hand, in the Croatian dramatised legend The 
Passion of Saint Margaret a further feminisation of already feminised 
Margaret’s character is under way. This point can be illustrated 
in fine detail. As in various other narratives of Christian virgin-
martyrs (from the apocryphal Thecla to Barbara and Juliana of 
Nicomedia), in this account of the aforesaid Antiochian virgin 
virginity was shaped in direct conflict with the traditional Roman 
conception of sexuality, marriage, and family. Moreover, the 
actions of Christian heroines who, despite their pagan fathers’ or 
betrotheds’ objection, decide to renounce marriage and childbirth, 
entailed a complete rejection of the authority of the Roman pater 
familias and all established social norms and values based on the 
daughter’s position and female subordination.54 This situation 
was, however, not equally highlighted nor developed in all such 
stories. Thereby the narrative of Margaret of Antioch belongs to 
the ones where her father was not given a more active role, even 
though the virgin’s antagonistic relationship with her father was 
implied. This phenomenon is generally significant for the literary 
canon of Margaret’s legend, so this line is maintained in the 
Passion where the father does not get any more significant role 
than the canon of legend prescribes. Nevertheless, the character 
of the father in the Passion has, to a certain extent, been changed 
and does not represent solely the sinful pagan community, but 
rather becomes an epitome of fatherly negligence. Here, on the 
other hand, the virgin also undergoes transformation: while in the 
53 Wendy R. Larson, “The Role of Patronage and Audience in the Cults of Sts. 
Margaret and Marina of Antioch”, in Samantha J. E. Riches and Sarah Salih (eds.), 
Gender and Holiness: Men, Women and Saints in Late Medieval Europe, Routledge, 
London, 2002, pp. 23−35.
54 See Shaw, The Passion of Perpetua, cit., pp. 3-4.
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literary canon of legend fathers violent fury caused by Margaret’s 
decision to reject affiliation with her family and community by 
accepting Christianity was clearly indicated, the Passion seems to 
have interpreted this situation by indicating that Margaret did 
not object to her father’s will , but to the devil’s, and that she not 
only came into conflict with him by authoritatively, even violently 
refusing marriage and paganism, and she also fight for virginity 
in radically different way: by patience and persistence in staying 
faithful to her vows. To put it differently, virgin behaviour, when 
it comes to the decision of virginity, does not arise more from the 
socially unusual possibility that a woman decides independently 
of herself and her life, which in those Christian stories thus 
emerged from the “radical critique of Graeco-roman gender 
discourses and sexual dimorphism tout court“,55 but instead of that, 
now the virgin’s behaviour is forced to fit in the ever socially more 
common image of female patience, humility and submissiveness. 
And such an image of a tamed virgin obviously did not suit the 
medieval dramatist any more. 
If, on the other hand, we were to try to fathom what prompted 
an unknown dramatist to such an interpretation of the ancient 
legend, somehow it seems appropriate to think that this was 
actually an instance of oblivion of time erasing the memory of 
what meant for the early Christians to be different from the others. 
Certainly, there is also an understanding of the relationship 
between’Christianity’ and ’paganism’ as a struggle between Good 
and Evil. It would therefore not be amiss to assume that this 
involved adjusting family relations (even if they were pagan!) to 
their then-contemporary viewpoint, which obviously thought an 
image of a docile daughter more convenient than the rebellious 
virgin. Moreover, this assumption might find a sort of justification 
in the fact that even in the early martyrologies Christian heroines 
were not portrayed as unambiguously masculine. As an early 
Christianity historian Stephanie Cobb remarks us, on the contrary, 
readers were faced with an irresistible “sexual dilemma”: these 
narratives encourage masculinisation of women (outside the 
Christian textual community) and entice their femininity (within 
the Christian textual community).56 In other words, against pagan 
men heroine has to prove as a ’better man’ , and against Christian 
men as a ’weak woman’.
55 Daniel Boyarin, “Virgins in Brothels. Gender and Religious Ecotypfication”, 
ELO, 5, 1999, pp. 195-217, p. 211.
56 Cobb, Dying to be Men, cit., p. 92. 
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Concurrently, virginity in the Passion remains predominantly 
virilely organised, although this virility is derived from a 
summation of various activities. As a virilised woman, the virgin 
martyr reflected an early tradition in which Christian criticism of 
’paganism’ was largely being levelled “through ’gender-bending’ 
attacks on female subordination”. Hence the radical independence 
and freedom of action quite characteristic for early Christian female 
martyrs whose prominent strength and agency were thus signs of 
absolute Christian superiority over ’paganism’. On the other hand, 
the power of Christian collective was also built on the ability of 
the virgin to overcome her ’female nature’ through using pious 
asceticism. By that understanding, the virgin’s inherent weakness 
was established as evidence of her strength, and her supernatural 
ability to gain that strength through pure faith would be used as 
an example of moral action. In this sense, Margaret of Antioch, 
as well as other female Christian saints of the same type, could 
have functioned as a highly charged symbol capable of expressing 
different meanings attributed to female virginity.
Renaissance Pastoral Virginity: The Hunter and the Fairy
This play by the renowned Benedictine monk from Dubrovnik 
belongs to the tradition of the Dubrovnik pastoral, which connected 
with concept of ’liberty’, as one the fundamental concepts of 
the political culture of the early modern Republic of Ragusa,57 
with the conventional pastoral tensions between the urban and 
rural spaces, culture and nature, historical and non-historical 
timeframe. This habitual set of allegorical images and motifs are 
however somewhat modified in Vetranović’s play by bringing into 
the very heart of the pastoral elements of the religious concept of 
virginity. In that regard, the pastoral is using the religious concept 
of virginity as freedom and liberation and engages it in the service 
of mythologizing of pastoral space that represents Dubrovnik as 
a Happy City ruled by liberty, harmony and reason.58 Therefore, 
such a perception of the pastoral space emphasizes the particular 
usage of that genre which was always inclined to creating an 
image of the restored original harmony, lost human integrity, 
57 See Lovro Kunčević, “On Ragusan Libertas in the Late Middle Ages”, 
Dubrovnik annals, 14, 2010, pp. 25-69.
58 For an overview of political conceptualization of early modern Dubrovnik 
as a Happy City, see Zdenka Janeković-Römer, “Grad trgovaca koji nose naslov 
plemića. Filip de Diversis i njegova pohvala Dubrovniku”, in Filip de Diversis, 
Opis slavnoga grada Dubrovnika, Zdenka Janeković-Römer (ed. and trans.), Dom i 
svijet, Zagreb, 2002, pp. 9-31.
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the dispossesed world of eternal youth and beauty, innocent 
eroticism before the Fall.59 Images which will, in a special way, in 
Vetranović’s pastoral be produced by dramatising the difference 
between virginity and marriage; the difference which represents a 
part of those carefully codified relationship between virginity and 
marriage, virginity and freedom, virgins and women which we 
have earlier found in patristic argumentation. 
Hence, the simple plot of Vetranović’s play can entirely be reduced 
to the dialogue between the captured Diana’s fairy and the hunter (in 
the presence of a silent rector) who will capture the fairy, try to sell her 
to the rector, and finally release her. The fairy understood as part of the 
pastoral represents an idealised Arcadian image of the geographical 
city of Dubrovnik, the hunter is part of the lowly rural world, while 
the rector (knez) is power over the City, which does not only represent 
a place of happiness and prosperity but also of the moral-ethical and 
political problems of the then-contemporary Dubrovnik’s reality. 
Shaped in such a way, the pastoral space implies an opposition 
between nature and civilisation; criticism of the moral deviations of 
Dubrovnik’s society (greed and avarice) which is embodied in the 
figure of the taciturn Ragusan rector who does not want to set the 
fairy free by paying the ransom which the hunter asks for her. The 
symbolism of such conceptualised space is obvious: between the real 
and fantastic world there is a clear relation of the lower hierarchy 
towards the higher, whereas the balance between those different 
worlds at the end of the play becomes re-established when the hunter 
decides to give the fairy to the rector as a gift, and the fairy bestows a 
panegyric upon the City.
But if we turn to the opposition of virginity (freedom/nature) 
– marriage (captivity/culture), the meaning which these pastoral 
patterns acquire becomes unsuitable for interpretations that do not 
doubt. What is clear is that in this drama virginity functions as a 
sign of integrity, strength and independence; in short, of virility. 
The fairy virgin has for a woman a thoroughly socially unusual 
opportunity to make decisions for herself, to choose or dismiss 
marriage, to negotiate for her destine; and yet the fairy virgin 
belongs to a different world order from the one in which a woman 
is measures by her success on the market of marital policy. And 
again, does this imply that the virgin is a woman at all? On the other 
hand, does this include a possible glimpse at a critical corrective of 
59 See Laurence Lerner, The Uses of Nostalgia. Studies in Pastoral Poetry, Chatto 
and Windus, London, 1972; and Richard Andrews, “Pastoral drama”, in Peter Brand 
and Lino Pertile (eds.), The Cambridge History of Italian Literature, 1996, pp. 292-298.
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the moral drainage of the urban world which views this captive 
fairy as a ’pretty thing’ that can be substantially marketable? And to 
enlarge upon this thought, can we even discern a hint of criticism 
of Dubrovnik’s marital policy which works through the system of 
dowries and arranged marriages?60 Maybe. But not for certain. For 
even if we exclude the fact that the pastoral allows greater space 
for the development of female characters than some other realistic 
genres such as comedy,61 there still remains an important way in 
which this unconventional freedom of the fairy’s conduct is framed. 
Thereby it is significant that the fairy’s choice, her refusal to marry 
a hunter who belongs to an entirely different, lower world – within 
the context of Dubrovnik’s marriage policy, which was extremely 
endogamous and did not permit marrying outside the Republic’s 
patrician class, while the only destiny awaiting unmarried patrician 
girls was becoming a nun – it was actually twice as culturally 
desirable: fairy dismisses marrying the hunter because of her 
choosing devoted virginity, and besides, it was a case of an illicit 
marital bond between a noble fairy and a mere rustic. Nevertheless, 
it is precisely because of this that Diana’s pastoral warriors could 
perfectly carry ambiguous demands of virginity that have in the 
past of the Western literature been carried by martyrological virgins.
Romance and Virginity: Branka
In Šenoa’s novel we find, as mentioned above, highly stylized 
patterns of sentimental romance. Description of the young 
heroine is a clear indication of this. Absolute chastity of the 
heroine, expressed through the appropriate rhetoric devices, is 
typically associated with a complete lack of awareness of one’s 
own beauty and sexuality. She is guided by the idea of pure love 
and a lofty sense of marriage, which is as such incompatible with 
the acquisition of goods and respectable social status serving as a 
purpose for entering into wedlock. Nevertheless, happy ending, 
which is essential for this type of storytelling, is subjected to the 
same social rules, and Branka consequently becomes a bride of a 
young nobleman.
60 See Zdenka Janeković Römer, “Nasilje zakona. Gradska vlast i privatni život 
kasnosrednjovjekovnom i ranonovovjekovnom Dubrovniku”, Anali Zavoda za 
povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, 41, 2003, pp. 9-44.
61 See Richard Andrews, Pastoral drama, cit., pp. 292-298; and Sue P. Starke, The 
Heroines of English Pastoral Romance, D. S. Brewer, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 1-41. See 
also Virginia Cox and Lisa Simpson, “Volume Editors’ Introduction”, in Maddalena 
Campiglia, Flori, A Pastoral Drama, Virginia Cox and Lisa Simpson (eds.), Virginia 
Cox (trans.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2004, pp. 1-37.
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Therefore, tightly organised by criteria of stereotyping, 
inherent to the narrative structure of romance, the novel is filled 
with generalising moral and social commentary. Šenoa believed 
in ethical and political potential of literature and advocated for 
writing that “has to be nationally functional, i.e., reflect the national 
spirit and serve for enlightenment and raising awareness of the 
people”.62 Thus, the distinguishing feature of the main female 
character of his novel is that she has been entrusted to convey the 
author’s convictions about the necessity of social and moral reform 
in the course of which the woman was expected to play a huge 
role. In this vision of modern nation, motherhood is established 
as an essential element of society, equally emphasizing the belief 
that a woman should be allowed an opportunity to participate in 
the realisation of the common good and the appropriate manner 
of achieving that is professionalisation of intrinsic philanthropic 
role of ’woman-mother’ or ’women-nurses’.63 
All this makes Šenoa’s heroic young teacher the pillar 
of ’idealism’. Although marriage is established as an ideal 
inextricably linked with the idea of romantic love and patriotic 
enthusiasm, most of the novel follows the adventures of a young 
idealist woman. Fearless, brave and daring – a modern Joan D’Arc 
– Šenoa’s Branka is a character akin to archetypal virile virgins. 
Thus, virginity is closely associated with a particular vision of 
freedom. It allows her to overcome the limits of socially acceptable 
female behaviour; it is a measure of heroine’s independence, her 
’masculine’ force. Described as enthusiastic, intellectually curious, 
exceptionally eloquent, witty, self-disciplined, Branka as a 
character does not live the life of a stereotypical social perception 
and experience of the literary structure of her time – that is what 
sets her apart from the typical domestic ’angel in the house’. 
On the other hand, the novel carefully keeps clear from 
explaining the heroine’s behaviour as woman’s quest for 
independence. The heroine’s ’modernity’ and ’emancipation’ is 
exemplified by her idealism, her patriotic ideas, and her passionate 
enthusiasm for the teaching profession. But it is quite far from 
understanding that such a lifestyle choice is a valid and permanent 
alternative to marriage and motherhood, even if the relationship 
62 Krešimir Nemec, Povijest hrvatskog romana od početka do kraja 19. stoljeća, 
Znanje, Zagreb, 1994, p. 81. 
63 Slavica Jakobović Fribec, “Feministička epistemologija objašnjena djevojčici. 
Ženski spoznajni subjekt u epistolarnom romanu Jagode Truhelke U carstvu duše. 
Listovi svojoj učenici (Osijek, 1910.)”, Filozofska istraživanja, 105, 27/1, 2007, pp. 83-94, 
p. 86.
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between spouses should allow the heroine to maintain a certain 
level of independence which she previously held. Nonetheless, the 
point is that only as a wife and mother can a woman participate in 
the well-being of the community because that is the mode which 
best suits her female nature. Harmonious end of the novel therefore 
unquestionably links Branka with submissive angelic iconography.
Conclusion
This entire situation concerning the plot, as we have seen, has 
its rationale in the historical and political context of these early 
Christian stories. However, something else here is of the essence: 
that same narrative situation, with modifications of course, can be 
found in other texts which we have discussed. This is so because 
in all of them there is a virgin figure who tests out behavioural 
scripts which enable her to disrupt the culturally conventional 
women’s gender role and stable meanings of gender. On the 
other hand, such transgressive effects do not necessarily entail 
emancipatory potential. Moreover, the differentiation of a ’virgin’ 
from a ’woman’, as well as underlining virility as a prerequisite for 
every woman’s progress definitely confirms in various ways the 
strict social control over women’s positions. And yet… would it be 
overly sentimental to conclude together with Zemon Davies that 
such figures which she called were were ’unruly women’ despite 
confirming the culturally dominant assumptions of womanhood, 
could even so become inspirational examples of women’s agency 
manifested by disrupting the ’natural’ female positions? If it were 
not overly sentimental, then in that sense, and only in that sense, 
virginity could be called a narrative of female autonomy. 
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Between Romanticization and De-
historization of History: The ‘Unveiling’ 
of Gender in Witchcraft Trials 
Nataša Polgar
Summary
In this article the author gives an overview of the paradoxical and 
problematic place of gender both in the historiography of witchcraft and 
feminist studies in the second half of the twentieth century. Namely, the 
issue of sex and gender in the construction of witches and in witch-hunts 
has long been its most visible and at the same time most  ’unseen’  feature 
in historiography. Up until the late twentieth century it was considered 
quite marginal and often counterproductive for  in ’depth’  studies of the 
phenomenon, while gender as an analytical category simply did not exist. 
Gender as an analytical category entered historiography only with (often 
justified) critiques of feminist works from the 1970s and 1980s, emerging 
as part of the political movement for the struggle for women’s rights. 
Here the author reviews the works that contributed most to the debate 
between historiography and feminist criticism, and which in the very least 
had divided and ambiguous results. On the one hand, this contributed to 
tempering the strict discipline of historiography and the introduction of 
a feminist critical apparatus at the end of the 2000s, but on the other, this 
created new myths about witches still circulating in popular culture and 
forming a part of the “general” knowledge on witch persecution, which 
were relying on the political use of witches during the first and second 
feminist waves.
The text also discusses the possibility of the further expansion of 
historiographic disciplinary boundaries by introducing psychoanalytic 
criticism in research on the phenomenon of witch-hunts on the basis of a 
brief overview of a case study by the author regarding the interpretation 
of Croatian records and testimonies from trials at the end of the 
seventeenth century up to the mid-eighteenth century and which relies 
on the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition.
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Even though there is data indicating that witch-hunts in 
Europe were primarily the persecution of women – who made up 
almost two thirds of the 60.000 persons convicted of witchcraft1 – 
the issue of gender has for a surprisingly long time been neglected 
in historiography, aside from the romanticist approach in the 
tradition of Jules Michelet’s study2 that influenced the widely held 
notion in popular culture of witches as being exclusively powerful, 
strong, wise and socially ’eccentric’ women whose behavior was 
the object of normalization and sanction on the part of patriarchal 
society. Gender was simultaneously the most visible and the most 
invisible feature of the persecutions, thus occupying a paradoxical 
place, and managed to enter into mainstream historiography 
during the late 1980s primarily by criticizing feminist theory. 
The relationship between feminism and historicism in the 
context of the study of persecution of witches has been marked 
by controversies, and many political and ideological agendas are 
inscribed in interpretations of the constructions of witches.3 
1 Witch-hunts were an early modern phenomenon that lasted from the late 
fourteenth to the late seventeenth and even mid-eighteenth century in some 
parts of Europe (for example Poland, Croatia, parts of Russia). “Geographically, 
they occurred most often in some parts of the Holy Roman Empire that were 
extremely fragmented legally: Franconian ecclesiastical territories; the Saar and 
Mosel regions; the electorates of Trier and Cologne, including the duchy of 
Westphalia; the duchies of Luxembourg and Lorraine; the prince-bishopric of 
Münster; Schleswig-Holstein; and Mecklenburg. Elsewhere, they occurred on 
the peripheries of France (for example, Navarre and Languedoc), in the Swiss 
Confederation, the Spanish Netherlands, the Austrian Habsburg patrimonial 
lands, and western Poland. Witch-hunting was generally less intense in both 
Mediterranean and northern Europe, with Catalonia from 1618 to 1620 as a 
notable exception in the former area and lowland Scotland, eastern England, in 
1645, and northern Sweden from 1668 to 1674 as exceptions in the latter area”. Rita 
Voltmer, “Witch Hunts”, in Richard Golden (ed.), Encyclopedia of Witchcraft, ABC 
Clio, Santa Barbara, pp. 1209-1241.
2 Jules Michelet’s book, La Sorcière, published in 1862, promoted the idea that 
witchcraft was an act of popular rebellion against the oppression of feudalism and 
the Roman Catholic Church. According to Michelet, this rebellion took the form 
of a secret religion inspired by paganism and fairy beliefs, organized by a woman 
who became its leader. This book, combining archival work with poetical and 
romanticist interpretations of witchcraft as a peasants’ rebellion, has significantly 
influenced some of the 20th-century historiographic and feminist approaches to 
witch-hunts. 
3 Although not related to the scientific approaches in question, one of the most 
radical examples of the use of witch-hunting for ideological and political purposes 
was the project of Heinrich Himmler. He organized a special unit within the SS 
called the “Hexen-Sonderkommando” which searched through court records and 
archives for confirmation of the thesis of that persecution of the witches as firstly 
a Christian, then Jewish attempt to destroy “Aryan women”. This thesis was put 
forth in 1935 by Nazi ’feminist’ Friedrike Müller-Reimerdes in a pamphlet entitled 
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While gender studies and feminist criticism have nevertheless 
left a significant impact on the historiographic research of witch-
hunts with a time lag of a few decades of fierce debates and which 
I write about in the first part of the text, psychoanalytic criticism 
along with a whole slew of key terms such as the unconscious, 
desire, subjectivization, Otherness, etc. which are important for 
consideration of the cultural and individual dynamics during 
the time of persecution remains controversial for mainstream 
historiography. Thus in order to ascertain how much analyzing 
the psychic structures of earlier century subjects can help in our in-
depth understanding of the persecution of witches and the witch 
imaginary, in the second part of the text I summarize my own 
research and interpretation of witch persecutions on the basis of 
court records from continental Croatia in the late seventeenth to 
mid-eighteenth century.
Historians and the Witch: ‘Invisible’ Gender
The rise of interest in ‘microhistory’, ‘history from below’ and 
history of mentalities in the 1960s also provoked interest in the 
mass persecutions of witches, previously held as a less relevant 
or unimportant part of much larger, usually military historical 
narratives. Since the phenomenon of the witch-hunt is a long-
lasting one, more than three centuries long, historiographic 
approaches in the second half of the twentieth century have 
been varied, covering almost all social, ideological, political and 
economic aspects that gave impetus to the persecutions: from the 
tense relation between theological discourse and popular culture 
with its belief system, the development of modern nation states, 
reformation and counterreformation, urbanization, economic 
crises, extreme weather conditions resulting in poverty and 
migrations for which societies/communities needed scapegoats 
who could be blamed for all misfortune, etc.,4 but without 
“Der christliche Hexenwahn” (“The Christian Witch-Craze”). More in Barbara 
Schier, “Hexenwahn und Hexenverfolgung. Rezeption und politische Zurichtung 
eines kulturwissenschaftlichen Themes im Dritten Reich”, Bayerisches Jahrbuch für 
Volkskunde, 1990, pp. 45-46; Michael D. Bailey, Magic and Superstition in Europe. A 
Concise History from Antiquity to the Present. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, 2007, pp. 236-238. 
4 A clear overview of the various disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches 
to the persecution of witches as an extremely complex phenomenon is presented 
on the website The Witchcraft Bibliography Project Online with bibliographic data 
published from the 1960s up to 2010, and which focuses on the different aspects of 
social, cultural, ideological, economic and other changes that have opened space 
for persecutions. However, precisely due to the many approaches and works, it 
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taking into consideration the simple and obvious fact that the 
persecutions were largely pointed at the feminine sex and as such 
are also a part of the early modern history of women.
Or, as stated by Elspeth Whitney, “[t]he extent to which gender 
has ‘fallen out’ as a category of analysis among the majority of 
historians of the witch-hunts is quite startling. Despite the use of 
elaborated methodologies borrowed from anthropology, sociology 
and folklore studies, the main lines of interpretation of the hunts 
have been constructed largely outside of work in women’s history 
or gender studies. ... nevertheless, the bulk of published research 
on the European hunts at the present time either ignores gender 
or, even while taking note of the relevance of women’s history and 
feminist analysis, tends to minimize its importance”.5 
When the previously ‘hidden’ gender of witches finally 
managed to reach the interpretative models of mainstream 
historiography of the 1970s and 1980s, all while the intense work 
of historians in archives across Europe inevitably showed that it 
was mainly women who were accused of witchcraft, explanations 
denying misogyny as either a cultural constant or as a specificity 
of the early modern period soon followed.
During the 1970s and 1980s (but even today) the studies of 
Keith Thomas6 and Alan Macfarlane7 were rather influential 
in historiography. Their research shifted the focus towards 
community dynamics in the course of economic and religious 
changes in England primarily. They both concluded, on the 
basis of archival material, that it was in fact women who were 
more frequently accused of witchcraft than men, but not because 
society as a whole was misogynous, but because these accusations 
had the goal of relieving the society of its poorest members, which 
were more often elderly, widowed women seeking financial help 
from their neighbors.8 Thomas argues that it could not have been 
has become impossible to administrate the site, but the systematized bibliography 
is still available at <witchcraftbib.co.uk>.
5 Elspeth Whitney, “The Witch ‘She’/The Historian ‘He’. Gender and the 
Historiography of the European Witch-Hunts”, Journal of Women’s History, 1995, 
7, 3, pp. 77-101.
6 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1971.
7 Alan Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England. A Regional Comparative 
Study, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970 [1991].
8 The phenomenon in question here is in fact the ‘feminization of poverty’, 
the origins of which are placed in the early modern age by many authors (cf. 
Marianne Hester, “Patriarchal Reconstruction and Witch Hunting”, in Jonathan 
Barry, Marianne Hester and Gareth Roberts (eds.), Witchcraft in Early Modern 
Europe. Studies in Culture and Belief, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
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a matter of a sex war, because in most cases women were both 
prosecutors and witnesses.9 This claim is still sometimes utilized 
in attempts to overturn feminist studies directed at unveiling the 
unequal power relations that shape, among other things, gender 
identities where one, almost exclusively feminine, is constructed 
as evil.10
Feminist Approaches: Discovery of Gender and Birth of 
a New Myth 
Simultaneously to denying or ignoring the role of gender in 
the construction of the witch-craze within the scientific, mostly 
historiographic community, outside of it and connected to the 
second wave of feminism, the use of witches for political purposes 
was getting stronger. 
As Katharine Hodgkin stated, “[a]nd though some researchers 
into witchcraft in Europe were more concerned with gender, 
their analyses seldom went beyond a few general remarks about 
stereotypes. Meanwhile, however, outside the academic context, a 
very different and highly politicized version of witch persecution 
was taking shape. The feminist movement of the early 1970s made 
from the witch its’ own heroine – assertive woman crushed by 
patriarchy”.11 
In this period the myth of witches as healers and midwives was 
born. They allegedly were the ones who helped the community 
but who, due to their knowledge and power, represented a threat, 
most of all to physicians, a profession in the making at the time. 
This concept was introduced in 1973 in the book by Barbara 
Ehrenreich and Deidre English, Witches, Midwives and Nurses: 
A History of Women Healers, and it became widespread common 
‘knowledge’, deeply rooted even up to today, although completely 
unfounded on historical sources as no correlation could be 
established between witchcraft accusations and midwifery.12 The 
1996, pp. 301-303, but also Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch, Autonomedia, 
New York, 2004). 
9 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, cit., pp. 568, 679.
10 Hester, Patriarchal Reconstruction and Witch Hunting, cit., pp. 289-290.
11 Katharine Hodgkin, “Gender, Mind and Body. Feminism and Psychoanalysis”, 
in Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies (eds.), Witchcraft Historiography, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Hampshire and New York, 2007, p. 184. 
12 Despite the criticism their book had suffered, English and Ehrenreich 
published a second edited and completed edition in 2010 in which they still did not 
refer to archival sources, but where they additionally elaborated the consequences 
of the political and economic monopolization of medicine from the early modern 
ages to contemporary times. 
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discourse of radical feminism in the 1970s has often completely 
neglected primary sources for promoting its own theses, insisting 
on the ahistoricity of history, which resulted in many works that 
have contributed to the politicization and dogmatization of the 
topic, rather than analyzing the position of women as witches or 
scapegoats in the early modern period, a position that stemmed out 
of complex cultural and ideological power relations, among others. 
This approach is visible in Mary Daly’s 1978 book, Gyn/Ecology, 
which, apart from Malleus Maleficarum, cites no other sources as 
the foundation for its often fictional reconstruction of the witch 
as a popular heroine or protofeminist. Her representation of the 
witch is thus very close to the romanticist narrative of persecution 
(which she terms “gynocide”) as a reflection of primitivism and 
barbarism directed against strong and independent women, who 
were mostly followers of the pagan feminocentric fertility cult. In 
addition to discrediting Daly’s work, it also served as her uncritical 
takeover of Margaret Murray’s theory on witches as followers of 
the pagan fertility cult or feminocentric religion.13 
Thus, the scientific study of witchcraft during the 1970s and 
1980s found itself in a double bind: ‘official historiography’ had 
no room for a serious analysis of the role of feminine gender, 
and on the other hand, feminist criticism was reluctantly if even 
at all interested in primary sources and deep historical analysis. 
Therefore the early modern ages and its witches double-sidedly 
disturbed the historicity of history: feminist critique by negating 
the witch-hunt timeframe, seeing it only as continuous misogyny, 
and official, ‘male’ historiography by negating the ideological and 
cultural constructions of femininity.
The development of feminist theory throughout the 1980s 
introduced new conceptual and analytical tools necessary for a 
different approach to the witch persecution phenomenon. The 
most influential among the studies published in this period were 
Christina Larner’s Enemies of God (1981) and especially Witchcraft 
and Religion (1984). 14 Although the main focus of her research was 
the role of the state and the state apparatus in witch persecution, 
she was also interested in the question of how witches were 
13 The book in question, The Witch-Cult in Western Europe (1921), is possibly the 
most criticized book about witches of all time. However, this book generated an 
entire following, and influenced not only the creation of wicca, popular culture 
imaginarium, but also the first wave of feminism. 
14 Christina Larner, Enemies of God. The Witch Hunt in Scotland, Chatto and 
Windus, London, 1981; Witchcraft and Religion. The Politics of Popular Belief, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1984.
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identified at the local level, and in the part gender played in 
this process. The key question for Larner was, “[w]hy women 
appeared particularly threatening to patriarchal order at this time 
and why they ceased to be so threatening about 1700”.15
According to Larner, witches were often in the position of 
victims due to their age and poverty, i.e. social status, but also 
partly due to the fact that they were sometimes perceived as 
difficult, aggressive neighbors: in situations in which it was 
completely normal for a man to exert physical force and solve 
a conflict, the only weapon at a woman’s disposal were words, 
curses. In the early modern age the legal system was changing 
rapidly, seriously intervening in private lives, especially that of 
women, proscribing desirable models of feminine behavior. From 
this perspective, quarrelsome women who cursed, as well as 
those whose behavior was deemed overly ‘liberal’, began to be 
perceived as a threat to the patriarchal order, not only from the 
perspective of men, but of other women as well. Larner states, “[t]
he stereotype witch is an independent adult woman who does not 
conform to the male idea of proper female behavior”, she disturbs 
the social order and becomes the symbol of disorder and chaos.16 
Her thesis is that persecutions of witches were “sex-related but not 
sex-specific”, meaning that witches were not persecuted because 
they were women but because they were witches.17 
In the late 1980s and in the 1990s several studies stressed the 
role of patriarchal societies in the construction of witches. In 
her book The Devil in the Shape of a Woman (1987), Carol Karlsen 
analyzes the accusations of witchcraft in colonial America and, 
drawing from archival material, describes in detail the social, 
economic and ideological circumstances of trials, emphasizing the 
rooted Puritanism of the culture.18 Unlike English (and, of course, 
not only English) witches, as claimed by previously mentioned 
male historians Macfarlane and Thomas, women in New England 
were not old, alone and poor; rather quite the opposite. Karlsen 
established that the accused were more often than not financially 
independent women and that tensions related to family 
inheritance lurked behind witchcraft accusations, along with 
sexual misconduct and aggressiveness in interpersonal relations. 
Unfortunately, her interpretation is reduced to the construction of 
15 Larner, Witchcraft and Religion, cit., p. 87.
16 Ibid.
17 Ivi, pp. 87-89.
18 Carol Karlsen, Devil in the Shape of a Woman. Witchcraft in Colonial New 
England, Norton, New York and London, 1987.
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the witch as a protofeminist heroine, whose financial and sexual 
independence irritated the puritan society and for which she 
had to be punished. The position of the witch is what makes it 
part of a long history of oppression and violence against women, 
concludes Karlsen. 
Like Karlsen, Elizabeth Reis investigated witch trials in New 
England and found a connection between witchcraft accusations 
and the Protestant construction of women as passive and therefore 
more subject to paranormal influences.19 Thus, in some periods 
woman was shaped as a saint, and in the context of the witch-
craze, the inhabitants of New England were directed towards ‘the 
dark side of womanhood’, highlighting the susceptibility of the 
female body and soul to the Devil. Sarah Farber also found this 
construction of woman as passive and submissive in the works 
by Catholic reformers, who modeled her as a medieval saint or an 
early modern witch.20 Marianne Hester emphasized the threatening 
aspect of womanhood as the main motive for accusations, which 
served the patriarchal system as a means to control and subordinate 
it.21 In the early modern ages societies underwent different changes 
– demographic, ideological, economic, religious and political, 
which triggered insecurity, tensions and conflicts, also manifested, 
according to Hester, in the relations between the sexes. She 
sees the witch-hunt as the re-creation of the patriarchal system 
under new circumstances, holding that women are construed 
as different than and inferior to men, and in this construction 
sexualization or eroticization play an important part. In the age 
of the witch-hunt, it was sexuality that provided the foundation 
for an especially negative representation of women as witches, 
and this is the reason why it was more common to sanction them 
for ‘sexual’ transgressions, such as giving birth to children out of 
wedlock or living out of wedlock. The patriarchal ideal in the age 
of persecutions was a quiet and passive woman but who, according 
to Hester, was portrayed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
demonological literature, in different pamphlets and sermons, as 
insatiable, sinful and morally inferior to men, therefore in a way 
19 Elizabeth Reis, Damned Women. Sinners and Witches in Puritan New England, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997.
20 Sarah Ferber, Demonic Possession and Exorcism in Early Modern France, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2004.
21 The reference points mainly to her book from 1992, entitled Lewd Women and 
Wicked Witches. A Study in the Dynamics of Male Domination, Routledge, London and 
New York, but also the chapter “Patriarchal Reconstruction and Witch Hunting”, 
in Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe, cit. 
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frightening. For her thesis that witch-hunts actually represented an 
attempt to control women sexually and economically, Hester finds 
confirmation in the prevalently English literature of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, in which women were portrayed as quiet 
and submissive. Although Hester’s professed interest is the social 
construction of witches in the age of the most intense persecutions, 
Katharine Hodgkin points out that her conclusions are ahistorical, 
and that she does not explain why the early modern era is the 
time when the threatening femininity takes on the attributes of the 
witch.22 
Over the last several decades feminist criticism has undoubtedly 
influenced new perspectives in studying witch-hunts, emphasized 
the role of gender/sex in the construction of the witch and the 
influence of patriarchal norms on the construction of the female 
and witch identity. Most feminist authors noticed a heightened 
anxiety in relation to women and their sexuality in early modern 
texts and trial records, a sexuality which the patriarchal society 
attempted to control and subdue to the religiously constructed 
ideal of femininity of the time. Also, feminist criticism encouraged 
the serious questioning of women’s history in the early modern 
ages, the relationship between the public and private sphere 
and drew attention to the ‘androcentric methods of analysis’ in 
previous works. Unfortunately, however, the feminist approach 
has occasionally contributed to the invention of new myths 
in the vein of the romanticist ones – witches were depicted in 
various ways, ranging from healers and midwives to strong, 
often financially independent women, appropriating the figure 
of the witch for political ends. But these theses were not based 
on historical evidence nor verifiable at the microhistoric level 
and were frequent targets of historicists’ criticism, which served 
as justification for the outright dismissal of feminist criticism 
as a valid analytical framework and resulting in not making 
(historiographic) disciplinary boundaries more permeable and 
inclusive of other disciplinary insights and methodology.
However, the third shift in the study of the mass persecution 
of witches (which occurred in the 1990s) – and included an 
understanding of gender relations, but also the relationship 
between the mind (primarily unconscious), body and language 
in the construction and representations of witches – appeared as 
extremely important for the dissolution of images of the witch 
that ranged from ‘an evil woman’ and disenfranchised victim 
22 Hodgkin, Gender, Mind and Body, cit., pp. 182-202.
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to the superhero of the early modern period. This shift included 
psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic criticism in the readings of 
different archival materials and trial records, but also literary 
texts which led research to a more complex understanding of 
the testimonies of the accused, the accusers but also of the entire 
witchcraft imaginary.23 
A Psychoanalytic Reading of Croatian Witch Trials
When it comes to Croatian witch trials, with the focus of 
my interest being Zagreb and its surroundings,24 it was easy to 
notice an overarching misogyny – the number of accused men 
was negligible, as almost 95% of those convicted of witchcraft 
were women, which puts Croatia at the very top in the European 
context. However, misogyny itself, traceable even in statutes 
written in Croatian from the thirteenth century onwards which 
sanction women as witches25 (unlike those in Latin that include 
both sexes as possible perpetrators of maleficium), did not seem 
a satisfying answer to the question of what made women in the 
late seventeenth century, marked as the beginning of mass witch-
hunts in continental Croatia, so terrifying. In my opinion, to keep 
insisting solely on misogyny as the key element of persecution 
is to lose sight of the specific historicity of the phenomenon. 
Somewhat paradoxically, or even cynically, it was the persecution 
of witches that made women visible participants in urban life in 
Croatia, inscribing them in the male written history of the early 
modern age, disturbing the thus far predominantly male history.
Reading the court records, I expected to find the very 
culmination of sexual antagonism between men and women 
23 Two of the best studies using the psychoanalytical approach are: Lyndal 
Roper, Oedipus and the Devil. Witchcraft, Religion and Sexuality in Early Modern 
Europe, Routledge, London, 1994; and Diane Purkiss, The Witch in History. Early 
Modern and Twentieth-Century Representations, Routledge, London, 1994. Roper is 
a historian who dealt mainly with court records, while Purkiss dealt more with 
literary works, mostly that of Shakespeare. 
24 Here I have analyzed the court records exclusively from the period from 1699 
to 1758, the time of mass witch-hunts in the north-western part of Croatia, and in 
this text I will quote those collected and published in the book by law professor 
Vladimir Bayer, Ugovor s đavlom / A pact with the Devil, Zora, Zagreb, 1952, third 
edition 1982. The choice of north-western Croatia (which used to be a part of the 
Habsburg Monarchy), moreover of Zagreb court records, was the only possible 
choice: for the rest of Croatia, which had at the time been under either Osman 
Empire rule or Venetian Republic which led to having no preserved court records, 
but more importantly no evidence of any mass witch-hunts.
25 These included the Vinodol Law, the Statute of the Island of Krk, the Statute 
of Poljice, and the Statute of Trsat (acc. to Bayer 1982).
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there, as could be suggested by the witchcraft imaginary: flying a 
broom or an animal, intercourse with the devil, orgies at Sabbath, 
signing a pact with the devil, etc. However, an analysis of the 
records indicated that sexually-driven anxiety does not play a 
primary role, but instead the underlying concerns connected with 
the body and corporeality came to the fore.
Therefore, although understanding the power dynamics in 
society at the time, and that gender relations and identities were 
important, it was pertinent to draw on psychoanalytic theory 
due to what, from the contemporary perspective, appeared as 
fantastic, irrational parts of the witch imaginary, perpetuated in 
demonological treatises, trial records, witness testimonies, but 
also in the confessions of the accused. Lacanian psychoanalysis 
was chosen as an adequate interpretative model for several 
reasons: first, because of the historization of its procedures, and 
also because of the prominent position that the notion of the 
Other occupies within, which was crucial for understanding the 
persecutions.26
Also, unlike feminist critics from the 1980s who saw women’s 
testimonies only as voices of the patriarchal order, I found them 
to be legitimate women’s narratives of their own lives, fears, 
projections and fantasies told through the adopted or imposed 
discourse about witches, although written in the third person by a 
man, likely after a longer period of torture. It seemed possible that 
26 In this text I will continue to use the term the Other relying on Lacan’s theory 
of the structure of subjectivity, under which is implied that the Other is a part of 
the symbolic register, by which the subject acquires / builds its own identity, while 
the other is part of the imaginary and, according to Lacan, a ‘by-product’ of the 
formation of the ego in the mirror stage. Lacan in his theory of subjectivity relocated 
the ego in the area of the imaginary, and merged the subject with the unconscious 
as a primary feature. Its subject then becomes the subject of the unconscious. 
The consciousness or self-awareness of the subject is, for Lacan, mere delusion, 
an illusion of the ego. Structuring the ego rests on the inability to distinguish the 
‘original’ from the copy at the mirror stage or identifying itself with the reflection in 
the mirror, which alienates the subject from itself and develops narcissistic binding, 
but also aggressive impulses that are primarily focused on the subject’s biggest 
rival – itself. Lacan names that reflection or projection of the ego the little other and 
refers to it as a (according to the French autre), which is “the other who is not really 
other, but a reflection and projection of the Ego in the relation which is always 
mirrored, interchangeable” (Lacan 1978). In Seminar II Lacan joins the concept of 
the little other, or rather opposes, with the concept of the big Other, A (Autre). That 
Other is the second subject, in the primarily symbolic area i.e. of language and the 
unconscious, the order “in which the subject different from the ego comes to life, 
in such a way that it is always split and discontinuous”. Malcom Bowie, Lacan, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 92. Or for Lacan the unconscious is 
the discourse of the Other. Jacques Lacan. Écrits I, Seuil, Paris, 1966, p. 16. 
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this could provide at least a partial insight into the psychological 
structures of the subjects involved in the persecutions of witches at 
the time, bypassing the widely held notion that the records were a 
mere reflection of the patriarchal system and dominant ideology, 
and those women nothing but ‘spokeswomen’ of patriarchy.
Similarly, with the inclusion of testimonies from the trials as a 
corpus belonging to the oral tradition in which beliefs and legends 
mirror themselves, personally and collectively immersed in a 
specific cultural, social and political context, the boundaries of the 
corpus – which folkloristics traditionally discerns as memorates 
and fabulates – were expanded.
Thus, the focus of my research was on the influence of the 
unconscious on the construction of witches in the early modern 
period as extremely dangerous to individuals and society as a 
whole, which can be read from the trial records and some social 
and penal practices of the period. 
Such psychoanalytic interpretation of the material aims to find 
or point out the mechanisms of the structuring of subjectivity and 
the effects of the unconscious as the key to creation or projection 
of witchcraft imagery, which partly puts aside the usual, 
traditional interpretation of persecution such as misogyny, the 
effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, social and 
cultural conflicts, bad neighbor relations, elimination of business 
competition, etc.
Of course, this in no way tries to diminish or deny the influence 
of counterreformation on the construction of witches in Zagreb and 
the continental part of Croatia, and of scaremongering: the return 
of the Jesuits in Zagreb in the early seventeenth century marked the 
long process of correcting and disciplining the behavior and beliefs 
of the population, as witnessed by Jesuit chronicles and the texts of 
certain writers and preachers, such as Juraj Habdelić, whose works 
provide enough material to reconstruct different aspects of the 
everyday lives of artisans, merchants, soldiers and the occasional 
aristocrat in Gradec in the late seventeenth century.27 This period, 
27 In his literary works, especially with his grand, more than thousand-page 
long book Pervi otcza nassega Adama greh from 1674, Habdelić depicted interesting 
minutiae of the folk culture of Zagreb at the time (see Zrinka Nikolić, ”Gradska 
kultura u djelima Jurja Habdelića”, Zbornik Odsjeka za povijesne znanosti Zavoda za 
povijesne i društvene znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 19, 2001, pp. 
183-213). This book was later used as a secondary source in interpretation of some 
of the events of the 1573 Peasants’ Revolt, the great fire in Zagreb in 1645, the 
Magnate conspiracy, etc. However, this book, which was mostly read out loud, 
was written with the intention of being a didactic handbook on morality, used as a 
source for both spiritual, religious and physical betterment of the people. 
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among other things, saw a change in the image of the body, and 
criticism of sensuality and sexuality, especially when it comes to 
women, as the body’s exclusive purpose should be reproductive 
from then onwards: the usage of women’s bodies for pleasure is 
proscribed as especially sinful, and the image of the Virgin Mary 
as an ideal woman and mother becomes more prominent. These 
processes were bound to cause anxiety, frustration and resistance, 
as witnessed by Habdelić himself.
An analysis of the records brought to the fore something less 
expected – the fear of the witch as fear of the mother, that is, it 
pointed to an anxiety related to the position of the mother in the 
process of the structuring of subjectivity. According to the trial 
records, the fear of women in the early modern ages manifested 
itself in several key images which have been perpetuated in personal 
narratives, subsuming the concept of witch as anti-mother, while 
always occupying the position of the subject’s Other.
Narratives or fragments of narratives dominated by images of 
dismembered bodies of children killed so that their body parts 
could be used to make witch ointment, slaughtered animals and 
destroyed crops, the banquet at which the served food causes 
disgust or breaks taboos – all these being traditionally parts of the 
female domain, hence the birth or destruction of life, care for the 
home or its destruction, nature... The position of women is the one 
between nature and culture, the imaginary and the symbolic. She 
is the one with the power which intimidates as it is comprehensive 
and the subject can hardly escape it. Woman as mother and as 
witch should be conquered so that the subject could reach the 
symbolic space, in language and in society.
Psychoanalytic criticism would not be the first choice in 
analyzing the relationship to the body and physicality if Lacan 
had not devoted considerable attention to the body through its 
association with mental registers, especially with the imaginary 
and symbolic. For interpretation of the statements, and then of 
certain parts of the witchcraft imagery, the mirror as a central 
point of formation of the ego is its crucial stage, but it is important 
also for identification of the accused. Although Lacan used the 
word stage, we are talking of, as Roudinesco emphasized, the 
psychological or ontological operation and not a passing phase 
of a child’s / subject’s development.28 It is because of ‘premature 
28 Elisabeth Roudinesco, “The Mirror Stage. An Obliterated Archive”, in Jean-
Michel Rabaté (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 29.
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birth’, while the child has not yet mastered the motoric system 
and fragmentarily reflects on his body, who wrongfully sees his 
own reflection / image (image) as himself, while his own body 
is foreign and frightening to him, almost as a rival. Then the ego 
is structured on the basis of the ideas generated by others and 
asks for confirmation of the Other (initially that of the mother) to 
maintain a semblance of integrity.29
The mother becomes the first guarantee of the child’s identity 
and corporal wholeness, but also the one who has power over the 
subject’s life: she is the one who gives life and takes it away; the 
threat of destruction that the mother embodies never disappears. 
As the Other, she is part of the symbolic, but the relationship the 
child has with her is dyadic, belonging to the imaginary: according 
to Lacan, the mother occupies a marginal position between the 
two registers, the imaginary and the symbolic, nature and culture.
The images of dismembered bodies, castration, emasculation, 
mutilation, removal of the entrails, heart, blood vessels, devouring 
the bodies and orgies over the bodies – these are all phantasms 
which have their origins in the mirror stage,30 accompanying the 
subject all through life: they can often be found in children’s games, 
sometimes they appear in dreams, as nightmares, the subject goes 
through them in a certain phase of the psychoanalytical treatment, 
and they are also the integral part of the images of witches. The 
descriptions of witches’ threats and their excesses concerning 
the helpless bodies of the victims are abundant and eerie in 
records, and appear equally in the images of witches as cannibals, 
especially in the images of the witch as the threatening mother.
Descriptions of atrocities by witches exercised over numerous 
bodies or parts of bodies – children, adults, animals – are 
gruesome: the “pulling out of the heart” is often mentioned, 
gutting, even extracting blood vessels and such. Thus, in 1699, 
accused Jela Škvarić said while being questioned, that when 
witches get together they “eat human flesh”;31 one of the suspects, 
Margareta Dumbović-Boljanec said “that Jalžunka, Ključarić’s 
wife, is a witch and that she cooked and served a child’s head, ... 
but also stated that she had not eaten children’s heads”,32 while 
accused Kata Dolenc gave a detailed recipe for various diseases 
that witches can cause, even “to return from the dead”: “When 
29 Anthony Elliot, Uvod u psihoanalitičku teoriju, AGM, Zagreb, 2012, p. 65.
30 Lacan, Écrits I, cit., p. 104.
31 Vladimir Bayer, Ugovor s đavlom. Procesi protiv čarobnjaka u Evropi, a napose u 
Hrvatskoj. Zora, Zagreb, 1982 [1953], p. 595. 
32 Bayer, Ugovor s đavlom, cit., p. 598.
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witches take someone, they can cure him. A bloody place on the 
body should be looked for, then rinsed and given to drink, he will 
soon gain strength, and quickly so. Even though half of his heart 
will be burnt, he should recover”.33 
All these examples, which could be interpreted as projections 
or phantasms of the subject, seem to show that those who accused 
women of witchcraft were in a way stuck in the imaginary; i.e. 
almost the entire witch imaginary points to the dominant and 
threatening mother and the lack of or a weak father figure. 
Although there is not much preserved data on the structure of 
the population of Gradec at the time, even less so for the wider 
Zagreb region, these structures of subjects who were witnesses in 
the witch trials imply that women had real power in the families 
– whether due to wars which took their toll primarily on the male 
population, to men’s absence as merchants and artisans who 
frequently traveled to other cities, or due to other reasons. However, 
it is precisely because of the asymmetrical relations of power in 
families, reflected in the formation of subjectivity intimidated by 
the image of the devouring mother, that it is possible to talk about 
the early modern period as the age of matriarchy, and about witch 
persecutions as a rebellion against the mother who impedes the 
subject’s entry into the symbolic.
A very similar process of structuring the subject can be traced 
in cases of women who admitted to being witches: they accepted, 
or rather internalized the dominant image of women as evil, sinful, 
dangerous and given to bodily pleasures as their own mirror 
reflection, the image of the Other became one’s own image for 
porous subjects. In a world in which the image of the Virgin Mary 
was imposed as the ideal self, frustration and fears relating to 
motherhood and one’s own sexuality had to be particularly strong 
– therefore identification with one’s own ‘witch-like’ Otherness 
was much more probable than identification with the unattainable 
ideal of the Virgin Mother.
Thus the witches slipped from the private sphere into becoming 
the collective Other - whether one’s own identity was constructed 
in opposition and fear towards them, or in identification with them. 
However, utilization of the constructed Otherness of the witch was 
recognized and supported by authorities – witches’ bodies served 
for channeling anxieties, conflicts and violence in the community, 
as well as becoming a medium for constructing society by means of 
torture and public burnings. The once powerful bodies marked by 
33 Ivi, p. 600.
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the devil (as a possible father) were by means of torture attempted 
to be ‘unmarked’ and then enslaved, humiliated, destroyed: 
disciplining and public punishment served as a warning, but 
also as a means to establish the dialectical relationship between 
master and slave. The accused, tortured and burnt women came 
primarily from the ranks of artisans, merchants and servants in 
nobility estates, although the law permitted accusation of the 
nobility as well. 
Evidence of the utilization of witches as a collective Other is 
the fact that persecutions never occurred during wars or political 
crises: almost no witches were on trial during the sixteenth 
century in Zagreb because the role of the Other was transferred, 
it belonged to the real Other, the Ottomans who attacked the city 
and its surroundings, while mass persecutions started in 1699, a 
month after the signing of the peace treaty in Srijemski Karlovci, 
which marked the end of the war against the Ottoman Empire.
Thus the phantasms and projections transferred from 
the individual sphere of the clergy that participated in their 
construction (such as Institoris and his phantasmatic diary and 
the most popular handbook of the inquisitors, Malleus maleficarum) 
and the ‘common people’ to the sphere of the political and the 
ideological, became the place of relieving tensions and redirecting 
violence.
The persecutions of witches in Zagreb and its surroundings 
represent an important contribution to the history of women, a 
history which to this day disturbs the important, ‘grand’ history, 
but also to the history of the unconscious, being a cautionary tale 
of the manner of constructing Otherness and its almost timeless 
usage in political and ideological purposes. 
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Feminism in Disguise: Isotta Nogarola’s 
Defense of Eve (1451)1
Francesca Maria Gabrielli
Summary
The humanist scholar Isotta Nogarola (1418-1466) contributed to 
the philogynist side of the Renaissance debate on women (querelle des 
femmes) both in her early and in her mature production. After discussing 
a defensio mulierum passage from Nogarola’s letterbook (1436 or 1437), 
this essay presents a reading of the carefully orchestrated defense of 
the first woman that the Veronese humanist scholar crafted in her 
major work commonly known as the Dialogue on Adam and Eve (1451). 
The Latin dialogue in question can be read as a sophisticated revision 
of the scriptural representation of humankind’s mother, one that 
simultaneously accepts and resists the stereotype of female inferiority, 
ultimately serving as an avenue both for Nogarola’s self-authorization 
and for her feminist advocacy. The aim of this essay is to show the 
subtle ways in which Isotta Nogarola legitimated her own intellectual 
and spiritual pursuits, as well as womankind’s desire for knowledge 
and spiritual perfection, by way of reinterpreting the biblical figure of 
Eve.
 
1 This essay is a revised and further elaborated version of a chapter from my 
doctoral thesis “Protofeminističke reinterpretacije ženskih biblijskih figura u djelima 
šest autorica između 15. i 17. stoljeća” (Protofeminist Reinterpretations of Female 
Biblical Figures in the Works of Six Women Authors from the XVth to the XVIIth 
Century), which I defended under the supervision of Professor Morana Čale at the 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb in May 2015. 
A version in Croatian of this essay is forthcoming in Francesca Maria Gabrielli, Evine 
kćeri. Žene o biblijskim ženama u talijanskoj renesansi (Daughters of Eve. Women on 
Biblical Women in the Italian Renaissance), Disput, Zagreb. 
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Do you not know that every one of you is an Eve? 
The sentence of God on your sex lives on in this age; the guilt, of 
necessity, lives on too.
(Tertullian, De cultu feminarum, I, 12)2 
... she had surpassed the limits of her sex and taken on a mentality 
that was manly or rather angelic ...
(Gerontius, Vita Melaniae Iunioris)3 
The reclaiming of a feminist future is necessarily grounded 
in and informed by the investigation of a feminist past. This 
essay presents a reading of the oeuvre of the Veronese humanist 
scholar Isotta Nogarola (1418-1466)4 in light of its importance for 
the development of feminist thought. In her study on the birth 
of feminism, Sarah Gwyneth Ross points out that “the historical 
significance of Renaissance women writers lies in their collective 
argument (by word and by example) for the intellectual equality 
of the sexes, which was the precondition for thinking about the 
political equality of the sexes”.5 The cultural discourse of the 
period at issue was, indeed, predominantly androcentric, drawing 
its justifications for considering women inferior – physically, 
intellectually, and morally – from classical and Judeo-Christian 
authoritative sources. At the same time, however, a philogynist 
cultural imaginarium was gradually gaining momentum. 
As Virginia Cox maintains, it was precisely the emergence 
of a discourse supportive of women from the thematization 
of illustrious women in the works of the fourteenth-century 
humanism’s founders Petrarch and Boccaccio onward that 
enabled the unprecedented phenomenon of the secular learned 
women’s active and extensive participation in the Italian culture 
2 As quoted in Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent, Vintage Books, New 
York, 1989, p. 63. 
3 As quoted in Gillian Cloke, ‘This Female Man of God’. Women and Spiritual 
Power in the Patristic Age, AD 350-450, Routledge, London and New York, p. 214. 
4 For Isotta Nogarola’s life and literary production, see Margaret L. King, “The 
Religious Retreat of Isotta Nogarola (1418-1466). Sexism and Its Consequences in 
the Fifteenth Century”, Signs, 3, 4, 1978, pp. 807-822; Margaret L. King and Diana 
Robin, “Volume Editors’ Introduction”, in Isotta Nogarola, Complete Writings. 
Letterbook, Dialogue on Adam and Eve, Orations, Margaret L. King and Diana Robin 
(eds. and trans.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2004, pp. 1-19 
(see also the introductions to the single chapters of King and Robin’s modern 
edition of Nogarola’s oeuvre; Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., passim).
5 Sarah Gwyneth Ross, The Birth of Feminism. Woman as Intellect in Renaissance 
Italy and England, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 
England, 2009, p. 314.
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of the Renaissance.6 Some of the Italian learned women who took 
up their pen in the period in question explicitly engaged in what 
is generally considered as one of its most important disputes: the 
debate on women (querelle des femmes).7 The early manifestations 
of feminism articulated therein were not only characterized by 
a general anti-misogyny stance, often articulated by way of pro-
woman readings of authoritative texts, but conveyed the “sense 
that the sexes are culturally, not just biologically, formed”.8 On 
the other hand, the authors who endorsed the misogynous side 
of the querelle insisted on adducing auctoritates, both classical 
and Judeo-Christian, and most notably the second biblical 
account of creation, i.e. the story of Adam and Eve (Gn 2-3.24), 
to validate women’s subordinate position to men as natural and 
divinely-ordained.9 Isotta Nogarola not only contributed to the 
discussion, but dared to venture into the thorny arena of biblical 
exegesis.10 Both in her early and in her mature writings, from 
the defensio mulierum passages in her epistolary production to 
the astute defense of the biblical first woman in her major work 
commonly known as the Dialogue on Adam and Eve,11 the Veronese 
6 The works at issue are Petrarch’s epistle Familiares 21.8 and Boccaccio’s treatise 
De claris mulieribus. See Virginia Cox, Women’s Writing in Italy, 1400-1650, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, pp. xi-xxii, 18-20. Cox remarks that “the 
Renaissance ‘defense of women’ is continuous in certain respects with previous 
traditions of prowoman argument”, i.e. with the philogynist side of the “debate 
in general on the merits and demerits of women, as it may be traced from classical 
antiquity through patristic, medieval, and early modern culture down to the 
present day”, yet “it is also quite distinct in its methods and emphases”, ivi, p. xviii. 
7 For the querelle des femmes, see Joan Kelly, “Early Feminist Theory and the 
Querelle des Femmes, 1400-1789”, in Women, History, and Theory. The Essays of Joan 
Kelly, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1984, pp. 65-109. The 
beginning of the Renaissance debate on women is usually identified with Christine 
de Pizan’s reaction to the misogynous views expressed in certain male-authored 
works (such as the portion of the Roman de la Rose authored by Jean de Meung). 
The debate permeated the Renaissance episteme, lasting for a period of about four 
centuries, during which various authors thematized misogynist or philogynist 
views.
8 Ivi, p. 67.
9 See for instance ivi, p. 73.
10 For a history of women’s cultural presence as readers and interpreters of 
the Bible from the beginning of the Christian tradition, see Adriana Valerio (ed.), 
Donne e Bibbia. Storia ed esegesi, Edizioni Dehoniane, Bologna, 2006. 
11 For the Dialogue on Adam and Eve, which constitutes one of the “inaugural 
texts in the history of the European controversy over gender and nature“, see 
King and Robin’s general introduction to their modern edition of Nogarola’s opus 
(Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., passim) and the introduction to chapter seven in 
particular (“The Great Gender Debate (1451)”, in Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., 
pp. 138-145; quotation at p. 142). See also Prudence Allen, “Isotta Nogarola (1418-
1466) and Ludovico Foscarini”, in The Concept of Woman. Volume II, Part II. The 
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scholar pondered women’s worth.12 Following a discussion of the 
peculiar lifestyle choices to which Isotta Nogarola committed, this 
essay will briefly analyze a celebratory list of women contained 
in one of her letters (1436 or 1437), and thereafter offer a reading 
of her carefully orchestrated dialogue on the primal couple (1451) 
so as to show the subtle rhetorical ways in which Nogarola 
legitimated her own intellectual and spiritual pursuits, as well as 
womankind’s desire for knowledge and spiritual perfection, by 
way of reinterpreting the biblical figure of Eve.
Isotta Nogarola and the Angelic Life
At the early age of twenty, the Veronese noblewoman Isotta 
Nogarola – whose ambition to acquire a high level of erudition 
in the field of humanist studies, a prerogative of the male elites, 
was wholeheartedly supported by her unlettered mother Bianca 
Borromeo13 – already figured as a well-known literary presence 
Early Humanist Reformation, 1250-1500, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge, England, 2002, pp. 944-969; Janet Levarie 
Smarr, “Dialogue and Letter Writing. Laura Cereta, Isotta Nogarola, Helisenne 
de Crenne, Chiara Matraini”, in Joining the Conversation. Dialogues by Renaissance 
Women, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005, pp. 129-153; Thelma S. 
Fenster, “Strong Voices. Weak Minds? The Defenses of Eve by Isotta Nogarola and 
Christine de Pizan, Who Found Themselves in Simone de Beauvoir’s Situation”, 
in Pamela Joseph Benson and Victoria Kirkham (eds.), Strong Voices, Weak History. 
Early Women Writers and Canons in England, France and Italy, The University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005, pp. 58-77.
12 Margaret King points out that, ”[a]lthough a few women had previously 
resisted the message about Eve, Nogarola’s work is historic: it is the first known 
major defense of Eve by a woman author” (Margaret L. King, “Nogarola, Isotta (1418-
1466)”, in Marion Ann Taylor (ed.), Handbook of Women Biblical Interpreters, Baker 
Academic, Grand Rapids, 2012, p. 390). Significant female-authored reinterpretations 
of the figure of Eve previous to Nogarola’s can be found in the oeuvre of the German 
visionary mystic Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) and the French writer Christine 
de Pizan (1365-ca. 1430), see Gerda Lerner, “One Thousand Years of Feminist Bible 
Criticism”, in The Creation of Feminist Consciousness. From the Middle Ages to Eighteen-
seventy, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1993, pp. 138-146. For a 
reading of the 1451 Dialogue on Adam and Eve of Isotta Nogarola within the history of 
female-authored biblical exegesis as crucial for the development of feminist thought, 
see ivi, pp. 146-147. For the life and production of Isotta Nogarola within a study that 
extensively deals with early feminist thought in Italy and England (1400-1680), see 
Ross, The Birth of Feminism, cit., pp. 30-40; pp. 143-151.
13 King and Robin point out that the merit of Nogarola’s education goes to her 
mother, Bianca Borromeo, a widow who recruited the humanist scholar Martino 
Rizzoni, a student of Guarino Guarini, as a tutor for Isotta and her sister Ginevra. 
See King and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., p. 3. Notwithstanding the 
possibility that “Bianca acted in accordance with her late husband’s wishes” (Ross, 
The Birth of Feminism, cit., p. 31), her continuous support of Nogarola’s intellectual 
and spiritual urge bears witness to the productive impact of a benevolent mother-
daughter dynamic. 
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within the northeastern Italian humanist circle on account of her 
Latin epistolary production.14 The increasing acclaim this woman 
author enjoyed throughout her life thanks to her talent and 
dedication is evinced in the letters of her correspondents. Apart 
from addressing her scholarly pursuits, however, the laudatory 
discourse with which she was lavished also incorporated the 
exaltation of the specific lifestyle to which Isotta Nogarola at a 
certain point committed. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that, in 
the period under consideration, women from the upper strata of 
society were generally presented with two mutually excluding life 
paths, the marital and the conventual (as per the maxim aut maritum 
aut murum)15 – in 1441 she decided to eschew both possibilities. At 
the age of twenty-three, and nurtured by her mother’s approval, 
Nogarola chose to live in her family’s home “in the anomalous 
condition of a permanently unmarried woman”, and dedicate 
herself to a life of study and perpetual virginity.16 What is more, 
Nogarola temporarily retreated from the humanistic public arena 
of epistolary exchange, withdrawing into a long literary silence 
in order to devote herself primarily to sacred studies.17 Indeed, 
as Margaret King and Diana Robin conclude on account of their 
14 Eugenius Abel edited Nogarola’s complete production towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. See Isotta Nogarola, Isotæ Nogarolæ Veronensis opera quæ supersunt 
omnia; accedunt Angelæ et Zenevræ Nogarolæ epistolæ et carmina, 2 vols., Eugenius Abel 
(ed.), apud Gerold et socios, Vienna, apud Fridericum Kilian, Budapest, 1886. In 
subsequent references: Opera. As already pointed out, Margaret L. King and Diana 
Robin in recent years edited Nogarola’s production and translated it into English, 
see Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit. All English translations of works by and to 
Isotta Nogarola in this essay are taken from King and Robin’s modern edition. On 
the very early renown (by 1438) of the humanist scholar and her sister Ginevra 
(who at that time married and thereafter abandoned her literary career), see King 
and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., p. 4. As one of the most prominent 
female authors in the Italian humanist production, Nogarola was among the first 
secular women who wrote in Latin. For female-authored humanist production, see 
the anthology edited by Margaret L. King and Albert Rabil Jr. (eds.), Her Immaculate 
Hand. Selected Works by and about the Women Humanists of Quattrocento Italy, Pegasus 
Press, Asheville, 2000. See also Lisa Jardine, “O decus Italiae Virgo, or The Myth of 
the Learned Lady in the Renaissance”, The Historical Journal, 28, 4, 1985, pp. 799-
819; Margaret L. King, “Book-Lined Cells. Women and Humanism in the Early 
Italian Renaissance”, in Patricia H. Labalme (ed.), Beyond Their Sex. Learned Women 
of the European Past, New York University Press, New York and London, 1984, pp. 
66-90; Margaret L. King, “Petrarch, the Self-Conscious Self, and the First Women 
Humanists”, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 35, 3, 2005, pp. 537-558.
15 See King and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., p. 5.
16 King and Robin, “The Book-Lined Cell (1441 to early 1450s)”, in Nogarola, 
Complete Writings, cit., p. 101. 
17 For Nogarola’s 1441 decision, see King and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, 
cit., pp. 5-9; King and Robin, The Book-Lined Cell (1441 to early 1450s), cit., pp. 101-107.
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analysis of the citational elements in Nogarola’s oeuvre, while the 
humanist scholar had, up to that time, for the most part (while 
not exclusively) been interested in the classics, from then on she 
concentrated her intellectual efforts upon the field of sacred studies, 
without renouncing her interest in classical literature.18 After a 
decade of literary invisibility, Nogarola resurfaced as an author 
who felt entitled to confront the age-long tradition of misogynous 
interpretations of the Genesis account. Indeed, in 1451 she circulated 
her revision of the second creation story in her work commonly 
known as the Dialogue on Adam and Eve, where the character ”Isota” 
transfers to the first man the greater guilt for the original sin and 
the consequent Fall of humankind, undermining thus the deeply 
rooted cultural prejudices against the female sex. 
It is not clear whether Nogarola’s decision in 1441 was 
influenced, at least to some extent, by an invective addressed 
against her and her family two years earlier19 by an anonymous 
humanist author:20 
... the saying of many wise men I hold to be true: that an eloquent 
woman is never chaste; and the behavior of many learned women 
also confirms its truth. ... before she made her body generally 
18 The only extant work by Nogarola from the period before 1451 that contains 
references to biblical and patristic texts is a 1438 letter to Damiano Dal Borgo, see 
King and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., p. 11; see also King and Robin, 
“Damiano (1438-1441)”, in Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., pp. 89-92. The following 
brief periodization of Nogarola’s work is based on King and Robin’s Volume Editors’ 
Introduction, cit., esp. pp. 9-17; as well as on King’s article Petrarch, the Self-Conscious 
Self, cit., pp. 541-546. In the period from 1434 to 1441, Isotta Nogarola engaged in 
correspondence with humanist scholars (she authored twenty-four letters and 
received twenty-seven). The year 1441 marked the beginnings of a decade-long 
literary silence, during which she also devoted herself to sacred studies. Indeed, 
the works Nogarola authored from the year 1451 display profusely her erudition 
in the sacred tradition. Nogarola’s extant works from the year 1451 to the year 1466 
comprise one dialogue (the Dialogue on Adam and Eve, the most important female-
authored contribution to Italian humanist culture), three orations (of which one is an 
encomium of Jerome), and a consolatory letter. Of her epistolary production in this 
phase, only one letter is extant (1451, to Ludovico Foscarini). 
19 King and Robin date the invective in the year 1439 (Volume Editors’ 
Introduction, cit., p. 6). For the invective, see also Arnaldo Segarizzi, “Niccolò Barbo 
patrizio veneziano del sec. XV e le accuse contro Isotta Nogarola”, Giornale storico 
della letteratura italiana, 43, 1904, p. 53. For Segarizzi’s transcription of the Latin 
original, see pp. 50-54.
20 Jane Stevenson argues that, despite the fact that it did not trigger a debate 
among contemporaries, the invective impacted Nogarola’s life, upon which she 
“retreated from her relatively public position as a scholar and intellectual into a 
more private mode of life”. See Stevenson, Women Latin Poets. Language, Gender, 
and Authority from Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2005, p. 162.
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available for promiscuous intercourse, she had first permitted – 
and indeed even earnestly desired – that the seal of her virginity 
be broken by none other than her brother ... Alas for God in whom 
men trust ... when she, who sets herself no limit in this filthy lust, 
dares to engage so deeply in the finest literary studies.21
Notwithstanding the fact whether the choice of uncloistered 
perpetual virginity was triggered or not by the accusations of 
sexual impropriety brought against her in this vituperative text 
(“an example of the humanist ‘war of words’” that in this particular 
instance capitalized on the widespread misogynous bias according 
to which “an eloquent woman is never chaste”),22 the lifestyle 
to which Nogarola committed in 1441, her “private practice of 
the vow of celibacy”,23 authorized her to live, unmarried, with 
her mother in her brother’s house, and to devote herself to both 
intellectual and spiritual pursuits. 
In their discussion of Nogarola’s lifestyle, Margaret King and 
Diana Robin raise the crucial question of whether her commitment 
to celibacy was a role “imposed upon her by cultural expectations”, 
in line with “a female type familiar in the era: the holy woman”, or 
was it perhaps something she intimately desired?24 
21 Translated by Margaret L. King and Diana Robin. Quoted from King and 
Robin, “Venice and Beyond (1438-39)”, in Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., pp. 68-69. 
22 Stevenson, Women Latin Poets, cit., p. 162. According to Sarah Gwyneth 
Ross, “the literary attack on Isotta Nogarola should be understood as one instance 
of a widespread practice: sexual invective constituted the preferred weapon 
of defamation in literary exchange. Jealous vituperation from rivals, however 
unpleasant, demonstrated one’s entrance on the public stage no less than elegant 
praise from colleagues and patrons did” (Ross, The Birth of Feminism, cit., pp. 38-
39). As Ross points out, the impact of the invective was weakened by the reactions 
of male humanist scholars, such as Niccolò Barbo, who “dismissed the accusations 
out of hand, emphasizing that Nogarola was a paragon of chastity” (ivi, p. 39). On 
this matter see Segarizzi, Niccolò Barbo, cit.
23 Allen, Isotta Nogarola (1418-1466) and Ludovico Foscarini, cit., p. 944, note 26.
24 King and Robin, “The Book-Lined Cell (1441 to early 1450s)”, in Nogarola, 
Complete Writings, cit., p. 102. King and Robin define the type of the holy woman, 
“much revered in Italy in the period 1300-1600”, as “a living saint who combined 
mystical experience with personal asceticism and sacrificial service to the poor 
and the ill” and remark that “Isotta Nogarola did none of these things”, apart 
from “the self-discipline she imposed upon herself by renouncing marriage and 
retiring to the household of her male kin” (Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., pp. 
7-8). See also King’s observation that “Nogarola, in effect, won permission for 
her studies by defining herself as a holy woman, a hermit in her own house and 
her own city. In this guise, she was admired” (King, Petrarch, the Self-Conscious 
Self, cit., p. 545). In her entry on Isotta Nogarola in Taylor (ed.), Handbook of 
Women Biblical Interpreters, cit., Margaret King remarks that the humanist scholar 
adopted “the lifestyle of a pinzochera, an uncloistered ’holy woman’, a social 
category not uncommon in urban Italy“ (ivi, p. 388). 
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Did Nogarola enter into a religious, as well as a scholarly retreat, 
in 1441? Did she do so willingly, or was that role imposed upon 
her by cultural expectations? Or was the construction of Nogarola 
as a holy woman the fantasy of male observers ... who could not 
otherwise understand the circumstances in which an unmarried 
woman, alone, studied and wrote? The written record cannot yield 
certainty on these issues ...25
While the question must necessarily be left unanswered, this 
essay suggests that – rather than interpreting the humanist author’s 
lifestyle (only) as a strategic negotiation with the restrictions of 
patriarchy to pursue a life of study, or, to put it in the words of 
Gerda Lerner, as “[t]he price paid by Isotta Nogarola for being 
a thinking woman”26 – it may be productive (especially with 
regard to her re-vision of Eve) to read her dedication to virginity 
as a self-empowering choice stemming from her own spiritual 
and intellectual inclinations and convictions, without posing 
hermeneutic resistance to the indications offered in some of the 
letters addressed to Nogarola, wherein we may find, for instance, 
a depiction of the unmarried learned woman as a “holy and 
venerable sister in the Lord”, wholeheartedly engaged in spiritual 
and intellectual pursuits in a room – a “book-lined cell” – of her 
family’s house.27 As Jane Stevenson puts it, it is “seriously to be 
asked whether the male humanist response to Isotta was actually 
reinforcing and validating a choice she was already known to 
have made: it cannot have been an attempt to force her into a pre-
existing mould, since no such mould existed” for the life choices of 
the first humanist women.28 In any case, even if the specificities of 
Nogarola’s situation were unusual for the time,29 her correspondents 
seem to make sense of them with ease. For instance, the humanist 
25 King and Robin, “The Book-Lined Cell (1441 to early 1450s)”, in Nogarola, 
Complete Writings, cit., p. 102. 
26 Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness, cit., p. 31. Gerda Lerner 
remarks that “[t]his role for a woman intellectual was approved by society because 
it continued the tradition of learned women religious” (ibid.). 
27 The two quotations from a letter that Matteo Bosso addressed to Isotta 
Nogarola after 1451 are taken from King and Robin, The Book-Lined Cell (1441 to 
early 1450s), cit., p. 105, notes 13 and 14. As King and Robin point out, even if 
Isotta mainly lived in isolation, she circulated freely in her hometown, where she 
delivered at least two public orations. Moreover, her most influential work, the 
Dialogue on Adam and Eve, is possibly the product of a public debate in which she 
engaged with Ludovico Foscarini. See ivi, pp. 6-7. 
28 Stevenson, Women Latin Poets, cit., p. 164. 
29 Jane Stevenson describes Nogarola’s choice of uncloistered celibacy as “a 
‘third way’ also followed by a number of later Italian women scholars”, see ivi, 
p. 162.
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and statesman Ludovico Foscarini – who appears in the Dialogue 
on Adam and Eve as the character ”Lodovicus” – did not hesitate 
to insist, in one of the many letters he sent her in 1453, that Isotta 
Nogarola, a consecrated virgin and scholar living austerely in the 
domestic space, was following a precise model: 
You follow the examples of the holy fathers, I do nothing of the 
sort. Those who struggle to pursue your kind of saintly life have 
progressed by hunger, thirst, cold, nudity, labors, vigils, fasts, 
and prayers, serving God in the hermitage, in the cloister, and in 
the home; forgetful of themselves they have disdained honors, 
wealth, patrons and clients, duties. You follow these models, you 
imitate them.30 
The expression “holy fathers” (sancti patres),31 even if 
broad, in the context of the aforementioned passage evokes 
the ascetic founders of Christianity. As Eugene Rice reminds 
us, the humanists’ rediscovery of ancient culture included the 
“reevaluation of Christian antiquity”,32 and in particular of the 
works of patristic thinkers, exalted for their “union of wisdom 
and piety with eloquence”, which perfectly resonated with 
the humanistic notion of virtus.33 The appeal of the Fathers of 
the Church, and in particular of the ascetic Jerome – acclaimed 
in the humanistic period, and especially so for his exaltation of 
perpetual virginity34 – is evident in Isotta Nogarola’s early and 
mature writings. Indeed, in an early letter to Giorgio Bevilacqua 
(1436 or 1437), she claimed an increase in wisdom each time she 
took in her hands the devotional book on the death of Jerome her 
correspondent had presented her with.35 In her first work with 
extensive biblical references, a letter to Damiano dal Borgo (1438), 
she corroborated her consolatory discourse by mentioning a point 
made by Jerome in one of his epistles.36 Finally, of the six works 
she composed in her mature years, one is an oration in praise 
of the church Father (1453), in which she quoted a considerable 
30 Quoted from King and Robin, “Foscarini (1451-1466)”, in Nogarola, Complete 
Writings, cit., p. 124. 
31 For the Latin original, see Opera II, pp. 103-104.
32 Eugene F. Rice, Saint Jerome in the Renaissance, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore and London, 1985, p. 85. 
33 Ivi, p. 93. Rice remarks that “all humanistic reading programs and the 
curricola of every humanistic school included works by the fathers, grouped now 
with the classical writers rather than with the medieval theologians”, ivi, p. 90.
34 See ivi, pp. 84-115. 
35 See Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 38. 
36 See ivi, p. 90. 
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portion from his renowned letter to the consecrated virgin 
Eustochium, thematizing the extreme hardships of his ascetic 
experience in the desert.37 As is well known, Jerome’s works, and 
in particular his letters, are a fundamental testimony to the intense 
female spiritual and intellectual participation in early Christian 
culture.38 Indeed, given the exceedingly scant female-authored 
writings we possess from the first centuries of Christianity, the 
contribution of Western women, especially manifest from the 
fourth century onward, is mostly tackled from the viewpoint of 
patristic writers, and in particular Jerome, who, as mentor to a 
circle of women that supported him, repeatedly extolled their 
ascetic and scholarly feats, defining them as exceptional, a point 
to which I will return. Rice asserts that Nogarola’s lifestyle is 
modelled on the “devotional practices” of the women advised by 
the church father, and specifically on the ascetic path thematized 
in his epistle to Eustochium: a life of perpetual virginity intensely 
invested in sacred studies, practiced in a room of her home as a 
form of only partial withdrawal from the world.39 The ’angelic life’40 
Jerome recommended to consecrated virgins closely resembles, 
indeed, Isotta Nogarola’s lifestyle: when approached from this 
perspective, the peculiarities of her circumstances make perfect 
sense, becoming as easily intelligible as they were, as it seems, to 
her contemporaries. In point of fact, Ludovico Foscarini exalted 
Isotta Nogarola’s dedication to both spiritual and intellectual 
pursuits – the “enterprise of letters and Christian life” of this 
“most worthy virgin” who leads her “life and spirit amid hard 
work and long hours devoted to study”, cherishing “not gold or 
embroidered robes, but Cicero, Virgil, Jerome, Augustine”, i.e. 
both the classical and the late-ancient patristic tradition – as a 
perfect embodiment of the angelic ideal:41
37 See ivi, pp. 167-174. According to Rice, “Jerome’s Ep. 22 to Eustochium, 
De virginitate servanda, was the most frequently copied of his letters”. Rice, Saint 
Jerome, cit., p. 92.
38 For early Christian women, see at least Elizabeth Clark, Women in the Early 
Church, Michael Glazier Inc., Wilmington, Delaware, 1983; Gillian Cloke, This 
Female Man of God, cit.
39 See Rice, Saint Jerome, cit., p. 97.
40 In the Christian discourse, the lifestyle of consecrated celibacy is represented 
as the angelic life, as for instance in Jerome’s letter to Eustochium, where he defines 
perpetual virginity as “the life that angels enjoy” (“angelorum vitam”). Jerome, 
Select Letters of St. Jerome, translated by F. A Wright, William Heinemann and G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, London and New York, 1933, pp. 96-97.
41 For Ludovico Foscarini’s early 1453 letter, see Nogarola, Complete Writings, 
cit., pp. 131-137. For the quotations from King and Robin’s English translation see 
ivi, pp. 133, 131, 133, 135.
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... although placed on earth, you are like the angels, speaking or 
thinking nothing except what pertains to the glory of God.42 
Humanistic epistolography is, of course, highly conventional, 
and the “inescapable models for the Renaissance Latin letters sent 
from scholarly men to virginal women are those of Jerome, which 
praise celibacy”;43 still, in this specific case, the praise of Nogarola 
closely corresponds to the peculiarities of the lifestyle to which 
she pledged herself, moved, as it seems, by a combination of 
both intellectual and spiritual urges, and, perhaps, by a desire for 
greater freedom. Indeed, as Elizabeth Clark deftly notes, the “chief 
route to the acquisition of greater freedom for Christian women in 
the patristic era was asceticism”.44 Isotta Nogarola seems to have 
chosen the path of her late-ancient foremothers to live a life less 
encumbered by social impositions and aligned with her deepest 
aspirations. 
Another aspect of the laudatory discourse addressed to the 
Veronese scholar is the adoption of a rhetoric of exceptionality. 
A number of Nogarola’s correspondents thematized her 
accomplishments as prodigious, insisting that she managed to 
exceed the constrictions posed upon her by her sex. As is well-
known, the roots of the misogynous topos at issue lie in the 
hierarchical gender divide that characterized the Western cultural 
imaginarium from classical antiquity through the patristic and 
scholastic era, down to the Renaissance (not to mention its legacy 
in the present day), at the heart of which is the notion of the 
superiority of masculinity. Indeed, Nogarola’s correspondents, 
as is the case with the Venetian nobleman Lauro Quirini, often 
depicted her excellence in both eloquence and Christian virtue as a 
product of a virile spirit, which is in consonance with the enduring 
trope of the virago, the woman who transcended her sex:45
Rightly, therefore, should you also, famous Isotta, receive the 
highest praises, since you have indeed, if I may so speak, overcome 
your own nature. For that true virtue that is proper to men you have 
pursued with remarkable zeal – not the mediocre virtue that many 
42 Ivi, p. 132.
43 Stevenson, Women Latin Poets, cit., p. 164.
44 Clark, Women in the Early Church, cit., p. 17. As Elizabeth Clark points out, 
“Christian women of the patristic era who renounced traditional sexual and 
domestic roles did indeed find new worlds open to them, worlds of scholarship 
and contemplation, pilgrimage and charitable endeavor” (ivi, p. 16). 
45 Quirini’s letter is approximately dated to 1445-1448 or 1451-1452. See Opera 
II, p. 9.
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men seek, but that which would befit a man of the most flawless 
and perfect wisdom. Thus Cicero rightly said, “You young men 
have a womanly spirit, but that woman has a man’s spirit”.46
The virago trope is a by-product of the age-long cultural 
imbrication of the mind(soul)-body and male-female hierarchies, 
i.e. of the repeated association, from classical antiquity onward, of 
masculinity with the realm of mind/soul and femininity with the 
realm of the body, considered, needless to say, as the inferior pole of 
the binary opposition.47 In the words of Mathew Kuefler, “[t]hrough 
such a strategy, virtuous qualities could be praised in women 
while leaving the intellectual equation of virtue and masculinity 
intact”.48 In his study on “the collapse of the ancient or classical 
ideal for men in the western Mediterranean in late antiquity and the 
establishment of a new Christian masculinity”, Kuefler argues that 
the late-ancient patristic writers, operating in the historical moment 
when Christianity had turned from dissenting sect to official 
religion of the Roman empire, supported the ancient equation of 
masculinity with perfection and aptly re-appropriated it by way 
of a paradoxical rhetorical strategy, i.e. by insisting “that Christian 
men were manliest when they abandoned the pursuits that Roman 
tradition had long considered manly – participation in war and 
politics, in sex, marriage, and family life – and pursued divergent 
paths to manliness. But manliness remained the end to which they 
strove, even if it might be delineated in different ways – as interior 
warfare, as ecclesiastical politics, as sexual and marital renunciation 
– and even if it might be redefined as Christian virtue”.49 Therefore, 
in spite of the egalitarian “genderless ideal” that emerged in at 
least some traditions of earliest Christianity – clearly evinced, for 
instance, in the pre-Pauline baptismal formula of Galatians50 (“As 
46 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 108. King and Robin note that the 
quotation is from Cicero, De officiis, 1.18.61, see ivi. 
47 For identification of woman with the body in classical antiquity, see Elizabeth 
V. Spelman, “Woman as Body. Ancient and Contemporary Views”, Feminist Studies, 
8, 1, 1982, pp. 109-131. For the “assimilation of male-female dualism into soul-
body dualism in patristic theology”, see Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Misogynism 
and Virginal Feminism”, in Rosemary Radford Ruether (ed.), Religion and Sexism. 
Images of Woman in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 
Eugene, 1998 (originally published in 1974), pp. 150-183, quotation at p. 156. 
48 Mathew Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch. Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and 
Christian Ideology in Late Antiquity, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, 2001, p. 31. 
49 Ivi, pp. 6, 206; on the issue see ivi, passim.
50 Ivi, p. 221 (for Kuefler’s take on the “genderless ideal” in earliest Christianity, 
see ivi, pp. 221-226). In Kuefler’s words, “it seems as though at least some of the 
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many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourself 
with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave 
or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one 
in Christ Jesus”)51 – the Fathers of the Church, including Jerome 
and Augustine, subscribed to the classical cultural association of 
virtus with vir, endorsing the corollary of female inferiority, and 
extolling those Christian women who excelled in virtue and biblical 
scholarship as praiseworthy and virile anomalies. It goes without 
saying that the ideal of virginity, present in Christianity from its 
origins and dominant from the fourth century, practiced by both 
men and women and considered the earthly imitation of the ‘life 
of the angels’ (a “harmonious” life “in a society no longer formed 
by bonds of marriage, family, kinship”),52 was reformulated in late-
ancient Christianity as an angelic yet masculine endeavor. In other 
words, notwithstanding its gender-ambiguous formulation in 
earliest Christianity (such is, indeed, Jesus’ well-known exaltation 
of Christian celibate men and women as “eunuchs who have made 
themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven” Mt 
19.12), the late-ancient ideal of celibacy was believed to entail, 
in a man’s case, the realization of the perfection inherent in his 
earliest Christians seriously challenged the customary social roles of men and 
women”. On the “egalitarian, countercultural, multifaceted movement” of earliest 
Christianity, before “a patriarchalization of the Christian community, offices and 
theology took place, as the early Christians adopted the institutional forms of 
the surrounding patriarchal culture”, see Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Word, 
Spirit, and Power. Women in Early Christian Communities”, in E. McLaughlin 
and Rosemary Ruether (eds.), Women of Spirit. Female Leadership in the Jewish and 
Christian Traditions, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979, pp. 30-70, at p. 31.
51 Gal 3-27.28. Biblical references appearing in this essay are taken from Michael 
D. Coogan (ed.), The New Oxford Annotated Bible. New Revised Standard Version with 
the Apocrypha, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2001.
52 See Peter Brown, “The Notion of Virginity in the Early Church”, in Bernard 
McGinn and John Meyendorff (eds.), Christian Spirituality. Origins to the Twelfth 
Century, Crossroad, New York, 1989, p. 427. The scholar explains that such was 
“the interpretation given to the promise of Christ” in Mk 12.25 (“For when they 
rise from the dead, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like 
angels in heaven; cf. Mt 22.29-30 and Lk 20.34-36), ivi, pp. 429-430. (Jesus’ words in 
Lk 20.34-36 are the following: “Those who belong to this age marry and are given 
in marriage; but those who are considered worthy of a place in that age and in the 
resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage. Indeed they 
cannot die anymore, because they are like angels, and are children of God, being 
children of the resurrection”.) According to Brown, to live the virginal life meant 
to have “withdrawn the body as a whole from society”, i.e. to “assert, instead, the 
right of the individual to seek for himself or herself different forms of solidarity, 
more consonant with the high destiny of free persons, able to enter into a freely 
chosen harmony of wills, which, so Christians of late antiquity believed, was the 
particular joy of the undivided life of the ‘angels of heaven’”. Ivi, p. 436.
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masculine nature, while in a woman’s case it was understood as 
the transcendence of her own imperfect and carnal feminine nature; 
in Jerome’s words: “A virgin is no longer called a woman”.53 As 
Rosemary Radford Ruether remarks, for the Church Fathers, who 
linked femininity with the intertwined realms of sinfulness and 
the bodily, only as virgin “woman rises to spirituality, personhood 
and equality with the male”; yet, her ascetic spiritual endeavor was 
repeatedly thematized as unnatural, as alien to female nature, and 
such a representation clearly served androcentric interests.54 As 
evinced in Nogarola’s correspondence, the cultural heritage of the 
virago ideal – a constitutive element of the patristic revision of the 
angelic ideal according to which, as it seems, Nogarola modelled 
her life – was still vital in the Renaissance. 
While Nogarola’s contemporaries frequently deployed 
the rhetoric of exceptionality and depicted her humanistic 
competence and her continent lifestyle as a transcendence of 
her sex, the woman writer recurrently resorted to a deprecative 
self-fashioning. Namely, Isotta Nogarola made extensive use of 
modesty tropes throughout her production, making excuses for 
the fact that she, a woman, dared to enter the male-dominated 
arena of literary writing. As Patricia Pender notes, expressions 
of modesty in the period in question were conventional among 
both male and female writers, who imitated “classical strategies of 
modesty propounded by Cicero, Quintilian, and the anonymous 
author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium”; yet, as the scholar remarks, 
“women’s modesty tropes do need to be understood differently 
from those of their male contemporaries ... because their historical 
position placed women in profoundly different relationships 
to discourses of authorship and modesty in the early modern 
period”.55 The specificity of Nogarola’s strategic disavowal of her 
own authorial competence hinges on the fact that she insistently 
represented her purported ineptitude as strictly dependent on her 
inferior female nature. For instance, in a 1436 letter to Guarino 
Veronese she wrote:
The weakness of my mind and my sex limit my ability to express 
what I have to say; and I do not myself seek, most learned man, 
53 See Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch, cit., pp. 230-231. Jerome, De perpetua virginitate 
beatae Mariae adv. Helvidium, 22, as quoted by Kuefler, op. cit., p. 231. 
54 Radford Ruether, Misogynism and Virginal Feminism, cit., p. 163; on this issue 
see ivi, passim. 
55 Patricia Pender, Early Modern Women’s Writing and the Rhetoric of Modesty, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 12 (emphasis in the original).
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nor do I wish to be believed to be one of those most famous women 
whom antiquity so extols, such as were Cornificia, Nicaula from 
Ethiopia, Faunia the sister of Faunus, Cornelia, Portia, and others.56
The fact that Nogarola’s thematization of a gender-specific 
intellectual inferiority is blatantly contradicted not only by the 
rhetorical prowess of her writing, but also by the examples of 
illustrious women she offers in her oeuvre, alerts the reader to the 
rhetorically astute and convolute ways of the humanist scholar’s 
self-promotion and feminist intervention.
On Disguised Seekers of Knowledge, a Late-Ancient 
Christian Woman Who Retold the Bible, and the Ghost 
of Eve
The following passage from a letter Isotta Nogarola addressed 
in 1436 or 1437 to her maternal uncle Antonio Borromeo is a 
celebratory list of carefully chosen exemplary female figures 
that defends women’s intellectual abilities, and, at the same 
time, conjures up a sense of gender ambiguity. What is more, the 
exempla can be read as means of self-authorization:
Certainly in Plato’s circle women were not unoccupied with divine 
philosophy: for example, Lasthenia of Mantinea and Axiothea of 
Phlius, and she, they say, wore men’s clothing in order to study with 
him. In how many poems has Cornelia the mother of the Gracchi 
been honored! Our ancestors have rightly preserved for later ages the 
memory of that remarkable woman Proba, the wife of Adelphus, a 
Christian by religion, who was so learned that they say she knew 
Virgil by heart and composed a clear and beautiful version of the 
New Testament. And so, does not learning exist among women – 
although woman is considered the origin and source of evil? Does 
not their learning letters warrant respect for women? Has it not made 
them more worthy of admiration that these women have surpassed 
not only other women in learning, but men as well?57 
The characteristics of the illustrious women in this laudatory 
catalog – from Cornelia, through Lasthenia and Axiothea, to Proba 
– can be interpreted as hinting to Nogarola herself, signalling her 
aspirations. First of all, the figure of the widow Cornelia, mother 
of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, renowned for devoting her life 
to the education of her sons, easily recalls the humanist scholar’s 
mother Bianca Borromeo, who hired Martino Rizzoni as a tutor 
56 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 52. 
57 Ivi, pp. 38-39.
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for her two daughters, Isotta and Ginevra.58 With the complicity 
of a reader capable of perceiving the allusion, two learned and 
influential men of the classical past are being displaced by two 
learned women. The maternal reference enables Nogarola to 
allude to the equal potential for intellectual prowess of men and 
women, while conveying to the reader a sense of her ambitions.
Lasthenia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phlius, who match the 
Nogarola sisters in number and intellectual aspirations, epitomize 
women’s desire to acquire knowledge in the male-dominated 
field of philosophy.59 In particular, Axiothea represents the figure 
of the disguised seeker of knowledge. She put on male clothes in 
order to access Plato’s lectures or, in other words, wore a mask 
crafted from gender stereotypes so as to accomplish her quest 
for intellectual assuagement, eluding the prejudice of learning 
as a male prerogative. The textual presence of the figure of the 
crossdresser – whose liminality ”not only blurs boundaries 
between male and female but also undermines the whole attempt 
to construct stable binary categories of oppositional difference” 
– opens up a space of ambiguity whose subversive potential 
has to be carefully assessed.60 According to Robert Clark and 
58 In a 1436 letter, Giorgio Bevilacqua made use of the same comparison with 
Cornelia to exalt Nogarola’s mother, see Margaret King and Diana Robin, “Kin, 
Friends, and Books (1434-37)”, in Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 32. King and 
Robin point out that Rizzoni may have been the tutor to all six of the Nogarola 
sisters, but Isotta and Ginevra were the two who stood out. See ivi, pp. 29-30. 
59 The rarely thematized story of Lasthenia of Mantinea and Axiothea of 
Phlius is found in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives; see King and Robin, Volume Editors’ 
Introduction, cit., pp. 10-11, note 22. King and Robin remark that no other fifteenth-
century woman writer mentions the story of Lasthenia and Axiothea; in the 
sixteenth century the story emerges in the opus of Lucrezia Marinelli. See ibid.
60 Robert A. Clark and Claire Sponsler, “Queer Play. The Cultural Work of 
Crossdressing in Medieval Drama”, New Literary History, 28, 2, 1997, p. 321. Clark 
and Sponsler share Marjorie Garber’s view of the transvestite as ”a potential figure 
of category crisis” (ibid.). In her study that investigates the historical significance 
and “cultural politics of transvestism”, Garber defines “category crisis” as ”a 
failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable, that 
permits of border crossings from one (apparently distinct) category to another” 
(Marjorie Garber, Vested Interests. Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety, Routledge, 
New York, 1992, pp. 3, 16). As the scholar remarks, “[t]he appeal of cross-dressing 
is clearly related to its status as a sign of the constructedness of gender categories. 
But the tendency on the part of many critics has been to look through rather than 
at the cross-dresser, to turn away from a close encounter with the transvestite, and 
to want instead to subsume that figure within one of the two traditional genders” 
(ivi, p. 9; see also Clark and Sponsler, Queer Play, cit., p. 320). Garber maintains 
that “one of the most important aspects of cross-dressing is the way in which it 
offers a challenge to easy notions of binarity, putting into question the categories of 
‘female’ and ‘male’”, and emphasizes that the ”disruptive act of putting in question 
DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE — 131
Claire Sponsler, ”crossdressing always has the potential for being 
transgressive, but the nature and degree of transgression is 
determined and perhaps controlled by the immediate framing”.61 
The female-to-male transvestism of Axiothea is here represented 
as a temporary means to an end. However, the very fact that 
Nogarola – a humanist scholar who in the name of her desire for 
knowledge negotiates with the patriarchal horizon of expectations, 
wearing the conventional mask of female inferiority in response to 
the equally conventional mask of female virility imposed on her 
in the light of her excellence – thematizes an act of cross-dressing 
aimed at women’s acquisition of knowledge on an equal footing 
with men, necessarily spurs to reflect both on the constructedness 
of gender and on the discrimination of women. On that account, 
Nogarola’s reference to the cross-dressing episode can be read 
as a subtle form of feminist resistance, aimed at eroding the 
established order and unsettling the gender divide. 
That the story of Axiothea is of considerable significance to 
Nogarola’s discourse on the intertwined issues of gender and 
knowledge, is corroborated within her opus by the resurfacing 
of an analogous anecdote, this time featuring a man who dressed 
as a woman. Indeed, as Margaret King and Diana Robin note, 
Nogarola mentions three times the story of the philosopher 
Euclides of Megara, who travelled from his home to Athens 
in woman’s attire so that he could listen to Socrates’s words, 
notwithstanding the law that condemned to death every 
inhabitant of the city of Megara spotted in Athens.62 The subtle 
intratextual dialogue recreated in Nogarola’s production between 
the two cross-dressings – Axiothea’s on the one hand, Euclides’s 
on the other – can be read as implicitly conveying once again the 
claim for an equal access to (and urge for) learning. By means of 
the liminal evasiveness of the female-to-male and male-to-female 
figure of the transvestite seeker of wisdom, gender hierarchy is 
momentarily destabilized, binaries are temporarily blurred, and 
is ... precisely the place, and the role, of the transvestite” (Garber, Vested Interests, 
cit., pp. 10, 13).
61 Clark and Sponsler, Queer Play, cit., p. 340; emphasis in the original. The two 
scholars assert that “representations, even when framed in ways that limit their 
transgressiveness, must leave behind a residue” (ibid.).
62 On the threefold recurrence and thematic importance of the anecdote of 
Euclides of Megara, see King and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., pp. 15-16 
(“The themes it foregrounds – those of disguise, gender itself as a role or mask, 
travel across forbidden borders, and the primacy, even at the risk of one’s life, of 
the quest for wisdom ... are dominant in her writings”, ivi, p. 16). The anecdote is 
fairly rare, and based on Aulus Gellius’s Attic nights (see ivi, p. 74, note 36).
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the quest for knowledge as a universally human need is strongly 
reasserted across the boundaries of gender. 
The next woman evoked in Nogarola’s defensio is Proba, a fourth-
century Christian woman, author of a poem on biblical material 
composed from Virgilian verses. Proba’s Cento is one of the rare 
female-authored works extant from the period of the early church.63 
After having celebrated female figures from both Greek and Roman 
classical antiquity, Nogarola directs the reader’s attention to the 
cultural contribution of Christian women in the late-ancient period, 
extolling the syncrectic work of a woman who reinterpreted in the 
words of Virgil portions of the Bible, namely the Old Testament 
Genesis account, including the story of Adam and Eve, and the 
New Testament life of Jesus. While the obvious reason of Proba’s 
appeal to Nogarola is her extensive knowledge of both classical and 
Christian materials, there may be a more complex rationale behind 
this exemplum. Firstly, the literary source the humanist scholar is 
drawing upon in her depiction of the late-ancient poet is Boccaccio’s 
treatise De mulieribus claris.64 As Pamela Joseph Benson maintains, 
Boccaccio’s rendering of the figure of Proba stands out with respect 
to the majority of female portraits in the work at issue, inasmuch as 
it represents one of the rare occasions in which the virago trope is 
not employed.65 By way of alluding to Boccaccio’s Proba, Nogarola 
evokes the story of a woman who, thanks to her intellectual efforts, 
reached the desired acclaim without undergoing a process of 
rhetorical de-feminization, which makes the late-ancient Christian 
poet a particularly desirable role-model of female intellectual 
endeavor. Furthermore, the blanks in the text open up another 
consideration regarding Nogarola’s fascination with Proba. The 
excerpt in question ends with an allusion to the patriarchal view of 
woman as “the origin and source of evil”. The rhetorical question 
(“And so, does not learning exist among women – although woman 
is considered the origin and source of evil?“) evokes centuries of 
misogynous interpretations of the second creation account,66 whose 
63 See Clark, Women in the Early Church, cit., p. 165; Cloke, This Female Man of 
God, cit., pp. 13-14.
64 See Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 39, note 41. For the section on Proba 
in Boccaccio’s De mulieribus claris (XCVII), see Giovanni Boccaccio, De mulieribus 
claris, Vittorio Zaccaria (ed.), in idem, Tutte le opere, vol. X, Vittore Branca (ed.), 
Mondadori, Milan, 1967, pp. 392-396.
65 See Pamela Joseph Benson, “Boccaccio’s ‘De mulieribus claris’. An 
Ambiguous Beginning”, in The Invention of the Renaissance Woman. The Challenge 
of Female Independence in the Literature and Thought of Italy and England, The 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, 1992, pp. 19-20.
66 According to Margaret King and Diana Robin, the topos of woman as “the 
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concerted efforts managed to narrativize the first woman as an 
inferior creature, burdening her – and with her all womankind – 
with guilty responsibility for the Fall.67 However, Nogarola avoids 
mentioning the name of Eve expressis verbis. Eve is left hanging 
in midair, as a sort of incorporeal threat. The intentionality of the 
omission is somehow confirmed by another reticence of the text: 
Nogarola only mentions Proba’s poetic rendering of the New 
Testament, leaving out her retelling of the Old Testament, one 
explicitly mentioned in the Boccaccian subtext.68 The lacunary 
reference uses silence to produce meaning. What comes to the fore is 
the acute impression that the figure of Eve is already, surreptitiously 
but powerfully, haunting the humanist writer. 
Towards the end of the epistle, Nogarola declares her 
programmatic desire to imitate the exemplary women she has 
named:
... at the moment I lack only money69 to be able, even if I am not 
worthy to be numbered in the circle of those women whom I have 
named above, at least to run in their footsteps.70 
Some fifteen years later, in 1451, the humanist author will 
circulate her own Latin revision of the figure of Eve in her “most 
learned and at the same time ... most syncretic writing to date”,71 
running in the footsteps of her late-ancient foremother Proba. 
The central argument of Nogarola’s defense of Eve hinges on 
the natural desire for knowledge of all human beings, aligning 
thus the impulse of the primal woman with the aspirations and 
accomplishments of the four learned women featured in this brief 
defensio mulierum, not to mention Isotta Nogarola herself.
Adam, Eve, and the Angel
In 1451, the humanist scholar composed the Dialogue on the 
Equal or Unequal Sin of Adam and Eve (Isotæ Nogarolæ de pari aut 
origin and source of evil” evokes both the biblical Eve and the mythological 
Pandora, see Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 39, note 42.
67 Apart from the Dialogue on Adam and Eve, this is the only recognizable 
allusion to Eve in Nogarola’s oeuvre. 
68 Boccaccio, De mulieribus claris, cit., p. 392 (“omnem Testamenti Veteris 
hystoriam et Novi”; i.e. “the whole history of the Old and New Testament”). 
69 In the letter under consideration, Nogarola asks her uncle money to buy a 
book by Livy.
70 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 39.
71 King and Robin, The Great Gender Debate (1451), cit., p. 142.
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impari Evæ atque Adæ peccato dialogus),72 perhaps on the basis of a 
learned debate (viva voce or epistolary)73 between herself and the 
statesman and humanist Ludovico Foscarini.74 The text thematizes 
the question whether the greater responsibility for the original sin 
should be carried by the first man or the first woman. As Margaret 
King and Diana Robin point out, even if the formal structure of the 
work commonly known as the Dialogue on Adam and Eve is that of 
a “disputation”, in which two characters, “Isota” and “Lodovicus”, 
articulate their respective stances as a series of arguments and 
counterarguments, the work is a “humanist dialogue”, a “work of 
fiction, an experiment in form developed from Nogarola’s craft as 
a humanist epistolographer, in which the two speakers are fully 
developed literary characters”.75 In the dialogue, the interlocutors 
”Isota Nogarola” and ”Lodovicus Foscarenus” discuss Augustine’s 
doctrine on the primal couple’s sin, as per the subtitle of the work:
An honorable debate between the illustrious lord Ludovico 
Foscarini, Venetian doctor of the arts and civil and canon law, and 
the noble and learned and divine lady Isotta Nogarola of Verona, 
regarding the judgement of Aurelius Augustine: They sinned 
unequally according to their sexes, but equally in pride. 76
72 Opera II, p. 185.
73 See King and Robin, Volume Editors’ Introduction, cit., p. 12. Margaret King and 
Diana Robin remark that, as stated by “her correspondent Matteo Bosso, in 1451 
Nogarola engaged in a public debate with Foscarini, which she later recorded as a 
Dialogue on the Equal or Unequal Sin of Eve and Adam: A Debate Over Saint Augustine’s 
Dictum, Namely That Adam and Eve Sinned Unequally by Sex, but Equally in Pride”; ibid. 
In his letter addressed to Isotta Nogarola, Matteo Bosso claimed that he “read” the 
“debate” she had with Ludovico Foscarini. See King and Robin, The Great Gender 
Debate (1451), cit., p. 138. Margaret King and Diana Robin argue that, despite the 
fact that Nogarola “unquestionably wrote” the dialogue, the “work is both more 
and less than her own work” (ivi, p. 12), and maintain that if the debate between 
a man and woman, although “wholly unprecedented”, “actually occurred, or if it 
was staged in a salon setting, or if it emerged from an exchange of letters, then 
Foscarini’s intellectual contribution ... to the final product must be acknowledged” 
(ivi, p. 140). According to the two scholars, however, two arguments “point to 
Nogarola’s final authorship”. First of all, the interlocutor Isota is the “driving force” 
of the argumentation, and second of all, the interlocutor Lodovicus in the end 
invites Isota to compose a work based on their exchange. See ibid.
74 The friendship and epistolary exchange between the married statesman 
Ludovico Foscarini and Isotta Nogarola began in 1451. A considerable number of 
Foscarini’s letters is extant (from 1451 to Isotta’s death in 1466), but only the first 
epistle by Nogarola. After her mother’s death in 1461, Isotta most likely moved 
to Foscarini’s household, where she lived till her final days. See King and Robin, 
Foscarini (1451-1466), cit., pp. 114-128.
75 King and Robin, The Great Gender Debate (1451), cit., pp. 140-141.
76 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 145. Opera II, p. 187: “præclara inter 
clarissimum D. D. Lodovicum Foscarenum Venetum artium et utriusque iuris 
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Indeed, in the eleventh chapter of the fourteenth book of The 
City of God, Augustine claims that only the woman – “the weaker 
part of that human alliance” – was deceived.77 “Although they 
were not both deceived by credulity”, Augustine maintains, 
“yet both were entangled in the snares of the devil, and taken 
by sin”.78 As William Mann points out, according to the late-
ancient theologian “sin entered the created world through pride”: 
indeed, both the disobedience of the angels and that of the first 
humans were motivated by a prideful impulse; Adam and Eve, 
in particular, “voluntarily succumbed to the temptation because 
of their prideful fascination with the thought that they would 
become like God”.79 Augustine’s doctrine of original sin embraces 
therefore both the idea of man’s and woman’s equal culpability 
and an understanding of woman as inferior to man. The following 
is an excerpt from the Confessions:
And just as in man’s soul there are two forces, one which is 
dominant because it deliberates and one which obeys because 
it is subject to such guidance, in the same way, in the physical 
sense, woman has been made for man. In her mind and her 
rational intelligence she has a nature the equal of man’s, but in 
sex she is physically subject to him in the same way as our natural 
impulses need to be subjected to the reasoning power of the mind, 
in order that the actions to which they lead may be inspired by the 
principles of good conduct. 80
On Augustine’s view, as Rosemary Radford Ruether remarks, 
even if equal to man as far as her rational soul is concerned, “[q]ua 
female, woman was created subordinate to man for the purposes 
of sex and procreation”.81 Therefore, male/female hierarchy – 
doctorem et generosam ac doctissimam divinamque dominam Isotam Nogarolam 
Veronensem contentio super Aureli Augustini sententiam videlicet: peccaverunt 
impari sexu sed pari fastu”. 
77 Aurelius Augustine, The City of God, vol. II, translated by Marcus Dids, T. and 
T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1871, pp. 22-25; p. 24. De Civitate Dei 14.11.
78 Ivi, p. 25.
79 William E. Mann, “Augustine on Evil and Original Sin”, in Eleonore Stump 
and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 47.
80 Augustine, Confessions, 13.32.47. Translated by R. Pine-Coffin. Quoted from 
Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch, cit., p. 134.
81 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Women and Redemption. A Theological History, 
Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1998, p. 4. See also pp. 75-76, where Radford Ruether 
explains that, according to Augustine, “production of children was the original 
purpose of the creation of the male-female pair in paradise, for if it was primarily a 
matter of companionship, another male would have been a better companion than 
the female”. On Augustine’s view, if Adam and Eve had not disobeyed, “Adam 
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“woman’s natural inferiority as body to mind in the right ordering 
of nature” – was God’s original intention.82 After the Fall, women’s 
God-given subordination was worsened into “coercive servitude, 
which women must accept as their special punishment for sin”.83 
In Nogarola’s dialogue, both Lodovicus and Isota articulate 
the thesis of Eve’s inferiority. While Lodovicus, however, defends 
Adam insisting on the first woman’s inferiority and greater 
responsibility for the Fall, Isota strategically accepts the notion of 
Eve’s lesser nature so as to relieve her, at Adam’s disadvantage, 
from the burden of greater culpability.84 If the dialogue, at the level 
of content, thematizes male/female gender inequality both from 
the perspective of the male character and from the perspective of 
the female character, on the other hand it represents in its formal 
structure the first “intergender dialogue” about issues of gender 
identity in which a woman and a man debate on the same footing 
theological matters of paramount significance.85 In other words, 
would have sown his seed in Eve without lust as a rational act fully under the 
control of his mind”, and ”Eve would have remained virginal in intercourse and 
parturition” (see ivi, p. 73).
82 Radford Ruether, Misogynism and Virginal Feminism, cit., p. 157. Radford 
Ruether points out that precisely for this reason Augustine “is somewhat temperate 
in his polemics against Eve as the original cause of the Fall. For him, the Fall could 
only occur, not when the body tempts, but when the male ruling principle agrees 
to ‘go along’”. (Ibid.).
83 Ibid. See also Genevieve Lloyd, “Augustine and Aquinas”, in Ann Loades 
(ed.), Feminist Theology. A Reader, Westminster John Knox Press, Louisville, 1990, 
especially pp. 90-94. Lloyd explains how Augustine “attempted to articulate 
sexual equality with respect to Reason, while yet finding interpretative content 
for the Genesis subordination of woman to man. What woman is as a rational 
spirit must, he insists, be distinguished from what she symbolizes in her bodily 
difference from man”. (Ivi, p. 91; emphasis in the original). Therefore, “despite 
his professed commitment to spiritual equality, Augustine’s symbolism leaves 
femininity precariously placed in relation to Reason”. (Ivi, p. 93). In other words, 
“[w]oman remains associated with bodily perturbation, in opposition to Reason. 
And her ‘natural’ subordination to man represents rational control, the subjection 
of flesh to spirit in the right ordering of things”. (Ivi, p. 94). 
84 Gerda Lerner notices the similar strategy adopted by the medieval German 
mystic Hildegard of Bingen and Isotta Nogarola in their defenses of Eve. The 
humanist scholar, “like Hildegard before her, accepted Eve’s greater weakness as a 
fact”. Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness, cit., p. 146. According to Fenster, 
Christine de Pizan defended Eve in similar terms in one of her writings (Letter of 
the God of Love, 1399), linking Eve’s lesser intellect with the “admired concept” of 
simplicity. See Fenster, The Defences of Eve by Isotta Nogarola and Christine de Pizan, cit., 
p. 64. For Pizan’s “logical advance over Hildegard’s acceptance of female weakness“ 
in The Book of the City of the Ladies (1405), where she asserts that Eve was made from 
the “noblest substance“, i.e. the body of man, see Lerner, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
85 According to Prudence Allen, “Isotta is significant for being the first person 
in western history to portray an intergender dialogue about gender that contains 
real disagreements about gender identity defended by a man and a woman, and 
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“the structure of this text in itself announced intellectual equality 
between the sexes”.86 However, the feminist implications of the 
dialogue are not limited to the dialectics of mutual intellectual 
respect between the male and female speaker, nor to the strategic 
defense of Eve articulated by the female speaker. The complex 
texture of Isota’s argumentation can be read as surreptitiously 
building up a space of empowerment for the first woman, 
destabilizing the very claim of female lesser nature.
The dialogue begins with the male interlocutor’s opening 
statement that Eve holds greater culpability for the original sin.87 
Lodovicus briefly lists a set of reasons to support his stance, among 
which is the woman’s desire to become similar to God (“she 
believed she could become like God”).88 Isota’s counterargument 
is, on the other hand, grounded on the assertion that Eve’s God-
ordained intellectual inferiority accounts for her lesser culpability: 
“for where there is less intellect and less constancy, there there is 
less sin”.89 Indeed, it was precisely the woman’s weakness that 
prompted the serpent to address her first:
Knowing her weakness, that crafty serpent began by tempting 
the woman, thinking the man perhaps invulnerable because 
of his constancy. ... the ancient foe did not boldly persuade but 
approached her with a question: “Why did God bid you not to eat 
of the tree of paradise?” She responded, “Lest we should die”. But 
seeing that she doubted the words of the Lord, the devil said, “You 
shall not die“, but “you will be like gods, knowing good and evil“.90 
Isota’s full quotation of the serpent’s utterance readjusts 
Lodovicus’s assertion regarding the motive behind woman’s sin by 
adding the element of the desire for knowledge: the reader is reminded 
that the promise of the serpent was not limited to the words “you 
will be like gods“, but included the specification “knowing good and 
evil“ (Gn 3.5). From Isota’s perspective, even if the first woman was 
aware of God’s command, she did not transgress an order directed 
that demonstrates a genuine complementarity of interaction”. Allen, Isotta Nogarola 
(1418-1466) and Ludovico Foscarini, cit., p. 955. See also King and Robin, The Great 
Gender Debate (1451), cit., p. 143: the dialogue “showcases ... the potential for a real 
equality of man and woman in the relationship between the characters Ludovico 
and Isotta”.
86 Ross, The Birth of Feminism, cit., p. 145. 
87 For a detailed synopsis of the dialogue, see King and Robin, The Great Gender 
Debate (1451), cit., pp. 143-145.
88 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 146. 
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. The biblical quotations are from Gn 3.4, 3.5.
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to her (“For in Genesis 2 it appears that the Lord commanded Adam, 
not Eve”),91 a crucial point to which she will insistently return. The 
female speaker remarks thereafter that the divine command was 
addressed only to Adam “because he esteemed the man more highly 
than the woman”.92 Isota’s just quoted statement invokes a further 
consideration. The learned reader of this Latin dialogue is most likely 
aware of the fact that in the creation account Eve was not yet created at 
the time when God uttered his prohibitive speech.93 Isota’s assertion, 
therefore, induces in the reader a skeptical attitude directed precisely 
toward the claim that God “esteemed the man more highly than the 
woman”. In other words, it is in the process of textual reception that 
Isotta Nogarola’s rhetorical strategy is revealed and accomplished: 
with the cooperation of the reader, fissures are being opened in the 
very proclamation of woman’s God-given inferiority. 
In the passage that follows, the female speaker begins addressing 
the motive of Eve’s actions following the serpent’s temptation:
Moreover, the woman did not eat from the forbidden tree because 
she believed she would become like God, but rather because 
she was weak and inclined to pleasure. It is written “Now the 
woman saw that the tree was good for food and pleasing to the 
eyes ... She took of its fruit and ate it, and also gave some to her 
husband and he ate”, and it does not say that she did so in order 
to be like God.94
Both at the beginning and at the end of the aforementioned 
excerpt, Isota explicitly states that Eve’s deeds were not 
motivated by the desire to become like God. Her actions were, 
rather, prompted by her very nature, a nature depicted as 
weak and highly susceptible to the realm of the senses (“she 
was weak and inclined to pleasure”), as per the age-long 
misogynous topos of woman as body. Significantly, Isota does 
not incorporate in this passage any reference to the desire to 
know good and evil. The omission enables the female speaker 
to build her defense on the argument that Eve did not take from 
the forbidden tree to become similar to God, i.e. out of a desire 
for power, without at the same time denying the first woman’s 
desire for knowledge. The latter, given Isota’s initial assertion 
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 See Gn 2.16-17 “And the Lord God commanded the man, ‘You may freely eat 
of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you 
shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die.’” 
94 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 146. The biblical quotation is from Gn 3.6.
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of Eve’s intellectual inferiority (“less intellect”), must remain 
untackled for the time being. 
Towards the end of her reply, Isota analyzes the punishments 
inflicted to the first humans, and aptly corroborates her former 
conclusion that Eve did not transgress an edict directed to her: 
But to Adam he said, “Because you have listened to your wife and 
have eaten of the tree of which I have commanded you (singular) 
not to eat (notice what is said, that God commanded Adam alone, 
and not Eve), cursed be the ground because of you ...”.95
The female character concludes her first intervention with a 
modesty trope, undermining her own voice on the grounds of 
the inferiority of her sex, which is, as earlier noted, a recurrent 
strategy in Nogarola’s writings: 
I have written this because you wished me to. Yet I have done so 
with trepidation, since this is not a woman’s task.96
The deployment of a modesty trope mobilizing the notion of 
female inferiority in the context of a defense of the primal woman 
hinging on that very notion can be read as once again alerting the 
reader not to take the paradoxical argumentation of the female 
interlocutor at face value: as is the case with Isota’s self-fashioning, 
her belittling representation of Eve may as well be the product of a 
calculated rhetorical posturing. 
In his reply, Lodovicus shifts the focus of Isota’s argumentation 
relating to Eve’s “less intellect and less constancy”, and addresses 
Eve’s “ignorance and inconstancy” (“Eve sinned from ignorance and 
inconstancy”).97 According to the male speaker, the ignorance of Eve is 
not natural but “born of arrogance (“For the woman’s ignorance, born 
of arrogance, does not excuse her”).98 Indeed, Isota should not find 
fault with Eve’s “intellect”, considering that it was God who created 
it.99 The problem, in other words, cannot lie in woman’s divinely 
ordained nature.100 It is rather her prideful desire that led her to sin: 
95 Ivi, p. 147.
96 Ibid.
97 Ivi, p. 148.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 In his next and last reply, Lodovicus will claim that Eve’s nature is perfectly 
appropriate to her reason, sex, and adequate for preserving her soul’s well-being. 
“Actually, Eve’s nature was excellent and concordant with reason, her sex, and 
her age. For just as teeth were given to wild beasts, horns to oxen, feathers to 
140 — DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE
For the woman’s frailty was not the cause of sin, as you write, but 
her pride, since the demon promised her knowledge, which leads 
to arrogance and inflates with pride, according to the apostle. .... 
The first impulse of sin, therefore, was an inordinate appetite for 
seeking that which was not suited to its own nature ... For that 
adversary said to Eve: “Your eyes will be opened and you will be 
like God, knowing good and evil”. Nor would the woman have 
believed the demon’s persuasive words ... unless a love of her own 
power had overcome her, which love is a stream sprung form the 
well of pride.101 
Nogarola’s subtle orchestration of the dialogue is becoming 
more and more apparent. Namely, Lodovicus reveals the 
omission in Isota’s argumentation and reminds the reader that 
the demon promised the first woman knowledge. Moreover, he 
represents Eve’s desire for knowledge as prideful, while implying 
that the female nature is not suitable for intellectual endeavors. 
On account of the claims of her interlocutor, Isota is now finally 
in the position to center her counterargument precisely on such 
unsuitability, subtly (yet radically) undermining it. 
Instead of arguing against his insistence on Eve’s ignorance 
by going back to her own initial thesis, i.e. that of Eve’s lesser 
intellect, Isota resumes her reasoning from Lodovicus’s statement 
and astutely adds, to counter his arrogance argument, that 
“Eve’s ignorance was implanted by nature, of which nature God 
himself is the author and founder”.102 In other words, the female 
speaker makes use of elements pertaining to her interlocutor’s 
argumentation to rectify her own initial statement regarding 
female intellectual inferiority. This strategy enables her to finally 
counter – at the very center of the dialogue – the misogynous view 
of woman’s ineptness for the feats of the intellect:
You argue further that “the fragility of the woman was not the 
cause of sin, but rather her inordinate appetite for seeking 
that which was not suited to her nature”, which appetite is the 
consequence, as you write, of pride. Yet it is clearly less a sin to 
desire the knowledge of good and evil than to transgress against a 
divine commandment, since the desire for knowledge is a natural 
thing and all men by nature desire to know.103 
birds for their survival, to the woman mental capacity was given sufficient for the 
preservation and pursuit of the health of her soul”. Ivi, p. 156.
101 Ivi, p. 148. The biblical quotation is from Gn 3.5.
102 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 151. 
103 Ivi, p. 152.
DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE — 141
Isota defuses her opponent’s argumentation by partially 
agreeing with his words: indeed, it was not woman’s (alleged) 
inferiority that motivated her actions, but her desire. The desire 
at issue was not, however, a prideful urge “not suited to her 
nature”. While Adam transgressed God’s commandment, Eve 
simply wanted to know, which is the expression of a natural urge 
shared by all of humanity. Indeed, as Margaret King and Diana 
Robin remark,104 the aforementioned passage contains a reference 
to the incipit of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, reminding the reader of the 
epistemic value the ancient philosopher placed on the senses, and 
especially the sense of sight:
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the 
delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness 
they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of 
sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not 
going to do anything, we prefer seeing to almost everything else. 
The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and 
brings to light many differences between things.105
To the reader who recalls the biblical passage quoted in Isota’s 
first reply, (“Now the woman saw that the tree was good for food 
and pleasing to the eyes ... She took of its fruit and ate it, and 
also gave some to her husband and he ate”), it becomes manifest 
that Eve, in Nogarola’s feminist revision, ate from the forbidden 
tree only because she employed her sensory faculty to gain 
knowledge, and not because, as Isota had firstly said, “she was 
weak and inclined to pleasure”. Eve “saw” and “took”, satisfying 
her natural and universally human intellectual curiosity, and 
not her alleged carnal nature. Her desire was sinful, because it 
incontrovertibly led her to sin, yet her sin was a lesser violation 
than Adam’s direct disobedience to God’s command. What is 
more, her actions were not motivated by pride, as Isota explains 
in the passage that immediately follows:
And even if the first impulse of sin were this inordinate appetite, 
which cannot be without sin, yet it is more tolerable than the sin 
of transgression, for the observance of the commandments is the 
road that leads to the homeland of salvation. It is written, “But if 
thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments”; and likewise, 
104 See ivi, note 47.
105 Aristotle, Met. I.1, 980a22-980a27. For the translation by W. D. Ross, see 
Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, 
vol. II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
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“What shall I do to gain eternal life? Keep the commandments”. 
And transgression is particularly born of pride, because pride is 
nothing other than rebellion against divine rule, exalting oneself 
above what is permitted according to divine rule or disdaining 
the will of God and displacing it with one’s own. Thus Augustine 
writes in On Nature and Grace, “Sin is the will to pursue or retain 
what justice forbids, that is, to deny what God wishes”. Ambrose 
agrees with him in his On Paradise: “Sin is the transgression against 
divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments”. 
Behold! It is clear that the greatest sin is the transgression against 
and disobedience to the heavenly commandments; whereas you 
have thus defined sin: “Sin is the inordinate desire to know”. But 
it is evident that the sin of transgression against a command is 
greater than the sin of desiring the knowledge of good and evil. 
So even if inordinate desire be a sin, as with Eve, yet she did not 
desire to be like God in power but only in the knowledge of good 
and evil, which by nature she was actually inclined to desire.106
Adam directly disobeyed God’s edict out of a prideful impulse, 
while Eve’s actions were motivated by a desire for knowledge, 
natural to the first woman. Now that the desire for power, as far 
as woman is concerned, is out of the equation, Isota can revise 
her former claim that Eve had no aspiration to become godlike, 
and explain that her desire to be similar to God was limited to 
her natural urge to know. The female speaker not only relieves 
Eve of greater culpability, insisting on the slightness of her 
sin, but authorizes women’s intellectual aspirations as natural 
and therefore God-ordained. However, the textual texture of 
this passage emphatically positioned around the center of the 
dialogue seems pregnant with a further message. Indeed, the 
fivefold occurrence of the word commandment (mandatum) in 
such a brief space can be read as signalling something to the 
reader.107 A possible clue to the textual locus to which Nogarola 
is drawing the reader’s attention is the twofold repetition of the 
syntagm serva mandata, which in both cases evokes the Gospel of 
Matthew (Mt 19.17).108 Given the subject-matter of the dialogue, 
the reference can be interpreted as surreptitiously including in 
Nogarola’s argumentation the wider intertext of the nineteenth 
Matthean chapter, which contains, indeed, Jesus’ only allusion to 
the biblical creation account (Mt 19.4-6):109
106 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., pp. 152-153. For the biblical and patristic 
references in this passage see ivi, p. 152, notes 48-51.
107 For the Latin original, see Opera II, pp. 201-203.
108 Ivi, pp. 201-202. 
109 See Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve and the Serpent, Vintage Books, New York, 1989, 
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He answered, “Have you not read that the one who made them 
at the beginning ‘made them male and female’, and said, ‘For this 
reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his 
wife, and the two shall become one flesh?’ So they are no longer 
two, but one flesh. Therefore, what God has joined together, let no 
one separate”.110 
While answering a question regarding the legitimacy of 
divorce in the broader context of a chapter that offers “a series of 
instructions ... to intensify the ethics of discipleship”,111 Jesus merges 
the two biblical creation accounts: namely, he quotes both from the 
egalitarian version of creation in the first chapter of Genesis (‘made 
them male and female’, Gn 1.27), and from the story of Adam and 
Eve in the second and third chapters, one traditionally co-opted for 
misogynous purposes (‘For this reason a man shall leave his father 
and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become 
one flesh’, Gn 2.24). By virtue of this conflation, Jesus offers his 
own revision of the Genesis story. His subversive reading unsettles 
gender hierarchies by reminding the reader of the simultaneity 
of man and woman’s creation (“Have you not read that the one 
who made them at the beginning ‘made them male and female’”) 
and undermines the very binary notion of gender by alluding to 
a significant verse from the story of Adam and Eve (“and the two 
shall become one flesh”). It goes without saying that the intertextual 
allusion to Jesus’ nondualistic reinterpretation of the Genesis 
account can be read as authorizing and potentiating the feminist 
edge of Isota’s revision. What is more, the Matthean chapter at issue 
contains verses that have been traditionally interpreted as Jesus’ 
promotion of celibacy as superior to marriage. Indeed, after the 
disciples say to Jesus that, if divorce is a sin, then “it is better not to 
marry” (Mt 19.10), Jesus responds: 
But he said to them, “Not everyone can accept this teaching 
but only those to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs who 
have been so from birth, and there are eunuchs who have been 
made eunuchs by others, and there are eunuchs who have made 
themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Let 
anyone accept this who can”.112
pp. xxii, 8. See also Mk 10.6-9.
110 Mt 19.4-6. 
111 J. David Hester, “Eunuchs and the Postgender Jesus. Matthew 19.2 and 
Transgressive Sexualities”, Journal for the Study of the New Testament, 28, 13, 2005, 
p. 25.
112 Mt 19.12.
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It seems plausible to read the intertextual evocation of 
Matthew 19 within the textual tissue of the dialogue as offering 
the reader a key to better understand Nogarola’s unconventional 
lifestyle. If my contention is right, it follows that even if 
Nogarola modelled her celibate lifestyle on patristic advice 
to female consecrated virgins, she resisted the concomitant 
misogynous understanding of the angelic path as a masculine 
feat, aligning herself instead with Jesus’ subversive discourse 
on gender. Indeed, if the figure of the transvestite, recurrent 
in Nogarola’s oeuvre, temporarily disrupts the internal 
coherence of the sex/gender system in the name of the quest 
for knowledge, the figure of the eunuch (intertextually evoked 
within a discussion of the first woman’s natural and universally 
human aspiration to know) implies a permanent queering of the 
bipolar understanding of gender: male and female are blurred 
in the fluid instability of “in-betweenness”.113 The kingdom 
of heaven can be read, as David Hester suggests, as a realm 
beyond gender dichotomies, beyond dualistic thought, as a 
place where the gender permeability of the eunuch, “a figure 
that is neither male nor female”, becomes a desirable identity 
model, disrupting “male privilege”.114 
The hypothesis that Nogarola adhered to the patristic model 
of the angelic path for women on her own terms, reclaiming the 
radical gender ideas in Jesus’ message and earliest Christianity 
(cf. Mt 19.10, Gal 3-27.28), is further corroborated by her 1453 
encomium to Jerome.115 The Church Father is represented in the 
oration at issue as embodying both the desire for knowledge and 
the urge for spiritual perfection. To thematize the latter, Nogarola 
quotes a passage from his letter of advice to the female consecrated 
virgin Eustochium that describes his ascetic experience in the 
desert; to thematize the former, the humanist scholar deploys 
the Euclides of Megara anecdote, i.e. the figure of the transvestite 
seeker of knowledge.116 However, given that in his epistle to 
Eustochium Jerome explicitly attacks transvestism among holy 
113 Megan K. DeFranza, “Virtuous Eunuchs. Troubling Conservative and Queer 
Readings of Intersex and the Bible”, in Susannah Cornwall (ed.), Intersex, Theology, 
and the Bible. Troubling Bodies in Church, Text, and Society, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2015, p. 58.
114 See J. David Hester, Eunuchs and the Postgender Jesus, cit., pp. 37-40 
(quotations at pp. 37, 40). 
115 For the oration in praise of Jerome, see Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., pp. 
167-174.
116 See ivi, pp. 172-173; p. 171.
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women,117 the fact that Nogarola depicts him as the cross-dresser 
Euclides, ready to embrace gender ambiguity to realize his deepest 
urges, can be read as subtly pointing to the misogynous pitfalls of 
his teaching. Indeed, in his letter to Eustochium Jerome defines 
himself as a eunuch by choice,118 yet presents in a negative light 
those spiritual women who use cross-dressing to align themselves 
with the genderless ideal, therefore deterring Eustochium – and 
all female consecrated virgins – from espousing the impulses 
toward a radical destabilization of the gender divide that emerged 
in earliest Christianity:
Other women change their garb and put on men’s dress; they cut 
their hair short and lift up their chins in shameless fashion; they 
blush to be what they were born to be – women, and prefer to look 
like eunuchs.119 
Jerome’s advice to Eustochium exhorts her to be devoted, as 
himself, to both asceticism and learning,120 yet to be also very 
careful not to transgress the binaries of gender. If my deciphering 
of the astute rhetorical strategies and subtle intertextual evocations 
of Nogarola’s works is correct, then the humanist author’s pledge 
to a life of virginity and intellectual pursuits reveals itself as a self-
empowering choice that, revising the misogynous aspects of the 
patristic notion of female virginity in the name of the emancipatory 
gender blurring discernible in earliest Christianity, offers freedom 
from binary constrictions of gender and from the imposition of the 
masculinity ideal. Nogarola’s reclaiming of consecrated virginity 
appears to be teeming with feminist implications. But how does 
all this relate to her representation of Eve?
In the continuation of her counterargumentation, Isota 
addresses Lodovicus’s jokey comment that “Eve may have so 
sinned that, like the demons, she did not merit redemption”, and 
claims on the contrary that she was redeemed with Adam. If, on 
117 See Elizabeth Castelli, “I Will Make Mary Male. Pieties of the Body and 
Gender Transformation of Christian Women in Early Antiquity”, in Julia Epstein 
and Kristina Straub (eds.), Body Guards. The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity, 
Routledge, New York and London, 1991, p. 44; Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch, cit., p. 
232. 
118 “Some men may be eunuchs of necessity: I am one by choice”. Ep. 22.19. 
Jerome, Select Letters of St. Jerome, cit., p. 93.
119 Ep. 22.27. Ivi, p. 117.
120 As far as learning is concerned, Jerome exhorts Eustochium to “read often 
and learn all you can. Let sleep steal upon you with a book in your hand, and let 
the sacred page catch your drooping head”. Ep. 22.17. Ivi, p. 87.
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the other hand, she was not redeemed with Adam, this was, Isota 
maintains, “because God held her sin as negligible”.121 Lodovicus’s 
reference to the fallen angels allows Isota to articulate what is, in 
my opinion, the crucial point of her defense of Eve: 
For the rebellious angel cannot claim to be excused by ignorance, 
as can Eve. For the angel understands without investigation or 
discussion and has an intellect more in the likeness of God’s – to 
which it seems Eve desired to be similar – than does man. Hence 
the angel is called intellectual and the man rational. So where Eve 
sinned from her desire for knowledge, the angel sinned from a 
desire for power.122 
To distinguish the sin of the fallen angel from that of the fallen 
woman, and to come to grips with the paramount question of 
Eve’s motive, Nogarola alludes to the epistemological question of 
how the angels know. Namely, the female speaker argues that the 
angel, a superior cognizer, necessarily sinned out of a desire for 
power, while the ignorant woman sinned out of her natural desire 
for knowledge. The passage under consideration evokes the 
“complex angelological systems” developed by the scholastics, 
and in particular by Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century.123 
Indeed, the distinction between the angelic creature as intellectual 
and the human creature as rational refers to a passage from the 
Summa Theologiae.124 According to Aquinas’ doctrine, while the 
cognition of a human being involves sensation, the angel, who has 
no natural body, cognizes “through intelligible forms provided 
at its creation”.125 Angels are, indeed, “absolutely immaterial 
cognizers, without corporeal senses”.126 After having clarified 
the fundamental role of bodily sensation in human cognition by 
quoting the incipit of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the female speaker 
121 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 153. 
122 Ivi, p. 153. 
123 On medieval angelology see David Keck, Angels and Angelology in the 
Middle Ages, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1998 (the quotation 
is on p. 3). 
124 The distinction is made in Summa Theologica I, question 58, article 3: 
“Therefore they are called ’intellectual beings’: because even with ourselves the 
things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood [intelligi]; 
hence ’intellect’ is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which 
acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called ’rational’; and this 
comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light”. Translated by the Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province (1947), see <https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/>.
125 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, Routledge, London and New York, p. 167.
126 Ibid.
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articulates Eve’s deepest aspiration: to cognize beyond the senses. 
Thus, in Isota’s argumentation the age-long – classical, patristic 
and scholastic – disparaging identification of woman with body 
is first destabilized and later transcended in the name of the first 
woman’s natural urge to know. Isota implants in Eve, i.e. in the 
woman that is traditionally perceived as representing the very 
essence of the female sex, a desire to rise beyond the body and 
its sensory apparatus, beyond gender, beyond marriage, beyond 
the subordinate procreative function of helpmeet to which both 
Augustine and Aquinas confine her.127 Therefore, in Nogarola’s 
revision of the biblical figure of Eve, the desire to become like the 
angels, which is both an intellectual and a spiritual aspiration, 
does not imply, contrary to tradition, a transcendence of female 
nature. The consideration that spurred Eve’s (sinful) actions, even 
if ill-founded since it was triggered by the deceitful words of the 
serpent, magnifies the defense’s emancipatory potential, defining 
the desire for knowledge and asceticism as natural to women: in 
other words, Nogarola’s defense legitimates women (as well as 
the author herself) to embrace the angelic path of intellectual and 
spiritual realization qua women, and not despite being women. 
What is more, Eve’s yearning to become like the angels – spiritual 
creatures beyond gender – can be interpreted as a further evocation 
of the egalitarian genderless ideal of earliest Christianity.
In the subsequent portion of her reply, Isota continues along 
the lines of her defense of Eve as inferior and imperfect, a strategy 
once again indirectly belied by the similar calculated pose deployed 
in the modesty topos that concludes her intervention: “Let these 
words be enough for me, an unarmed and poor little woman”.128 
Lodovicus, on the other hand, ends his counterargumentation by 
exalting Isota and attacking womankind as such, thus aligning 
his stance with the misogynous implications of the rhetoric of 
exceptionality. However, the fact that Lodovicus, toward the end 
of the dialogue, desists from arguing against the female speaker 
with regard to the “distinction between the sin of angel and of 
man”,129 emphasizes the significance of Isota’s discourse on Eve’s, 
and womankind’s, angelic urge.
127 For Augustine’s and Aquinas’ view of Eve as created for the function of 
procreation see Radford Ruether, Women and Redemption, cit., p. 94; see also note 
81 in this essay.
128 Nogarola, Complete Writings, cit., p. 156. 
129 “As to your distinction between the sin of angel and of man, that is a huge 
issue, and although it provides worthy fruit for your brilliant mind, it is too 
abundant to consider in this brief space”. Ivi, p. 157. 
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 After the astute rhetorical work of reclaiming women’s 
potential she strategically carried out, more or less explicitly, in 
her writings, the humanist scholar in her last extant work (1461) 
articulates the following statement: “Ah yes, but I, who am not 
ashamed to be a woman, speak as a woman”,130 one last compelling 
testimony to her feminist commitment.
Conclusion
Isotta Nogarola’s production can be read as articulating – 
in a somewhat convoluted and often disguised fashion, for the 
purposes of authorial legitimation on the one hand, and of feminist 
advocacy on the other – a discourse on gender that resonates 
with the porosity discernible in the beginnings of the Christian 
movement, as well as promoting the desire for knowledge and 
spiritual perfection as two interdependent urges, natural to 
women from the very first intellectual and angelic impulses 
embodied by Eve.
130 Ivi, p. 194. For Nogarola’s self-assertive statement, see also Ross, The Birth of 
Feminism, cit., pp. 150-151.
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Feminist Epistemology Outside the 




Recovering the intellectual contributions of early women activists 
remains an important task for feminist scholars, because the deeply 
androcentric processes of academic canon-making continue to obscure 
women’s activism and erase them as thinking subjects even when 
documentary and archival evidence of their actions, reflections and 
motivations exists. To begin this project, I recover Jane Addams’ practice 
of sympathetic knowledge as an early form of feminist standpoint 
epistemology. Both identify the basis for new knowledge and social 
progress in the subjective, lived truths of the least empowered. 
A Memory
In 1978, I was an undergraduate at a college with few female 
professors or students, but with a very active Women’s Union. It 
was in that group among my peers that I eagerly consumed the 
new and exciting scholarship on women that was just coming 
out: Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere’s Women, Culture 
and Society (1974), Susan Brownmiller’s Against Our Will (1975); 
Berenice Carroll’s Liberating Women’s History (1976); Mary Daly’s 
Gyn/Ecology (1979); Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English’s 
For Her Own Good (1979).1 Those were heady times for me of 
1 Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds.), Women, Culture 
and Society, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1974; Susan Brownmiller, Against 
Our Will. Men, Women and Rape, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1975; Berenice A. 
Carroll (ed.), Liberating Women’s History. Theoretical and Critical Essay, University of 
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ongoing discovery and questioning, as old certainties were 
overturned. Meanwhile, back in the classroom, I was studying 
the intellectual history of the Italian Renaissance. I have a very 
sharp and poignant memory of an incident that occurred about 
halfway through the term. Bolstered by my outside reading with 
the Women’s Union, I finally ventured to inquire of my professor 
why we hadn’t yet encountered any texts by or about women in 
the course. My professor froze, glowered at me, and pronounced, 
“Miss Borland, women as we understand them today did not exist 
in the Renaissance”. In effect he was telling me that the intellectual 
tradition I was lucky enough to inherit was entirely masculine, 
because women as thinking subjects were an historical novelty 
of the very recent past. This erasure of a whole class of subjects 
was a very effective exercise of power. It wasn’t until class was 
dismissed, and I was on my way out the door that it occurred to 
me that men as we know them today hadn’t existed during the 
Renaissance either. 
Teaching and writing history was and remains political project, 
for historical legacies shape our understanding of the possible 
and impossible. Women’s history in the 1970s responded to that 
project, recognizing that the stories we tell ourselves about the 
past do have consequences in the most basic sense of who counts 
as a knowing subject. Mary Louise Pratt’s2 exemplary study of 
the development of the European bourgeois subject through close 
readings of 18th and 19th century travel narratives demonstrates 
that the travel narrative readership participated in a new planetary 
consciousness that both described and possessed far-flung places, 
subjugating their inhabitants or eliminating them altogether, and 
ultimately producing among the survivors uncertainty about their 
own ability to describe and define reality. 
My colleague, Sabra Webber, warns against “colonizing the 
past” by which she means the scholar’s tendency to view past 
actors as always “less evolved” in their thinking than we are.3 
Webber joins Homi Bhabha and others in recuperating the “subtle 
Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1976; Mary Daly, Gyn/ecology. The Metaethics 
of Radical Feminism, Beacon Press, Boston, 1979; Alan Dundes, ”The Psychology of 
Legend”, in Wayland Hand (ed.) American Folk Legend. A Symposium, University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, pp. 21-36; Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre 
English, For Her Own Good. 150 Years of the Experts Advice to Women, Anchor Books, 
Garden City, New York, 1979. 
2 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes. Travel Writing and Transculturation, 2nd 
edition, Routledge, New York, 2008 [1992].
3 Sabra Webber, Folklore Unbound. A Concise Introduction, Waveland Press, 
Longrove IL, 2015, p. 25.
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insights of earlier thinkers” and in recognizing early formulations 
of ideas and perspectives that resonate strongly with our thinking 
today. One might argue that the decolonizing stance leads to 
overly celebratory recuperations of historical actors that foreclose 
critique. However, recuperating voices that have been erased, 
marginalized or simply forgotten offers its own critique, and 
can be useful to building an alternative intellectual tradition that 
supports the social change one desires. Today, I review the work 
of a North American feminist who made significant advances in 
both social and intellectual arenas from outside the academy. 
Jane Addams was regarded as the most influential North 
American woman of the Progressive Era (roughly 1890 to 1920), a 
time of rapid social upheaval that confronted many of the social 
justice issues that plague us today. U.S. immigration was at an all-
time peak. Capitalism had wreaked worldwide havoc particularly 
on poor people, flooding local markets and cultivating new desires 
for cash in places like Modruš-Fiume county in Croatia, uprooting 
settled populations and sending them around the world. In her 
1910 study Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, for example, Emily Green 
Balch mentions a town from this area she calls “Lipa” where 
1800 of 3400 residents had migrated to Calumet Michigan by 
1910, because those who had once earned supplemental income 
carrying goods and people across Croatia’s mountainous terrain 
had been rendered redundant after the construction of a railroad.4 
In the U.S. rampant corruption and the growing gap between 
the rich and the poor threatened democracy. The burgeoning 
cities championed progress while propagating enormous slums. 
Prostitution, addiction, and domestic violence threatened 
families. In addition to these domestic issues, militarism engulfed 
Europe, ultimately leading to a disastrous world war, and the U.S. 
embraced Imperialism, embarking on police actions and territorial 
conquests in the Pacific, the Caribbean and Central America, 
actions that left in their wake a continuing legacy of racism, 
dictatorship, and economic and social dysfunction. Addams and 
her colleagues worked tirelessly to address all of these issues, 
always from the woman’s perspective. 
Best known and celebrated as the founder of the Chicago Hull 
House, Addams was also a prolific writer and social theorist. As 
a social justice activist, she practiced a form of solidarity that 
consisted in immersing oneself in the environment one wishes 
4 Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, Charities Publication 
Committee, New York, 1910, pp. 175-76.
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to transform, consulting people at the grassroots, conducting 
research on the problems besetting that environment, and using 
that research to develop policy and change unjust laws. Though not 
tied to any specific religious tradition, her approach resonates with 
Latin American liberation theology, particularly as elaborated by 
the murdered Jesuits of San Salvador.5 Almost a century before 
these men lost their lives working to harness the resources of their 
university to solving the problems of the poor, Addams and her 
friend Ellen Gates Starr moved into a large home surrounded by 
an immigrant slum in the near west side of Chicago. As with other 
communities in the Settlement movement, Hull House provided 
a temporary home for young, mostly female, college-educated 
reformers and various kinds of services to residents of the 
surrounding community: childcare, after school programs, adult 
education, emergency aid, meeting space for immigrant and labor 
organizations, as well as a multitude of rotating projects. In spite of 
the fact that US women did not yet have the vote, the Hull House 
volunteers succeeded in contributing to the passage of significant 
reform legislation that transformed Chicago, including the Factory 
Law that closed down sweatshops, the Child Labor Law, and the 
establishment of a Juvenile Court. In 1910, Addams published a 
memoir, 20 Years at Hull House, which quickly went into reprint, 
selling over 80.000 copies by the time of her death in 1935.6 
Rediscovered during the 1970s, this text became a mainstay in 
women’s history and social work classes. More recently, feminist 
philosophers have reevaluated Addams’ influence on theory, 
correcting the standard view that she was a mere implementer 
of the ideas of the American Pragmatist School.7 Since 2002, the 
University of Illinois Press has republished much of her work, but 
early editions are also available online.
Addams’ voluminous writings show a robust interplay of 
experience and reflection in the American pragmatist tradition. 
Maurice Hamington argues that as a Public Philosopher she in 
fact “carried pragmatism to its logical conclusion, developing an 
5 John J. Hassett and Hugh Lacey (eds.), Towards a Society that Serves its People. 
The Intellectual Contribution of El Salvador’s Murdered Jesuits, Georgetown University 
Press, Washington, 1991.
6 Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House, Victoria Bissell Brown (ed.), Bedford 
and St. Martins, New York, 1999 [1910], pp. 122-36.
7 Maurice Hamington, “Jane Addams”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2014/entries/addams-jane/>; Maurice Hamington (ed.), Feminist Interpretations 
of Jane Addams, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 2010.
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applied philosophy immersed in social action”.8 Her Hull House 
experiments are epistemologically focused but replete with a faith 
in the humanity of her neighbors and the possibility of collective 
progress through increased public discourse. She believed 
strongly in democracy and viewed the widening economic and 
cultural gap between the rich and the poor as its greatest threat.9 
Although she remained a resident of Hull House her entire 
life, Addams did not restrict her activism to the local sphere. In 
1915, with her colleagues, the Wellesley Economics professor, 
Emily Greene Balch, and Alice Hamilton, she drew on preexisting 
women’s suffrage networks, uniting women from warring and 
neutral countries, to lobby world leaders for a negotiated peace 
to World War I. Their report, Women at the Hague,10 details their 
travels through Europe to both collect evidence in favor of and 
to urge political leaders to adopt a negotiated peace. Though 
unsuccessful, this utopian project resulted in the creation of the 
still extant Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom, 
which continued after the first world war to work towards an 
international system of governance and to fight U.S. Imperialism 
in the Americas.11 With the advance of WWII the organization 
then headed by Balch worked to address the needs of refugees. 
Their staunch opposition to war during wartime made Addams 
and Balch the object of suspicion by the U.S. government. In fact, 
Balch lost her job as an Economics Professor at Wellesley in 1918 
as a consequence of her anti-war activities.12 However, their work 
earned each a Nobel Peace Prize, Addams in 1931 and Balch in 
1946. 
Addams’ has received international recognition for her peace 
activism. Her social work has been recuperated; her contributions 
to social theory are currently being assessed. In this essay I explore 
what she might contribute to our understanding of folklore, oral 
history and life review. In 1916, at a moment when her public 
reputation had suffered a reversal as a consequence of her antiwar 
stance, Addams compiled a set of essays in The Long Road of 
8 Hamington, Jane Addams, cit.
9 Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House, cit., p. 95.
10 Jane Addams, Emily Greene Balch and Alice Hamilton, Women at the Hague, 
Macmillan, New York, 1915.
11 See for example Emily Greene Balch (ed.), Occupied Haiti. Being a Report by 
a Committee of Six Disinterested Citizens, The Writers’ Publishing Company, New 
York, 1927.
12 Judy D. Whipps, “The Feminist Pacifism of Emily Greene Balch, Nobel Prize 
Laureate”, NWSA Journal, 18, 3, 2016, pp. 122-32.
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Woman’s Memory. By examining this text seriously, I hope to show 
how it might disrupt historicity in oral narrative research. The text 
is composed of three sets of disparate materials, which had each 
been published in periodical form prior to this publication.13
Addams begins her text by affirming classical scholars’ notions 
that among the elderly memory exercises a conservative function, 
refashioning the past to eliminate the hardships endured and recall 
only what is valuable and beautiful. However, social intercourse 
rather than classical authority provides her with an additional 
insight, as she reflects on a six-week flurry of visits to Hull 
House, provoked by reports that the settlement was harboring 
a ’Devil Baby’. Among the curiosity seekers who descended on 
the settlement were several older women anxious to advise in the 
matter of what to do about this supernatural visitation. Having 
arrived and been disappointed, for there was no devil baby, they 
unburdened themselves to Addams, spontaneously performing 
what today we would call life review. These life stories accentuate 
what Addams calls the “monstruous” social injustices that had 
formed and deformed them. 
The three chapters that follow focus on the combined import of 
the urban legend and the elderly women’s life review narratives 
it provoked. Chapter Five moves to a consideration of women’s 
war narratives and the final chapter relates a series of Addams’ 
own childhood memories of death, provoked by a visit to Egypt. 
Putting aside for the moment the question of how these disparate 
materials form a unity, I will explore Addams’ epistemological 
approach, focusing on the Devil Baby chapters. 
Unfortunately, Addams is no folklorist. She reports only two of 
the innumerable versions of the urban legend at the center of the 
hubbub. In the Italian version an atheist father savagely trashes a 
holy picture; when his believing wife delivers soon after, the baby 
has horns, cloven hooves and immediately blasphemes. The father 
delivers the creature to Hull House, where the good ladies take it 
to the chapel for baptism. When they open the shawl the baby has 
disappeared and is seen leaping across the far pews. In the Jewish 
version, a father of six girls tells his wife he’d rather have the devil 
than a seventh. Addams concludes, “Save for a red automobile 
which occasionally figured in the story and a stray cigar, which in 
some versions the newborn child had snatched from his father’s 
13 Marilyn Fischer, “Trojan Women and Devil Baby Tales. Addams on Domestic 
Violence”, in Hammington, Feminist Interpretations of Jane Addams, cit., pp. 81-106.
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lips, the tale might have been fashioned a thousand years ago”.14 
This assessment is in line with the understanding of contemporary 
legend scholars15 as is Addams’ subsequent location of the story’s 
meaning in the tellers’ attempts to manage social change. 
In her narrative framing of the ensuing life review narratives, 
Addams positions herself as a rational thinker who gradually 
begins to question her own attitude, partially adopting the 
perspective of the tellers. This receptivity to their experience 
allows her do a number of things significant for oral narrative 
researchers: she recognizes the power of narrative to affirm and 
enrich the teller, she affirms subjective over rational meanings, 
and she identifies the narratives as pushing toward abstract, 
shared, subjective truths.16
Addams begins by confiding that the curious crowds’ 
expectations to pay to see the child shocked her, and she quickly 
tired of their eager insistence that she show it to them. Here she 
positions herself as morally and intellectually superior to her 
coarse and inhumane immigrant and working class visitors.17 But 
she is intrigued and touched by the elderly women in the crowds, 
who appear to have gained some authority as a result of the rumor. 
Responding to this quickening among a group whom she has 
known before only as downtrodden, disregarded and silenced, 
she observes that the legend provokes in them recollections of 
supernatural experiences and powers which seem to provide 
them with a profounder, more meaningful sense of self. (She does 
not share these stories, however, moving instead to the life review 
material that focuses on the lived experience of poverty.) As she 
grapples with the question of how to feed the imaginations of the 
elderly, she compares the self-satisfying “goodness” of reading a 
book to an invalid with her own struggle over whether to transmit 
or deny the urban legend. This comparison points to and gently 
critiques the tendency of the privileged classes to elevate the 
14 Jane Addams, The Long Road of Women’s Memory, Macmillan, New York, 1916, p. 4.
15 See for example Alan Dundes, ”The Psychology of Legend”, in Wayland 
Hand (ed.), American Folk Legend. A Symposium, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1971, pp. 21-36. 
16 See Carl Lindahl, “Legends of Hurricane Katrina. The Right to Be Wrong, 
Survivor to Survivor Storytelling and Healing”, Journal of American Folklore, 
125, 496, 2012, pp. 139-176; Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History 
Different”?, in Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories. 
Form and Meaning in Oral History, State University of New York Press, New York, 
1991, pp. 45-58.
17 Michael Bamberg, “Positioning between structure and performance”, Journal 
of Narrative and Life History, 7, 1997, pp. 335-342.
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redeeming value of their own written cultural materials over the 
oral tales of impoverished communities. While visiting an Irish 
storyteller, Addams reports, “She could only live a few months at 
best, I argued to myself; why not give her this vivid interest and 
through it awake those earliest recollections of long-accumulated 
folklore with its magic power to transfigure and eclipse the sordid 
and unsatisfactory surroundings in which life is actually spent?”18 
Addams thus suggests a move from strict rationality (there is no 
Devil Baby) to an understanding of how such tales might provide 
confirmation to the believer that invests her with the authority to 
tell her subjective truths. 
Although she does not ultimately join the legend transmission 
chain, Addams turns to a consideration of the subjective truths 
encoded in the legend, arguing that it works as a strategic 
abstraction of the older women’s lived oppression and offers 
them a defensive tool, a warning to overbearing husbands dressed 
up in an exciting narrative. The next two chapters draw on her 
elderly visitors’ life review stories divided by content as well as 
by Addams’ identification of the conflicting functions of memory 
(what we would call life review) to either reconcile with life or to 
offer a means of rethinking and discarding tired conventions. 
Chapter two features stories of domestic violence. And yet, 
Addams insists, no matter how brutalized a woman has been in 
her life, she remains human, capable of identifying moments of 
human connection without bitterness. In one vignette, a mother 
recounts her love and appreciation for a son, currently imprisoned 
for murdering his own wife. Addams quotes the woman recalling 
that after a night of scrubbing floors, “I’d never get home much 
before twelve o’clock, but Joe would open the door for me just as 
pleasant as if he hadn’t been waked out of a sound sleep”. Addams 
in her turn notes, “She was so triumphantly unconscious of the 
incongruity of a sturdy son in bed while his mother earned his 
food, that her auditors said never a word, and in silence we saw a 
hero arise before our eyes, a defender of the oppressed…”.19 Here, 
she surfaces the double-knowing of receptive listeners, who even 
as they confirm the narrator’s sense-making, maintain their own 
interpretations of her story. In contemporary oral history research, 
auditor/interpreters most often work to eliminate the gap between 
a narrator’s intended meaning and the auditor’s interpretation 
most often through methods of collaborative review, discussion 
18 Addams, The Long Road of Women’s Memory, cit., p. 18. 
19 Ivi, p. 51.
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and consensus-building.20 However, intersubjectivity also allows 
for interpretive dissonance of the kind Addams surfaces here. 
With regard to contemporary theories of life review, on the 
one hand Addams’ focus on subjective as opposed to literal truths 
conforms to current values and practices. On the other, she treats 
her material with a relatively free hand, sometimes providing 
direct quotations, often simply reporting in her own words what 
her interlocutor told her. She provides no reliable transcriptions, 
and her narrative style suggests that the stories included in the 
text are representative of a larger body of narratives that remain 
undocumented. 
Addams is also silent with regard to the inter-subjective 
management of the interview, that is, the recognition that even 
life reviews are co-created through dialog, questions and answers, 
and the assumptions and expectations narrator and auditor bring 
with them to the communicative exchange.21 Addams ignores 
these features, portraying the life reviews as spontaneous and 
unprompted (as they may have been), and the listeners as having 
refrained from intervening in the free flow of self-disclosure. 
Moreover, the fact that the ethic of care she models in her attentive 
listening is mirrored by the ethic of care the narrators produce in 
their stories goes unremarked and untheorized. 
In chapter three Addams offers another set of stories that 
rather than reconciling women to an unjust world act as social 
disturbers. She asserts, “when these reminiscences, based upon 
the diverse experiences of many people unknown to each other, 
point to one inevitable conclusion, they accumulate into a social 
protest, although not necessarily an effective one, against existing 
conventions, even against those which are most valuable and 
those securely founded on cumulative human wisdom”.22 Here 
Addams focuses specifically on the problem of “fallen women” 
and their offspring, capitalizing on an implicit link between an 
unwanted pregnancy and a devil baby. Though she paints a 
sympathetic picture of “respectable” women, whose marital 
happiness is threatened or whose own respectability can be 
compromised by their association with the “fallen ones,” the older 
women visitors’ life reviews produce two kinds of tales: ones that 
20 See for example Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory, Routledge, New York, 
2010; Peter Friedlander, “Theory, Method and Oral History”, in Robert Perks and 
Alistair Thomson (eds.), The Oral History Reader, Routledge, New York, 1998, pp. 
311-319. 
21 Abrams, Oral History Theory, cit., pp. 54-77; see also Goffman, 1959.
22 Addams, The Long Road of Women’s Memory, cit., p. 53.
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catalog the heartrending consequences of maintaining a narrow 
moralism or ones in which the protagonist expressed an ultimate 
satisfaction with defying propriety and protecting unwed mothers 
and their children from a hostile world. She concludes, “Maternal 
affection and solicitude in women’s remembering heart, may at 
length coalesce into a chivalric protection for all that is young and 
unguarded”.23 As an example of this new moral stance, she points 
to Hungarian women’s protest against a military regulation that 
would have required weekly medical examinations of all servant 
women living close to army barracks in order to protect the soldiers 
from disease. In this case, she points out, the least protected class 
of women is exposed to great insult. And, she continues, legal 
reforms in Scandinavia and Germany that defend unwed mothers 
and their children have led to greater legal rights for all women. 
In this chapter, then, Addams explicitly argues that social 
transformation occurs not as the consequence of a few great thinkers 
but is the result of a gradual shift in the thinking of multitudes. 
Simultaneously, she introduces a concept of women’s morality 
that is less categorical than are patriarchal norms, allowing for a 
consideration of individual actors and circumstances. She states, 
“Each case has been quietly judged by reference to an altered 
moral standard, for while the ethical code like the legal code 
stands in need of constant revision, the remodeling of the former 
is always private, tacit, and informal”.24
In Chapter Five, Addams shifts her focus to the changing 
nature of women’s lives as a factor that must necessarily lead to 
changes in social thinking and behavior. The stories in the chapter 
highlight women’s shifting attitudes and loyalties as their lives are 
impacted by the great industrial changes of the early 20th century. 
In addition to freeing working women from the isolation and 
dependency of domestic work (including piecework which had 
been banned recently in Chicago, partly as a result of Hull House 
reformers efforts), Addams argues that the constant association 
of industrial life has cultivated desires for liberty and a larger 
participation in the public world among women. For Addams, 
human communication and interaction contribute to self-
cultivation and social justice. Once again she conflates upper and 
working class cultures by comparing the impact the 18th century 
French salons had on intellectual progress with that of immigrant 
women’s workers associations. She concludes, “We may predict 
23 Ivi, pp. 82-83.
24 Ivi, p. 79.
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that to control old impulses so that they may be put to social 
uses, to serve the present through memories hoarding woman’s 
genuine experiences, may liberate energies hitherto unused and 
may result in a notable enrichment of the patterns of human 
culture”.25 In other words, Addams believes social conditions 
have allowed working women greater liberty to live and express 
themselves independently of men. Their inherited wisdom, their 
special perspective, what we might call their standpoint, is now 
available to transform public institutions and ways of thinking in 
ways that will advance the larger culture. 
The next chapter, Women’s Memories: Challenging War, draws 
from two-months of European travel in 1915, recording the 
wartime narratives of women, to support the Peace Party’s 
argument for a negotiated settlement. In this case, Addams 
claims that memory acts to blur nonessential details in order to 
more sharply focus on common, shared human experience. Her 
refashioning of other people’s stories to make a specific point, 
latent in the earlier chapters, is quite plainly evident here. At the 
beginning of the chapter she provides the following footnote: 
The following conversation is a composite made up from several 
talks held with each of two women representing both sides of 
the conflict. Their opinions and observations are merged into 
one because in so many particulars they were either identical or 
overlapping. Both women called themselves patriots, but each 
had become convinced of the folly of war.26 
What follows is a quoted account of a social reformer colleague 
and a third person report of the account of a woman who represents 
for Addams the perspective of ’humble’ internationalists, people 
who, by virtue of family immigration, have rejected Europe’s 
hyper-nationalism in favor of a community of nations, for which 
an idealized America forms the model. In this way the report 
not only compares perspectives from women on two sides of the 
conflict (the sides are not identified), but also from two social 
positions, the intellectual and the common woman. In both cases, 
a woman’s instinct to protect the life of her children and by 
extension, life in general, opposes the duty men feel to serve their 
country, no matter how destructive the mission. 
Both the material and its treatment mark an abrupt shift from 
the previous focus, raising the question of why this chapter forms 
25 Ivi, p. 114.
26 Ivi, p. 115.
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part of the study. One explanation has to do with the moment of 
publication, 1916, and Addams’ own investment in a negotiated 
peace to WWI. The similarities in the workings of memory offer 
another. In the composite stories, Addams identifies the dynamic 
evident in the Devil Baby stories: the narrator moves from a 
commitment to conventional morality (in this case, defense of 
one’s country) to a growing sense of conflict with received wisdom 
derived from women’s distinctive experience of motherhood, to a 
rejection of the status quo in favor of a new moral code, pacifism. 
Addams and her two interlocutors perceive warfare as a primitive 
means of solving conflicts that world progress, which rests on 
government reform, immigration and scientific advances, has 
rendered obsolete. She perceives women’s special experience with 
nurturing the young and defenseless as an unvoiced or unheard 
historical imperative. By gathering these stories that illustrate 
“a selective groping to another standard”, she hopes that “a 
sufficient number of similar variations might even, in Memory’s 
leisurely fashion of upbuilding tradition, in the end establish a 
new norm”,27 the rejection of war. 
The final chapter marks another abrupt shift. Here Addams 
shares an account of how a visit to the monuments of ancient 
Egypt, provokes a series of childhood memories concerning 
death. Pegging civilizational change to the stages of a human life, 
she betrays her embeddedness in 19th century notions of social 
evolution. Yet her aim is to show how, “a sincere portrayal of a 
widespread and basic emotional experience, however remote in 
point of time it may be, has the power to overwhelmingly evoke 
memories of like moods in the individual”.28 This point is important 
to Addams, because she wants to show something essentially 
human across historical time periods, nations, and social classes: 
a shared subjectivity that is a valid form of knowledge different 
from the rational. We might argue that she privileges questions 
of humanity over those of historicity. She interprets the Egyptian 
monuments and paintings as mirroring her childhood desires 
to shut out death with strong walls, to ward it off with magical 
formulas, to resist the destruction of the corporeal self, to quell 
a guilty conscience and to embrace notions of reincarnation, 
concluding “such ghosts of reminiscence, coming to the individual 
as he visits one after another of the marvellous human documents 
on the banks of the Nile, may be merely manifestations of that 
27 Ivi, p. xii.
28 Ivi, p. 141.
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new humanism which is perhaps the most precious possession of 
this generation, the belief that no altar at which living men have 
once devoutly worshipped, no oracle to whom a nation long ago 
appealed in its moments of dire confusion, no gentle myth in which 
former generations have found solace, can lose all significance for 
us, the survivors”.29 
Why end this way? How does this final chapter connect with 
the Devil Baby legend with which she began her inquiry? In the 
first chapters Addams portrays herself as reaching towards the 
humanity of older women who, being mostly disregarded, have 
heretofore not revealed themselves as animated, thinking subjects. 
Stirred to recollection and life review, they reformulate worn out 
notions of morality, privileging an ethic of care. She then moves 
to a younger generation of women, who, as they enter the public 
realm as wage earners, begin to transfer these values from their 
private lives to society as a whole. War interrupts social progress 
and compels both privileged and ordinary women to engage in 
the process of reflective life review that leads to a rejection of 
patriotic morality in favor of the life-sustaining ethic of pacifism. 
Addams’ turn to a consideration of Pharoanic conceptions of 
death and the afterlife displays the same receptivity now across 
time and civilizational difference. In its universalizing scope, it 
offers perhaps an alternate “planetary consciousness” to the one 
Pratt surfaced in travel narratives authored by European men. 
Ultimately, The Long Road of Women’s Memory contributes a 
number of early methodological formulations to our understanding 
of oral narrative research. First, Addams upholds the power 
and importance of subjective truths. Second, she recognizes the 
epistemological value of adopting the standpoint of the least 
privileged to uncover new knowledge that can transform society. 
In general, her approach aligns very well with contemporary 
scholars and practitioners of oral history performance, a branch of 
oral history scholarship that seeks to harness life review to projects 
of individual and social transformation or healing.30 These projects 
identify the value of collecting life reviews in the immediate 
impact of the reflexive process on the narrating self and on 
translating elements of the resulting narrative into performances 
that can impact others to reject existing attitudes that blame 
the victim. Leaves of Magnolia, Alicia Rouverol’s collaboration 
29 Ivi, p. 167.
30 See for instance Della Pollock (ed.), Remembering. Oral History Performance, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005.
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with male prison inmates, for instance, deploys life review to 
encourage prisoner-actors to come to terms with their pasts.31 
As these men fashion a performance for an audience of at-risk-
youth, they also gain a sense of personal agency in an otherwise 
power-laden environment, and hopefully, help their audience 
chart a different future. Restaging stories of domestic violence32 or 
training disaster survivors to document the experiences of their 
fellow survivors33 are other contemporary projects that provide 
platforms to routinely silenced groups to express their subjective 
truths and diversify sense-making in the public sphere. 
To conclude, Addams’ insistence that the road of women’s 
memory is indeed long, resists the kind of historical erasure of 
women’s subjectivity that my Renaissance History professor 
attempted so long ago. Recuperating her legacy reminds us of the 
“subtle insights of earlier thinkers” and of what we can imagine 
as possible. What would it take for us to advance her vision of a 
civilization that has evolved beyond war?
 
31 See Alicia Rouverol, “Trying To Be Good. Lessons in Oral History and 
Performance”, in Pollock, Remembering, cit., pp. 19-44.
32 M. Heather Carver and Elaine Lawless, Troubling Violence. A Performance 
Project, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 2010.
33 Pat Jasper and Carl Lindahl, ”The Houston Survivor Project. An Introduction”, 
Callaloo, 29, 4, 2006, pp. 1504-05. See also Lindhal, Legends of Hurricane Katrina, cit.
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“I wanted to be somebody”: Learning 




The article describes a feminist oral history project researching the 
lives of several Croatian intellectual women, aiming to enrich women’s 
history with accounts of their subjective experience. The article outlines 
the necessity of conducting such a project, its practical challenges and 
conclusions that were drawn from the interviews. Croatia and the rest 
of Europe are facing retraditionalization, which has disrupted women’s 
lives and women’s history. The younger generations of women often 
embrace conservative trends uncritically, while at the same taking 
feminism’s outcomes for granted, unaware of the fact that women’s 
rights once gained are not irreversible but depend on fragile socio-
political circumstances. This can be challenged by the use of oral history. 
Younger women could feel empowered by the older women’s struggle 
for equality and more fulfilled lives. The private struggles – especially 
those of educated women outsiders – have the capacity to overcome the 
generational differences and make real changes. 
Introduction: Analyzing Women’s Lives from Different Sources
One of the dangers of traditional scholarship is the false notion 
that what is your idea cannot be my idea too; it leads to the 
ridiculous assumption that ideas spring from a single mind as if 
the mind existed in a vacuum, and was not necessarily affected by 
the insights of others.1 
1 Christine Mason Sutherland, ”Feminist Historiography. Research Methods in 
Rhetoric”, Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 32, 1, 2002, p. 112.
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In order to further develop knowledge and raise consciousness 
about past women’s lives, which constitute the body of women’s 
history, women’s stories have to be told, kept, analyzed and 
properly valued. Since the 1970s it has been acknowledged that 
women’s lives were “hidden from history”,2 because historians 
were primarily interested in public and political history. Today, in 
an era of insecurity and growing threats to women’s rights all over 
the world, and especially in post-socialist countries like Croatia, 
it is essential to repeat over and over again that stories about 
women’s past lives are important and that they deserve analytical 
treatment. The importance of women’s life stories was particularly 
acknowledged by the methodology of feminist anthropology 
and ethnography3 as well by the vast field of women’s history. 
Standpoint theory recognized women’s lives as research-worthy, 
claiming that one has to start exploring from the outside, from 
marginal lives, to get the most objective view of the prevailing 
structures and practices.4 Croatian researchers have reclaimed 
women’s lives through oral history5 and studies on women’s 
history.6 However, as a small country burdened by a difficult past 
in contemporary political life, the lingering impact of the 1991-
2 Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden from History. 300 Years of Women’s Oppression and 
the Fight Against It, Pluto Press, London, 1973. 
3 See Gloria Bowles, Renate Duelli Klein (eds.), Theories of Women’s Studies, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1983; Ann Oakley, Taking it Like a Woman. A 
Personal History, Random House, New York, 1984; Judith Stacey, “Can There Be 
a Feminist Ethnography?”, Women’s Studies International Forum, 11, 1, 1988, pp. 
21-27; Lila Abu-Lughod, “Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?”, Women and 
Performance, 5, 1, 1990, pp. 7-27; Katherine Borland, “Decolonizing Approaches to 
Feminist Research. The Case of Feminist Ethnography”, in Sharlene Nagy Hesse-
Biber (ed.), Handbook of Feminist Research. Theory and Praxis, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA, 2007, pp. 621-627.
4 See Sandra Harding, “After the Neutrality Ideal. Science, Politics, and ‘Strong 
Objectivity’”, Social research, 59, 3, 1992, pp. 567-587.
5 See Vesna Barilar et al. (eds.), Aktivistkinje. Kako “opismeniti” teoriju, Centar za 
ženske studije, Zagreb, 2000; Dijana Dijanić et al., Ženski biografski leksikon. Sjećanje 
žena na život u socijalizmu, Centar za ženske studije, Zagreb, 2004; Ana Bogdanić 
(ed.), Usmene povijesti starijih Romkinja iz grada Rijeke, Udruga žena Romkinja Bolji 
život, Rijeka, 2005.
6 See Andrea Feldman, Žene u Hrvatskoj. Ženska i kulturna povijest, Institut 
“Vlado Gotovac”, Ženska infoteka, Zagreb, 2004; Zdenka Janeković-Römer, Maruša 
ili suđenje ljubavi. Bračno-ljubavna priča iz srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika, Algoritam, 
Zagreb, 2007; Renata Jambrešić Kirin, Dom i svijet. O ženskoj kulturi pamćenja, 
Centar za ženske studije, Zagreb, 2008; Renata Jambrešić Kirin, Sandra Prlenda 
(eds.), Women Narrating their Lives and Actions, Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 
Centar za ženske studije, Zagreb, 2013; Ida Ograjšek Gorenjak, Opasne iluzije. Rodni 
stereotipi u međuratnoj Jugoslaviji, Srednja Europa, Zagreb, 2015; Marija Ott Franolić, 
Dnevnik ustremljen nedostižnom. Svakodnevica u ženskim zapisima, Disput, Zagreb, 
2016.
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1995 war of independence and constant repatriarchalization since 
the 1990s, Croatia has a long way to go in terms of ethnographic 
research on women’s lives. 
One of the goals of researching women’s lives is to empower 
younger women and make them more conscious of how their 
lives are affected by gender inequality. Many women born in the 
early 1990s are only vaguely aware of what feminism is, even if 
their lives benefit from the achievements of feminism.7 This is 
the phenomenon of double entanglement, “the coexistence of neo-
conservative values in relation to gender, sexuality and family life 
... with processes of liberalization in regard to choice and diversity 
in domestic, sexual and kinship relations”.8 Retraditionalization 
and the deterioration of women’s rights are now taking place all 
over the world, as modern history repeatedly reminds us that the 
battles for women’s basic human rights are never won completely: 
“We find ourselves having to repeat and relearn the same old 
lessons over and over that our mothers did because we do not 
pass on what we have learned, or because we are unable to 
listen”.9 
I have spent the last decade doing interdisciplinary research 
on various published and unpublished female autobiographical 
texts. I read various autobiographies and diaries using the 
methodological tools of historiography, feminist criticism and 
women’s history, and ended up writing a book based on my PhD 
thesis on what female autobiographical texts tell us about the lives 
of women in the past.10 In the second phase I started an oral history 
7 The Facebook page Women against feminism is a world-wide phenomenon that 
started in 2013. It is a place where people, mostly women, post their reasons for 
not being feminists. It is very interesting that most of their reasons spring from not 
understanding what the movement is or what it stands for, such as “I don’t need 
feminism because I am not a victim”, or “I don’t need feminism because I don’t 
hate men”. See more at <https://www.facebook.com/WomenAgainstFeminism/> 
or <womenagainstfeminism.tumblr.com >. 
8 Angela McRobbie, “Post-feminism and Popular Culture. Bridget Jones and 
the New Gender Regime”, in James Curran and David Morley (eds.), Media and 
Cultural Theory, Routledge, New York and London, 2006, p. 60.
9 Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class and Sex. Women Redefining Difference”, in 
Sister Outsider. Essays and Speeches, Crossing Press, Berkeley, 2007, pp. 114-123, 
p. 117. 
10 My book-length study Dnevnik ustremljen nedostižnom. Svakodnevica u ženskim 
zapisima (A Diary of the Unattainable. Everyday Life in Women’s Autobiographical 
Writing) was primarily based on the extensive unpublished personal diary 
of Croatian scholar and poet Divna Zečević (1937–2006), written from 1961 to 
2006 (Marija Ott Franolić, Dnevnik ustremljen nedostižnom. Svakodnevica u ženskim 
zapisima, Disput, Zagreb, 2014). Selected entries of her diary were published in 
2017 under the title Život kao voda hlapi (Life Just Fades Away). See Divna Zečević, 
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project, interviewing older women and analyzing their life stories, 
told in their own voices. The interviews in this project complement 
women’s history, give a face to women’s time, and provide an 
insight into the relationship between personal and public memory. 
The history of the everyday is a field within which women’s 
history can be useful to historiography.11 I wanted to especially 
explore the possibilities of juggling intellectual endeavors with 
motherhood and family. While most women in the West today 
can and do fully participate in the public sphere, this participation 
is still largely affected by societal expectations placed on the 
biological functions of the female body. The question posed by 
Simone de Beauvoir in Second Sex is in my opinion still relevant: 
“How, in the feminine condition, can a human being accomplish 
herself? What paths are open to her? Which ones lead to dead 
ends? How can she find independence within dependence? What 
circumstances limit women’s freedom and can she overcome 
them?”.12
Until recently, women were mostly excluded from official 
historical documents,13 but it is precisely women’s texts or texts 
about women’s lives that can enrich the universal, ’neutral’ view 
of history, which too often served the interests of the privileged 
male-oriented world. Personal texts were recognized as valuable 
historical sources for microhistory and tracing the everyday in 
the 1970s, but since the 1980s there has been a debate about the 
epistemological legitimacy of historical narrations. Doubt was 
cast upon historiography with respect to the ’truth’ of the past, 
since historians are always subjective and immersed into their 
historical moment,14 and the self is seen as heterogeneous, fragile 
and decentered15 and language as a construct.16 Undoubtedly, 
personal accounts of women’s lives cannot be completely reliable 
Život kao voda hlapi. Izbor iz dnevnika 1961-2006, Marija Ott Franolić (ed.), Disput, 
Zagreb, 2017.
11 See Dorothee Wierling, “The History of Everyday Life and Gender Relations. 
On Historical and Historiographical Relationships”, in Alf Lüdtke (ed.), The History 
of Everyday Life. Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995, pp. 149-168, p. 153. 
12 Simone de Beauvoir, Second Sex, Vintage Books, New York, 2011 [1949], p. 37.
13 See Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1999.
14 See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1978. 
15 See Jean-François Lyotard, La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir, Les 
éditions de minuit, Paris, 1979.
16 See Roland Barthes, “The Discourse of History”, in The Rustle of Language, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 127-140. 
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because of an author’s need to exaggerate some events or emotions 
and leave others out, due to the instability of the author’s memory, 
or her awareness of possible readers of her text. However, it is 
easy to agree with psychologist Mark Freeman who notes that:
 
In relegating autobiographical texts to the status of mere fictions, 
we not only cut ourselves off from the possibility of attaining 
those insights that can accrue from the process of rewriting the 
self; we cut ourselves off from the possibility of thinking about 
historical truth in a deeper and a more comprehensive way than 
is often allowed.17 
Stories are essential to human existence and an important part 
of conveying feminist experiences and agendas for the future. 
Telling different stories, imagining alternative lifestyles, can 
open up our future: “Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with 
the narrative, with the stories that we tell and hear told, those we 
dream or imagine or would like to tell”.18
Starting a Feminist Oral History Project
In my efforts to identify new women’s stories, I took my 
research one step further and started interviewing highly educated 
Croatian women born between the 1920s and the early 1940s.19 
The focus of the interviews was on how the respondents combined 
their personal lives with intellectual or artistic endeavors. The 
respondents in my research – translators, teachers, historians, 
university professors – were women who had, for the better 
part of their lives, lived in a socialist regime. As a socialist state, 
Yugoslavia had a somewhat contradictory relationship to women’s 
lives and rights. On the one hand, emancipatory law was built into 
the communist system, guaranteeing all basic rights to women – 
from voting to property ownership, from education to divorce, 
equal pay for equal work to the right to control their bodies. But 
these proclamations of gender equality never corresponded to 
17 Mark Freeman, Rewriting the Self. History, Memory, Narrative, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1993, pp. 32-33.
18 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot. Design and Intention in Narrative, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1992, p. 3.
19 Twelve interviews were conducted from 2013 to 2015 and are kept in my 
private collection. Hopefully one day Croatia will form a national women’s 
archive and the interviews will be deposited there, together with the female 
autobiographical texts I collected while writing my PhD thesis. In the meantime, 
these interviews could be aired as radio broadcasts or made into a documentary 
film. 
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social reality, as women faced a triple burden of jobs, childcare 
and housework. Reproduction and housework “transformed into 
a natural attribute”,20 making women practically subordinate and 
economically exploited. Jambrešić Kirin observes that: 
“To women on the left, the socialist framework of society opened 
up multifarious opportunities for successful professional and 
political careers. However, the conflict between revolutionary 
and traditional values generated various antagonisms and 
compromises ..., particularly in the private sphere where the 
patriarchal sexual contract (C. Pateman) with its “natural” division 
between men’s and women’s roles was still retained”.21 
Talking about working and raising her son in the early 1950s, 
at a time with no diapers, hot running water or washing machines, 
one of the respondents, Micheline Popović, a translator born in 
1924, concluded: “When you got home [from work], this was a 
full-time job all-right!”
Women’s personal choices and decisions are always framed by 
their time, their class, the circumstances and narratives they belong 
to. The personal is always political. The respondents provided 
a lot of evidence that during socialism the private sphere was 
mostly dominated by a patriarchal attitude to women, and that the 
traditional, patriarchal family was very much alive in socialism. 
Most of the respondents were born at a time when women 
were supposed to fulfill their motherly and caretaking roles, 
and put others before their own wishes. Even educated women 
often internalized these societal demands. The respondent Desa 
Janjatović, born in 1934 in a small town, talked about servility being 
seen as a woman’s natural attribute: “we were a family of women, 
expected to do anything for anyone who asked”. Avenka Žurić, 
born in 1938, talked about how she failed to fulfill the expectation 
to be a good housewife. She said: “We are still enslaved by old 
patterns of behavior, created not by this generation, but by those 
that came before. So, when a clumsy person is born like myself, 
20 Silvia Federici, “Women Against Housework”, in Revolution at Point Zero. 
Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle, PM Press, Oakland, CA, Common 
Notions, Autonomedia, Brooklyn, NY, 2012 [1973], pp. 15-22, p. 16. 
21 Renata Jambrešić Kirin, “Intelektualke nakon revolucije. Od partijske 
do zatvorske ćelije”, in Drago Roksandić and Ivana Cvijović Javorina (eds.), 
Intelektualci i rat. 1939.–1947. Zbornik radova s Desničinih susreta 2011, Filozofski 
fakultet u Zagrebu, Plejada, Zagreb, 2012, pp. 199-216, p. 215. Translation mine. 
The internal reference is to Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1988.
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ha, of course that is hard to please – even today, I did not make 
the bed and I had this small thought, I have to close the door on 
that mess. But why should the mess not be seen?”. The interviews 
also reflected a strong divide between male and female duties. For 
example, Micheline Popović talked about her husband, a doctor, 
“a little spoiled, only child, he might have been an exception”. On 
the rare occasions when he went to the market or shop during the 
1950s or the beginning of the 1960s, he would carry everything that 
he bought in his briefcase, to avoid being seen with the groceries. 
Reading the Other, Understanding Myself
I employed the feminist methodology of collaboration between 
researcher and researched as the most valuable part of a feminist 
approach, because I was aware that in the process of exploring 
women’s lives I was also searching for answers about my own life. 
Nancy Miller named this stance personal criticism,22 invoking more 
engaged ways of reading women’s lives and writing about them. 
There were women before us who struggled juggling professional 
and personal lives. Why not use already tested strategies, together 
with inventing new ones? Today, more than ever before, women 
are expected to do it all – to get an education, to work, to get 
married and have children, and too often to take care of them and 
the household. This issue was problematized by Sandberg23 who 
was rightly but perhaps too harshly criticized24 for addressing 
only privileged white women. Nevertheless, Sandberg tackled 
an issue still important for women: juggling a job, children and 
a family can be a taxing journey full of uncertainties, and most 
women still struggle to find a balance on a daily basis. 
Even when immersed in patriarchal patterns, some women in 
the past were innovative in their strategies of survival in a world 
where the rules were made by others. We have to understand 
and recognize women’s life strategies in order to make female 
genealogy more open to an exchange of knowledge and solidarity. 
I understand female genealogy as a mutual space consisting of 
22 Nancy K. Miller, “Getting Personal. Autobiography as Cultural Criticism”, 
in idem, Getting Personal. Feminist Occasions and Other Autobiographical Acts, 
Routledge, New York and London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 1-30.
23 See Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In. Women, Work and the Will to Lead, Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 2013. 
24 See Susan Faludi, “Facebook Feminism, Like It or Not”, The Baffler, 23, 2013, 
<http://thebaffler.com/salvos/facebook-feminism like-it-or-not>; bell hooks, “Dig 
Deep. Beyond Lean In”, The Feminist Wire, October 28, 2013, <http://www.thefem-
inistwire.com/2013/10/17973/>.
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women listening to other women telling their stories.25 Carolyn G. 
Heilbrun believed in the need to tell the stories of women’s lives 
in order for them to become “stories other women can use”,26 and 
Felman urged women to “read autobiographically”,27 believing 
that women have been deprived of genuine narratives – “we do 
not know our stories”.28
In my oral history project I focused on well-educated women, 
“feminist heroines,” who transcended societal pressures and were 
consequently, to a lesser or greater extent, considered outsiders. 
I was especially eager to understand the extent to which even 
the most emancipated and liberated women had internalized 
certain societal rules. As noted by Marso, “feminist heroines, in 
reflecting on their personal choices, express radical self-doubt 
while simultaneously criticizing the limited choices they were 
offered”.29 This was also evident in the interviews I conducted: 
Micheline Popović whose husband carried the groceries in a 
briefcase and had no relationship with their son until he was 
older also declared that she and her husband were equals in their 
marriage. She later explained “I don’t see it as a contradiction, 
probably that was how I was raised and life was just like that, I 
don’t think either of us was more worthy than the other, those 
were completely separated spheres of life, and it functioned very 
well, this was a matter of organization”.
One of the goals of this research is to show contemporary 
women “that we already have a history, that certain women, 
despite all the cultural obstacles, have made their mark upon their 
history”.30 Ljerka Auferber, a teacher and translator born in 1922, 
talked about the joy of balancing her personal and professional 
life: “I felt no guilt for leaving my small daughter to my parents, 
I wanted to go studying, I was so happy, so happy … I wanted 
to be somebody, to study, to have a job, to be qualified for 
doing something. Even with a child I gave English lessons, even 
managed to translate some stories, there is a book in which you 
25 See Zuzana Kiczková (ed.), Women’s Memory. The Experience of Self-Shaping in 
Biographical Interviews, Iris, Bratislava, 2006, p. 7. 
26 Carolyn G. Heilbrun, Writing a Woman’s Life, W. W. Norton and Company, 
New York and London, 2008 [1988], p. xvi.
27 Shoshana Felman, What Does a Woman Want? Reading and Sexual Difference, 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1993, p. 14.
28 Ivi, p. 156.
29 Lori Jo Marso, Feminist Thinkers and the Demands of Femininity. The Lives and 
Work of Intellectual Women, Routledge, New York and London, 2006, p. 16.
30 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, Columbia University Press, New York 
and Chichester, 1993, p. 19. 
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can see, I am officially the translator, nothing was hard”. Oral 
historian Alistair Thomson wrote a book Moving Stories on four 
British women moving from the United Kingdom to Australia in 
the 1950s and 1960s in search of a better life. He mentions the story 
of Dorothy Wright, born in 1928, who enrolled at university at 
the age of 53. Her university experience was “excellent – it was 
marvelous, I thoroughly enjoyed it. … Oh, goodness me! Yes, yes, 
yes! I started to think more and I thought, ‘Well, I haven’t been 
thinking for years!’”.31 There is great geographical and cultural 
distance between these women’s lives, yet life under patriarchy 
has made many women strive for the same goal: more personal 
freedom, a chance for individual growth and self-development in 
a society that only goes so far in recognizing gender equality and 
women’s empowerment. 
In the process of interviewing, I became aware that women’s 
oral history interviews carry great emancipatory potential. After 
writing down the stories of four women migrants, Thomson wrote: 
Taken together, these four women’s life histories highlight 
significant historical patterns. Though the sample of four is by no 
means representative, they do share what Italian oral historian 
Alessandro Portelli calls ‘the horizon of possibilities’, a set of 
common circumstances and expectations, which each woman 
managed in distinctive ways.32 
The goals of feminist ethnography and oral history are closer in 
approach to the “horizons of possibilities” than they are to women’s 
lives “as they were really lived,” for it is precisely these possibilities of 
change that carry emancipatory potential. This was also recognized 
in Thomson’s oral history project, when he gave all interviewees 
other women’s stories to read: “When they read all four stories, 
each of them recognized aspects of her own life in the others’ stories 
including both opportunities and constraints for women of their 
generation, and this recognition was enlightening and affirming”.33 
In light of the affective turn34 in contemporary humanities 
and social sciences, it is acceptable for respondents to share 
31 Alistair Thomson, Moving Stories. An Intimate History of Four Women Across 
Two Countries, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011, p. 90.
32 Thomson, Moving Stories, cit., p. 183. The internal quotation is from 
Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia. Oral History and the Art of Dialogue, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1997, p. 276.
33 Ivi, p. 323.
34 See Patricia Ticineto Clough (ed.), The Affective Turn. Theorizing the Social, 
Duke University Press, Durham 2007. 
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their subjective thoughts and reasons. Alison Jaggar holds that 
emotions are more than necessary in order to explain the 
world, understand it and make efforts for change, even though 
“we have no access either to our own emotions or to those of 
others independent of or unmediated by the discourse of our 
culture”.35 Even though every experience is unique and should 
not be used to exclude those that are different, life stories can 
be full of motivation and hope. This idea is close to that of 
Svetlana Alexievich who uses a method of oral history in order 
to understand the past and preserve the history of emotions by 
“reading the voice”.36
The Course of the Interviews and the Challenges 
Encountered
Before an interview, I would visit a potential interviewee and 
clarify my research. We would talk about her life and I would 
make detailed notes. I made an outline of the semi-structured 
interview. When we met for the recording in her home, I would 
ask her about her childhood and her intellectual interests: 
were they encouraged or was she meant to be concerned 
with traditional ’women’s chores’? We would talk about her 
education and personal life: did she desire to marry and have 
children or was it something that had to be done? Did she feel 
like an outsider, and did she experience any consequences of 
being outside the norm? 
I would then listen to the interview and take notes. If I needed 
certain parts of the interview to be elaborated, I would schedule 
another meeting with the respondent. The second interview 
would usually be more relaxed, full of details and laughter, 
small talk, as if we were already friends. The respondents would 
show me photographs, we would discuss the latest books we 
had read, there would be cake and tea, the atmosphere was 
domestic and the confiding could begin. I felt right at home in 
many conversations, as their lives and dilemmas mirrored mine 
in many ways. Intersubjectivity was taking place – I shared and 
compared my experiences as a woman and an academic with the 
respondents. But I wondered, as Patai aptly put it: “should we 
do research only when we choose to make friends with people 
35 Alison M. Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge. Emotion in Feminist Epistemology”, 
in Christina Hughes (ed.), Researching Gender. Vol. 4. Feminist Futures, Sage, Los 
Angeles and London, 2013 [1989], pp. 262-292, p. 271.
36 Svetlana Alexievich, War’s Unwomanly Face. An Oral History of Women in 
World War II, Random House, New York, 2017, p. xix.
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we are interviewing? Is it an improvement of the old model, or 
another form of manipulation?”.37
I conducted twelve interviews with intellectual women born 
between the 1920s and early 1940s, and spoke to ten more about 
their lives and the possibility of an interview. The interviews I 
conducted were not life stories in the strict sense of a more or less 
coherent retelling of the course of one’s life; they were thematically 
focused on intellectual efforts and motherhood, even if some 
women chose to share more detailed accounts of their lives. 
Two main challenges arose in the course of the project: finding 
women willing to be recorded, and learning to listen to them. 
Firstly, it turned out that not all women I contacted were willing 
to talk about their lives. They were mostly willing to participate 
in the research for the book composed of my findings, or for the 
interview to be stored in the future national women’s archive, 
but almost all were intimidated by the notion of their interview 
being used for a documentary film or for radio broadcasts. This 
may have been a consequence of my decision not to choose public 
figures, because I wanted to explore the lives of women whose 
life stories were not ’extraordinary’. It was important to me that 
the interviewees should feel untroubled by the interview. I did 
not want them to feel constrained by the possibility of their words 
being heard by the general public, or – since Croatia is a small 
country with an even smaller intellectual circle – by people who 
might know them personally. It almost seemed to me that the 
most educated, eloquent and impressive individuals were also the 
most guarded when it came to their intimacy and personal life. 
Generally, women who were willing to talk openly were the ones 
recommended to me by somebody I knew personally. 
Another problem I encountered was how to listen. Firstly, 
I had to make sure I was not reading my point of view into 
an interviewee’s answers. I was aware of the generational, 
occupational, ideological and other differences between us. The 
questions had to be posed in an open and neutral way, so as not 
to channel the answers I would want to hear.38 I had to strike a 
37 Daphne Patai, “U.S. Academics and Third World Women. Is Ethical Research 
Possible?”, in Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai (eds.), Women’s Words. The 
Feminist Practice of Oral History, Routledge, New York and London, 1991, pp. 137-
153, p. 144.
38 For an example of a feminist researcher reading herself into her respondents’ 
worldview, see Katherine Borland, “‘That’s not what I said’. Interpretative conflict 
in oral narrative research”, in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), Oral 
History Reader, Routledge, New York, 1998, pp. 310-321.
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balance between getting close to the interviewee, getting her to 
trust me, and not restraining her responses with my worldview. 
Secondly, I wondered whether I should engage in a conversation 
with my respondents or just let them speak. Generally, the women 
felt more comfortable and relaxed when I spoke freely and asked 
spontaneous questions. I was encouraged by a project in which 
students who engaged in conversation with respondents created 
a rapport and elicited more lively storytelling than those who 
confined themselves to non-verbal responses.39 
Finally, there was the question of how to present these stories 
to women who could ’read autobiographically’, identifying facets 
of their lives in the story of another? I openly discussed various 
possibilities with my respondents. My interviews could be a solid 
base for an oral history women’s archive, but this would not make 
them widely available. The interviews would reach more people 
if they were aired as radio broadcasts. I have discussed the idea 
of transforming the recorded material into a documentary film 
with several documentary directors, but they found the theme too 
ordinary (they would prefer making a film about famous Croatian 
women), and most of my respondents did not feel comfortable 
with the idea of being shown on screen. I even considered the 
possibility of making a film without their names, to enable my 
respondents to be anonymous, but how would that reflect on the 
feminist approach of my project? To hide their names, professions, 
and achievements – the precise reasons I wanted to talk to them? I 
also considered the possibility of introducing oral history projects 
to schools, giving students the opportunity to interview their 
grandmothers, aunts, to connect to their female genealogy.
“I talked a lot and said nothing”: The Power of Adaptability
Even though this is just the first part of my project, and more 
interviews are needed to create a solid base for a more thorough 
analysis of intellectual women’s everyday life, I have been able to 
draw some symptomatic conclusions so far. 
First of all, after the interview was over (and sometimes 
unrecorded), almost all of the respondents concluded that what 
they said was banal, mundane, and that they were sorry it could 
be of no use to me. Micheline Popović even said: “I talked a lot and 
said nothing”. The same phenomenon was noted by Kiczková, 
39 See Ann Green, “The Exhibition that Speaks for Itself. Oral History and 
Museums”, in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1998, pp. 448-456, p. 453. 
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Ryan, Thomson and others.40 This may not be surprising, since the 
respondents were raised at a time when all the topics discussed 
were looked upon as too trivial, even ’too female’, something 
emotional and therefore not important. Ever since Aristotle, 
women’s occupations in the West were mostly seen as belonging 
to life instead of art, to emotions and nature instead of intellect, 
and it is no wonder women have internalized these postulates. But 
there is more than meets the eye. After conducting an oral history 
project with women who served in the military in the Second 
World War, Ryan found that almost all of them claimed to have 
done nothing important, even though some of them participated 
in major historical and military events.41 Ryan sees it as a rhetorical 
move with which these women wanted to acknowledge society’s 
expectations (in the words of Diana Tietjens Meyers “lip syncing 
the ominous baritone of patriarchy”),42 while at the same time 
affirming the importance of their wartime work. Even women 
who wanted to remain anonymous in Ryan’s project still asked for 
their interviews to be deposited in a public archive. Secondly, all 
the respondents in my project mentioned their adaptability, albeit 
in different contexts – some describing the hardships or prejudices 
they encountered, or listing their main characteristics. 
What is the connection between these two self-attributed 
traits of intellectual women’s lives, banality and adaptability? 
They are female life strategies that simultaneously represent 
the main problem of women intellectuals in Western society 
and its possible solution. If we could look at the banality and 
unimportance of women’s lives as being at the core of Western 
patriarchal society, something that may just be the biggest 
problem for women, then adaptability could be the solution 
that they have come up with on their own, using their strength, 
courage, emotions and intelligence. Writing about ways of 
finding a female voice and self-imagery, Diana Tietjens Meyers 
enlists the skills women need to become autonomous in the 
articulation and the enactment of their lives, naming them 
“skills that make self-determination possible”.43 These skills, 
according to Meyers, are: introspection skills that allow women 
40 See Kiczková, Women’s Memory, cit; Kathleen M. Ryan, “‘I Didn’t Do 
Anything Important’. A Pragmatist Analysis of the Oral History Interview”, Oral 
History Review, 36, 1, 2009, pp. 25-44; Thomson, Moving stories, cit.
41 See Ryan, I Didn’t Do Anything Important, cit.
42 Diana Tietjens Meyers, Gender in the Mirror. Cultural Imagery and Women’s 
Agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2002, p. 16.
43 Ivi, p. 9.
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to understand themselves; communication skills that enable 
them to benefit from others’ perceptions; memory skills for 
recalling their own experiences; imagination skills that facilitate 
envisaging alternative life plots; analytical and reasoning skills 
that enable them to assess the relative merits of different visions; 
self-nurturing skills that secure their physical and psychological 
equilibrium despite missteps and setbacks; volitional skills for 
them to resist capitulating to convention; interpersonal skills 
that enable them to join forces to challenge and change cultural 
regimes.44 The result of having these skills, as Meyers explains, 
will be a woman finding her own voice. 
As Simone de Beauvoir rightly observed: “if a caste is 
maintained in an inferior position, it remains inferior”, but she 
ended the sentence optimistically, concluding that “freedom can 
break the circle”, perhaps the very freedom gained by exercising 
the above-mentioned skills.45 The circle can indeed be broken 
because ’adaptable ’ has a double meaning. Firstly, it means 
that a person can endure procedures and behaviors marked as 
usual and expected, and even make herself believe that they are 
what she wanted all along. But it can also lead women to search 
for a path of their own. And this other adaptability – a flexibility 
which could easily transform into resistance to the patriarchal 
order – could be an opening towards a more equal society. It is 
precisely the Others, the ones living in a world in which they 
did not make the rules but only strategies to survive, who are 
interested in change: they have a fuller understanding of the 
world. 
Croatian poet and literature scholar Divna Zečević left behind 
a very extensive diary. She wrote about how to succeed in a male 
dominated society, but she also asked herself what it means to be 
a woman and whether she should call herself a feminist and what 
does it mean to be one. As an outsider in more ways than one, she 
could not fit in any group, so feminism was not an exception. Her 
diary is a remarkable egodocument, a testimony to her everyday 
life and women’s history in socialism. It is also a powerful reminder 
of how important it is for women to leave traces of their thoughts 
and actions which defy patriarchal and autocrat societal limitations. 
Divna Zečević herself was aware of the fact that intellectual women 
have to lead the way in order for all other women to become aware 
of the constraints of patriarchy: 
44 Ivi, pp. 20-21.
45 Beauvoir, Second Sex, cit., p. 860.
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19 April 1982, Monday
It is questionable whether it is even possible to achieve women’s 
equality to men. When considering, ostensibly, only women 
intellectual workers – and in that case – the question of improving 
their position affects the life and position of women in the most 
godforsaken, backward places, who at this point in time have no 
idea that the resolution of some vague faraway issues has a direct 
impact on their lives, too. Besides, when writing about the position 
of women – one ought to focus not on women, but above all on 
men and their privileged position. Some speak of their patriarchy 
as if it were a question of genetics and inheritance, and not interest; 
“I am patriarchal,” he says, for God’s sake, as if it were the color 
of his eyes. Who amongst us would not be patriarchal if it meant 
food on their table when they got home, a clean pair of underwear 
and a shirt ironed after washing, lying and lazing about and so 
on [go to bloody hell]. It’s good to be patriarchal over the backs of 
women. It is a position as pleasant for men as it is humiliating for 
the women workhorses.46
As long as we only analyze official traditional sources, this type 
of women’s agency always stays hidden and unacknowledged.
46 Zečević, Život kao voda hlapi, cit., p. 300.
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Yugoslav Women Intellectuals: 
From a Party Cell to a Prison Cell1
Renata Jambrešić Kirin
Summary
The Yugoslav socialist framework enabled big advances as concerns 
the legal, economic and social equality of women that radically changed 
their traditionally subordinated family and social position. However, the 
postwar period of revolutionary enthusiasm, female political activism 
and the access of women intellectuals to the male-dominated spheres 
of journalism, diplomacy, administration and governmental offices 
did not exist long. Taking into account memoirs and oral histories of 
five distinguished women the article reveals the reasons for Party’s 
antifeminist attitudes: a) the political fear of ambitious female ‘quality 
staff’; b) the ideological fear of the women guardians of the traditional 
and religious foundations of collective identity; c) a cultural mistrust 
toward the mobile woman who easily transcends family, social and 
ethnic boundaries. These biographical sources show that any attempts 
at free thought and autonomous action outside of the party line was 
severely punished.
Among numerous antagonisms, paradoxes, possible 
“contradictions of modernity“2 or “conflicting complementarities”3 
relating to Yugoslav society in the socialist period, the antifeminist 
1 This article has been financed by The Croatian Science Foundation (“Narrating 
Fear: From Old Records to New Orality”, Project No. IP-06-2016-2463).
2 John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, Hurst and Company, London, 2000.
3 G. W. Creed, Domesticating Revolution. From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent 
Transition in a Bulgarian Village, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University 
Park PA, 1998.
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treatment of women intellectuals has been the least studied. 
Indeed, in the entire spectrum of retrospective approaches – from 
serious academic studies to revisionist daily political discussions 
– it seems that gender and social egalitarianism was recognized 
as a civilizational achievement of the communist authorities. Not 
denying the truth of this principal remark, my starting point is 
that state sponsored egalitarianism should not overshadow key 
failures in Yugoslav state feminism, its democratic deficit and many 
shortcomings pertaining to its emancipatory claims.
As noted by authors with more or less sympathy for feminist 
scholarship one of the main reasons for the ‘perverted tragedy‘ 
of communism as an “emancipatory project going awry”4 is the 
resistant patriarchal sexual contract that treats women as an object 
of political projection and manipulation.5
Paradoxically or not, by establishing a modern political 
patriarchy Yugoslav communist authorities confirmed their 
affinity for Western political and popular culture as well as its 
debt to the autocracy, or perhaps rather gerontocracy of other 
communist regimes. Political patriarchy, whilst a seemingly 
marginal issue for researchers of communism and post-
communism, the Cold War, or the welfare state, is an essential 
component of feminist scholarship and memory studies. Namely, 
if the problem of reflecting nodal dates in the East-Central Europe 
such as 1948, 1956, 1968 and 1989 confronts feminist scholars with 
the need for inventing a new conceptual apparatus in order to 
step out of defined historical periods/categories,6 the issue of 
the gendered corporality of social agents is unavoidable when the 
hegemony of official historical narratives and the parochialism of 
malestream paradigms are questioned. As Marianne Hirsch noted 
4 Slavoj Žižek, On Belief. Thinking in Action, Routledge, London and New York, 
2001.
5 Carole Pateman, Sexual Contract, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988. See also 
Mihaela Mudure, “Zeugmatic spaces. East/Central European Feminisms”, in 
Jelisaveta Blagojević, Katerina Kolozova and Svetlana Slapšak (eds.), Gender and 
identity. Theories from and/or on Southeastern Europe, Women's Studies and Gender 
Research Center, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 407-433. 
6 Cf. Rada Iveković, “Women, Nationalism and War. 'Make Love not War'“, 
Hypatia, 8/4, 1993, pp. 113-126; Andrea Petö, “Stories of Women’s Lives. Feminist 
Genealogies in Hungary“, in M. Jovanović and S. Naumović (eds.), Gender 
Relations in South Eastern Europe, Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, Beograd and 
Zur Kunde Südosteuropas, Graz, 2002, pp. 211-218; Renata Jambrešić Kirin, 
“The Retraumatization of the 1948 Communist Purges in the Yugoslav Literary 
Culture“, in Marcel Cornis-Pope and John Neubauer (eds.), A Comparative History 
of the Literary Cultures of East Central Europe: Junctures and Disjunctures in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries, John Benjamins, Amsterdam and Philadelphia 2004, pp. 124-132. 
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in connection with Holocaust studies, gender and sexuality have 
been used “to create a lens through which we can understand the 
particularities found in women’s testimonies and memoirs, and 
to shape a platform that has enabled those stories to emerge and 
be heard in a context in which masculine and heteronormative 
stories had for the most part dominated”.7
My intention is to illuminate the fate of Yugoslav women 
intellectuals in the period of (counter) Stalinist purges (1945-1953) 
from the perspective of gender history and a feminist approach 
to women’s political and intimate citizenship8 in an autocratic, 
hierarchical, and fundamentally homosocial regime of power 
characterized by antagonism towards women (intellectuals and 
rebels) as “the first form of attack on the ‘Other’”.9 Because of the 
strong communist power structures animating forgetting, oblivion 
and the erasure of the system’s ‘constitutive violence‘, women’s 
traumatic historical experiences in post/socialism function as a 
kind of counter-history or finally verbalized trauma. They were 
not a part of Yugoslav inner dissidents’ or political victims’ 
narratives and thus not exaggerated or re-used in symbolic nation 
building processes during the 1990s. Official communist denial 
of ’rebellious women‘ as equal political prisoners has its echo in 
the recent rejection to understand those women as ’survivors of 
totalitarianism’ or to incorporate them within a specifically female 
discourse of victimization during and after the war in the nineties.
Combining an interest in the politics of memory and the 
transmission of women’s historical experiences with a new 
reading of archival sources and a biographical method I am 
looking for the answers to the questions of how and why many 
distinguished professional women and former revolutionaries 
disappeared from the historical stage in the early 1950s, that is, 
why they were violently interrupted in their intellectual, public 
and personal self-realization. The impetus for this study comes 
from a recent discussion over the role of gender policy in the Cold 
War10 and, on the other hand, from local studies concerning the 
7 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 2012, p. 17.
8 Cf. Carole Pateman, Sexual Contract, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988; Ken 
Plummer, Intimate citizenship. Private decisions and public dialogues, University of 
Washington Press, Baltimore, 2011.
9 Iveković, Women, Nationalism and War, cit, p. 114.
10 Francisca de Haan et al., “Aspasia Forum. Gendering the Cold War in the 
Region. An Email Conversation between Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis, Renata 
Jambrešić Kirin, Jill Massino, and Libora Oates-Indruchova”, Aspasia, 8, 2014, pp. 
162-190. 
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unsolved ’woman question’ as a generator of permanent crisis in 
Yugoslav socialist society.
However, even studies with a feminist orientation, such 
as the work of Lydia Sklevicky, Neda Božinović, Sabrina P. 
Ramet, and Ivana Pantelić11 have not provided a satisfactory 
answer to the question of to what extent intolerant, suspicious 
and paternalistic attitudes towards women intellectuals 
reflected the traditionalism and conservatism of the communist 
gerontocracy, or whether the situation was the other way 
around, i.e. whether the modern “patriarchal contract“ was 
a kind of concession to old mentalities, cultural beliefs and 
attitudes or a part of an empty rhetorical moral condemnation 
of ’deviant phenomena’ in the fast developing socialist society 
The reason why I relied on biographical sources (women’s 
memoirs, interviews, documentaries) lies in the fact that only 
they can provide answers to my research questions: What 
messages did Yugoslav communists send to women - not only 
through legal, normative, and propaganda discourses, but 
also through their daily encounters with female colleagues 
and collaborators? Did they encourage them in their efforts to 
use their newly acquired rights and win over the new areas 
of professional and social affirmation? Did they respect them 
as equal partners, associates, public figures and politicians or 
just relied on them as devoted, responsible and less ambitious 
partners in building a socialist society?12 Autobiographical 
discourse is of particularly importance for feminist analysis 
because it brings together the internal and external experience, 
social and personal history, and uncovers “a person’s place in 
the social order of things in addition to the social background, 
11 Lydia Sklevicky, Konji, žene, ratovi, Ženska infoteka, Zagreb, 1996; Neda 
Božinović, Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u 19. i 20. veku, Žene u crnom, Belgrade, 1996; 
Sabrina P. Ramet, “In Tito's Time”, in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Gender Politics in 
the Western Balkans, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park PA, 
1999, pp. 89-105; Ivana Pantelić, Partizanke kao građanke, Institut za savremenu 
istoriju, Beograd, 2011.
12 A similar set of questions was already articulated by Barbara Wolfe Jancar 
but I have discovered it after the article was already completed: “If Communist 
societies are unique in their pioneering efforts to achieve sexual equality, have 
women in these societies deliberately refused to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered them? Has the male leadership presented options to them which make 
it difficult for women to participate? Is the failure of women to rise to the top 
of the status pyramid symptomatic of a prevailing disinterest among women in 
status and power, because they feel they have already achieved equality?”. Wolfe 
Jancar, Women under Communism, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
and London, 1978, p. 3.
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structures and processes that are at work in a particular 
context”.13 
The Yugoslav socialist framework enabled big advances as 
concerns the legal, economic and social equality of women that 
radically changed their traditionally subordinated family and 
social position. To educated women on the left the egalitarian 
system opened up opportunities for successful professional careers. 
They were better positioned than former partisan women largely 
engaged in voluntary reconstruction work, propaganda work, the 
social care of orphans and war victims. The fact that women’s share 
in leadership bodies in 1948 (with women deputies numbering 4 
percent in the federal Assembly and 4.8 percent women in the CPY’s 
Central Committee) was not proportional to their participation in the 
partisan combat units (12.5 percent) is the best indicator of their poor 
integration into communist political life and power-sharing.14 The 
postwar period of revolutionary enthusiasm and the open access of 
women intellectuals to the male-dominated spheres of journalism, 
diplomacy, administration and governmental offices did not exist 
long. One of the reasons for women’s professional stagnation in 
the period from 1948-1952, which is the focus of this paper, was an 
inherent contradiction of the Titoist political system that “did make 
considerable propaganda in favor of gender equality, whether in 
films or the periodical media or programmatic statements at party 
forums“ but, as Sabrina P. Ramet observed, failed “to take up the 
task of using the educational system to reshape people’s thinking 
about gender differences”15, i.e. to radically and consistently fight 
against patriarchal values and attitudes. 
Bare Life at the Bare Island (Goli otok) Stalinist Camp
When in 1948 the Yugoslav revolution began to eat its children, 
the daughters, sisters, wives and mothers of imprisoned ’enemies‘ 
were among its first scapegoats and collateral victims thus 
discrediting the very idea of  revolution for future generations. This 
short episode of Stalinist purges (1948-1953/56), accompanying 
the Tito-Stalin split, with some 56.000 administratively penalized 
citizens and internees16 (never received its juridical epilogue, nor 
13 Lynette Šikić-Mićanović, ”Using Biographical Research to Understand 
Experiences of Crisis among Homeless People in Croatia“, Etnološka tribina, 43, 
2013, p. 102.
14 Cf. Ramet, In Tito's Time, cit., p. 93, p. 99.
15 Ivi, p. 95.
16 Cf. Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito. Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav 
Communism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1988.
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its victims’ political rehabilitation.17 Instead of the large show 
trials of the time – found in Prague, Budapest and Bucharest – 
the Yugoslav secret police Udba organized many small show 
trials; provincial Kafkaesque ‘inquisitory processes’ and home 
detentions in which the ferocity of prewar communist factional 
fighting became intertwined with blatant careerism, personal 
animosity, war traumas, antifeminism, chauvinism, and even anti-
Semitism. Instead of a seemingly simple division between those 
who supported Tito and those who have opted for Stalin, the 
startup of the Party’s ‘decision-making and separation machine’ 
have continued with the mass production of ‘enemies of the 
people’ to whom the repressive apparatus had to identify and 
explain “their, for them invisible, violations and sins”.18 This inter 
party conflict actually created a biopolitical foundation of political 
community to which sovereign power of the ruler (not constitution 
and civil rights) provides the criteria of inclusion and exclusion 
from the communist ‘utopian society’ and defines the extent of 
political freedom.19 According to the Slovenian ethnologist Božidar 
Jezernik the concentration camp on the Adriatic Goli otok island 
(meaning the Bare island) lies in the very foundation of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia: “While silenced, it was a hard rock at which the state 
was grounded. When people started talking about it the state began 
to disintegrate“.20 For our argument it would be more accurate to 
17 In addition to the camp on the Goli Otok island, the Yugoslav authorities 
developed a whole system of smaller prisons and concentration camps for 
confining Stalin supporters on the islands of St. Grgur, Ugljan, Rab, Vis and 
Korčula and in prisons in Bileća, Stolac, Ramski rit, Požarevac, Stara Gradiška, 
Mamula and others.
18 Davor Beganović, Pamćenje traume. Apokaliptička proza Danila Kiša, Naklada 
Zoro, Zagreb and Sarajevo, 2006, p. 274.
19 Scholars writing in the field of post/socialism studies generally agree 
about a “pure modernity of communist experience” and about some specificities 
of totalitarian effects “different from earlier forms of dictatorship”, Stéphane 
Courtois et al. (eds.), The Black Book of Communism, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1999, p. 13. For some historians the mass violation of civil rights 
is an embarrassing reminder of “the ideological connection between Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet bloc countries”, Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, cit., p. 253. 
There is a broad consensus concerning the legal and socio-psychological meaning 
of the Stalinist purges, but the ethical and political implications of this ‘irrational’ 
violence for Yugoslav society as a whole remains a challenge for (feminist) 
interpretation.
20 Božidar Jezernik, On cogito ergo sum: arheologija neke šale, Društvo za 
preučevanje zgodovine, literature in antropologije, Ljubljana [Special issue of the 
journal Borec, 533/534], 1994, p. 686. The Croatian Political Establishment does not 
yet agree about what to do with the ‘difficult heritage’ of political violence and 
the ‘bare island’ as a synonym for the Yugoslav form of ‘Prison communism’. The 
Croatian Alcatraz, as one local agency depicts the island to tourists, is today part 
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rephrase this claim saying that only the break of the traumatic 
silence of women detainees at Goli otok gave us a full picture of 
the ideology driven regime whose biopolitical reality began where 
the state ended together with its law, rules and humanist rhetoric.
The fact that nearly half of the prisoners in the Goli otok camp 
belonged to the old ‘Bolshevik guard’, the Spanish volunteers, 
prominent communists, and former prisoners of Nazi and Stalinist 
camps, meant that the newly established Yugoslav Gulag was 
faced with the most difficult task – to denigrate and disintegrate 
heroes and ‘revolutionary saints’, to break the unbreakable, 
those who do not ask for mercy, nor offer it to anyone. Namely, 
prisoners and their interrogators or judges were often close friends 
or former members of the same party cell or partisan unit. The 
new moment in this horrific but familiar story of the reversal of 
political power was an attempt to erase written, archival and lived 
histories of Yugoslav communism embodied in some prominent 
figures of politicians and intellectuals. In this way the caesura 
between prewar and postwar societies and cultures was deepened 
and filled with new ruptures, regressions, censorships and 
transgenerational traumas. Actual or falsely accused Stalinists, 
stigmatized as ‘political criminals’, were deprived of a future but 
also of their (revolutionary) past; the hardest part of their sentence 
being the imposed self-destruction of personal biographies. Ženi 
Lebl named this perfidious method of imposed brainwashing and 
the reinvention of self ‘automortography’21 because it referred to 
self-denial, symbolic death and the loss of the right to testify in 
public. Contrary to the basic idea of communist emancipation, 
according to which oppressed people and proletarians for the first 
time in history began to manage their own time by narrating their 
history22, former prisoners signed a formal pact of silence in order 
to regain their freedom but also be written out of the history of 
Yugoslav communism.
The number of women who served a sentence officially named 
“socially-useful work and rehabilitation” (cca 860) is perhaps 
negligible compared to the total number of detained political 
prisoners (cca 17.000) according to sparse and incomplete data23 
of local grassroots offering of "horror tourism", with visitor figures apparently 
numbering approximately 50.000.
21 Ženi Lebl, Ljubičica bela. Vic dug dve i po godine, Dečje novine, Gornji 
Milanovac, 1990.
22 Alain Badiou, Stoljeće [Le Siècle, 2005], Antibarbarus, Zagreb, 2008, p. 122.
23 Cf. Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, cit.; Antun Vujić (ed.), Hrvatski leksikon, 
vol. 2, Zagreb, Naklada leksikon, Zagreb, 1996, p. 392.
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but the technology of penal ‘auto-correction’ hurting women’s 
integrity and self-esteem, as well as destroying their political 
prospects, had long-term effects on the (minority) status of 
distinguished women in politics and social life.24 Like the victims 
of Stalinist purges, Yugoslav women, female relatives of those 
considered to be ‘traitors of the homeland‘, were blackmailed 
by imprisonment, as well as the confiscation deprivation of civil 
rights if they did not sign divorce papers, did not give up their 
loved ones or additionally charge or ‘denounce’ them as the 
enemy of the people. The mere fact that they were wives, sisters 
or daughters of ‘compromised comrades’, blocked any career 
prospects to many women. Communist morality based on a 
total correspondence between the private and political life of the 
individual was regarded as superior to a civil morality, although 
both shared patriarchal values and the authority of the ‘law of 
the father’. In the revolutionary context, the strong homosocial 
bond between ‘brothers in arms’ and the hierarchical structure 
was considered to be a positive achievement, but during the rift 
in the party-family the ‘unfit’ members often had to cope with 
(symbolic) vendettas and fratricide.25
 Perhaps the best common denominator for the different 
experiences of women confined in Soviet gulags,26 Bulgarian 
camps for ”and rehabilitation” and Greek island camps for 
communists,27 is revealed by the Russian name for one kind of 
women’s camps – ČSIR (člyen sem’i izmennika Rodini), Camp for 
the female family members of the Homeland’s  traitors – which 
suggests a metaphorical blending of family and patriotic honor 
as concerns members of the political community.
24 Cf. Renata Jambrešić Kirin, “Izdajice su uvijek ženskog roda: političke 
zatvorenice u arhipelagu Goli”, Up and underground [Special issue Art Dossier 
Socijalizam], 17/18, 2010, pp. 231-242.
25 The close connections between the mentality of the patriarchal family 
and that of the Communist Party is best witnessed by prewar conspiratorial 
code names: Ćaća (daddy) for the Central Committee, Djed (grandfather) for the 
Comintern, Familija (family) for the Communist Party and Svadba (wedding party) 
for the Party congress.
26 Cf. Nanci Adler, The Gulag Survivor. Beyond the Soviet System, Transaction 
Publishers, New Brunswick, 2001; Simeon Vilensky, Till my tale is told. Women's 
memoirs of the Gulag, Virago Press, London, 1999.
27 Tzvetan Todorov, Voices from the Gulag. Life and Death in Communist Bulgaria, 
Penn State University Press, University Park PA, 1999. See also Polymeris Voglis, 
"Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War, 1945-50", Journal of Contemporary 
History, 37/4, 2002, pp. 523-540.
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Discarded Women Revolutionaries: from a Party Cell to 
a Prison Cell
 My arguments are based on the analysis of four life stories by 
women who have spoken out publicly – on their own or a scholar’s 
initiative – half a century after the initial trauma. They are a part 
of a rather small but important corpus of women's narratives 
concerning their experiences of living, working, acting publicly and 
being punished in socialist Yugoslavia.28 Miljuša Jovanović (1917-
1991) had one of the leading positions in the Yugoslav National 
Office for War Invalids until she doubted the official explanation of 
the murder of her brother, General Arsa Jovanović, who had been 
accused of trying to escape to the USSR via Romania and of his 
support for the Cominform Resolution. Although she joined the 
partisan movement in Montenegro in its early days and earned the 
rank of captain, in addition to being an invalid who could hardly 
walk after both her feet froze during a march through Mount 
Igman in January 1942, Miljuša was sentenced to four years at the 
Goli Otok camp because she chose not to renounce her brother and 
because she insulted Milovan Djilas, the closest collaborator of Josip 
Broz Tito and the head of Agitprop, and also a former friend of her 
family. In 1948 one of her pre-war comrades greeted her on the 
street in Belgrade, calling ”Hello, resistance fighter”29 – knowing 
that Udba30 had been monitoring her for months and that she was 
out of favor with the Party. This collegiate-mockery compliment 
(resistance fighter) epitomized her resistance to Bolshevik party 
loyalty which turned former revolutionaries and movers & shakers 
into dull, autocratic rulers. Namely, the authority of communists 
stemmed from long term activity in the underground movement, 
28 Cf. Rosanda Dragović-Gašpar, Let iznad Golog otoka, Beograd, 1990; Lebl, 
Ljubičica bela, cit.; Eva Grlić, Sjećanja, Durieux, Zagreb, 1997; Milka Žicina, Sve, sve, 
sve, Srpsko kulturno društvo Prosvjeta, Zagreb, 2002; Marija-Vica Balen, Bili smo 
idealisti... Uspomene jedne revolucionarke, Disput, Zagreb, 2009; Vera Winter, The 
life history interview, 2012 <http://www.croatianmemories.org/en/video-archive/
verawinter/?search=subtitleandval=vera+winter.>
29 The original phrase is ‘Zdravo ilegalac!’. The transcript of the oral history 
interview with Miljuša Jovanović was made and publicized by Dragoslav Simić: 
Goli otok Miljuše Jovanović I, Recorded and compiled by D. Simić, Audio arhiv 
Simić, Beograd, [Edicija za 21. vek, DVD 1, 2], <http://www.audioifotoarhiv.com/
gosti%20sajta/MiljusaJovanovic.html. >.
30 The State Security Service (SDB or SDS), more commonly known by its 
original name as the State Security Administration (UDBA or UDSA), was the 
Yugoslav secret police from 1946-1991. It was primarily responsible for internal 
state security for identifying and obstructing activities conducted by the 
‘domestic enemy’ (i.e. the ‘bourgeois rightwing’, clericalists, members of the 
Cominform, nationalists, and separatists). 
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not simply because they were efficacious and brave, but because 
they were always prepared for the worst: for spying, privacy, 
trial and armed action, built on the belief that “they would 
rather be in jail than be jailers”.31 However, the external threat of 
Soviet intervention, the temptations of political power and the 
struggle for social benefits resulted in inappropriate behavior and 
actions typical of Stalinism. In such an environment of real and 
political paranoia, individualism and critical thought were made 
possible only through ‘illegal’ activities, at the cost of internal 
exile or dissidence because party loyalty entailed strict adherence 
to hierarchy, discipline, loyalty, and collectivist consciousness. 
However, from the mid-1950s reforms, political life was greatly 
democratized and the critique of social negativities from the pen 
of ‘entitled critics’ of the system and hotline comedians (Nela 
Eržišnik, Mija Aleksić) were more than welcome. This was a specific 
form of channeling ”permissible speech of the forbidden”, which 
included the critique of luxury, political abuse, etc., and functioned 
as a ”necessary outlet to political discipline”.32 Nevertheless, for 
the women purged, sentenced and imprisoned without formal 
judgment there was no social or symbolic rehabilitation or return 
to public life until the 1990s.
 During the People's Liberation War of Yugoslavia Marija-Vica 
Balen (1910-1984) acted as an AFŽ activist and Agitprop journalist 
on the front line (Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonija); the end of the 
war saw her take a position as a headmistress of a children's home 
in Buzeta near Glina, and after the liberation she worked as editor 
for Croatian Radio. As the wife of the Yugoslav press attaché in 
Washington, her family moved to the United States in late 1948, 
but as early as 1949 she was taken to the prison on Savska Street 
in Zagreb, along with her three sisters, as her husband Šime Balen 
did not want to testify against Andrija Hebrang, the leading 
Croatian communist reputed as a favorite of Stalin. In her memoirs 
written in the early 1980s and published in 2009, she recalls the 
degrading treatment of political delinquents, as they were often 
dubbed, a term which equated political activists and intellectuals, 
in a position to co-create the official policy, with women criminals 
and prostitutes, considered as the greatest threat to both petite 
bourgeois and communist morality:
31 Eric Hobsbawm, Zanimljiva vremena. Život kroz dvadeseto stoljeće [Interesting 
Times: A Twentieth-Century Life, 2002], Disput, Zagreb, 2009, p. 124, p. 125.
32 Gordana Bosanac, Visoko čelo. Ogled o humanističkim perspektivama feminizma, 
Centar za ženske studije, Zagreb, 2010, p. 192.
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I kept shaking from the cold and damp and choking from the lack 
of air. Not only was it impossible to sleep there but also to survive, 
so I began to protest and shout, demanding that they move me to 
another room. And - and they did move me. But, among criminals 
and prostitutes .... So, fifteen years later when I was treated the 
same way in the UDBA prison in Zagreb, I realized that all the 
police were the same!33 
As a distinguished communist and partisan she felt that not a 
single risk, even bringing her three children into mortal danger, 
should waver her ”sacred duty to her people and her country in the 
most dramatic lessons of their recent history”,34 she was nevertheless 
amazed, during the set-up process against Hebrang, by the ease 
with which the new nomenclature, as perfidious Anti-Stalinist 
dictators, eliminated all undesirable ‘elements’ and required 
blind Bolshevik obedience.35 Instead of creatively developing her 
potential as a journalist and political activist, Marija-Vica Balen, 
who had been a prominent member of the Communist Party since 
1928, and, had met prominent Yugoslav communists during the 
course of her extensive underground activism, spent the rest of her 
life working as a proof reader at The Školska knjiga publishing house 
where she laboriously attended to other people's manuscripts, 
work and careers. There is a striking similarity between Eva Grlić 
(1920-2008) and Marija-Vica Balen’s life stories: both were part of 
an ‘elite‘ prewar leftist intelligentsia close to Josip Broz, while in 
the Partisans they could see their children only on the photographs 
smuggled out of occupied Zagreb by the same comrade. For a while 
they shared the same cell in the prison in Savska Street in early 1949 
and, finally and permanently, both were degraded in jobs far below 
their professional competence.
Dragica Srzentić-Vitolović (1912-2015) from the region of Istria 
was a pre-war communist from a circle of respectable Belgrade 
intellectuals, a regular contributor to the feminist-socialist magazine 
Žena danas (Woman Today) and one of the founders of the magazine 
Nin. Together with her husband she fought with the Montenegrin 
33 Balen, Bili smo idealisti, cit., p. 103.
34 Ivi, p. 72.
35 Ivo Banac offered a good explanation on the mentality of Yugoslav anti-
Stalinist Bolshevism: ”Yet the conflict with Stalin played the same part in the 
shaping of Yugoslavia's political system that collectivization and the purges of the 
1930s played in the history of Soviet communism. The frank accounting for this 
period which the Yugoslavs will ultimately have to provide is made more difficult 
by Western analysts who assume that every manifestation on anti-Stalinism or 
anti-Sovietism within a socialist state is necessarily a sign of emerging political 
pluralism“, Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, cit., p. 257.
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partisans, and upon the call from the Supreme Headquarters of the 
People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) she departed for 
Vis and then to London, where she worked as a BBC announcer in 
the Yugoslav section. After the war, she co-organized the setting-up 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in charge of the diplomatic service 
and cooperation with non-European countries), and as government 
commissioner she personally took to Moscow the letter in which Tito 
famously said ”No to Stalin”. In the documentary film by Želimir 
Žilnik One Woman, One Century (2011) – her first notable public 
appearance in sixty years – Dragica Srzentić talks about similar 
methods of torture in the socialist UDBA prison in Podgorica, 
in the very same prison that was used by Italian Fascists. This is 
a constant theme in the memories of pre-war revolutionaries, for 
instance Ženi Lebl (1927-2009), in her autobiographical book titled 
Suddenly Different, Suddenly the Other36 describes a similar method 
of ‘testing’ by Bulgarian interrogators in Niš as well as by UDBA 
agents in the Glavnjača prison in Belgrade. It consisted of physical 
and mental torture with elements of sexual violence. However, 
what especially hurt these two successful young women with 
perfect wartime biographies were backstabbing, insinuations and 
false accusations by their fellow workers and close party comrades. 
Namely, at the time of her arrest in May 1952 Srzentić was Deputy 
Secretary General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FNRJ, 
and Lebl worked as a journalist for the newspaper Politika and had 
been promised a position as foreign correspondent in Paris:
I was already working as journalist for the Politika when I turned 
twenty, and two years later I became senior reporter in this 
newspaper. I was also accepted to attend Journalism and Diplomacy 
College without being a member of CPY. … I didn’t know that my 
success would produce envy among my close friends and that I 
would fall victim to their insidious slander. I did not know that they 
would decide my fate. But that's another long story, a story of the 
Yugoslav GULAG, told partly in the book White Violet (1991).37
Both women were experienced revolutionaries, educated and 
talented, with a knowledge of foreign languages, enthusiastically 
devoted to building a new democratic society, and with respectable 
war experience – from captivity in the Berlin Gestapo prison (Lebl) 
through negotiations with the British government about the set-up 
36 Ženi Lebl, Odjednom drukčija, odjednom druga. Sećanja i zaboravi, Čigoja, 
Beograd, 2008.
37 Ivi, p. 189.
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of the new Yugoslav government (Srzentić) – yet the methods of 
torture on the islands of Goli Otok and Sveti Grgur, in the women's 
prison in Stolac, changed permanently not only their life path, but 
also the way in which they described the world and people. 
From a Female Role Model to the ’Queen of the Stalinist 
Ball’
The threat of further detention resulted in their decades long 
silence and led to their suppression of experienced trauma. So-called 
“status degradation ceremonies” had a particularly destructive 
effect on the psyche and self-esteem of female detainees. These 
consisted of theatrical forms violating certain individuals’ dignity 
and integrity through the use of derogatory songs and slogans, 
i.e. short plays that ‘staged their guilt’ and ridiculed their private 
life, feminine outlook and professional achievements. According 
to the sociologist Harold Garfinkel,38 the intention of the status 
degradation ceremony is to denounce and stigmatize an individual 
as unworthy of the privileges that go along with his or her former 
role in society or in an institution. The paradigm of such moral 
indignation is public denunciation or the ritual destruction of the 
person denounced “I call upon all men to bear witness that he is not 
as he appears but is otherwise and in essence of a lower species”.39
During one of the ceremonies of public humiliation at the 
Goli otok prison Dragica Srzentić-Vitolović was disguised as ‘The 
Queen of the Stalinist Ball’: she was given a crown of thorns and 
nettles and sneakers that read: ’Made in the USSR’. This theatre of 
cruelty aimed to ridicule, cause pain and result in a psychological 
crackdown and the imputation of ‘guilt’ on those who until 
yesterday had represented a moral role model for the community. 
Members of the repressive apparatus willingly and frequently used 
traditional derogatory practices against women manipulating 
shame as “the most emotional tone of every personality”,40 as the 
38 Harold Garfinkel, ”Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies”, 
American Journal of Sociology, 61, pp. 420-424.
39 Ivi, p. 421.
40 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer: suverena moć i goli život [Homo Sacer. 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 1998], Multimedijalni institut and Arkzin, Zagreb, 
2006. Harold Garfinkel describes the function of shame: “A prominent function 
of shame for the person is that of preserving the ego from further onslaughts by 
withdrawing entirely its contact with the outside. For the collectivity shame is an 
'individuator'. One ex-periences shame in his own time. Moral indignation serves 
to effect the ritual destruction of the person denounced. Unlike shame, which does 
not bind persons together, moral indignation may reinforce group solidarity“, 
Garfinkel, Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies, cit., p. 421.
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primary means for the patriarchal devaluation of women based 
on the premise that women’s lives are not worth much and that 
there is, as historian Michelle Perrot has formulated, a woman’s 
shame that has existed since time immemorial. Such degradation 
and threats to reproductive health, imposed on women political 
prisoners arrested according to the law of having violated public 
peace and order, just as prostitutes, their fellow prisoners, 
say a great deal about the contradictions of an ideology that 
fundamentally changed the institutions and social relations, but 
not the patriarchal premises concerning the natural supremacy of 
men (in power) over women (without power and influence). This 
Stalinist ‘penal orthopedagogy’ directed against the ‘Stalinists’ 
suffers from a surplus of ideological signifiers but lacks an ethical 
aspect, namely one that, according to Foucault41 constitutes the 
difference between religious dogmatic self-denial and the modern 
constitution of subjectivity. 
Unlike male prisoners who since the 1960s gradually 
accomplished the right to appropriate the story of Goli Otok as 
relevant historical experience, women political prisoners had 
neither social support, nor a model or framework for the narrative 
of their own experience of being ‘inner dissidents’. Their loss 
of self-esteem, depression, a sense of helplessness and post-
traumatic symptoms resulted in a withdrawal from public life, 
and sometimes from the world of work. Interviews and memoirs 
of these remarkable women, written after more than half a century, 
were partly motivated by the wish of their authors to testify about 
the collective (Ženi Lebl published several books on the destiny 
of Jewish communities in the territory of Yugoslavia) or about 
their ‘great husbands’ (Rudolf Bićanić, Danko Grlić, Šime Balen, 
Vojo Srzentić) with whom they accompanied and shared the fate 
of the oppositional left intellectuals, but most importantly they 
provided reflections on the experience of morally and politically 
incriminated and marginalized women intellectuals who through 
their work and public activities permanently marked a period but 
were ignored both by socialist and post-socialist historiography.
Paternalism in the Party
 The so-called objective difficulties – the negative consequences of 
rapid industrialization and urbanization, the uneven development 
of the country and the fight against the ‘fifth column’ after the 
41 Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the Self", in Michel Foucault, Paul Rabinow 
(ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Penguin, London, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 223-251. 
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conflict with Stalin – pushed ‘women's issues’ into the background. 
The Party and state leaders controlled the organized activity of 
women and defined its objectives and tasks. Paternalistically 
structured ‘socialist feminism‘ enabled women to have legal 
protection and economic equality, but not equal participation 
in decision-making and political power. I was surprised how 
the descriptions of bureaucratic measures (instrumentalization, 
atomization and abolishment) taken by the Czechoslovakian 
communist government in the 1950s in order to reduce, discipline 
and control women’s organizations fits the Yugoslav scenario.42 
In the Yugoslav case, too, as the Croatian feminist historian Lydia 
Sklevicky pointed out in her study based on meticulous archival 
research, the communist government was literally afraid of an 
autonomous, strong mass women’s movement. Thus, the Yugoslav 
communists abolished the AFŽ (Antifascist Women’s Front) in 
1953 and abruptly closed down the onward progress of the social 
revolution and emancipatory women’s activism. 
In his speech at the last Congress of the AFŽ (the Antifascist 
Front of Women) in 1953 Milovan Djilas said that one of the reasons 
for the abolition of the AFŽ was the strengthening of democracy 
and women’s equality in Yugoslavia, and that the time had come 
for society as a whole to take over the tasks of such ‘semi-political 
organization’, i.e. the Socialist Alliance of Working People and the 
future alliance of women’s societies.43 It was felt that the gradual 
increase in living standards and the material conditions of life would 
lead to a general improvement in the social position of women. 
However, in reality this led to a depoliticization of ‘women’s issues‘ 
and women’s associations, to an underestimation of women’s 
(political) force, and therefore to the reduced influence of women 
on the further development of socialist relations. In relation to the 
period of rebuilding and development, in the mid-1950s women’s 
activity decreased, cases of women’s labor rights’ violations and 
worker layoffs became more frequent, as did regressive attitudes. 
42 Cf. de Haan, Aspasia forum, cit., p. 175 and passim.
43 The AFŽ was gradually transformed, first into the League of Women’s 
Associations (1953-1961), and then into KAZDAŽ, the Conference for the Social 
Activity of Women (1961-1965), fatefully following the Communist Party line, that 
is, the conviction that “our socialist society functioned in a genderless way”. The 
second period, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, was characterized by the loss 
of the second and most important dimension of women's activismwork for society 
and work for/on themselves. The third period of socialist women’s activism was 
marked by grassroots feminist and civil initiatives called neofeminizam (‘new 
feminism’) or second wave feminism, which was visible only in big Yugoslav cities 
such as Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.
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After the abolition of the AFŽ socially active women lost their 
independent platform for political action and became more exposed 
to attacks and insinuations and more dependent on the fatherly 
figure of Tito who had always had a patronizing and paternalistic 
attitude towards women. Describing ambiguous and complex 
relationship between communism and feminism in socialist 
Romania, Mihaela Mudure reached similar conclusion: 
The communist project of modernizing society granted women some 
rights: universal suffrage, the right to education, political visibility. 
But these successes were only apparent, these rights were void of 
content as voting and political visibility was fake political agency 
in a dictatorial system. The right to education was also affected by 
the imposed ideology of the time. Women were not granted these 
rights as autonomous social agents, the greatest patriarch became 
the Party and within the Party: the secretary general.44
 
The failure of party policy to solve the problem of gender and 
social inequality, feminist scholars believe, lies in the communist 
renewal of the ‘will to power’ and with it the restoration of a 
social hegemony that “once again reproduces not only inequality 
but also new forms of oppression and a lack of freedom”.45 The 
ongoing asymmetry of power was more likely “a consequence of 
the operation of the Communist system itself” than the product 
of “centuries of oppression”46. Given that the ‘new woman’ was 
a symbol of the transformative potential of Yugoslav socialist 
society, her moral discreditation and criminalization because of 
her political and public engagement represented a dangerous 
backlash. According to my research at least three elements of a 
post-revolutionary patriarchal anxiety of Party’s authorities can 
be detected: a) the political fear of ambitious women (‘quality 
staff’); b) the ideological fear of the women guardians of the 
traditional and religious foundations of collective identity; c) a 
cultural mistrust toward the mobile woman who easily transcends 
family, social and ethnic boundaries. The testimonies of women 
political prisoners show that the attempts of resisting ideological 
dogmatism, discriminatory practices and the patriarchal structure 
of the Party from within resulted in severe sanctions, and that 
attempts at free thought and autonomous political action outside 
of the party line, was severely punished.
44 Mudure, Zeugmatic spaces, cit., p. 421.
45 Bosanac, Visoko čelo, cit., p. 12.
46 Wolfe Jancar, Women under Communism, cit., p. 3.
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Numerous examples of the coexistence of antiintellectualism 
and antifeminism, nominal egalitarianism and resistant patriarchal 
consciousness are stated in Gordana Bosanac’s (1936) ‘philosophical 
autobiography’47 which in detail describes her intellectual 
development during the 1950s. Her professor of philosophy at 
the University of Zagreb complemented the issue of dialectical 
materialism with a discussion of the difference between intelligent 
men and less intelligent women’s facial physiognomy, claiming 
that men have a high-brow, because their ‘box of thoughts‘ needs 
more space. The professor demonstrated a full range of gender 
discriminatory practices in his academic work without ever being 
sanctioned for them. From that moment on, this student, the future 
Marxist philosopher and sociologist began to think about the 
obverse and reverse of the official policy of gender equality:
However, it turns out that there is a stronger, ‘more legal’ 
force that governs the will of the people, some unwritten rule, 
and one that rules gender differences among people invisible, 
yet effective, that with all the discipline of real socialism exists, 
there is nevertheless that discipline, which he recognizes and 
subsumes as his own evaluation. This force did not have a name, 
it was not critically discussed and was not contested, and only 
much later was appointed as patriarchal consciousness. It never 
questioned the acknowledged ‘socialist consciousness’ so they 
could peacefully exist alongside one another.48
Concluding Remarks: From Silenced Revolutionaries to 
Feminist Activists
The social power of the Yugoslav communist party faced with 
the large scale recruitment of new members was strengthened 
by the promotion of emancipatory values  and the ‘cultivation 
of virtues’ – by taking over the Leninist myth of communists as 
‘people of exceptional virtues’. An integral part of this myth, based 
on the belief that socialist society is the best and most just of all 
social systems, includes psychosocial measures of self-control, 
namely, the internalization of fight against all human weaknesses, 
flaws and imperfections. The persistent correction of one’s own 
shortcomings by encouraging virtues (and identification with dead 
partisan heroes) also implied the correction of biographies of those 
who did not correspond to the model of being an exemplary person 
of exceptional intellectual abilities and moral qualities, but of 
47 Bosanac, Visoko čelo, cit.
48 Cf. Bosanac, Visoko čelo, cit., p. 196.
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humble working class or peasant family origin. The transformation 
of repressive measures of discipline and punishment into practices 
of self-disciplining, self-criticism and self-correction, as described 
by Michel Foucault49 follows the efforts of an individual to adapt 
to modern industrialized society and its socialist version. “The 
Yugoslav paradox” is perhaps best described by Carol S. Lilly who 
claimed that the transition away from idealism of Yugoslav male 
and female revolutionaries originated as a move toward it:
For only when the Yugoslav Communist truly attempted to 
realize the promises of their ideology did they begin to lose faith 
in their ability to transform society, culture, and human beings by 
persuasive means. Party rhetoric, the leaders then discovered, was 
successful mainly when it relied on preexisting values and beliefs, 
but was much less so when it tried to instill in the population new 
ideas and new behavioral norms. Persuasion, in other words, 
could occasionally help realize the party’s short-term political 
agenda but not its long-term transformative one.50
 This is a crucial moment for the forming of a symbiosis between 
the socialist emancipatory agenda and traditional ‘women's 
values ’ nurtured equally in the socialist women’s press as well as 
in the private sphere of the home where the patriarchal logic of 
undervalued and invisible women's physical and affective labor 
fought back against the ideals of ‘state feminism’. The rivalry of 
two collectivist projects (patriarchal and communist), which in 
their own way disciplined, socialized and exploited women’s 
labor and reproductive capacity for the paternal or common 
good, has found a common interest in restoring the discourse 
of femininity hand in hand with the discourse of successful 
professional women. As Barbara Wolfe Jancar concluded: “much 
of the research in Communist countries has an instrumental goal: 
to provide the leadership with information about the way women 
feel, work, and live, with the aim of improving their performance 
at work, upgrading family life, or increasing the birth rate”.51 The 
main problem regarding the unfortunate alliance of Yugoslav 
leftist women intellectuals and communists stems from the 
fact that the Party’s political goal was not to raise autonomous, 
responsible and well-informed female citizens.52 As Josip Broz Tito 
49 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, cit, pp. 223-251.
50 Carol S. Lilly, Power and Persuasion. Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist 
Yugoslavia 1944-1953, Westview Press, Boulder CO and Oxford UK, 2001, p. 251.
51 Wolfe Jancar, Women under Communism, cit., p. 10.
52 Svetlana Slapšak, ”Between the vampire husband and the mortal lover. 
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clearly stated in his speech at the first AFŽ Congress held in 1945 
in Belgrade: Yugoslav ‘forward-thinking women’ were expected 
to justify the trust they had been given, and focus all their forces 
on “issues of strengthening our government”.53 The ethnologist 
Miroslava Malešević commented on this paternalistic and 
instrumentalist behavior of former comrades, who concentrated 
on consolidating power: ”Having fulfilled the task enforced by 
extraordinary circumstances, a former partisan woman and shock 
worker would … withdraw from the social scene as quickly as 
she emerged on it. Energetic breakthroughs into all professions, 
including the highest levels of government, were quickly put to a 
stop”.54 The Croatian feminist scholars Biljana Kašić and Sandra 
Prlenda added that after the joint victory with their revolutionary 
male comrades in 1945, women “had to turn back to their private 
histories and, by decoding the revolutionary symbols (both 
utopian and traditional), exposed the extent to which women’s 
history could undo any ideological narrative closure”.55 Evidence 
of the downplaying of women’s (revolutionary and leftist) history 
lies in the fact that the socialist Yugoslavia never established a 
research institution, archive or museum dedicated to its world-
famous women’s partisans and revolutionaries, among them 
ninety-one war heroines with the highest decoration in the 
country, the status of National Hero. In that sense it is difficult 
to say whether “Cold War women’s organization in Yugoslavia 
and elsewhere played an active [and important – R.J.K.] role 
in everyday Cold War politics”, as Chiara Bonfiglioli recently 
concluded in her article.56 I do agree that during the 1940s and 
the 1950s, due to the tightening of relations between the Cold 
War parties and the continuing struggle for the implementation 
of women’s rights (abortion was partly liberalized in 1963, and 
fully in 1977), Yugoslav women in general were politically more 
active and more upset by measures which prevented them from 
succeeding in their actions more than their successors in the later 
decades of the mature ‘socialism with a friendly face’.57 But the 
A narrative for feminism in Yugoslavia”, Research on Russia and Eastern Europe, 
2, pp. 201-224.
53 Tito quoted in Pantelić, Partizanke kao građanke, cit., p. 54.
54 Miroslava Malešević, ”Osmi mart – od utopije do demagogije”, Glasnik 
Etnografskog instituta SANU, 36/37, pp. 53-80, cit. p. 70.
55 Biljana Kašić and Sandra Prlenda, "Women’s History in Croatia: Displaced 
and Unhomed", Aspasia, 7, 2013, pp. 154-162.
56 Chiara Bonfiglioli, “Women’s Political and Social Activism in the Early Cold 
War Era”, Aspasia, 8, 2014, pp. 1-25.
57 At the same time we must bear in mind that Yugoslav socialist authorities 
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fact is that we had to wait for a generational change and the late 
1970s to hear the voices of new women, most often the daughters 
of revolutionary and/or ‘purged and silenced’ mothers, who were 
able to articulate questions concerning their perplexed positions 
in socialist family and autocratic state in feminist terms,58 whilst 
simultaneously being open to look for the answers among their 
activist “sisters” in the East and the West alike59. 
 
intensively searched for other sources of party legitimacy “including the gradual 
decentralization of power, a higher standard of living, and greater freedoms 
(including the freedom to travel abroad) than were available to the citizens of any 
other Communist regime”, Lilly, Power and Persuasion, cit., p. 252.
58 Yugoslav scholars and activists who managed to organize the first feminist 
international conference (Drugarica Žena. Žensko Pitanje // Comrade Woman. The 
Women’s Question) in Belgrade in 1978 publicly called themselves feminists. 
Chiara Bonfiglioli proved in her MA research that this event has been foundational 
for feminist movements in the following decades that were in some way “part of 
larger globalised changes occurred since 1989, changes that have also affected the 
practices and theories of feminism in Eastern and Western Europe”. Bonfiglioli, 
“Back to Belgrade, 1978. An exploration in memories”, in R. Jambrešić Kirin and 
Sandra Prlenda (eds.), Feminisms in a Transnational Perspective. Voicing Feminist 
Concerns, IEF and Centre for Women Studies, Zagreb, 2009, pp. 268-278, cit. p. 277.
59 The first version of this article was published in the journal History of 
communism in Europe, 5, 2014, pp. 36-52. I am grateful to the editors of the Zeta 
Books, Bucarest, for their kind permission to reprint it.
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Acting History Across Media: Margarete 
von Trotta‘s Hannah Arendt 
Lada Čale Feldman
Summary
Margarete von Trotta’s film Hannah Arendt, dealing mainly with 
the episode of the philosopher’s life which produced her famous 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, renewed controversies surrounding the initial 
reception of this report. In contrast to the criticisms of the film which 
insisted on its referential aspect – the ‘truth‘ of Margarete von Trotta’s 
biographical rendition, of Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Eichmann’s 
moral responsibility, as well as of the moral responsibility of Jewish 
representatives for deaths in concentration camps – this contribution will 
try to discuss the impact of the film in terms of its three intertextual frames 
of reference: first, the current cinematic appetite for ’playing for real‘, 
especially for playing prominent middle-age female public figures (for 
instance, Queen Elisabeth II by Helen Mirren or Margaret Thatcher by 
Meryl Streep); second, Hannah Arendt’s own ideas on ‘acting’, conceived 
in its double, political and theatrical sense, as well as on vita contemplativa/
vita activa dichotomy, given the difficulty of artistically enacting “the life 
of the mind“; third, the way Margarete von Trotta inscribes her film into 
the tradition of iconographic representations of ‘the woman of ideas’, 
insisting not so much on Hannah Arendt’s own feminist allegiances, but 
on feminist implications of her acting on the public stage.
Doomed to feature as the most salient metaphor standing for 
the irretrievability of history – insofar as we conceive of history 
as an actual, embodied practice – the art of acting1 strangely 
1 Comp. Leo Braudy, “Acting. Stage vs. Screen”, in Robert Knopf (ed.), Theater 
and Film. A Comparative Anthology, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
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resembles the notorious neuralgias of women’s historical position 
and their long-standing historical invisibility: acting is not only 
considered to be a reproductive art, but it is also an art that lacks 
autonomy, predicated as it is on constant negotiations with others, 
above all with changing playwriting and directing poetics as well 
as managing or directing decisions. Acting on film managed at 
least to escape the predicament of irretrievability, rendering many 
a female historical figure – both the actual and the performing 
one – memorable for times to come: it remains, however, rather 
dubious to what extent the thorny issue of female acting practice 
truly profited by this medium of its manifestation and, as a 
consequence, gained in historical and theoretical prominence.2
Here I will address a specific cinematic instance of representing 
history – that is, a strange case of a woman who made history 
– in which one can discern the imbrication of multiple media 
manifestations of acting, the ‘crossing-overs‘ that are produced 
in art works which, for example, feature a film that is made out 
of the script adaptation of a novel in which parts of the original 
plot take place in a theatre. Such imbrications often rely on the 
ambiguity of meaning that from the very inceptions of philosophy 
haunts the word ‘acting’ – in the sense of doing something in the 
everyday world – with its often despised and troublesome Other, 
acting as performing, acting as pretense, all the more insistent 
since the same holds for the inverse tendencies in the history of 
ideas on theatre, to conceive of artistic acting practice as related 
to or exemplifying questions of subjectivity and agency, if not 
even achievements of self-authorship and authenticity of being. 
As I will try to demonstrate, Margarete von Trotta’s biopic Hannah 
Arendt (2012) provides a telling instance of such multiple media 
and discursive framing of (female historical) acting: it uses the 
aforementioned double, retroflex connection of human and artistic 
1976/2005, pp. 352-360. See also Edward Burns, Character. Acting and Being on the 
Pre-Modern Stage, Macmillan, London, 1990.
2 The history of female acting, especially its resonances with changing 
philosophical conceptualizations of ‘the woman problem’, is an issue to which I 
cannot but repeatedly return, so far mostly in connection to drama and theatre, not 
cinema. Cf. Lada Čale Feldman, Euridikini osvrti. O rodnim izvedbama u književnosti, 
kazalištu, teoriji i folklore, IEF and Centar za ženske studije, Zagreb, 2001; Lada 
Čale Feldman, Femina ludens, Disput, Zagreb, 2005. Karen Hollinger undertook 
a more thorough investigation of the Hollywood actress both “as an artist and an 
ideological construct”, deploring the fact that female cinema stardom falls into 
the general neglect of screen acting, “one of the most undertheorized areas in film 
study”, Hollinger, Hollywood Acting and the Female Star, Routledge, London and 
New York, 2006, pp. 3-4.
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action as a cinematic strategy in order to underpin the fictional 
performance of the protagonist by the very ideas on acting that 
were exposed by Hannah Arendt herself in her first important 
book, The Human Condition.3
The fact that the book was initially meant to be titled Amor 
Mundi. Love of the World, seems itself to be eloquently alluding 
to the author’s refusal to subscribe to the philosophical tradition 
of reflexive distance and solitary retreat, and to abandon the 
involvement in, and the address of, the mundane plane of human 
action. In this book, in which Arendt lays the ground for what 
will become her political philosophy, she questions the Christian 
distinction between vita activa and vita contemplativa by returning 
to the ancient Greek praise of a life devoted to the production 
of memorable, immortal deeds. Instead of the aforementioned 
dichotomy of actual and pretend acting, Arendt conceptualizes 
another distinction pertaining to the human condition, and 
thereby introduces a different kind of theatrical implication of 
our everyday dealings: while relying on specifically ancient 
Greek notions of what constitutes a character and counts as 
human action,4 she insists that what we produce during our 
lifetime – whether it be a book or a building – can have no true 
bearing on the understanding of our personality, since such an 
effect of our endeavors can only answer to the question of what 
we were. It is therefore only the actions that we undertake in the 
public space, qua political beings disclosed in public speaking, 
in making decisions and in acting upon them, that can answer 
the question of who we were. She thus foregrounds the material 
immediacy of acting and speaking in public – with all the fragility 
and unpredictability of their outcome – as the only means through 
which a person is revealed to the world in its Aristotelian ethos, 
in its distinctness and uniqueness. Our own ethos is, however, 
opaque to ourselves: only those who watch us doing, and who are 
willing to write the story which would narrate our life can fully 
account for who we were: such a story is therefore necessarily told 
by others who survive us, who can grasp our life in its entirety, as 
something finished and bounded.5 
3 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, 1958/1998.
4 From the perspective of theatre studies, and the extant traditions of poetics of 
pre-modern acting, cf. Burns, Character, cit., pp. 18-27.
5 Cf. Julia Kristeva who insists on “the possibility of representing birth and 
death, to conceive of them in time and to explain them to others, that is, the 
possibility of narrating” as the crucial component of the human condition which for 
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That is also why Hannah Arendt considered theatre to be a key 
cultural institution of ancient Greece: it was a place where stories 
of memorable deeds were not only told in words, but actually 
embodied and enacted anew, enabling the Greek audience to 
grasp both the meanings of one’s life and to confront the very 
question of a life’s meaning: “Only the actors and speakers who 
re-enact the story’s plot can convey the full meaning, not so much 
of the story itself, but of the ‘heroes’ who reveal themselves in 
it”.6 Hannah Arendt thus partakes of the philosophical tradition 
of the theatrum mundi metaphor, with, however, a crucial 
difference: unlike all those philosophers, beginning with Plato, 
who conceived of human action as of something akin to an actor’s 
doings on stage insofar as these doings are dictated by a script or a 
directing agency transcending actors themselves, she emphasized 
the mundanity of human actions, relying on the concept of both 
acting and spectating as this-worldly activities. The meaning of 
human action is thus for her not something prescribed in advance, 
but rather intrinsic to the action and yet fully realized only if it 
is grasped by the audience, that is, by those who will watch and 
be capable to then narrate our actions as storytellers of our lives. 
Above all, unlike Plato, Arendt praised the particular case of 
theatre actors whom she considered to be supreme storytellers 
insofar as they also corporeally inhabit these stories as they 
unfold, and as they interpret the uniqueness of one’s actions and 
being, channeling their meanings to the interested subsequent 
audiences: “against static mimesis, Arendt calls upon theatrical 
gestural action as the modus operandi of optimal narration”.7 
This significant displacement of the theatrical metaphor from 
otherworldly to the mundane and much more politicized frame 
of human action, which ascribes immense responsibility to three 
inextricably connected human roles in the theatrical event – the 
one of the storyteller (the playwright), of the actor, and of the 
spectator – will bear on my interpretation of the attempt not only 
to narrate, but to also artistically enact several crucial episodes 
Arendt “grounds human life in what is specific to it, in what is non-animal about it, 
non-physiological”. She continues: “This concept, whose Aristotelian provenance 
is obvious, links the destinies of life, narrative, and politics: narrative conditions 
the duration and the immortality of the work of art; but it also accompanies, as 
historical narrative, the life of the polis, making it a political life, in the best sense of 
the word (one that, ever since the Greeks, has been under threat)”, Julia Kristeva, 
Hannah Arendt. Life is a Narrative, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001, p. 8.
6 Arendt, The Human Condition, cit., p. 187.
7 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, cit., p. 18.
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from the philosopher’s own life in Margarete von Trotta’s film. As 
already mentioned, I will argue that this conceptual framework 
informed von Trotta’s work on the script, as well as her cinematic 
directing strategies, much more than any attempt at ‘truthfully‘ 
recreating historically picturesque snapshots from Hannah 
Arendt’s life.
Let me state at the outset that von Trotta’s biopic is a film 
which apparently does not in any way deal with Hannah Arendt’s 
eventual feminist allegiances, representing as it does an episode in 
her life in which she was involved in the controversy surrounding 
the Eichmann trial (as a matter of fact, the initial title of the 
film was meant to be The Controversy). To those of you who are 
not familiar with that historical episode, just a short reminder 
that Adolf Eichmann was a German official responsible for the 
transportation of thousands of Jews to the camps; when the Israeli 
government and police kidnapped and arrested him in Argentina 
and then brought him to Jerusalem to try him for his war crimes, 
the American political journal The New Yorker commissioned 
Hannah Arendt, then already a world reputed author of Origins 
of Totalitarianism,8 to report on the trial. She wrote a series of 
five articles which were later published in her book Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, a Report on the Banality of Evil9 in which she claimed 
that Eichmann was not a monster, as everyone apparently wanted 
to believe him to be, but an average bureaucrat, unable to think, 
and that he embodied what she called “the banality of evil”. 
Moreover, she claimed that Jewish councils, by their obedience 
and collaboration, facilitated the deportation of the Jews. Finally, 
she questioned the entire legal procedure and especially its 
outcome by arguing that Eichmann should have been prosecuted 
in an international and not a national court, and that he should 
have been tried and condemned for contributing to the crime 
against humanity, not against a specific ethnic group. These 
three claims stirred what is today still considered as an almost 
incomprehensibly violent reaction from both the American and 
Israeli Jewish community, which protested in an undignified 
way, even sending her death threats. The film focuses on the 
circumstances that prompted her decision to write about the trial 
as well as those that prompted the ensuing attacks she had to 
suffer, by disclosing the ways her interpretive decisions regarding 
8 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 1951.
9 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report in the Banality of Evil, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, The Viking Press, New York, 1963/1964.
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Eichmann’s personality, and regarding the way the trial was 
conducted, were shaped by her own life story, and by her own 
personality and ethos.
Curiously enough, however, the reception of the film – from the 
many reviews I had the chance to read on the Internet – made me 
think about a sudden reversal of critical positions habitually taken 
with respect to aesthetic production with clear feminist ambitions, 
which, to my mind, von Trotta’s film had all along. Namely, both 
feminist artworks and criticism are all too often accused of ‘a 
referential fallacy‘, that is, of a forceful concentration on the ways 
aesthetic representations do or do not conform to the authenticity 
of female experience, to a woman’s way of feeling and knowing, 
to her actual social, material and historical conditioning, and these 
habitual accusations are often accompanied by what I think is an 
otherwise thoroughly justified insistence upon the at least relative 
autonomy of aesthetic expression, the primacy of its structural and 
intertextual, rather than referential qualities. So why do I evoke 
these accusations in connection to Margarete von Trotta’s film 
Hannah Arendt? Because I believe that the full feminist implications 
of this film were either completely missed, when they were not 
denigrated by the popular press, and that they were missed or 
misconstrued precisely because critics seemed not to care too 
much about the dramaturgical choices and intertextual resonances 
of the film, focusing all too readily on its referential aspects – on the 
truthfulness of the film in its rendition either of Hannah Arendt’s 
physical appearance and voice, or of her private and public life 
and the social circle she dealt with – as well as on the director’s 
supposed justification of Arendt’s judgement of Eichmann, the 
Jewish councils and of the Israeli government and tribunal.
Von Trotta’s film, in short, renewed the controversy that it 
took as its topic, rather than being considered as an artwork in 
its own right, representing that controversy and reflecting upon 
the conditions that produced it. As for its feminist dimensions, 
not only were they undermined by the primacy of the mentioned 
focus on the Eichmann trial itself in its actuality – rather than on 
its media representation, which is the primary relevant aspect 
of it to cinema as a medium – but they were also often taken 
as something to be disregarded in advance by both Hannah 
Arendt’s and the director’s explicit refusal to use this label as their 
aesthetical-political agenda. It seems to me that it is precisely in 
this respect that this film could serve as an extraordinary example 
of the difficulties surrounding the very definition of feminist 
aesthetics: is it something pertaining to the intention of the author, 
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or something inherent in the matter chosen, in the structural 
features of an artwork, in its production choices, or something 
appearing only in the eye of the beholder, activating his or her 
associations, desires and identifications? Interestingly, in reviews 
that acknowledged feminism as a relevant frame of reference, von 
Trotta has been blamed not only of uncritically endorsing Hannah 
Arendt’s stance and making a kind of hagiography, but also of 
having created just another “didactic feminist buddy movie”10 
featuring strong independent women and their mutual emotional 
ties, as well as of having made a “stagey and mannered” film11 
and a typical ‘melodrama’,12 obviously not an adequate and 
sufficiently masculine genre to the seriousness and the scale of the 
problem she was dealing with. So what prompted such reactions? 
I think von Trotta’s characteristic feminist move, namely, her 
decision to show Hannah Arendt in both her private and her 
public dealings, both as a loyal and warm friend, a passionate 
and tolerant, if not magnanimous wife to a beloved but somewhat 
coquettish husband, and as a sharp, distanced, uncompromising 
analyst, professor and reporter – in short, both as an emotionally 
honest, and as an intellectually honest human being, regardless of 
whether such honesty suits the entrenched positions of the public 
sphere on any public issue she may have been involved in.
Above all, however, von Trotta was ridiculed for her ambition 
to represent thinking on screen,13 in scenes which I personally find 
admirable, in which Barbara Sukowa, the leading actress playing 
Hannah Arendt, is shown to be doing this, that is, acting thinking, 
representing thinking as an act that leads to crucial moral decisions 
and prompts further public acts. Just to provide an example 
which would prove with what kind of finesse von Trotta makes 
Sukowa do this, let us look for instance at how the film starts: in 
what seems at first to be an all too easily recognizable scene of the 
10 Mark Lilla, “Arendt and Eichmann. The New Truth”, The New York Review of 
Books, 2013, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/11/21/arendt-eichmann-new-
truth/>.
11 Peter Bradshaw, “Hannah Arendt. Review”, The Guardian, 2013, <https://
www.theguardian.com/film/2013/sep/26/hannah-arendt-review>.
12 Martin Steven, “Review: Thinking on screen – von Trotta’s ‘Hannah Arendt’”, 
The Conversation, 2014, <http://theconversation.com/review-thinking-on-screen-
von-trottas-hannah-arendt-23026>.
13 See Lilla, Arendt and Eichmann, cit. Martin Steven says that in this respect the 
film “approaches self-parody”, while Richard Brody thinks that the film belongs 
to a specific genre, “soft-core philosophical porn”. Comp. M. Steven “Review. 
Thinking on Screen”, and R. Brody, “Hannah Arendt and the Glorification of 
Thinking”, The New Yorker, 2012, <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-
brody/hannah-arendt-and-the-glorification-of-thinking>.
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deportation of Jews in a threatening nocturnal nowhere, we are 
in fact confronted with the scene of Israeli secret police catching 
Eichmann unawares in his distant Argentinian shelter from the 
world. Right after he is put into the truck, we are shown his lamp 
left lying on the ground, as a symbol of a light of reason lost, both 
once upon a time in Eichmann and presently in the moves of his 
persecutors. The next shot: Barbara Sukowa as Arendt lights her 
cigarette, lighting thus the light of her thinking, which will follow 
us all throughout the film as a symbol of someone taking her time 
to reflect,14 instead of being led by irrational emotions – either by 
hatred of the horrifying executioner or by unquestioned allegiance 
to her own identity as a Jew, let alone by the memories of the fear 
from the threat she herself had to suffer under Nazi regime. The 
first lines that are spoken in the film are equally suggestive of the 
entire controversy that is about to be represented in the film, for we 
hear Janet McTier, playing Mary McCarthy, Hannah’s best friend, 
protesting “Why are you defending him?” to which Hannah 
protests back “I am not defending him!”, and although these lines 
do not refer to Eichmann, but to McCarthy’s former husband, they 
do anticipate the misunderstanding that Hannah will soon face on 
a much larger scale, involving not only her proclaimed adversaries 
– above all, the Jewish American intellectuals and journalists such 
as Lionel Abel and Norman Podhoretz – but also some of her best 
male friends like Hans Jonas.
In contrast to those critical reactions to the film which pointed 
to von Trotta’s own banality in treating Hannah Arendt’s 
misrepresentation of both Eichmann and the Holocaust, for me 
this film, which was obviously intended for popular consumption, 
entered into quite a different line of associations and produced 
quite a different kind of disruption of cinematic expectations. I 
would like to situate this film within a discussion pertaining rather 
to the position of actresses within the dominant, Hollywood star 
system, to the availability and the stereotyping of female roles in 
cinema, as well as to the current growing phenomenon of ‘playing 
for real’, as Tom Cantrell and Mary Luckhurst called the acting task 
to “play real people”.15 The analysis of the way Barbara Sukowa’s 
interpretation fits into female ‘acting for real‘ is all the more 
14 For a rare appreciation of the impact of this scene for our re-evaluation of 
time for thinking in current university politics, see Iris Van der Tuin, “Making Time 
for Duration. Thinking at the Contemporary University”, History of the Present. A 
Journal of Critical History, 5, 2, 2015, pp. 187-199.
15 Tom Cantrell and Mary Luckhurst, Playing for Real. Actors on Playing Real 
People, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2010. 
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pressing if we have in mind the scarcity of such tasks for women 
in contemporary cinema and the outstanding achievements the 
representation of contemporary female public figures reached with 
recent cinematic versions of Queen Elisabeth II (The Queen, 2009) 
or of the former British Prime minister Margaret Thatcher (The Iron 
Lady, 2011). In both cases, interestingly, these characters seem to be 
caught by the camera eye in their rather unglamorous phases of life, 
in late middle or very old age, when they appear as grey haired, 
sexually unattractive women, sometimes even inexpressive in their 
stern faces, subdued manners or, in the case of the film The Iron Lady, 
lost looks of senile dementia, unappealing to the male gaze in their 
countenance and outfit, and yet authoritative and commanding 
while occupying their positions of power. The two films I mention 
feature two major contemporary stars, Helen Mirren and Meryl 
Streep, both of whom gained their reputation already in their 
youth, not only as drama actresses but also – if not primarily, in the 
case of Helen Mirren – as ‘sex bombs’. By the way, although many a 
reviewer of von Trotta’s film will insist on Sukowa already having 
been awarded for the equally complex role of Rosa Luxemburg 
some twenty years ago (Rosa Luxemburg, also directed by von 
Trotta, 1986), there will also be those who will prefer to mention her 
other former roles in Rainer Maria Fassbinder’s films, of femme fatale 
Lola and the good-hearted prostitute in Berlin Alexanderplatz (1980). 
On that note, it may perhaps sound unbelievable, but even 
Meryl Streep, with all her long-standing and indeed growing 
high visibility in current American film culture,16 is one of the rare 
stars that already in the early nineties of the 20th century dared 
to denounce the situation of actresses in the film industry. In her 
dark humorous diagnosis, written for the review Screen Actor in 
the now distant 1990, she bitterly comments how not only most 
of the roles a woman can get in Hollywood are that of prostitutes, 
but that, like hookers, actresses seem to lose their market appeal 
around the age of forty, and that if the trend of catering to young 
male audience continues, women will soon be exterminated from 
the movies altogether. Here is how she explains why she misses 
actresses from the Hollywood golden era:
These women inspired me. The derivation of that word is from 
Latin in-spirare: to breathe life into, to fill with life, to breathe in – 
and I did. I gasped when I saw these women. It made me want to 
16 Meryl Streep, “When Women Were in the Movies”, in B. Cardullo, H. Geduld, 
R. Gottesman, and L. Woods, (eds.), Playing to the Camera. Film Actors Discuss Their 
Craft, Yale University, New York, 1998, pp. 242-246.
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be something, to achieve something, to express my humanity, my 
aliveness, my connection to that radiant, important creation that 
was woman.17
It is precisely in this spirit that I watched Barbara Sukowa 
featured as a 50-year-old, grey-haired Hannah Arendt, and in 
particular all the close-ups of her face in which we are given the 
opportunity to count all her wrinkles, whether character ones or 
ones grown with age or indeed ones added by the mask. Given 
the assumption that close-ups allow for “a greater sense of actor-
audience intimacy”18 that is said to be otherwise lacking in film as 
opposed to stage acting,19 it is remarkable to what extent von Trotta 
insists on them, as if reminding us of the role we play in the film, 
as well as of the role Hannah Arendt assigned to the audience in 
her philosophical interpretation of the theatrum mundi metaphor. 
It is this allusion to Arendt’s ideas which guided the director 
in presenting several inserted ‘theatrical’ audiences within the 
frame of cinematic watching, in order to make us aware that these 
inserted audiences are watching what we watch, primarily the 
actress playing Hannah Arendt. Moreover, all throughout the film 
Sukowa’s middle-aged face is shown to be expressing a whole 
array of human emotions, from joyfulness, conviviality, love, 
even sexual arousal, via determination, intellectual absorption 
and contemplation, to concern, compassion and distress: it is a 
face and a body shown to be fully living the moment it is in, not 
a body restricted to the usual maternal or spinsterish functions 
of cinematic middle-aged women, whose sexual side, as E. Ann 
Kaplan demonstrates in her discussion of ‘the unconscious of age‘ 
tends to be considered by the predominantly male reviewers to be 
something unimaginable and repulsive.20
17 Ivi, p. 245.
18 Hollinger, Hollywood Acting, cit., p. 6. See also Hugo Münsterberg, “The 
Means of Photoplay“ [1916], in Bert Cardullo (ed.), Stage and Screen. Adaptation 
Theory from 1916 to 2000, Bloomsbury, London etc., 2012, pp. 26-33; Erwin Panofsky, 
“Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures“ [1934], in Cardullo (ed.), Stage and 
Screen, cit., pp. 39-54; Josef von Sternberg, “Acting in Film and Theatre“ [1955], in 
Cardullo (ed.), Stage and Screen, cit., pp. 119-132.
19 For a rather curious contradiction reigning in the questions of intimacy 
between those who prefer performing live in contrast to playing to the camera, see 
Allardyce Nicoll, “Film Reality: The Cinema and the Theatre“ [1936], in Cardullo 
(ed.), Stage and Screen, cit., p 82; Bert Cardullo “Playing to the Camera or the House. 
Stage vs. Screen Acting“ [1998], in Cardullo (ed.), Stage and Screen, cit., p. 208.
20 Cf. E. A. Kaplan, “The Unconscious of Age”, in L. Marshall and V. Lipscomb, 
(eds.), Staging Age. The Performance of Age in Theatre, Dance and Film, Macmillan, 
London etc, 2010, pp. 48-49.
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 Unlike however both Helen Mirren’s and Meryl Streep’s 
endeavors to achieve the most thorough resemblance to the actual 
historical prototypes they were assigned to embody, Barbara 
Sukowa rejected the initial idea to imitate Arendt’s voice or apply 
facial prosthetics in order to resemble her, especially her Jewish 
nose, and threw herself into the extensive reading and study of all 
the philosopher’s works and correspondence in order to, as she 
professes in her interviews, truly think Hannah Arendt’s thoughts 
in those cinematically controversial moments in which the film 
attempts to represent, to use the title of another book by Hannah 
Arendt, “the life of the mind”. Not only are such tasks quite rare 
in female screen acting history, but neither can I help myself in 
considering Sukowa’s choices against the background of von 
Sternberg’s well known dismissal of the importance of thinking 
for acting, as opposed to attractiveness,21 as also against the 
tradition of the most prominent Hollywood acting school, Method 
acting, in terms of which actresses “are seen as incapable of the 
emotional intensity and philosophical depth said to characterize 
the performances of male Method actors”.22
Besides the fact that all three films representing female 
historical figures that I mention here insist on the correlations 
between public appearance and playacting, while featuring older 
women whose indisputable stature is blemished because of their 
coldness in dealing with public affairs, there is another strategy 
importantly connecting the three films, which equally stems 
from ‘playing for real’: they all seamlessly combine documentary 
material with the filmed sequences. In The Queen and in Hannah 
Arendt specifically, this procedure is used in order to foreground 
the protagonists’ and therefore also the actresses’ physicality, since 
in both these films we see the protagonist, the historical figure as 
acted by the actress, confronted with her major concurrent and 
yet to a certain extent twin figure featuring in the documentary 
cinematic material that is watched by the acted protagonist: in 
The Queen this threatening figure is a much younger, much more 
glamorously appealing Lady Diana, with her enigmatic, Mona 
Lisa look and smile, ‘the queen of hearts’ ruling over the British 
people in a way a Hollywood star rules over the popular mind, 
while in von Trotta’s film it is Eichmann himself, to whom Hannah 
Arendt’s character seems to be brought close from the very first 
21 See also Josef von Sternberg ”Acting in Film and Theatre“, in Cardullo (ed.), 
Stage and Screen, cit., p. 119 et passim.
22 Hollinger, Hollywood Acting, cit., p. 9.
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sequence that we saw, as to the source of the controversy she will 
soon overtake. It is quite a daring parallel, if we have in mind that 
Eichmann is not only the object of Hannah Arendt’s writing and 
political analysis, but also in light of the sheer facts that it is the 
man that the Israeli politicians took as a scapegoat on which to 
outpour all the horrible frustrations generated by the Holocaust 
catastrophe in its entirety. That move was for Arendt wrong from 
the start, given that she was adamant at judging the individual for 
his individual deeds and individual responsibility, and for crimes 
against humanity, not against Jews.
Allowing the reading of this film as an occasion to re-generate 
the trauma of the initial controversy, however, is far from my critical 
intentions, since in my opinion, von Trotta’s interest did not lie in 
either disparaging or justifying Hannah Arendt’s interpretation 
of the measure of Eichmann’s ‘guilt’, ‘monstrosity’ or, indeed, 
‘banality’, but rather to create the conditions of spectating that 
would create a parallel between us as spectators and Hannah 
Arendt’s spectating position during the Eichmann trial. We are 
insistently invoked to watch Barbara Sukowa watching Eichmann, 
but I single out the shots in which we encounter the character of 
Hanna, played by Barbara Sukowa as if seated in the press-room, 
while observing the documentary transmissions of Eichmann’s 
trial as if appearing to the philosopher/journalist via television 
screen, when she is seen to be given the opportunity to slowly 
scrutinize his face, attitude and behavior in the actual courtroom. 
In such a way a chain of possible identifications is created that 
goes from us via the fictional Arendt as both the spectator and 
the female actor in the public space, to Eichmann’s actual body 
in documentary transmission, who represents the same focus of 
both her and our attention as the one Arendt would subsequently 
become to the outraged public, which was trying to grasp the 
meaning of her actions just as she was trying to grasp the meaning 
of Eichmann’s action, and just as we as spectators are put in a 
position of trying to grasp the meaning of Sukowa’s acting. Von 
Trotta, it seems to me, emphasized thus the question of what it 
means to be a person, to represent a person, to understand who 
the other person is, as well as to know who we are. There is a line 
in the film pronounced by Sukowa, or better to say supposedly 
read by Sukowa from the letter she is writing as Hannah Arendt 
to The New Yorker, in which she explains her motives for following 
the trial: “I have never seen these persons in flesh”, which means, 
“I have never confronted them as actors in public, they were 
so far just impersonal forces to me, and I am interested in the 
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uniqueness of human beings, appearing in public as speakers and 
taking responsibilities for what they do and say”. 
Furthermore, there is an entire host of allusions within the 
film to theatre, beginning with the trial as a sort of ‘courtroom 
dramatics’, as Hannah Arendt herself treated it in her book, a 
propaganda theatre, of course, by the Israeli government,23 but 
a theatre still in which Adolf Eichmann can finally be allowed to 
appear as a person, to speak out and plead his case. In the film 
we see Barbara Sukowa playing Arendt as someone arriving at a 
conclusion that he simply relinquished that very last opportunity 
to appear as a person who thinks with his own mind and 
speaks with his own voice. The fictional Arendt describes him 
to her friend Kurt Blumenfeld (played by Michael Degen) as an 
insignificant ‘clown’, but we are free to check her diagnosis, since 
we are allowed to look at his face in the documentary transmission 
and judge for ourselves to what extent her evaluation of his 
performance was naive or perspicacious, for there were many 
suggestions by Arendt’s later detractors that Eichmann simply 
fooled her as a good actor.24 We are thus, furthermore, made 
to reflect upon our evaluation of Sukowa’s acting in relation to 
Eichmann’s gimmicks in front of the Israeli judges, and thus to 
touch, in a truly exacerbated way and context, upon one of the 
most controversial issues in acting theory – how to distinguish 
shallow pretending from, to sound even more paradoxical, true 
acting in all its aesthetic, ethical and political potential?25
23 Arendt even describes the architecture of the courthouse as a kind of theatre 
“complete with orchestra and gallery, with proscenium and stage, and even side 
doors for the actors entrance”. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, cit., p. 7.
24 This was the opinion of Willem Sassen, see Elke Schmitter, “Vivid Cinematic 
Essay Examines Hannah Arendt”, Spiegel online, 21 January 2013, <http://www.
spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/magnificent-new-german-film-depicts-hannah-
arendt-a-876955.html>.
25 Theatre theory has dealt with the issue in too many instances for me 
to be able to pay due respect to all of them on this occasion, but as far as the 
screen acting is concerned, a very good introduction to the discussion is given 
by James Naremore, especially his masterful treatment of “performance within 
performance”. See J. Naremore, Acting in the Cinema, University of California Press, 
Berkeley etc., 1988, pp. 68-82. A distinction between mere pretending and being 
socially authentic, which collapsed in Goffman’s everyday “presentation of self” is 
quite another problem than the aesthetic analysis of ‘expressive coherence’. Both 
theatre and film theorists therefore rarely address the issue of social pretending-
within-performance. Croatian theorist Branko Gavella is an interesting exception, 
daring to postulate the distinction between moral and aesthetic ‘transparency’ and 
‘sincerity’. See Lada Čale Feldman,“Gavella i Goffman”, in Dani hvarskog kazališta. 
Građa i rasprave o hrvatskoj književnosti i kazalištu. Gavella. Riječ i Prostor, HAZU i 
Književni krug Split, Zagreb, Split, vol. 39, no 1, 2013, pp. 139-170.
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The film will further insist upon such ‘theatrical’ settings – 
and that is perhaps why it was criticized for its ‘stagey’ manners 
– in which we will be able to watch Hannah Arendt either 
watching and listening to others, such as, in her youth (played 
by Friedericke Becht), during Martin Heidegger’s (played by 
Klaus Pohl) lectures, or appearing as herself in her significant 
social worlds, acting as a unique person, thinking with her own 
mind and speaking with her own voice, whether these settings be 
private or public: in Heidegger’s office, in her own home, talking 
with her husband Heinrich Blücher (played by Axel Milberg), 
with her friends in both New York and Jerusalem, as well as 
with her secretary, or lying on the couch and chain-smoking, not 
merely like Hannah Arendt in her real life, but, I would say, much 
more like the emblematic Brechtian philosopher spectator, who, 
while watching a play, prefers to light a cigar and contemplate 
from an analytical distance in order to acquire knowledge of the 
intricate background mechanisms of human dealings, rather 
than to be simply caught in the illusion of their representation. 
As if to be placed in the position of an audience within 
the film itself, we watch Sukowa as Arendt teaching at the 
university, in two very important scenes of the film in which 
the protagonist is shown to be using her own figure at the 
lecture platform – the very physical presence of her own body 
– in front of an audience of students. The physical presence 
required by lectures will thus figure as a kind of secondary 
medium of her otherwise verbally transmitted intellectual 
process, the passion of which she realizes primarily in the 
characteristic gestures and vigorous movements around 
the lecturing space, as if carried away by the argument she 
makes. The director especially focuses on one member of the 
audience specifically, a female student watching and listening 
to Sukowa as Arendt in complete absorption and intellectual 
rapture, as if sharing the lecturer’s thought process, just as 
Arendt herself had earlier been shown to have once watched 
and listened to Martin Heidegger, palpably profiting from the 
sense of closeness generated by the fact that during the lecture, 
the originator of an idea is allowed to voice that same idea 
in a conspicuously sensuous, incomparable, unique rhythm, 
tempo and intonation. 
Many a critic disparaged the way Martin Heidegger was 
introduced into the film, but again, I do not think it was done 
for the mere reasons of biographical consistency: in contrast to 
Arendt’s courageous outspokenness, in the film he is shown to 
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be not only walking, but also literally hiding in the woods,26 
and not only in front of his jealous wife – he had an affair 
with Hannah whom he secretly continued to meet even after 
their emotional break-up – but also hiding in front of the 
whole world, and pettily claiming that he is just a little boy 
–’junge Knabe’ – incapable of orienting himself in the political 
circumstances in which he became enmeshed by embracing 
the ideology of Nazi party. Reviewers found these scenes 
with Heidegger completely flawed – to be precise, ‘cringe 
inducing’27 – but I think that the part of the film concerning 
the character of the intellectual whom many would call the 
greatest philosopher of the 20th century offered another 
chapter to the whole issue of what it truly means to think and 
act accordingly: as opposed to the mindless Eichmann, here 
we are shown a brilliant mind, developing brilliant theories 
of thinking as something, as the character of Heidegger in 
the film professes, “giving no immediate strength to act”. 
With all its marvelous contemporary resonances, refusing 
the instrumentality of university teachings in the current 
neoliberal agenda, that statement, at least within the historical 
and narrative context of Margarete von Trotta’s film, sounds 
like an all too transparent alibi for not being capable to turn 
one’s thinking into responsible acting.
These meta-theatrical, meta-cinematic and above all meta-
spectating moments lead me now to what I see as feminist accents 
of the film, accents which in this case, in a true Brechtian manner, 
overflow the borders of cinematic illusion: we are given a film 
by a woman director, Margarete von Trotta, filming a script 
written by two women, Margarete von Trotta and Pam Katz, 
with the assistance of a camerawoman, Caroline Champetier, to 
whose camera eye Barbara Sukowa is playing, impersonating a 
woman philosopher whose thinking and acting in a public space 
not only inspires young women but is also inevitably perceived 
and understood, regardless of whether she herself caters to it or 
not, in connection to the fact that she is a woman. For the whole 
26 For a more thorough discussion of the historical background of these 
episodes and the significance of the scene representing ‘the walk in the woods’ as 
“the central image in Heidegger’s thought”, see Joel Rosenberg, “Into the woods. 
Eichmann, Heidegger, and Margarete von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt”, Jewish Film 
and New Media, 2, 2, 2014, pp. 201-216.
27 Lilla, Arendt and Eichmann, cit. David Rieff used exactly the same qualification. 
See Rieff, “Hannah and her Admirers”, The Nation, 2013, <https://www.thenation.
com/article/hannah-and-her-admirers/>.
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controversy that Hannah Arendt stirred with her, as was stated, 
over-sophisticated coinage, the “banality of evil” – by which 
she designated an unprecedented, modern phenomenon of the 
normalization of evil – had a lot to do with the fact that it was 
uttered by a woman, and a woman of ideas for that matter. Before 
I corroborate my contentions with instances in the film that to my 
mind speak in favor of such an interpretation, let me just dispel 
any doubts regarding its controversial genealogy by first pointing 
to a study by Jennifer Ring, The Political Consequences of Thinking, 
Gender and Judaism in the Work of Hannah Arendt28 in which one can 
find a nice analysis of the complex role Hannah Arendt’s gender 
played in the reception of her book on Eichmann among both 
European and American Jews, and second, to a study by Janis 
Bergman Carton, The Woman of Ideas in French Art, 1830–184829 
which, although dealing with a very short period in the history of 
arts in the 19th century – a period however in which precisely the 
woman of ideas flourished with the rapid growth of the popular 
press – demonstrates equally well how the sight of a woman who 
thinks and writes or is politically engaged produced at the time a 
kind of iconographic scandal. The intellectual woman was namely 
either represented in caricatures as a ridiculous bluestocking, or 
as a sexually monstrous transvestite, or she was, in rare cases 
of idealization of feminine intellectuality – of suggestion that a 
woman can dispose of some kind of active interiority – allegorized 
in figures like Mary Magdalene, Sapho, and the like. Pictures by 
Henri Lehmann figure as rare reverent representations of female 
intellectual depth, but Bergman Carton is quick to inform us that 
the painter was fiercely attacked by Baudelaire himself for such 
iconographic choice and backward historical style.30 It is also 
worth noting that in both these perspectives the woman of ideas 
was conceived of, according to Carton’s examples and findings, 
in sharp contradistinction to woman’s ‘natural’, maternal duties. 
In Margarete von Trotta’s film – which should be understood 
against the background of such a tradition of iconographic 
misogyny, let alone cinematic manipulation of the male gaze – our 
attention is turned upon the fact that the primary sin attributed to 
Hannah Arendt was her cold, ironic and flippant tone, sneering and 
cynical, that is, her lack of feeling, her intellectual arrogance, which 
28 Jennifer Ring, The Political Consequences of Thinking, Gender and Judaism in the 
Work of Hannah Arendt, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1998.
29 Janis Bergman Carton, The Woman of Ideas in French Art, 1830-1848, Yale 
University Press, New York, 1995.
30 Ivi, p. 162.
DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE — 217
all boils down to her lack of femininity. Suggestion of cynicism is 
a clear allusion to her lack of maternal instincts: in the film, we 
hear her very rational explanation of why she never became a 
mother – first because she was poor and then because she was too 
old – for which she is immediately scolded by Kurt Blumenfeld’s 
wife, when Arendt pays a visit to her Zionist friend at his home 
in Jerusalem. Arendt also says explicitly that she would probably 
never have had such a tender relationship with her own daughter 
as she has with Lotte, her secretary (played by Julia Jentsch), who 
then adds with understanding that friends are people we choose 
to love freely. Pertaining to the context of mothering, the scene in 
which we see Martin Heidegger running to Arendt’s student room 
and immersing his head into her lap is also significant, for it seems 
to be pointing to the need of all the ’junge Knaben’ – all the young 
boys who will soon be lost in political turmoil and turn into Nazi 
ideologues, or ideologues of any kind – for the protection of, or a 
return to, their mother’s lap, even in situations of obvious sexual 
appetites. We are likewise made to read through Hannah Arendt’s 
eyes the letter arriving to her from a neighbor that calls her a Nazi 
whore, just as women were called Judenhure by Nazis themselves. 
Her secretary Lotte reads, with her eyes full of tears, another 
enraged letter containing the description of Hannah Arendt’s 
physical appearance as something exuding coldness, contempt 
and brutality, almost the same kind of monstrous evil that was 
thought to reside within Eichmann himself, and once again we 
are invited to make the correlation between the two figures, as 
social actors whose physical appearance was mercilessly exposed 
to the public eye and its irrational appetites, a correlation all the 
more scandalous since we know of the atrocities that Eichmann 
committed just as well as we have seen, in the film, the kindness, 
warmth and sensitivity with which Hannah Arendt treats human 
beings by whom she is surrounded, underlying her explicitly 
stated preference for individual friends, regardless of their 
political opinions and allegiances, and not for families, nations or 
other groups with which she is supposed to identify. 
In this way, ambivalent analogies between Jewish and female 
identity politics are being drawn and it is through these analogies 
that we are made to understand both Hannah Arendt’s and 
Margarete von Trotta’s reluctance toward inducing any kind of all 
too easily made feminist identifications: just as Jews can easily turn 
their suffering into an ideology preventing them from thinking 
and judging soundly, so also any kind of advertising of identity 
politics risks not accounting for the unique circumstances of a 
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unique human being acting in a unique way and taking unique 
responsibilities, indeed, making a stake out of this very uniqueness 
of her own thinking and acting. I would therefore say that feminist 
aesthetics motivating von Trotta’s choice of her collaborators, her 
focus on a woman’s gaze, both within and outside the borders 
of her film, as well as her willingness to again make a film with 
a strong female protagonist, is extremely subtle and cautious: it 
points to the extent to which women are bound to be sensitive to 
this story, as strongly as it points to any dismissal of one’s full and 
unique humanity for the sake of group identifications. Making us 
resist the interpretive moves to which Hannah Arendt’s person 
was subjected to, during and after her lifetime, the film thus forces 
us to both acknowledge the feminist implications of her situation, 
and to abstain from identifying her primarily as a woman, as a 
female philosopher and political thinker. 
But let me remind you once again that the fact that her works 
– the report on Eichmann in particular – acquired great fame does 
not in any way help one to grasp the stakes of her uniqueness, 
since, following her own rule of thumb, these works cannot answer 
for who she was, but rather for what she was. It is therefore crucial 
to perceive the reliance of the film on both the actress interpreting 
her life and on the documentary material featuring Eichmann, 
which provides a foil against which the audience will judge the 
protagonist’s character, her own acting choices. As opposed to the 
person she strived to be – the person only engaged actresses like 
Barbara Sukowa can make meaningful for us – Adolf Eichmann 
was, as Arendt says in the movie to Kurt Blumenfeld, not a person, 
but a nobody. But a nobody is only one step away from everybody, 
and that is, I think, something a lot of film critics had difficulty 
swallowing, for we all prefer to think about the Holocaust as, to 
use one of the reviewer’s formulation, ‘unassimilable otherness’: 
Hannah Arendt, however, thought that the evil enabling the 
Holocaust to happen was something that could start and flourish 
anywhere, an intrinsic possibility of everybody, to disregard 
human beings for the sake of an abstract cause, a phantasm of 
group identity, which forces its recruits to choose to be and to 
act as a nobody. As is well known, she ran from Germany only to 
be imprisoned by supposed friends, Frenchmen, and even in the 
USA where she found a heaven of democracy on earth, as she says 
to the students in the film, she is rejected by her best friends and 
forced to be afraid again that the hatred she generated through 
her independent thinking will expel her from the country as it 
once did from her native homeland. 
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A true summary of the entire film and the peak of its cinematic 
strategies, explicit and implicit arguments, is the six-minute 
performance by Barbara Sukowa delivering Hannah Arendt’s final 
moving speech to the students, in a kind of, indeed, university 
theatre, at the moment in time outside the cinematic space in 
which, as Iris Van der Tuin justly points out,31 the very profession 
of scholar and university professor underwent an unforeseen 
moral, disciplinary, and financial crisis. It is during that scene that 
one can fully admire Sukowa’s double tour de force, both as a stage 
actress and as a film actress who found the source of her artistic 
style in the study of a process of thinking in public, making the 
intensity of her thought be expressed by her body. Upon arriving 
at the lectern, she first asks for permission to smoke, as if she is 
asking permission to again think through, in the very midst of her 
corporeal exposure to the audience, her own particular reasons 
for the use of words that had stirred such public turmoil. In the 
auditorium, we once again watch the variety of responses within 
the audience she must confront: university bureaucracy filled 
with aspiring Jewish professors, her loyal but now offended, 
disgusted, and estranged friend Hans Jonas (played by Urlich 
Noethen), her students amazed at the opportunity to now watch 
their professor answering for her deeds in public in the same way 
we as the empirical audience earlier saw Eichmann summoned to 
‘the courtroom dramatics’ to answer for his former decisions and 
deeds. 
Just as Arendt’s professor and lover Heidegger whom we also 
previously saw lecturing to her while she was looking at him in 
awe, so now Arendt is shown drawing all her persuasive power 
to convince and enlist her students to her cause, especially the 
young woman that we noticed in the previous parallel situation, 
the one who will probably continue her professor’s work with 
the same alignment of passion and intellectual clarity that the 
young Arendt pleaded for in the film while consulting with 
Heidegger. As if determined to accomplish the most difficult task 
of her life, Sukowa as Arendt starts reading and smoking, only 
to soon abandon her notes and dispose of her glasses, in order to 
move freely around the room and address her audience directly, 
to look at her detractors in return, boldly and honestly, to let 
her emphasis grow in a vocal crescendo while supporting her 
delivery by vehement gestures, even better to clarify the terms by 
which she framed the puzzling human disaster of the Holocaust, 
31 Cf. Van der Tuin, Making Time for Duration, cit., pp. 187-199.
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of the Jewish collaboration with the executioners both in the 
Ghetto and within the camps, and of Eichmann as the model of 
human abnegation of responsibility under totalitarian regimes, 
let alone of the way the current Israeli government handled the 
trial. I urge any one of you whom I have successfully convinced 
of the thoughtful design of this film to watch this last scene again, 
memorable insofar as it is a rather unique instance of an actress 
being given the opportunity to use her body in order to convey 
such immaterial entities as the stakes of moral philosophy, and to 
represent the very embodiment and vulnerability of the inevitably 
gendered and yet unique position from which one is bound to 
watch the world, to love it and to know it, and – to act accordingly.
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Arendtian Concept of Judgment:
Between Thinking and Acting?
Daša Duhaček
Summary
Contemporary feminism has – as has mainstream philosophy – 
juxtaposed and weighed the concepts of theory and practice, especially 
considering feminist theory in relation to feminist activism and vice versa. 
On the other hand, the political theory of Hannah Arendt has addressed 
these issues through a myriad of approaches, her concept of judging 
being one of the most challenging. 
This text will use Arendt’s political theory as a point of departure 
and analyze a possible feminist approach to the category of judgment 
as it may or may not be lodged within either thinking or acting; or, 
possibly, between them. It is my argument that, mainstream philosophy 
notwithstanding, Arendt herself did not see the relation between theory 
and practice as an (outstanding) problem of contention. What remains 
to be assessed is how does feminist theory interpret the category of 
judgment, given its potential to relate either to thinking or acting. 
Staying unequivocally with Arendt’s concept of the political – instead 
of responding to the immediate needs of the social – and, also, keeping 
a critical distance from identity politics, contemporary feminism (Linda 
Zerilli) claims that a freedom-centered concept of the political is worth 
the risk of losing the safety nets of maintaining any universal goals.
Hannah Arendt on Judgment
A possible point of departure in discussing judgment may 
be Hannah Arendt’s last major work, published posthumously, 
entitled Life of the Mind. This work was to unfold what she also 
designated as vita contemplativa, but, importantly, she suggests 
that it can be viewed as a counterpart, or a work complementary 
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to her book The Human Condition, which she originally entitled 
Vita Activa.1 It is a truism that Hannah Arendt devoted her life’s 
work to drawing our attention to the significance of vita activa, 
and highlighting the kernel of the political – action. However, 
there was also another matter: “I had been concerned with the 
problem of Action, the oldest concern of political theory and 
what had always troubled me was that the very term I adopted 
for my reflections on the matter, namely vita activa, was coined 
by men who were devoted to contemplative life…”.2 Her work 
on the Life of the Mind was almost an intellectual debt that she 
felt an obligation to fulfill. It was to have three parts, Thinking, 
Willing and Judging, pertaining to the three mental activities. 
As is known Hannah Arendt died just as she finished the second 
part, on Willing and – other than two the epigraphs – she did 
not write any part of Judging. Nonetheless, while working 
on this part of Life of the Mind, she delivered and consequently 
wrote preparations for the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 
a text which has, for some time now, been a source of numerous 
interpretations for Arendt’s category of judgment.3 Judgment, 
up to then, albeit certainly practiced, was not yet comprehensively 
or systematically theorized about in her texts. 
Therefore, one of the venues of these interpretations is the 
question if the unwritten part on judging could have articulated 
arguments which would bring together vita activa and vita 
contemplativa and bridge the gap that mainstream philosophy 
has, throughout its history, built between them. In that respect, to 
date, the concept of judgment is a place of contention, even to the 
extent that noted interpreters of Arendt consider it a significant 
challenge just “to throw a bit of cold water on the tendency among 
political theorists” to interpret Arendt’s concept of judgment as 
the one which bridges the gap between thinking and acting.4
It is my argument that, regardless of her unequivocal, critical 
distancing – to say the least – from philosophy, as a metaphor of 
vita contemplativa and her focus on the political, Arendt herself 
did not see the relation between theory and practice as an 
1 Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind, Part One, Harcourt Brace and Company, San 
Diego, 1977, p. 6.
2 Ibid.
3 This text was a part of Arendt's preparation for teaching at the New School 
in 1970, just as the parts on Thinking and Willing were a prepared for the Gifford 
Lectures which she delivered in 1974.
4 Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, p. 88.
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(outstanding) problem of contention, especially not as something 
that would form the configuration of her last book so as to present 
it in this dual structure: thinking as opposed to acting. 
The topicality, the urgency in considering the concept of 
judgment is for Arendt elsewhere, i.e. in its defining element, 
namely, “judgment is one of the fundamental abilities of man as a 
political being”.5 This makes judging relevant for both, thinking 
and acting, i.e. for the actor and the spectator. 
In explicating the category of judgment as relevant to the 
political Arendt invokes Kant. For Arendt, the point of departure 
is Kant’s The Critique of Judgment (once called the Critique of Taste). 
Judgment – that the analysis of thinking and willing were leading 
to – was, without a doubt, to be politically relevant. The fact that 
Kant’s category of judgment was deployed in aesthetics was 
no obstacle. Moreover, the category of judgment is developed 
in Kant’s Critique in such a way that the topics addressed are 
“all of them of eminent political significance”.6 Developing 
these politically relevant topics Hannah Arendt underscores 
other issues which provide the context of judgment: sociability 
of men,7 and, the problems stemming from focusing on the 
particular.8
In turn these two issues which Arendt highlights in introducing 
the process of judging lead to the significant conclusion about the 
judgment, namely its contingency, and, consequently, the space 
of freedom it necessitates. Arendt’s postulate that freedom is the 
conditio per quam of the political is the context in which the tension 
between thinking and acting should be placed. 
Ideal of Certainty vs. a Defeated Cause 
One of the first interpretations of Arendt’s incomplete 
theory of judgment was presented by Michael Denneny, who 
had the advantage of being present at the lectures where it was 
articulated. He proceeded from the epigraphs found under the 
title ‘judgment’ in Hannah Arendt’s typewriter after her death, 
the first being Cicero’s dictum “The defeated cause pleases 
Cato,” and leads up to the core of the problem which presents 
5 Hannah Arendt, “Crisis in Culture”, in H. Arendt, Between Past and Future, 
Penguin Books, New York, 1993, p. 221.
6 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989, p. 14.
7 Nota bene, Arendt’s use of the term men is to be understood precisely as she 
used it, i.e. as a generic term and not as gendered term.
8 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, cit., p. 14.
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itself in ”the tendency in philosophical ethics that allows one, 
having proved evil is conceptually impossible or that theft is a 
contradiction in terms, to disregard the fact that people continue 
to go around murdering and robbing each other”.9 Denneny 
captures here what Linda Zerilli much later expands on, in order 
to argue that, “[a]t stake in the kind of judgment that is relevant 
to politics is not knowledge, but understanding…”.10
Highlighting her argument Zerilli states that “each thinker 
casts the entire political problem of judgment as an epistemological 
problem … that can only be solved by philosophy and the search 
for first principles” and adds that it is critical to resist ”the framing 
of a political problem of judgment in epistemological terms”.11 
However, most interpretations of Arendtian judgment could 
not be satisfied with Cato’s pleasures with defeated causes; they 
appear to be closer to the ideals of philosophers still glued to 
Hegel and that strain of German idealism in general, of whom 
Hannah Arendt had to say: “Pursuing the Cartesian ideal of 
certainty as though Kant had never existed, they believed in all 
earnest that the results of their speculations possessed the same 
kind of validity as the results of cognitive processes”.12 
Two Elements: Judging on the Particular and Sociability
At stake here is the political as Arendt conceptualized it and 
there the category of judgment plays an important part. As said, 
one of the key perspectives from which ‘the affairs of men‘ are 
to be considered is that “we have men in the plural, who actually 
are in the center of our considerations and whose true ‘end’ is, 
… sociability”.13 It is the sociability and communicability of men 
which makes the appearance of the political possible and thus 
creates the spaces where the beautiful or the miracles of political 
action can be judged.
This communicability (of judgments of taste) is “conditio sine 
qua non for the existence of beautiful objects” because “the judgment 
of the spectator creates the space without which no such object could 
appear at all”. Furthermore “the very originality of the artist (or 
9 Michael Denney, “The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judgment”, 
in Melvyn Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt. The Recovery of the Public World, St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 1979, p. 263. 
10 Linda Zerilli, “’We Feel Our Freedom’. Imagination and Judgment in the 
Thought of Hannah Arendt”, Political Theory, 33, 2005, p. 162 (emphasis added).
11 Linda Zerilli, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Judgment”, Signs, 34, 2, 2009, 
p. 304, p. 306.
12 Arendt, Life of the Mind, cit., p. 16. 
13 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, p. 26.
DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE — 225
the novelty of the actor) depends on making himself understood by 
those who are not artists (or actors)”.14
The difficulty arises not when the universal (rule or a principle) 
is given; this would make the process of judging determined by 
subsuming the particular under the universal. “If however only 
the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, 
then the judgment is simply reflective”.15 Moreover, “judgment in 
general is the faculty of thinking the particular”.16
What follows is that validity in traditional epistemological 
terms is not the primary concern for Arendt. But even more 
importantly, it is not to be considered to be the primary concern 
for her concept of the political either. Moreover, Arendt opts for 
the ‘defeated cause’ rather than for the ‘ideal of certainty’.
Some of the noted interpreters of Arendt’s political theory “do 
not think that Arendt ever gave a fully satisfactory answer to the 
questions she raised about the relations of thinking and evil”.17 It 
was never Arendt’s intention to convince or provide a fully satisfactory 
answer the complex problem of relating thinking to (moral) 
judgment (of evil). Moreover, following from her distancing from 
the ideal of certainty, it would be self contradictory to give a fully 
expanded answer. What Bernstein, as well as Seyla Benhabib, see 
as a missing closure with an impasse of Arendt’s theory, is an 
acute awareness of the problem that could not be resolved without 
compromising the issue of judgment on the crux of its key points, 
judging particularity and plurality of human beings. 
The conclusion that cognitive validity was not the primary 
concern, but that it is political validity makes it easier to address 
the apparent juxtaposition of actor vs. spectator. 
Spectator and Actor/Thinking and Acting
In one of the main interpretations of the category of judgment, 
that is often used as a point of departure and has hence almost 
became a standard, Ronald Beiner points out that the category 
of judgment is in Arendt’s work unfolded either as a faculty 
of a political actor, or as a capacity of a spectator.18 Arendt has 
14 Ivi, p. 63 (emphasis added).
15 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, 
p. 18.
16 Ibid.
17 Richard Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massacushetts, 1996, p. 171 (emphasis added).
18 Ronald Beiner, “Interpretative Essay”, in Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant, 
cit., p. 92.
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introduced the category of judgment by attributing it to both 
the actor and the spectator, which, as Beiner and many other 
interpreters have noted, has been uneven.
Namely, in one of her earlier texts on the subject of judgment, 
Crisis in Culture Arendt, underscores that judgment is relevant to 
the realm of the political: “the faculty of judgment in its proper 
perspective … implies a political rather than a merely theoretical 
activity”.19 Not only does Arendt in her early writing on this issue 
highlight judging as a political activity, and focus is therefore on 
the actor, but she also prioritizes the political. In her later work 
she analyzed judgment with a decisive emphasis on the decision 
making process, or judging, of a spectator and while fulfilling her 
debt to vita contemplativa, she appears to be privileging the spectator. 
Lisa J. Disch, a feminist theorist, claims that “dilemma of 
spectatorship versus [political] membership on the judgment 
writings” was imposed and is in fact not consistent with Arendt’s 
main line of argument.20 We may translate the terminology which 
Lisa J. Disch uses and in a faculty of thinking see spectatorship 
and, in political membership, an exemplary actor. 
Both, the actor and the spectator exercise the faculty of 
judging under the condition of plurality which is, at the same 
time conditio humana, and conditio per quam of the political. And 
most importantly, within this understanding of the category of 
judgment there is a potential, a possibility to dispense with a 
dilemma of acting versus thinking. 
Arendt’ s Lectures in Kant’s Political Philosophy almost entirely 
revolve around the position of the spectator, the onlooker. This 
shift in emphasis, however, was not of primary concern to 
Arendt. What she considered her primary task is to construct the 
parameters of judgment so that it may reflect all the complexities 
irrelevant of where it is to be deployed, action or spectatorship, politics 
or storytelling, present or past. The fact that judgment was more 
thoroughly treated as the judgment of the spectator rather than the 
actor may be attributed to a number of things, ranging from the 
obvious fact, that Arendt did not finish her work on the subject, to 
the more subtle issue, that certain points in dealing with judgment 
could have been held to be more controversial when approaching 
the judgment of the spectator than that of the actor; the most 
notable being the plurality of men.
19 Arendt, Crisis in Culture, cit., p. 2019.
20 Lisa Jane Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca and London, 1994, p. 143.
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The category of judgment has significance throughout the 
times of Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Life of the Mind and although 
there is shift in emphasis the meanings are complementary and 
not contradictory.
It is feminist theory, or better said, theory inflected by feminism 
that has fully taken this into account.
Contemporary Feminism on Judgment
Feminism has serious reasons to be invested into the concept 
of judging, especially in considering the potential of an Arendtian 
concept of judging since it is a political judgment which is here at 
stake. Although Hannah Arendt’s political theory has been in the 
focus of many feminist theorists, not many of them have in fact 
confronted the problem of judgment. 
Some of the earlier interpretations did point towards this 
direction. Lisa Jane Disch, using as a point of departure the 
Arendtian approach of storytelling, leads up to unfolding the 
category of judgment, as distinct from thinking.21 Judging 
demands plurality – and this is precisely why it is politically 
relevant – whereas thinking is a solitary business. L. J. Disch 
considers that a critical stance towards mainstream philosophical 
tradition is very important, a stance which Arendt also develops 
throughout her work. Seyla Benhabib shares in this sharp 
distinction between thinking and judging – moreover she detects 
and builds a tension between these two faculties of the mind.22 
However, Disch and Benhabib differ in assessing Arendt’s 
critical stance toward (mainstream) philosophy – as opposed to 
Disch, this critical stance often meets with a disapproval of Seyla 
Benhabib. 
A somewhat different position is more successfully established 
in the way Judith Butler built the political theory of Hannah 
Arendt in her more recent work. While developing the issues of 
the end of the nation-state, of sovereignty, and cohabitation, Judith 
Butler unfolded the category of judgment against the backdrop 
of a whole set of political problems, from politics of Israel to the 
Eichmann trial. Her question brings thinking and judging closer, 
when she asks, “is thinking in Arendt’s sense always an exercise 
in judgment of some kind… ?”.23
21 Disch, Hannah Arendt, cit., p. 167. 
22 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, 1996, p. 192.
23 Judith Butler, Parting Ways. Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2012, p. 155. 
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The work of Linda Zerilli is a step forward in clarifying 
the significance of judging. Linda Zerilli has used as a point of 
departure what she has chosen to name as a freedom centered 
feminism. Her unfolding of this concept –freedom centered 
feminism – first addresses feminisms where, she claims that issues 
other than freedom were in the forefront, such as the question of 
the social or the question of the subject (especially as articulated) 
in identity politics. Although she recognizes the legitimacy of 
these issues she is also critical of the way they overflowed and 
threatened to drown/sink the feminist scene. 
Since her analyses are focused on building the concept of 
freedom centered feminism, this almost unavoidably leads up 
to the category of judgment. And, the category of judgment is 
analyzed within the framework of Arendt’s political theory, 
or, more precisely, Arendt’s concept of the political. Instead 
of responding to the immediate and ever present needs of the 
social and framing all struggles based on identity politics with 
a never ending series of exclusions which always ends “with an 
embarrassing etc”24 of ‘wounded’ identities,25 Zerilli withdraws 
all of these safety nets woven into the feminist concepts of the 
political. The seductive element of these concepts holds a promise 
of reaching a final goal, an ultimate purpose. As opposed to this 
Zerilli presents the need for creating a space, ruled only by the 
principle of freedom and thus open for the potential appearance 
of judgments. 
So, a response to the question “[w]hy is it [the faculty of 
judgment] important to freedom-centered feminism?“26 is a 
fundamental reason that judgment has the potential to respond to 
the requirement of addressing the appearance of the new, or “[w]
henever we are confronted with something frighteningly new…”,27 
when we cannot fall back on the presupposed certainty of concepts 
already present. 
Judgment aspiring to political validity, is distinct from Kant’s 
determinate judgment, which is a statement on the particular 
subsumed under a universal. It is not grounded in preconceived 
concepts, and it therefore does not necessarily rely on the logical; 
24 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Routledge, New York, 1990, p. 143.
25 Wendy Brown, “Wounded Attachments”, in Wendy Brown, States of Injury, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, pp. 52-76.
26 Linda Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London, 2005, p. 127. 
27 Hannah Arendt, “Understanding and Politics”, in Jerome Kohn (ed.), Essays 
in Understanding, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1994, p. 325.
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moreover it exceeds the constraints of the cognitive processes 
since it is not based on preexisting knowledge.28 What is at stake 
here is to come to terms with the unexpected, the new, which 
Arendt’s actor has to confront, first in order to understand, and 
then following that reflection, to act. This is why also, “[f]or 
freedom-centered feminists … ‘the problem of the new’ is more 
than an epistemological question .… The problem of the new is a 
political question…”.29 Leaving aside the evident placement and 
prioritizing of the political in relation to the epistemological, 
judging is a process which concerns the particular, but does not 
have the firm ground or the stable framework or the safety net of 
the universal. “Rules are like a mental crutch to which we cling for 
fear of not being able to understand or judge at all”.30 This safety 
net, in the face ‘frighteningly new’ offers false hope and no safety. 
Therefore the criteria of the (standard) objectivity do not apply.
Using Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Arendt – opposing his model 
of determinate judgment (from the universal to the particular) – 
turns to the Kantian concept of the reflective judgment and uses 
his aesthetics to construct the parameters of what she proposes 
a politically relevant judgment should be. What Zerilli draws out 
and presents is Arendtian judgment as a process. The issue to be 
addressed becomes less and less a fixed category of judgment 
and becomes a process of judging. We return here to the initial 
formulation of the judging faculty as an activity. This activity 
not only builds, but also sustains the space of political action. 
Moreover, this process is a continual, sustained, thoughtful, 
painstaking process of building a space based on human plurality, 
where only the possibility of judging in freedom is protected – as 
well as threatened. 
This process is also very much based on what Arendt 
designates as representative thinking, formulated in Kantian 
terminology as “an enlarged mentality”.31 In her interpretation, 
“that the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in 
exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely the ability to see things 
not only from one’s own point of view but in the perspective of all 
those who happen to be present”.32 However, Arendt is precise to 
state that “this is neither a question of empathy … nor of joining a 
28 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss, cit., p. 128.
29 Ibid. (emphasis added).
30 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss, cit., p. 219, n. 6.
31 Kant, The Critique of Judgment, cit., p. 19.
32 Arendt, Crisis in Culture, cit., p. 221.
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majority”.33 What is stake here is not the identity of any separate 
group nor a particular social stratum, but the common world, 
or “the difference between understanding another person and 
understanding the world”.34 And what is needed is imagination 
or, more precisely “training one’s imagination to go visiting”.35 
Consequently political judgment can only appear in such a space, 
which is also the space of acknowledgment.36
Judgment therefore is not a bridge between thinking and 
acting, because if one acts in a politically relevant way, then it 
cannot be other then thoughtful (as opposed to thoughtless), and 
vice versa, thinking is, in and of itself, a political act. Furthermore, 
this means that no single reflection aspiring to be a (political) 
judgment can be instrumentalized, used, or in the function of any 
cause.37 It can never be a means toward any end. It is contingent, 
because it is freedom-centered. This entails a risk, taken as a part 
of, and underlying any (political) action. Therefore, judgment as 
a human faculty is not confined, restricted, limited to either the 
spectator or the actor. 
However, Hannah Arendt, especially in her later texts, does 
appear to privilege judgment of the spectator: “The advantage 
the spectator has is that he sees the play as a whole, while each 
of the actors knows only his part, or if he should judge from the 
perspective of acting, only the part of the whole that concerns 
him. The actor is partial by definition”.38 In fact there is no such 
advantageous position as that of the spectator, because this 
artificially built position exists only in the imagination of the 
theorist, inasmuch as all the would-be-spectators are in fact on the 
stage, and they are acting their part, whether they acknowledge 
it or not. Moreover, the play Arendt has in mind is more or less 
the same one which Benhabib invokes when she asks “If we are 
no more than the sum total of …. expressions we perform, is 
there ever any chance to stop the performance for a while, to pull 
the curtain down and let it rise only if one can have a say in the 
production of the play itself?”.39
33 Hannah Arendt, "Truth and Politics", in Between Past and Future, cit., p. 241. 
34 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss, cit., p. 150 (emphasis in the original).
35 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, cit., p. 43.
36 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss, cit., p. 158.
37 Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, p. 89.
38 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, cit., pp. 68-69.
39 Seyla Benhabib, “Feminism and Postmodernism. An Uneasy Alliance”, in S. 
Benhabib et al. (eds.), Feminist Contentions, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 21.
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Arendt is not building a privileged position of the proverbial/
metaphorical spectator who attends the Olympian Games in order 
to see/watch (theorien), and is therefore neither a philosopher; 
nor is she ‘a partial actor’ juxtaposed against this spectator who 
has the advantage of seeing ‘the play as a whole’. Her concern is 
building a space of action. 
Although not focusing on the roles of either the spectator or 
the actor per se, but on the kernel of the political judgment, Zerilli 
maintains that “[t]he spectator is the one who, through the use 
of imagination, can reflect the whole in a disinterested manner, 
that is, a manner free not simply from private interest but from 
interest tout court…”.40 Is the position of the spectator a privileged 
position, especially since in relation to vita contemplativa, vita 
activa, (political) action is – or should be – in Arendt’s world 
a privileged human activity? Zerilli also maintains that this 
position is “achieved … when I look at the world from multiple 
standpoints … to which I am always something of an outsider and 
also something of an outsider to myself as an acting being“. 41
Thinking versus acting is a crude distinction which does not 
do justice to Arendt’s fine tuning, but it does follow the general 
ambiguity of feminist, as well as mainstream philosophical – 
traditional and contemporary – split, a rift artificially built. But, 
as a spectator and as an actor I am one. The point of (analytically) 
separating one from the other appears as tearing apart a single 
being (indeed, placed in the web of human plurality) in order 
to underline the ‘thinking business’, solitary as it may appear 
at first glance, so as to underscore that the process reflection for 
the faculty of judging is – or should be – part and parcel of any 
political action. Otherwise we face thoughtlessness.
The spectator, whose position in rendering judgment may be 
regarded as privileged in relation to the actor, is only privileged 
in terms of temporality, because the only aspect of being solitary 
is the personal/individual responsibility (and/or guilt) for the act 
one has committed. Reflection allows for hindsight, we perceive 
of the whole, which this different temporal positioning allows for. 
The supposed rift, the gap, the in – between thinking and acting, 
often perceived by mainstream philosophy, may have called for 
a false dilemma which then in turn required a bridge construed 
by judging between them. They are not two distinct processes, 
but they may appear and become distinct if temporally placed: 
40 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss, cit., p. 158.
41 Ivi, p. 150.
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namely, one is judging in the present, or one may be judging on 
the past, or, one may be judging about the future. Thereby these 
processes become distinct, since one cannot judge in the past or 
in the future.
The issue of time, the temporality of judging as a process is 
missing. Here Arendt’s own constant framing within time (and 
space) parameters should be considered, which even she does not 
always do. Namely, what Arendt or her interpreters perceive and 
isolate from the time framework and designate as a position of the 
spectator is a position of privilege in terms of the temporality of 
judging and it is turned to the past. However when turning to the 
future, the position may become slippery, interchangeable between 
actor and spectator. It is only the present which is undoubtedly 
always already the position of the actor, but the position which 
does not exclude theorien – this privilege is severely constricted 
by time and often even lost, devoured by it. Only the difficult, 
sometimes unbearable, position of the actor is what drives some 
to construct the (ivory) tower of spectatorship. 
To conclude: since feminism is inextricably entangled with 
political act(ivism) to the extent that the political is the sine qua 
non of its very existence, judgment, conceptualized precisely as 
discussed, has the power to become “central feature of critical 
feminist political practice”42 as well as the central feature of any 
critical political practice.
42 Linda Zerilli, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Judgment”, Signs, 34, 2, 2009, 
p. 297.
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The Abject Body: Feminist Approaches 
to Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy in 




Starting from the fact that Hannah Arendt did not elaborate much 
on the problem of the body and on its role in the process of forming the 
political, Julia Kristeva, Linda M. G. Zerilli and Judith Butler tried to 
reconstruct her view on that topic. The authors claim that the dominant 
public discourse, almost always represses the body, ascribing it to the 
same adjective of ’abject’. While Zerilli focuses on the violent nature of the 
law dividing the private from the public and the body from the political, 
Kristeva points out that the bond between the body and speech is too 
strong to be questioned, so the body cannot be condemned only to the 
private sphere; embracing the terminology, Butler also addresses the 
‘abject body’, saying that it refers to any body which defies the imposed 
ideal: the white, male, heterosexual body. 
Even a casual glance at contemporary political and social 
situation reveals how important and urgent it is to act in terms 
of feminist agenda. Once an optimistic and bright future that 
offered us dreams of stabilizing women’s rights and achieving 
synergy within a healthy sisterhood slowly got replaced by (once 
again) a misogynistic current world of renewed patriarchy and 
conservatism. Thanks to a number of conservative parties and 
their harsh campaigns, fundamental women’s human rights such 
as the right to live free from violence or a right to decide if and 
when a woman has children have become debating points. In a 
society in which a highly respected member of the largest religious 
group decidedly (and without any legal or moral consequences) 
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states that a woman is ‘secondary‘, in a relation to a man, it is hard 
not to be anxious about the future. However, one has to wonder 
what lies in the foundations of this never-ending nonsense? What 
is the first, most obvious difference between a man and a woman? 
Certainly, it is a body, unpleasant and detachable little package 
that ‘houses‘ our mind and attracts prejudices. The question of its 
role in the unfavourable positioning of a female subject attracts the 
attention of four philosophers mentioned in this essay: Hannah 
Arendt, Julia Kristeva, Linda M. G. Zerilli and Judith Butler.
By differentiating between the two dimensions of human 
identity, formulated as a question of what a human being is and 
who it is, Hannah Arendt’s political theory introduces two strictly 
divided spheres: the private and the public. While a mere glance 
at the physical aspect of the body can answer a subject’s question 
about what s/he is (human being belonging to one of the two 
sexes), the question of who s/he is will remain unanswered as 
long as the subject remains within the imaginary walls of her/his 
solitude. A prerequisite for resolving the problem of one’s ‘who’ is 
to step into the public sphere of the political that is constituted by 
the act of common acting and speaking. Furthermore, the ability 
to act and speak within the community presupposes a certain 
plurality: the presence of others who will observe and witness our 
words and deeds, and who will also become observed by us. It is 
only in such an environment that our life can be narrated and that 
the identity of one’s ‘who’ can be partially revealed to a subject 
and its community.
However, the public sphere is not equally available to 
everybody – as Arendt points out, in the ancient Greek society 
women and slaves did not possess the right to vote, and, therefore, 
were limited merely to a body and to the sphere of strict privacy. 
In an analogy with Aristotle’s theory that says that one’s soul can 
never be exposed to the view of others, Hannah Arendt states that 
the body must be common and apolitical, and can, thus, have only 
two functions: production and procreation. The body is, in her 
view, something that is given, that should be accepted as it is, 
while its sole function in the sphere of the political is to partake 
in the constitution of plurality as one of the ‘human conditions’. 
Feminist criticism detects the weak spot of Arendt’s theory 
at this exact point. It remains unclear why would a female 
philosopher, who must have experienced the political and 
social consequences of being a female, so strongly defend theses 
that one’s gender is politically irrelevant and that each body is 
equally apolitical. Starting from the question of whether Arendt’s 
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unwillingness to talk about the body (or deliberate diminishing 
of its relevance) is symptomatic of her view on feminism, female 
theorists have for decades been searching for something that Zerilli 
calls the ‘Arendtian body’. The term ‘abjection of the body’ will, 
therefore, unite all three theorists: talking about the maternal body, 
Kristeva draws attention to the repressive nature of a dominant, 
symbolic discourse that will, by suppressing the semiotic part of 
language, subdue the primal drives which are inseparable from 
the (maternal) body; Zerilli points out at the violent nature of the 
law which divides the private from the public, i.e., the body from 
the polis, resulting in undisguised fear of corporeality; Butler, 
on her part, notes that even the gender and the sex of a newborn 
are the results of the so-called naturalizing trick conducted by 
the dominant discourse: every deviation of (unreal) social scripts 
results in a sense of abjection towards the body. My comparative 
analysis of these interpretations of Arendt’s political theory, 
organized in three sections, tries to reconstruct her genuine stand 
towards the body, determining whether it is applicable to the 
modern notion of the body’s importance. 
Julia Kristeva – the Semiotic, Maternal Body
Starting with the question of what motivates the subject to step 
into the public sphere, why s/he needs others, and what s/he is like 
before the interaction with the society, Julia Kristeva concludes 
that, within every need for communication, there is an aspiration 
for exchanging one’s opinion with others. Sharing our thoughts 
with others, comparing our points of view and joint evaluation 
of other people’s actions represents a prerequisite for creating 
a social web, that is, Arendt’s ‘sphere of the political’. What is, 
indeed, the meaning of the words thought and thinking after all? 
Referring to Kant’s theory, Arendt points out that, before stating 
anything, the subject needs to have a thought about it, a judgment 
based on “taste as the faculty of distinguishing, of discriminating 
between pleasure and displeasure”.1 Therefore, in order to have 
an ability to speak, the subject needs to have a body whose 
sense of pleasure defines her taste and indirectly her judgment 
as well. In that close link between the two senses (pleasure and 
displeasure) essential for the formation of taste/judgment, and 
the body, Kristeva detects the biggest puzzle of Arendt’s political 
theory. Freeing one’s thought of its solipsism and its entrance into 
1 Cf. Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt. Life is a Narrative, University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 2001, p. 67.
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the sphere of public thinking is linked, quite paradoxically, to 
the “only thing we cannot share”2 the body. Therefore, the body 
becomes a paradigm of private property. If the main prerequisite 
of entering the public is the pronouncement of a judgment based 
on physical pleasure or displeasure, how could the body remain 
as apolitical as Arendt requires it to be? Without the body, would 
we have anything to talk about, anything to act upon? What is the 
true nature of relation between the public/political and the body? 
Arendt considers the body to be nothing more than a 
constitutive element of plurality – her femininity is, as she sees 
it, something that is “irrefutably given”3 and therefore (just 
like Arendt’s Judaism) cannot and should not be brought into 
question. In a quite contrary reasoning, Julia Kristeva sees the 
sex of the (female) body as the main reason for its social isolation, 
which she ascribes to the repressive nature of the public discourse. 
Embracing Lacan’s differentiation between the symbolic and 
the semiotic dimension of the language, Kristeva speaks of a 
phallocentric symbolic law of the father which fears the mother-
defined-femininity closely linked to the semiotic. 
The first dimension of the language is, of course, the realm of 
structured public thinking, ‘understandable’ speech – in which a 
phallus has the privileged role,4 and the law of the father dictates 
all interpersonal relations – while the other dimension is focused 
on the body and the complex relationship between the mother 
and the newborn who has not entered the realm of language yet. 
The pronunciation of first meaningful words will certainly widen 
the child’s social circle – apart from the mother, his/her verbal 
experiment will now be available and intelligible to other members 
of the community. Therefore, the child’s role in the society grows 
proportional to the development of his or her ability to speak. 
However, stepping into language, society and the political is 
always accompanied by some degree of trauma. In order to attain 
who that will match what, the child has to differentiate from the 
general ‘human’, and undergo a process of individualization, 
the separation from the mother, and the formation of his or her 
singular identity. This seemingly natural and painless process is, 
indeed, says Kristeva, extremely repressive and violent, especially 
in relation to the body. A symbiotic link between the mother and 
2 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, cit., p. 67.
3 Ivi, p. 69.
4 Kathleen Lennon, “Feminist Perspectives on the Body”, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/
feminist-body/> (05/2014).
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her unborn child will, from the moment of birth, slowly move 
towards its inevitable end – the well-known dichotomy between 
nature and culture imprints its marks on every single body and 
reminds us that our stepping into civilization, accepting culture, 
the symbolic and language necessarily brings along a breakdown 
of our link to nature, primal drives, the body and the maternal. 
Is that abruption always equally successful? Can the body be 
disciplined without severe consequences? Kristeva’s answer lays 
within the term ‘abject body’: 
When the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of 
milk – harmless, thin as a sheet of cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail 
paring – I experience a gagging sensation and, still farther down, 
spasms in the stomach, the belly; and all the organs shrivel up the 
body, provoke tears and bile, increase heartbeat, cause forehead 
and hands to perspire. Along with sight-clouding dizziness, 
nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates me from the 
mother and father who proffer it.5 
A similar reaction is evoked by a glance at clipped nails, 
excrement, or an open wound – proofs that a restrained and 
repressed body defies the discipline forced upon it, warning 
us that the limit between us and the others, the private and the 
public, is amazingly thin and permeable. By refusing to drink the 
offered milk, the subject consciously questions (and undermines) 
parental authority, and forms its own identity, but also loses 
control over its body while its repulsion of food is operated by 
the unconscious. By rejecting the imposed milk skin, the subject 
strengthens the link between itself and the Other (parent), but, 
at the same time, rejects that which is not Other to him – food. 
Rejecting the food will, hence, result in the subject’s (un)conscious 
rejection of itself, even if that means its own death. 
However, the amount of abjection varies depending on the 
sex of the body. The pre-symbolic maternal body presents greater 
danger than the male body, while it bears greater abjective 
potential. The body that bleeds monthly (although its skin, the 
border between the outer world and the body, is not damaged) 
provokes double discomfort – not only does the impurity6 
emerge in regular cycles and flow uncontrollably from the female 
5 Julia Kristeva, Moći užasa. Ogled o zazornosti, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1989, p. 9.
6 Kristeva alludes to a historical link between menstrual blood and impurity, 
that is an interpretation of the menstrual cycle as a period of monthly cleansing 
during which women in underdeveloped societies succumb to a variety of special 
rules of behavior. 
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body, but it also passes through the same hidden gap through 
which all human beings have to pass in the act of birth. Hence, 
every subject, by the act of birth, has become impure, and the 
battle against the body is lost at the moment it starts. The mother’s 
fertile body becomes the strongest reminder of how futile the 
struggle against the body really is – relevance of the body as the 
main prerequisite of our existence cannot be diminished. “Archaic 
fear of the mother is basically fear of her ability to give birth”;7 
an ability which the male sex, due to its biological structure, 
cannot develop; consequently, ‘mother’ and ‘maternal’ are to be 
devaluated and placed away from reason, logic and culture. 
To the semiotic maternal body, in constant opposition to the 
symbolic, the newborn will present an opportunity to reaffirm its 
status in the field of culture and language, but that sort of transition 
would (even if it were possible) result in the further tightening of 
the bond between the mother and the child, and hence complete 
the child’s inability to emancipate itself from its mother. The literal 
cutting of the umbilical cord must therefore, be followed by the 
symbolic emancipation of a new human being by way of stepping 
into the realm of language, that is, the rejection of the mother’s 
body, and of the body in general, as abject and unwanted. 
Paradoxically, the body reaches its ultimate abjective power 
at the moment of its death, for nothing is as abject as a corpse. 
The corpse, as a material deprived of any spiritual substance, is 
the sole body without the soul, and will therefore produce the 
strongest sense of repulsion – it will remind us that the body is, 
in spite of our efforts to dominate it, capable of trespassing the 
border between life and death, and of ‘winning’ by returning to 
the realm of the semiotic and indescribable to language. 
However, there are other, less fatal, means of freeing the 
semiotic potential of the body. According to Kristeva, a woman 
can choose between two allowable actions: writing poetry and 
becoming a mother. While the latter postpones the abject effect of 
the body (for the female body will be glorified only as long as it 
serves its reproductive purpose), poetry will result in the subject’s 
final defeat. Embracing the semiotic ‘babbling’, based on sound 
and rhythm rather than on meaning, re-establishes the primal 
symbiosis between the mother and the child and annihilates 
the process of subject’s differentiation and individualization. 
Therefore, writing (and reading) poetry gradually pushes the 
subject toward psychosis. 
7 Julia Kristeva, Moći užasa, cit., p. 91.
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Although coherent and interesting, Kristeva’s theory of the 
body as a place of battle between the symbolic and the semiotic, the 
mother-like and the law of the father, reproduces the repression 
that it tries to demonstrate. Moreover, she strengthens the 
problematic dichotomy between male and female as cultural and 
natural, or intellectual and instinctive. Furthermore, by imposing 
motherhood and the semiotic as immanent to femininity, she re-
establishes gender boundaries and resurrects the 19th century 
classification of hysteria as a primarily female illness. Another 
‘female’ illness closely linked to the body emerges in the 20th and 
21st century – it is called anorexia. 
While the first one illustrates “rebellion against linguistic and 
cultural rules of the father, as well as returning to a ‘maternal 
language’, that is semiotic babbling of a newborn”,8 the second 
one focuses on disciplining the body. By refusing to eat, the 
anorexic will, as Bordo points out, seemingly gains control over 
her body and, at the same time, diminishes ‘unwelcome’ maternal 
attributes such as fertility. An androgynous body deprived of 
female visual tributes (sometimes even of abject menstruation) 
becomes very similar to Michel Foucault’s useful body9 – however, 
the body’s subversive power will always remain merely a potential 
one. Protest against the cultural repression of the body will, sadly, 
often remain only unconscious – a ‘restrained’ body may, in 
theory, revoke power and equality to male subject, but it will, in 
truth, become weak, fragile and impotent, that is, equivalent to an 
ideal imposed by the phallocentric discourse. 
Linda M. G. Zerilli – Sacred and Hidden Corporeality 
Arendt’s elusion of the body intrigued American theorist 
Linda M. G. Zerilli as well. Yet, she interprets it as a deliberate 
undermining of the social distinction between the two genders, 
pointing out that Arendt herself said: “I have never pretended to 
be anything else or to be in any way other than I am, and I never 
even felt tempted in that direction. It would be like saying that 
I was a man and not a woman – that is to say, kind of insane”.10 
8 Susan Bordo, “Unbearable Weight. Feminism, Western Culture, and the 
Body”, in Vincent B. Leitch (ed.), The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, W. 
W. Northon and Company, New York and London, 2001, pp. 2362-2376.
9 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison, Vintage books, 
New York, 1977, p. 136.
10 Arendt cited in Linda M. G. Zerilli, “The Arendtian Body”, in Bonnie Honig 
(ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, The Pennsylvania State University, 
1995, pp. 167-188, p. 170.
240 — DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE
Speaking of the body and of its two functions of procreation and 
production, Arendt mostly concentrates on the sense of physical 
pain, an experience for which the gender distinction is completely 
irrelevant. Extreme and unbearable pain, says Zerilli, alienates 
the body from the public sphere, and condemns it to a private 
sphere “for nothing, by the same token, ejects one more radically 
from the world than exclusive concentration upon the body’s life, 
a concentration forced upon man in slavery or in the extremity 
of unbearable pain”.11 A sense which, due to its specific nature, 
cannot be shared with others, places the body in the sphere of 
the private, usually described as hidden and sacred. What exactly 
is happening in the privacy of the body that makes it sacred? 
Primarily two actions, which remain hidden not only from the 
public but from the subject himself – birth and death. None of us 
knows where we were before our birth, the same way we cannot 
know where we go after we die. The mystery of the two ultimate 
points of human existence has been incorporated by ancient 
Greeks into the most important and long-lived antique cult of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries through which Greek culture speaks about 
birth, fertility and afterlife: 
Eleusinian Mysteries provided for a common and quasi-public 
experience of this whole realm, which, because of its very nature 
and even though it was common to all, needed to be hidden, kept 
secret from the public realm: Everybody could participate in them, 
but nobody was permitted to talk about them. The mysteries 
concerned the unspeakable, and experiences beyond speech were 
non-political and perhaps antipolitical by definition, …. where 
the initiated is said to know “the end of life and the Zeus-given 
beginning”.12 
The rites in which “everybody was permitted to participate, 
but none was allowed to talk about”13 evoked the myth of 
Demeter, the goddess of fertility, and her daughter Persephone,14 
whose abduction resulted in the creation of the four seasons of 
the year.15 Yet, Arendt chose to link the creation of the world to 
11 Arendt, The Human Condition, cit., p. 112.
12 Ivi, p. 63, n. 61. The internal quotation (“the end of life and Zeus-given 
beginning”) is from the ancient Greek lyric poet Pindar.
13 Ibid. 
14 The Roman version of her name is Persephone but mythology often refers 
to her as Kore (daughter) which is pronounced very similar to Khora (maternal 
principle in Julia Kristeva`s theory). 
15 Karl Kerenyi, Eleuzinski misteriji, Vuković and Runjić, Zagreb, 2013. 
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– Zeus! Pindar’s syntagm ’Zeus-given beginning’, adopted by 
Arendt,16 is considered by Zerilli as symptomatic and it raises the 
question whether an unfavorable position of the body is linked 
to its gender, fertility, motherhood and femininity. Although 
this statement is doubtful, indeed, the female body has a bigger 
disruptive potential for its biological nature which suggests that 
it knows (or at least might know) more about the moment of 
birth. Therefore, its subversive potential must be suppressed by 
proclaiming it undesirable, dangerous and abject. 
Although “the sex of the body is a public secret”,17 it must remain 
hidden while the body is banished from the world by a strict and 
repressive law which “represents a wall dividing mother from 
others and precluding any access to her”.18 Repeating the thesis of 
Kristeva, Zerilli claims that the cession to the body and its semiotic 
drives results in a radical alienation from the world, and a step into 
the psychotic. At the same time, the rejection of the body will have 
the same effect because no matter how premeditated thoughts and 
deeds might be, they are inseparable from the body and its drives. 
However, the wall created by a repressive law, a wall which 
the subject strives to tear down, is not completely negative. Drive-
regulated action creates “a complex web of actions and words”19 
between people, so there must be a physical interspace which 
combines them as a virtual wall of collectiveness. Paradoxically, 
action directed towards breaking of boundaries needs the same 
boundaries for its survival, in the sense that they provide the 
plurality of perspectives needed for answering the question of 
who one is. 
Speaking of plurality, both Arendt and Zerilli point out the 
problem of modern society and its inclination towards hyper-
liberalization and the elimination of repressive walls. Breaking 
taboos and prohibitions liberates our body from the enforced 
boundaries of gender, sex, nationality, etc., still, relief is only 
temporary; it gives the subject a false sense of belonging to a 
community, while actually condemning it to something that 
Arendt calls “subjectivity of one’s own singular experience”.20 
In that state, the identification of one’s ‘who’ becomes impossible 
due to the fact that it becomes uncertain whether there is a subject 
to whom that ‘who’ can be ascribed. 
16 Arendt, The Human Condition, cit., p. 63, n. 61.
17 Zerilli, The Arendtian Body, cit., p. 178.
18 Ibid.
19 Ivi, p. 183.
20 Ibid.
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The solution is, therefore, a compromise – instead of eliminating 
boundaries, we should re-inscribe them with the imperative of 
permeability. The body coming out of isolation – “the dungeon 
of subjectivity”21 – can blur the boundaries of its sex (even to the 
point of being almost unrecognizable), but it must keep, at least, 
one referent point of its self. 
In a modern society that aspires to massiveness, the repression 
of the body reaches new levels of articulation. While the past 
centuries censured the body, hiding it from public view (and 
subjecting it to the sometimes-insane dictates of the fashion, 
which made the body dependent on others),22 nowadays society 
‘fights’ the body with creativity. Instead of hiding it, modern 
society hyper-represents the body to the point of diminishing its 
relevance. Seductive and naked (mostly female) bodies call out to 
us from billboards and commercials; sexualized public figures set 
the approved model for imitation; the idyllic body of the fertile 
mother assures us that the modern society has embraced and 
glorified fertility. Is it really so? 
Fertility and motherhood, attributes of the body responsible 
for its formerly repressed position, have nowadays (thanks to a 
reversion of strategy) become tools of an even stronger repression. 
Fearful supremacy of the mother’s body which is, along with the 
other abject potentials of the body itself, able to host a new life 
for a period of 40 weeks, has been neutralized by ‘speaking the 
unspeakable’ of birth. Unlike the moment of dying, the act of 
birth has lost its sacredness – in the era of technology, the process 
of giving birth stays documented as a part of an initiating rite of 
parenthood. However, behind an alleged glorification of the female 
body lays repression, which is ironically strengthened mostly by 
women themselves. Moreover, the female body has been reduced 
only to its ability to give birth to another life. By letting a body and its 
drives into the sphere of the public, the symbolic enables a discourse 
about women and femininity while still remaining rigid and linking 
femininity only to the body. Consequently, the female body has 
been reduced only to its ability to give birth to another life, while the 
public discourse, somewhat simplified, offers only two models of 
identification with the female subject: the temptress, and the mother, 
where only the latter gets the ability to really act in the public sphere. 
21 Ibid. 
22 It is enough to remember a corset which has been deforming women`s 
chests, complex dresses with insertions so wide that they have completely blocked 
access to the female body, or extensive bathing suits that have, once soaked, been 
cooling the swimmer to the point of freezing. 
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According to the etymology of the term, the ‘temptress’ is there 
to tempt the male subject, therefore remaining simply an object 
of lust, or a referent model which, by her fragility23 and over-
emphasized-feminine-bodily-attributes, subliminally suggests 
that desirability is always linked to fertility. As a conclusion, 
female body must, if it wants to participate in the public, be 
maternal, and can only be so. The glorification of fertility and a 
special form of motherhood (which reduces the complex mother-
child relationship merely to biological dependence manifested 
through breastfeeding) are, surprisingly, accepted among women. 
Recommendation of the World Health Organization says:
Breastfeeding is the normal way of providing young infants with 
the nutrients they need for healthy growth and development. 
Virtually all mothers can breastfeed, provided they have accurate 
information, and the support of their family, the health care system 
and society at large. Exclusive breastfeeding is recommended 
up to 6 months of age, with continued breastfeeding along with 
appropriate complementary foods up to two years of age or 
beyond.24 
How should a mother who spends two (or even more) years of 
her life as a mobile milk factory, actively participate in the public 
and politic sphere remains unsaid. Simplified, the mother who 
refuses to breastfeed defies nature while she refuses to prolong the 
abject status of her body. Alleged liberalization will, therefore, be 
fatal to the body. The epistemologically impotent temptress, or the 
heroic mother, may cross the wall dividing them from the public, 
but, even when they do, they will still remain only observers. 
However, the biggest abject potential generates a subject 
refusing to choose between the two sides – the woman which 
refuses to be reduced to a sexual object (but at the same time, 
does not want to/cannot become a mother) and the woman who 
refuses to form her gender identity around her sex. Exactly those 
‘problematic‘ subjects find their place in the gender theory of 
Judith Butler. 
Judith Butler – Defying Social Scripts
Before discussing Judith Butler’s theory, it is important to point 
out to a specific view on the body which distinguishes her from 
23 Bordo, Unbearable Weight, cit., p. 2370. 
24 World Health Organisation, <http://www.who.int/topics/breastfeeding/en/> 
(04/2014) – the web page refers to many published papers and research on the topic 
of breastfeeding which are all financed by World Health Organization.
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the theorists already discussed. Unlike Arendt (who stresses the 
certainty of her gender and claims that to say that she is a man, and 
not a woman, would be ‘kind of insane’),25 Butler focuses on the 
complexity of defining the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Questioning 
the ‘insanity’ of gender confused subjects, she claims that the 
gender category is actually the result of a ‘naturalizing trick’26 
which produces an “illusion of natural unity between biological 
sex, gender identification and heterosexuality”.27
Instead of describing, the public discourse produces the gender 
of the newborn – “it ′girls′ a girl”28 by addressing the female body 
as a ’she’, and male as a ‘he’. However, Butler does not ascribe 
the abject character to a body only because it is female. Gender 
performances that we (and everybody around us) tend to repeat, 
are always based on “social scripts”29 that prescribe unachievable 
ideals. Hence, the heterosexual white male body becomes 
socially privileged while all the others, who are not fitted into a 
set model, gain the title of unwanted and abject. Transgender, 
transsexual, homosexual or disabled subjects, as well as women, 
therefore become abject, not because of their connection with 
the semiotic, but because of the excluding nature of the public 
discourse. Moreover, Butler questions the subversive potential 
of the semiotic, reminding us that we cannot ascribe meaning 
to something that is not already in language. At the same time, 
the forming of language is not possible without suppressing the 
semiotic. 
However, the biggest difference between Butler and the 
previous interpreters of Arendt lies in the term maternal. The 
link between fertility and the female body is, Butler states, the 
result of “a compulsory cultural construction of a female body 
as a maternal body”,30 to which the repressive law of the father 
imposes the imperative of reproduction. Arendt elapses from 
maternity as well. Although she mentions the act of giving birth, 
it does not serve the purpose of glorifying motherhood but 
stresses the alienating character of an extreme corporal pain. Sex 
and gender are, as far as Arendt is concerned, placed at the very 
25 Cited in Zerilli, The Arendtian Body, cit., p. 170. 
26 Judith Butler, “The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva”, in Hypatia. A Journal of 
Feminist Philosophy, 3, 1989, pp. 104-118.
27 Ibid. 
28 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”, Routledge, 
New York, 2011, p. 7.
29 Ivi, p. 8.
30 Ibid.
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margin of the problem – they are, for their unbreakable link to a 
body, apolitical and irrelevant. 
How can the radically unfavorable position of a body 
be corrected? Butler offers something which is similar to 
Arendt’s ‘action’ (which is by definition “unpredictable” 
and “irreversible”,31 her term is “discursive citation”.32 The 
subversive potential of this term lays in the fact that the meaning 
of the gender constituting performance depends on the context. 
Transsexuality will, therefore, undermine the link between the 
body shape and gender; travesty can bring gender stereotypes 
into question; homosexuality will destabilize the link between 
gender and heterosexuality. When combined, these subversive 
practices represent the most efficient tool in the battle against the 
abject character of the body. 
How does Butler’s theory connect to the subversive strategies 
of her two predecessors? Female homosexuality, which Butler 
considers to be one of the most efficient mechanisms for disclosing 
and re-inscribing gender binaries, is, in Kristeva’s theory, 
characterized as one of psychosis, as an “irreversible loss of one’s 
self”33 and a “regressive libidinal stadium prior to culture”.34 The 
complete reconstruction of the mother-child bond (in its primal 
form in which the subject is still not differenced from the mother) 
will not only represent a violation of the homosexuality taboo 
but will also flirt with the strongly prohibited incest. Therefore, 
the semiotic is allowed to enter the public only through one of 
the two socially viable and privileged praxes: poetry as a place of 
controlled emanation of subconscious, and motherhood by which 
a female subject becomes (someone’s) mother as well. However, 
the combination of the two mentioned forms of praxis will (for a 
female subject) often be disastrous: “the heterosexual mother poet 
will suffer from eternal melancholy”.35
However, Arendt and Butler fail to mention the problem of a 
male homosexual and incestuous subject. Although he is also un-
detachable from his body and linked to primal drives of maternal, 
both theorists will fail to notice his abject potential; they will 
ascribe to him less or even none abjectness. What will happen 
when a male body points its sexual drive towards an object of the 
same sex, or even his own mother? 
31 Ivi, p. 236.
32 Butler, Bodies that Matter, cit., p. 2.
33 Butler, The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva, cit., p. 111.
34 Ivi, p. 112.
35 Ivi, p. 111.
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Annulling the individualization process brings a male subject 
back to the dangerous field of tabooed incest – although she is 
the appropriate sex, the mother will remain strictly prohibited as 
a sexual object. Libidinal focus on his own mother makes a male 
subject as abject as his female double and, in addition, causes him 
to ‘forget’ who he became after the initial mother-child separation. 
A similar problem arouses in the case of homosexual fixation 
on the father or any subject of the same sex. Although focusing on 
the male, the paternal and the symbolic (as a contrast to the female, 
maternal and semiotic) should reaffirm the male principle and 
strengthen the dominant public discourse, male homosexuality 
has a great subversive potential. The male subject, as a regulatory 
principle, in its homosexual version, embraces attributes which 
are usually ascribed to the female gender and, by doing so, blurs 
the gender binary. Therefore, the subversion lies in the fact that 
the male subject does not need to imitate the Other as a strategy 
for improving his social status. Phallocentric discourse which 
describes the female as “attractive, sentimental and gentle”36 
and the male as “determined, courageous and bluff“,37 will all 
of a sudden be facing a problem of knowing but not recognizing 
the subject standing before it. Paradoxically, in order to publicly 
acknowledge his sentimental and gentle feelings towards the 
same sex, the male subject needs to be ‘determined’, ‘courageous’ 
and ‘bluff’. Hence, the main precondition of the public statement 
of affinities, which would make him abject in the eyes of the public 
discourse, is the possession of the same attributes that qualify him 
as a regulatory principle of his own gender.
The Everlasting Quest
Although the question of Hannah Arendt’s motives for 
eluding the problem of the body lacks an unambiguous answer, 
the complexity of the problem suggests that we should, for 
now, be satisfied with different interpretations of the ‘Arendtian 
body’. Is the body, for Arendt, really apolitical and, therefore, 
uninteresting, or does her elusion hides an unspoken critique 
36 Definition from Vladimir Anić, Rječnik hrvatskog jezika [Croatian dictionary], 
Novi liber, Zagreb, 2000, p. 1395: Difference between the definitions of the terms 
man and woman testifies about their different position within the dominant 
discourse. While the first term refers only to an adult male, the other definition 
splits into several levels. Woman is first of all a) a person of the sex opposite to a male, 
and only then b) an adult female. Second entry explains that a woman is a spouse of 
the opposite sex (in conversational manner) while the third one defines a woman as a 
servant (conversational manner).
37 Ivi, p. 563.
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of its repressive position and the subtle suggestion that gender 
binarism is unnecessary and unwanted? Between the two options, 
I am inclined to believe that the abject character of the body lies in 
its determination to revolt against the imperative of reproduction, 
and to defy socially imposed ideals, no matter which sex or gender 
it is. 
If we accept Kristeva’s explanation, talking about the body and 
its drives will always evoke the link to the maternal, fertility and the 
female principle; the submission of the body by the symbolic and 
the dominant is, therefore, motivated by the abject ascendency of 
the uncontrolled female body. Although Kristeva’s interpretation, 
followed by Zerilli’s theory, is not completely wrong, she forgets 
that Arendt places all bodies into the sphere of the private, 
regardless of their sex. Forced gender determination of those 
bodies and their limitation only to maternal attributes neglects a 
stronger argument: the body has to have its place in the sphere of 
the public because of its inseparability from speech and action as 
elements constitutive of the political. Reason and thinking cannot 
function without the ‘empirical material’ provided by the body; 
without it, reason is utterly closed in its solipsism, at the same 
time distant and impotent. As to fertility-if we decide to proclaim 
it one of the attributes immanent to the female body, it seems 
adequate to speak of intellectual fertility, which is born from the 
female growing need to find her space in the sphere of the public 
and the political. 
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Some Remarks on the Position of Women 
in the History of Yugoslav Experimental 
Cinema: The Case of Tatjana Ivančić
Petra Belc Krnjaić
Summary
Researching (amateur) film archives from a feminist perspective 
opens several practical and theoretical questions; who decides which 
films to archive, restore and showcase – especially when they engage 
with film and visual arts, professional as well as amateur production, 
and how does the researchers’ position affect her/his work? Looking at 
films of amateur/experimental filmmaker Tatjana Ivančić from Socialist 
Republic of Croatia, this paper examines some of the possible archival 
and institutional shortcomings which caused the marginalisation of 
female experimental filmmakers from Yugoslavia and proposes several 
simple actions which could correct these omissions. 
Whose histories are being collected? And for whose benefit? 
 (Sara de Jong and Saskia Wieringa)1 
But I would prefer, I must say, students to concentrate not on the 
individuals or on history, but on the actions of archives, what they have 
done in looking after their collections, making their collections available, etc. 
(David Francis, former Curator of the British National Film Archive)2 
1 Sara de Jong and Saskia Wieringa, ”The Library as Knowledge Broker”, in Sara 
de Jong (eds.), Teaching Gender with Libraries and Archives. The Power of Information, 
vol. 10, ATGENDER and Central European University Press, Budapest, 2013, p. 17. 
2 Paolo Cherchi Usai et al., Film Curatorship. Archives, Museums, and the 
Digital Marketplace, Synema – Gesellschaft für Film und Medien, Österreichisches 
Filmmuseum, Vienna, 2008, p. 62.
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The Invisible ‘Mistress’ of Yugoslav Amateur Film3
The experimental film scene in Zagreb (just as was the case with 
the rest of Yugoslavia) grew out of the amateur ciné-circles such 
as the Ciné-club Zagreb. This was the oldest and strongest club in 
Socialist Republic of Croatia (hereafter indicated as SR Croatia), 
whose most prolific member was a woman – Tatjana Ivančić. 
According to the Ciné-club Zagreb monograph,4 Ivančić made over 
70 short films in the period between 1967 and 1986, and according 
to one of the most important magazines of the contemporaneous 
ciné-club milieu, Sineast, her experimental and documentary films 
were very well known in the amateur film festival circles at the 
time.5 It was these same circles that provided the context for the 
emergence of directors like Karpo Ačimović Godina, Mihovil 
Pansini, Dušan Makavejev, Ivan Kaljević, Ivan Martinac, Lordan 
Zafranović, and others. Born in 1912, Ivančić began her (amateur) 
film career sometime in her mid-fifties, and in the course of only six 
years her films were already screened and awarded in places such 
as Novi Sad, Maribor, Zadar, Split, Pula, Berlin, Tokyo, Trieste, 
Sousse etc. Her work revolved mainly around nature, animals, in 
particular the sea, and it was characterized by technical excellence. 
In 1975 she received an award for the high technical and artisanal 
level of her films,6 and in one interview she emphasized the stability 
of her image and strong hand coordination, expressing annoyance 
for the dilettant approach towards filmmaking.7
Ivančić was also the first woman who was awarded the 
prestigious title of the Master of the Amateur film of Yugoslavia 
in 1980,8 a title given to the ciné-club members based on the 
points accumulated throughout the competition within the 
Yugoslav amateur film festival circle. Some of the most prominent 
experimentalists from the SR Croatia, like Mihovil Pansini and 
Tomislav Gotovac, carried this prestigious title, which must 
3 I would like to thank Aleksandar Ivančić, Tomislav Šakić and Matko Burić for 
their help with the documentation on the work of Tatjana Ivančić, and Jelena Bulić 
and Steven Ellis for their language/editing suggestions and corrections. 
4 Duško Popović (ed.), Kinoklub Zagreb. Filmovi snimljeni od 1928. do 2003. 
Sedamdeset i pet godina Kinokluba Zagreb, Hrvatski filmski savez, Zagreb, 2003. All 
translations in this essay are mine unless otherwise noted.
5 Đorđe Deđanski, “Deveti festival 8mm amaterskog filma Jugoslavije“, Sineast, 
20, 1973, pp. 114-115.
6 “XIX savezni festival amaterskog filma Jugoslavije, Novi Sad, 19-21. decembra 
1975.”, Sineast, 30-31, 1975/76, p. 143. 
7 Velimir Bojko, “Vratiti žanrove”, Sineast, 63/64, 1984/85, p. 274. 
8 Zoran Tadić, “Van iz kuhinje!“, <http://www.matica.hr/kolo/240/van-iz-
kuhinje-16785/> (3/2018).
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have been an important recognition from the (amateur) film 
community. However, as Croatian film director Zoran Tadić 
insightfully observed while writing on Ivančić’s oeuvre,
[w]hat can’t be measured neither by awards nor by festivals, what 
truly impresses, without courtesy and protocol, is the level of the 
films, a closed, full-blooded and accomplished authorial world, 
brought to life with an abundance of unconcealed scrutinizing 
passion, and yet so simple, that we are barely aware that Tatjana 
Ivančić is an indispensable name of the Croatian, and not only 
amateur, filmmaking.9
Yet, in the recent resurgence of Yugoslav experimental cinema in 
the international art institutional context, the work of Tatjana Ivančić 
seems to be completely forgotten. The exhibition As Soon as I Open 
My Eyes I See a Film. Experiment in the Art of Yugoslavia in the 1960s 
and 1970s, curated by Ana Janevski in 2008,10 and the catalogue/book 
of the same name published in 2010,11 mention only established and 
institutionally recognized female artists – Bogdanka Poznanović, 
Marina Abramović, Sanja Iveković, and Nuša Dragan. In 2010, 
Ljubljana’s Moderna Galerija / Museum of Modern Art hosted an 
exhibition This is all film! Experimental film in Yugoslavia 1951-1991, co-
curated by Janevski, Bojana Piškur, Jurij Meden, and Stevan Vuković. 
Amongst female artists included in this exhibition there were 
only Nuša Dragan, and Breda Beban, also an institutionally (and 
internationally) established artist. The four-part film programme 
Artists, Amateurs, Alternative Spaces: Experimental Cinema in Eastern 
Europe, 1960–1990, organized by Ksenya Gurshtein and Joanna 
Raczynska for the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D. C.12 
did not take into consideration the entire Yugoslavia but focused on 
SR Croatia and SR Serbia, presenting only one female artist – Sanja 
Iveković. Finally, the book of essays on Yugoslav black wave and 
9 Zoran Tadić, ”Tatjana Ivančić maritime mini-documentaries”, in Zoran 
Tadić, Ogledi o hrvatskom dokumentarcu, Hrvatski filmski savez, Zagreb, 2009, 
p. 144., “Ono pak što se ne mjeri ni priznanjima ni festivalima, ono što istinski 
zadivljuje, nekurtoazno i neprotokolarno, jest razina filmova, zatvoren, punokrvan 
i cjelovit autorski svijet, ostvaren s toliko neskrivane (sic) promatračke strasti, a 
tako jednostavno, da smo jedva i svjesni kako je Tatjana Ivančić nezaobilazno ime 
hrvatskoga, ne samo amaterskog, filmskog stvaralaštva”.
10 See the website of the exhibition As Soon as I Open My Eyes I See a Film. Experiment 
in the Art of Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, <https://bit.ly/2q5zGYs> (4/2018).
11 Ana Janevski (ed.), As Soon as I Open My Eyes I See a Film. Experiment in the Art of 
Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, Museum of Modern Art in Warsaw, Warsaw, 2010.
12 Film Series: Artists, Amateurs, Alternative Spaces. Experimental Cinema in 
Eastern Europe, 1960-1990, http://bit.ly/2FyEr7v (3/2018). 
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experimental cinema, Surfing the black,13 published in 2012, included 
a text by Ana Janevski, “We Cannot Promise To Do More Than 
Experiment“,14 in which the author writes about the Zagreb amateur 
ciné-community, albeit focusing only on its male protagonists. 
These books, exhibitions and film programmes might be 
considered as some of the most important general overviews of 
the Yugoslav experimental cinema which took place in the past 
ten years in an international institutional context,15 a context 
immensely important for the distribution of knowledge, the 
canonization and legitimation of art. By failing to include the work 
of Tatjana Ivančić in their overviews, have the authors of these 
books and exhibitions simply continued to perpetuate certain 
historical blind spots, and if that is the case – what would be the 
cause of this gender-biased vision? 
At this moment I believe that the institutional context in which 
Ivančić’s films are currently placed has made her work invisible 
to museum curators and art historians who began labeling 
this existing amateur/experimental film corpus as Yugoslav 
experimental cinema and started exhibiting it in the museological 
context (Ana Janevski, Bojana Piškur, Jurij Meden, Stevan Vuković 
etc.). Although the institutional background of an artwork (in this 
precise case – experimental film) could be perceived as far less 
interesting than its content analysis, the concept of the institution 
seems to occupy one of the central positions in the process of 
rethinking art/film history through a feminist perspective. As 
art historian Linda Nochlin says, social and institutional context 
are the very instances responsible for the ‘failure’ of women to 
step into the realm of art. “The fault lies not in our stars, our 
hormones, our menstrual cycles, or our empty internal spaces, 
but in our institutions and our education education understood 
to include everything that happens to us from the moment we 
enter this world of meaningful symbols, signs, and signals”.16 
13 Gal Kirn (ed.), Surfing the black, Jan van Eyck Akademie, Maastricht, 2012. 
14 Ivi, pp. 46-75.
15 The book Cinema by Other Means (2012) by Serbian/American scholar 
Pavle Levi undoubtedly also belongs to this scope of texts and film programmes 
deserved for the acknowledgment of Yugoslav avant-garde film practice and 
its integration in the historical context of the Western cinematic avant-garde. 
However, Cinema by Other Means is not explicitly focused on the historiography of 
Yugoslav experimental cinema, as is the case with the abovementioned catalogues 
and programmes, and for the purposes of this paper I didn't take Levi's book into 
consideration. Nevertheless, Cinema by Other Means does not mention Ivančić, or 
any other female experimentalist from Yugoslavia.
16 Linda Nochlin, ”Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists”, in Linda 
Nochlin, Women, Art, and Power and Other Essays, Routledge, New York, 2018, p. 150. 
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”By stressing the institutional”17 in her seminal essay “Why Have 
There Been No Great Women Artists“, Nochlin encouraged many 
scholars to follow in her wake18 and use the method she devised 
as a paradigm.19 This invitation to expose the ways in which the 
institutions shaped and are still shaping women’s existence helps 
us at the same time to understand (and to expose) the ways in 
which they shape knowledge on women as subjects and objects 
of history, subsequently producing inequality and authorial in/
visibility. “Not a given to be studied, art was what the art historical 
expert stated it was. …. Generations are marked by what we show 
and tell and what we do not show and do not tell“ wrote Griselda 
Pollock,20 encouraging us to openly ask: whose history is being 
written in the context of SR Croatian/Yugoslav experimental 
cinema, by whom and for whom?
 
Creating a ‘Yugoslav Experimental Filmmaker’ in the 
Post-Yugoslav Context
After the fall of Yugoslavia and the separation of its 
socialist republics in the early 1990s, the amateur ciné-club 
films produced in the SR Croatian ciné-clubs were made into a 
collection by the Hrvatski filmski savez (Croatian Film Clubs’ 
Association, hereinafter called the CFA) – a non-governmental 
umbrella association of amateur filmmaking, which originated 
in SR Croatia.21 CFA was established in 1963 under the name 
of Kinosavez Hrvatske (Croatian Cinema-Association) as an 
association dedicated to promoting, supporting and developing 
the non-professional and amateur filmmaking, and today it forms 
a part of the Croatian Association of Technical Culture.22 Besides its 
regular program activities, CFA “has also been housing a film and 
video archive since 1974, including a collection of 580 film titles 
and 3.000 video works made in the period from 1928 to 1998“.23 
Due to its lack of infrastructural conditions needed for maintaining 
a film collection, the films that the CFA gathered are (mostly) being 
17 Ivi, p. 176.
18 Cf. Griselda Pollock, ”A Lonely Preface”, in Rozsika Parker and Griselda 
Pollock, Old Mistresses. Women, Art and Ideology, I. B. Tauris, London and New 
York, 2013, p. xviii.
19 Nochlin, Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists, cit., p. 176.
20 Pollock, A Lonely Preface, cit., pp. xviii-xxvii. 
21 Croatian Film Association was formerly called the Cinema-Association of SR 
Croatia, and today is occasionally translated as Croatian Film Clubs’ Association.
22 ”What is the Croatian Association of Technical Culture (CATC)?”, <http://
www.hztk.hr/crotec/what-is-crotec/> (4/2018).
23 Croatian Film Association, <http://www.hfs.hr/hfs/onama_e.asp> (3/2018).
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kept in the Film Archive of the Croatian state archives, and the 
legal status of this corpus of films is at the moment not completely 
clear. Besides the Croatian Museum of Contemporary art (which 
itself owns only a small number of SR Croatian experimental films 
and videos – around 30 for the period of the 1960s and 1970s)24 
there is no other institution in the present day Croatia which 
systematically takes care of the Croatian experimental film and 
video from the socialist period. CFA’s praiseworthy decision to 
preserve, catalogue and archive the amateur ciné-club material 
made it a curated archive of the SR Croatian experimental film (and 
video), and a crucial (maybe even the only) source of knowledge 
on the Croatian experimental film history. 
During the 1990s and 2000s CFA began broadening its range 
of activities, thus entering the field of professional filmmaking 
and Croatian film culture. Within its scope of publishing 
activities, in the early 2000s CFA began releasing a series of 
DVDs and books dedicated to the SR Croatian experimental 
film scene and ciné-club culture, albeit focusing predominantly 
on men and internationally established artists, as well as those 
authors which have been socially or otherwise canonized at their 
time (from the late 1950s onwards). The CFA published several 
monographs devoted to particular authors; Ivan Martinac and 
Tomislav Gotovac each have two books devoted to them, and 
Vladimir Petek got a thin monograph. The authors who were 
honored with monographic DVDs (published by the CFA) were 
also exclusively male:25 Tomislav Gotovac (2009; 2015), Ivan 
Martinac (2007), Miroslav Mikuljan (2011), Mladen Stilinović 
(2013), Zdravko Mustać (2009), Željko Kipke26 (2008), and Petar 
Trinajstić (2010). The DVDs dedicated to a particular period 
(Early experimental film and video art in [SR] Croatia [2007]; [SR] 
Croatian experimental film and video of the 1980s [2007] and The 
Croatian experimental film and video of the 1990s [2009]) included 
three female video artists – notably Breda Beban, Sanja Iveković, 
and Nicole Hewitt – but these artists did not begin their careers 
in amateur circles, as was the case with Martinac, Petek, 
Pansini, Gotovac and Ivančić, the members of the amateur film 
community which the CFA represents and stands for. Besides 
24 Film and video collection of the Croatian Museum of Contemporary Art, <http://
www.msu.hr/#/en/16/> (4/2018). 
25 To summarize: this DVD collection consists of 42 male and only 4 female 
authors. 
26 According to my knowledge, Kipke was never a member of the amateur 
Ciné-club circle. 
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films by Iveković (Monument, 1976; Osobni rezovi [Personal Cuts] 
1982; Chanoyu, co-directed with Dalibor Martinis, 1983), Beban 
(Geography, co-directed with Hrvoje Horvatić, 1989), and Hewitt 
(In/Dividu, 1999), the only other female author which found her 
place place among this DVD-worthy group of male cineastes 
was Dunja Ivanišević (Žemsko [Gal], 1968), a one-time amateur 
filmmaker and a member of the ciné-club Split. Ivanišević is 
included in the DVD overview of the Split film school (2015), 
originally published as a visual addition to the The Split Film 
School monograph, which was initiated and edited by Sunčica 
Fradelić, current president of the ciné-club Split. 
Among the information on Ivančić’s work, two remarks shed 
some light on her curious contemporary invisibility. Vera Robić 
Škarica, former director of the CFA, and Aleksandar Ivančić, 
Tatjana’s son, commented that Ivančić was not completely 
accepted in the Ciné-club Zagreb circle during the 1960s and the 
1970s because she was a woman, and because her poetics differed 
significantly from what was considered aesthetically valuable at 
the time.27 Have the custodians of the SR Croatian experimental 
film collection and the editors of these DVD and book editions 
kept reproducing (consciously or not) the same patriarchal/artistic 
value patterns dominant in the 1960s, which used to discriminate 
against women on the basis of their authorial style and gender? 
Was the foundation of this non-profit collection guided by the idea 
of preserving the local amateur and experimental film culture, 
or have there been attempts to ‘commercialize’ the collection, 
imbuing it with certain proven aesthetic and artistic values? If that 
would be the case, this raises the question of the standard and the 
role model for this type of established aesthetic and artistic values. 
What defines the quality traits which make certain films valuable 
enough to be made visible, while condemning others to stillness 
on the archival shelves? The position of Yugoslav experimental 
cinema between film and art, amateur and professional – 
undoubtedly also reflects on the overall visibility of such films, 
forcing us to pose one more question: can one intervene in the 
(historical) process of canon formation, and how can that be 
achieved?
27 Eventually, Robić Škarica even helped Ivančić to establish her own small ciné-
club through which Ivančić competed in the Yugoslav amateur film festival circle, 
although today her films are all listed under the Ciné-club Zagreb production. These 
information have been found in the transcript from the unfinished documentary 
on the history of Ciné-club Zagreb, and I would like to thank Croatian film scholar 
Tomislav Šakić for providing me with this valuable historical material.
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Experimental Cinema and (the Formalism of) the Film Strip
In Croatia there is no Film Institute or a Film Museum which 
would strategically promote the national (experimental) film 
heritage. As a result, researchers and interested audience often 
rely on the extra-institutional film spaces, independently run art 
organizations and the student centers. Dealing with objects made 
on the material such as S8mm film, a medium Ivančić often worked 
in, makes it even harder to research such work, since neither the 
Film Archive nor CFA offer the possibility of watching the small 
gauge formats,28 with the CFA being also very selective in regards 
to whom it will allow to reasearch its archival material. From a 
researcher’s position it is important that the films are viewable 
in good quality so that one can discern the details in the image, 
otherwise it can be difficult to analyze the film. Unfortunately, of 
all the films Ivančić made, to my present knowledge, only 14 are 
officially archived and rudimentary digitalised (presumably by 
copying the projection of a wall) which means that the technical 
quality of the existing digital copies of her films is quite subpar, 
thus making them difficult to analyze as well as showcase.
The question of the medium is particularly important for the 
history of experimental cinema, since the authors working in this 
genre often explored its materiality and formal elements. However, 
this idea of materialist and formalist approach towards experimental 
filmmaking influenced the writing of the 1960s and 1970s American 
and UK film avant-garde, often overshadowing the work of women 
who were exploring or rather – moving through a different visual 
territory.29 On the one hand, there was the idea of the romantic artist, 
28 Besides, film is a delicate medium and each projection damages the strip 
which also deteriorates with time, especially if it is not adequately stored, affecting 
the overall quality of the image. Due to its technical specificities, the process of 
film restoration requires specialized knowledge and can be very time-consuming 
and expensive, especially if the films were produced in substandard formats such 
as S8mm. Merely digitally copying the projected S8mm film of a white wall might 
preserve certain amount of visual data, but if the filmstrip already lost some of its 
qualities, the digital copy can only give a vague idea of the original work. The film 
restauration in Croatia is almost without exception publicly funded, yet it seems 
there is no clear strategy or a list of priorities regarding the amateur/experimental 
material which needs to be preserved. This is additionally complicated by the fact 
that the Croatian national film heritage has not yet resolved its legal ownership 
status. Cf. Iva Marčetić, ”Zamrznute pozicije” [Frozen positions], <http://www.
kulturpunkt.hr/content/zamrznute-pozicije> (04/2018).
29 Cf. Jean Petrolle and Virginia Wexman, ”Introduction. Experimental 
Filmmaking and Women's Subjectivity”, in Jean Petrolle et al. (eds.), Women and 
Experimental Filmmaking, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2005, 
pp. 1-17. 
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and on the other, there were structural and materialist approaches 
privileging the strict formal organization of the material and the 
exploration of its material capabilities. “Inherent in the formalist 
rhetoric was the rejection of the alternative languages of cinema 
that didn’t fit the prescribed norm, and loosely speaking individual 
artists were ‘in’ the avant-garde, if their work could be matched 
to theoretical categorization“ wrote British experimental artist 
and theorist Jackie Hatfield, arguing that the experiments with 
narrativity, representation and multiple screens have not been 
included in “the main theoretical arguments that have shaped the 
histories of experimental film and video“.30
This leaning towards the materiality of the 1960s and 1970s 
cinematic experiments also marks the scholarship on the 
experimental film scene in Zagreb/Yugoslavia. Croatian film 
scholar Hrvoje Turković proposed three periods in the development 
of Yugoslav experimental cinema: the preparatory phase (1951-
1962), the Genre Film Festival (GEFF) phase (1961-1970) – marked 
by the radical experiments in the medium of film31 – and the 
phase of the renewal and establishment (1974 onwards).32 Mihovil 
Pansini, one of the most influential SR Croatian experimentalists 
of the 20th century and the co-founder of GEFF, called the 1960s 
and partially the ‘70s “the film strip“33 period of the Zagreb ciné-
club,34 while Ana Janevski similarly concluded that “the amateur 
films in Zagreb were characterized by experimenting with the 
medium“35 and that “[t]he Zagreb filmmakers were interested 
in film for its properties and structure, and for the possibility of 
deliberation and experimentation via the medium itself“.36
This characterization of the period, although accurate for the 
bigger part, can be seen as reductive since it doesn’t include the 
30 Jackie Hatfield, “Expanded Cinema and Narrative: Some Reasons for a 
Review of the Avant-Garde Debates Around Narrativity“, Millenium Film Journal, 
39/40, 2003, <http://bit.ly/2g4GT74> (12/2016).
31 GEFF was an experimental film festival taking place in Zagreb between 1963 
and 1970, invested in the promotion of radical filmmaking and lead by the idea of 
antifilm as its main conceptual invention and theoretical guideline.
32 Hrvoje Turković, “Nacrt za povijest jugoslavenskog eksperimentalnog 
filma“,Bilten filmoteke, 16, 7, 1980, pp. 19-38.
33 Mihovil Pansini, “Pet razdoblja Kinokluba Zagreb“, in Duško Popović (ed.), 
Kinoklub Zagreb 1928/2003, Hrvatski filmski savez/Kino klub Zagreb, Zagreb, 2003, 
p. 8. 
34 “Filmska vrpca“. 
35 Janevski, As Soon as I Open My Eyes I See a Film, cit. 
36 Ana Janevski, “We Cannot Promise To Do More Than Experiment. On the 
Yugoslav Experimental Film and Cine Clubs in the 1960s and 1970s", in Kirn, 
Surfing the black, cit., p. 52. 
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work of Tatjana Ivančić, whose films can hardly be summed up 
by this paradigm. Although Ivančić never experimented with 
multiple screens, her films are indeed marked by narrativity 
and representation which often veers towards abstraction and 
textural explorations as opposed to the hailed anti-illusionism 
of experimental film. Her films encompass the years from 1967 
until 1986, which means she was prolific in the 1970s (the decade 
in which she made 50 films). These were the years which were, 
according to Pansini, still partially marked by the research of the 
medium, and according to Turković, marked by the revival of 
amateurism and the decline of the GEFF-like poetics in the wider 
Yugoslav context37 with a “going through the motions life“ in the 
context of Ciné-club Zagreb.38 As exemplary cases of experimental 
filmmakers in the Zagreb circle of that period Turković singles 
out cinematographer Branko Bubenik, and the famous Croatian 
conceptual artist Mladen Stilinović.39
Bearing all this in mind, it seems unfortunate that some of 
the relevant retrospective screenings of Yugoslav experimental 
cinema40 mainly repeat the titles from the extant film programmes, 
while the international programmers mainly choose from the 
collection of films preselected by the CFA. Being omitted from the 
CFA’s publications, DVDs and recommendations, as well as the 
curated film programmes, Ivančić easily remained invisible for 
the researchers engaged with the field of Yugoslav experimental 
cinema.41
To Screen a Film (in the Right Context) is to Keep It Alive
The amateur film as a form of cinematic expression has 
generally been a neglected field of scientific research42 and the rare 
articles that dealt with the SR Croatian experimentalists – apart 
37 Turković, Nacrt za povijest, cit., p. 31-32.
38 Hrvoje Turković, “Kinoklub Zagreb. Filmsko sadište i rasadište“, in Duško 
Popović (eds.), Kinoklub Zagreb 1928/2003, cit., p. 13.
39 Turković, Nacrt za povijest, cit., p. 32.
40 Cf. Avant-garde cinema from Ex-Yugoslavia, 1950s-80s, Anthology Film 
Archives, New York, (2015), <https://www.havc.hr/eng/info-centre/news/
anthology-film-archives-shows-avant-garde-films-from-former-yugoslavia> 
(3/2018); “Croatie, la voici“, Cinémathèque Française and Centre Pompidou, Paris, 
2012, <http://www.culturenet.hr/default.aspx?id=47925> (3/2018), <http://www.
hfs.hr/hfs/zapis_clanak_detail.asp?sif=34134> (3/2018).
41 The predominant focus in all of these programmes is on the work of Tomislav 
Gotovac, Ivan Martinac, GEFF and the idea of antifilm.
42 “Projekt: Archäologie des Amateurfilms. Ausgrabungen zur visuellen Kultur 
der Moderne“, <https://bit.ly/2HzVCWk> (04/2018).
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from a text by Croatian curator and art historian Branka Benčić43 
– never really problematized this institutional - that is: amateur 
position of them as filmmakers. Because of this amateur position 
- of the experimental film artists in Yugoslavia, and the lack of 
a Film Institute or a Film Museum in the present day Croatia, 
archiving these films within the CFA seemed as a reasonable and 
a commendable gesture. However, given their legal position as an 
NGO amateur association, and the plethora of their mandatory 
regular activities,44 all the shortcomings of their work on this 
collection are completely understandable. A similar fate has 
befallen the SR Croatian video art scene, thus spurring the curator 
Branko Franceschi, who curated an exhibition dedicated to the 
[SR] Croatian video art in 2002, to ask whether CFA is the right 
institution to deal with video art or ”should that particular role be 
given to the institutions that are made solely for the purposes of 
modern and contemporary art”.45 
Since 2015, when this paper was originally presented, several 
Ivančić’s films were shown in a non profit cultural institution, an 
art gallery and within the scope of an experimental film festival,46 
a text on her work (among other authors) has been published in 
the Croatian scholarly film journal Hrvatski filmski ljetopis,47 and 
in 2018 one of Ivančić’s films (The City in the Shop Window, 1969) 
was a part of an important exhibition in the Museum of Arts and 
Crafts in Zagreb - ‘60s in Croatia - Myth and reality. The organizers 
43 Branka Benčić, “Sve je povezano/Everything Is Connected”, in Sunčica 
Fradelić (ed.), Splitska škola filma–60 godina Kino kluba Split, Kinoklub Split, Split, 
2012, pp. 14-34.
44 CFA as the rooftop association of amateur filmmakers in Croatia coordinates 
and assists 46 of Croatian amateur ciné-clubs, it organizes film courses and 
workshops for children and adults, produces feature, documentary and 
experimental films and acts as a film distributor as well. Besides these activities, 
CFA publishes film books and film magazines, organizes state festivals of amateur 
film, and finally since CFA rents a movie theater, it also acts as a cinémathèque, 
organizing film screenings of contemporary and classic arthouse films. Overview 
of their activities can be seen in the yearly reports published on their webpage: 
Hrvatski filmski savez, <http://hfs.hr/izvjestaji.aspx> (3/2018). 
45 Branko Franceschi, “Zbirke videoumjetnosti u Hrvatskoj” [Collections of the 
Croatian video art], Život umjetnosti. Časopis za suvremena likovna zbivanja, 69, 2003, 
pp. 12.
46 Galerija Greta, Zagreb, May 2016; CZKD, Belgrade, March 2016; CZKD, 
Belgrade, November 2016; Alternative Film/Video Festival, Belgrade, December 
2016. All screenings were curated by the author of this article. Ivančić's film The 
City in the Shop Window was also shown in April 2017 in the MM Center in Zagreb, 
and the screening was curated by the Croatian film critic Višnja Vukašinović.
47 Petra Belc, “Experimental Film with a Female Signature. Short Overview of 
Selected Topics and Films", Hrvatski filmski ljetopis, 88, 2016, pp. 57-78.
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defined the exhibition as “a major cultural project”48 whose aim 
is to encompass culture, design, architecture, photography, 
theater, literature … and film, so this inclusion of Ivančić’s film 
in the exhibition segment of experimental film marks a big step 
in recovering her significance for the history of SR Croatian 
(experimental) cinema.49 
This, however, does not mean that the films of Ivančić have 
never been screened in Zagreb. According to available information, 
there have been two retrospective screenings of her work after 
her death in 1987; the first screening took place sometime in the 
late 2001 or early 2002 within the scope of a major Ciné-club 
Zagreb film retrospective,50 and the second screening occurred in 
November 2008.51 Both of these screenings took place in the Ciné-
club Zagreb, and as Vjeran Pavlinić remarked for the screening 
of 2001/2002, Ivančić was a “true discovery of this retrospective” 
but only three viewers came to see her films.52 Showing therefore 
Ivančić’s films in a wider artistic and cultural context a context 
more closely connected to the one represented by the Museum of 
Contemporary Art included different types of media/promotional 
outlets and meant not only addressing a different type of audience 
but also achieving a wider public reach.
Archival Sexism, or: What Defines a Good and Valuable 
(Yugoslav) Experimental Film
Mihovil Pansini in an interview he gave to the film critic 
Miloje Radaković said “... we talked about antifilm because ciné-
club was left without film stock, so we didn’t have the possibility 
to shoot. It’s like when a man doesn’t have a woman so he 
masturbates. So this was a kind of masturbation. It is quite an ugly 
comparison, but there is something to it” .53 While researching 
48 Muzej za umjetnost i obrt, <https://www.muo.hr/blog/2018/02/06/najava-
sezdesete-hrvatskoj-mit-stvarnost/> (3/2018).
49 The selector of the film programme is Tomislav Šakić, a Croatian film scholar 
who recently published a book (based on his PhD thesis) dedicated to modernism 
in Croatian cinema of the socialist period (Tomislav Šakić, Modernizam u hrvatskom 
igranom filmu. Nacrt tipologije, Disput, Zagreb, 2016). The book dealt prominently 
with the fiction film so the omission of Ivančić can be understandable, but the 
screenings of her films in the spring of 2016 and 2017 persuaded him to include her 
work in this exhibition (as expressed in a private conversation).
50 Vjeran Pavlinić, “Prvih sedam desetljeća kinokluba Zagreb”, <http://www.
hfs.hr/nakladnistvo_zapis_detail.aspx?sif_clanci=226#.WsuOBbw8ORs> (4/2018).
51 Cunterview.net, <http://bit.ly/2I96qrX> (3/2018).
52 Pavlinić, Prvih sedam desetljeća kinokluba Zagreb, cit.
53 “... razgovarali [smo] o antifilmu zato što je Kino-klub ostao bez vrpce, te 
mi nismo imali mogućnosti snimati. To je kao kad čovjek nema žensku pa onda 
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the archives I encountered negligence regarding female films, a 
lack of understanding or interest for their particular poetics, and I 
believe that the quote by Mihovil Pansini quite accurately depicts 
the situation in the ciné-clubs of the 1960s and 1970s, which must 
have been uneasy for women. In the conversations during my 
research I was told that back in the day women were “creating 
more than enough”54 and learned that the films of Ivančić were 
repeatedly mocked in the festivals for their “naïve lyricism” 
until the people from the film festival circuit saw her in person. 
Given the fact that she was a “nice older lady”, my interlocutor 
said “they” decided to hold themselves back from being more 
critical.55 These occasions sparked my desire for reinscribing 
women’s work in the canon of Yugoslav film avant-garde, 
subsequently guiding my judgment more by emotions and less 
by reason. Was I sufficiently objective during my research? Have 
I been unintentionally biased while analyzing Ivančić’s films?56 
Are they indeed just unconventionally amateurish, or can she be 
rightfully called an experimental film artist? 
It is hard to generalize on the quality of an entire oeuvre based 
on the knowledge of only 14 films out of the 74 Ivančić supposedly 
made, but in order to resolve my doubts I would like to compare 
her work to the work of Mladen Stilinović, and evaluate it in the 
light of texts on experimental cinema by Croatian film critics and 
scholars. This search for the ‘marks of quality’ which define the 
masturbira. Tako je i ovo bila neka vrsta masturbacije. To je dosta ružna usporedba, 
ali u njoj ima nečega”. Mihovil Pansini in Miloje Radaković (ed.), Pansini Antifilm, 
Dom kulture “Studentski grad”, Beograd, 1984, p. 30.
54 Aleksandar Erdeljanović, head of the Yugoslav Cinematheque archive in 
Belgrade. 
55 Vladimir Anđelković, president of the Center of the Serbian amateur film.
56 It is indeed hard (or even impossible?) to be ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ within 
(humanistic) sciences, especially when it comes to the question of the artistic 
judgment value. The concept of self-reflexivity has therefore been used on 
numerous occasions in order to assist or to clarify for the researcher the position 
he/she assumes within his own research material. “[R]eflexivity is self-critical 
sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self 
as researcher” wrote Kim England, professor of geography at the University of 
Washington, in her much-quoted article dealing with the feminist approach 
towards the scientific research (Cf. Kim England, “Getting Personal. Reflexivity, 
Positionality, and Feminist Research”, The Professional Geographer, 46, 1, 1994, pp. 
80-89.). The aim of the concept is to interrogate one's own position/role within 
the chain of knowledge production, by being aware of all the aspects of power 
relations that might influence the research process, and is considered to be a part of 
the feminist research methodology (cf. Nancy A. Naples, “Feminist methodology”, 
in George Ritzer (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, Blackwell Publishing, 
Malden, Oxford and Carlton, 2009, pp. 1701-1706).
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valuable SR Croatian experimental film might be considered as 
a gesture of provocation, since the field of experimental cinema 
is marked by a highly individualized authorial approach, and it 
seems as if each work has to be approached individually, from 
the singular artistic universe of that respective author. There are, 
of course, genres and modes of creation in experimental cinema 
(as would be the case with the structural or the diary film), 
but one might conclude that there exist as many typologies of 
experimental cinema as there are authors making it.57
As notable examples I will use Stilinović’s film Zidovi, kaputi, 
sjene (Walls, Coats, Shadows, 1975) and the writing of the Croatian 
film scholars, experimentalists and film critics on the question of 
self-consciousness as a positive qualitative factor in defining the 
artistic value of a film. Stilinović’s film is chosen due to the fact 
that on the level of organization of visual material it resembles 
Ivančić’s Pijesak (Sand, 1971),58 and also because Stilinović made 
only two films within the Ciné-club Zagreb (Početnica 1, 2, 3 
[Primer, 1, 2, 3] in 1973, and Traže te [They are Looking for You] 
in the same year), which once more underlines the question 
whether the CFA is dedicated to the preservation of the Croatian 
amateur (experimental) film heritage from the socialist period, or 
if its editorial politics have served other purposes. 
Walls, Coats, Shadows, Pebbles, Stones and Sand
Stilinović’s films are undoubtedly significant in the context of 
Yugoslav experimental cinema. But why is Stilinović, with only 
two films made within the Ciné-club Zagreb, considered more 
57 Cf. Peter Gidal, Structural Film Anthology, British Film Institute, London, 
1976; Hrvoje Turković, “Što je to eksperimentalni film”, in Filmske sveske, 4, 1981; 
Catherine Russell, Experimental Etnography, Duke University Press, Durham, 
1999; Malcolm Le Grice, Experimental Cinema in the Digital Age, British Film 
Institute, London, 2001; P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film. The American Avant-Garde 
1943-2000, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002; Hrvoje Turković, “Što je 
eksperimentalni (avangardni, alternativni) film?”, Zapis. Bilten Hrvatskog filmskog 
saveza, 38, 2002; Nicole Brenez, “Cinémas d'avant-garde“, Cahiers du cinéma, 
Paris, 2007; Dominique Noguez, Eloge du cinéma expérimental, Paris expérimental, 
Paris, 2010; Pavle Levi, Cinema by Other Means, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2012; A. L. Rees, Povijest eksperimentalnog filma i videa, 25 FPS, Zagreb, 2016.
58 The documentation on the films of Tatjana Ivančić from the Film Archive 
of the Croatian state archive dates this film to 1975, however I decided to use the 
date from the Ciné-club Zagreb monograph. The monograph has been published 
in 2003, while the dating from the Film Archive to my present knowledge relies 
upon the information from the book by Vjekoslav Majcen which was published in 
1994. Cf. Vjekoslav Majcen, Filmska i video zbirka Hrvatskog filmskog saveza, Hrvatski 
filmski savez, Zagreb, 1994. 
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Fig. 1: 
Mladen Stilinović, 
Walls, Coats, Shadows, 
1975, 8mm. Printed 




Walls, Coats, Shadows, 
1975, 8mm. Printed 
with kind permission of 
Branka Stipančić. 
significant than Tatjana Ivančić, with her 74 films made in that 
same ciné-club? Let us take a close comparative look at two of 
their films. Walls, Coats and Shadows (1975, 6’40’’, silent) consists 
of three major visual units; the first one is made up of close ups 
of different textures, presumably the surfaces of the city walls. 
Hence the first name in the title of the film the walls (Fig. 1). 
The second unit consists of different shots of passers-by, more 
precisely the medium shots of their coats (Fig. 2). Hence the 
second name in the title of the film the coats. The last, third unit, 
consists of the medium shots of the public walls and the shadows 
of the passers-by, which move across them. Hence the third name 
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The film Sand by Tatjana Ivančić (1971, 3’30’’) opens with a 
close up of a small crab moving swiftly under the surface of the 
sea, followed by an intertitle which announces the name of the 
movie. Music which sets the atmosphere for the work is Debussy’s 
Première rhapsodie (1910) and the camera focuses on the interplay 
of the waves and the refractions of light in the shallow shores of a 
sandy Mediterranean beach (Fig. 4). The underlying motif of this 
play of textures is the sand, and the film culminates with a musical 
crescendo and a dynamically edited succession of the shots of 
sand and stones (Fig. 5), gradually moving away from the fine 
grains of sand, gliding over somewhat bigger pebbles, and finally 
finishing with the close up of the rocky wall (Fig. 6), presumably 




Sand, 1971, S8mm. 
Courtesy of Aleksandar 





Walls, Coats, Shadows, 
1975, 8mm. Printed 
with kind permission of 
Branka Stipančić.
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Fig. 5: 
Tatjana Ivančić, 
Sand, 1971, S8mm. 
Courtesy of Aleksandar 





Sand, 1971, S8mm. 
Courtesy of Aleksandar 





According to the monograph of the Ciné-club Zagreb, Sand was 
made in 1971, four years before Stilinović’s Walls, Coats, Shadows, 
and we might conclude that they bear a structural resemblance. 
They both engage with surfaces and their textures, and on the 
whole they both operate on the level of conceptual structuration 
of the visual material. Both films carry the visual subject matter 
in their title and visually focus on that particular motif Stilinović 
engages with the shots of walls, coats and shadows, while Ivančić 
focuses on the sand. However, the breadth of meaning which 
they offer seems to be significantly different. In this particular 
case Stilinović keeps the meaning of the film harnessed to the 
purely visual level − the level of wit and play-on-images, which 
are characteristic traits of his authorial poetics throughout other 
media as well.
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His visual pun thus remains only on the level of the form 
through which he points the viewers’ attention towards the textures 
of the surfaces gradually informed by the shadows of the passers-
by. Ana Janevski considers this film to be in an ironic relation to 
the idea of the structural film,59 while Hrvoje Turković primarily 
accentuates the rhytmization of the visual material as the main 
quality of Stilinović’s Walls, Coats, Shadows.60 It seems as if Ivančić, 
on the other hand, aims at conveying something that bears the 
conceptualization of a bigger philosophical scope − that of the 
change in the nature of things themselves. In Stilinović’s film we see 
authorial wit paired with geometrical compositions and formalistic 
concepts of repetition based on the similar visual material, while 
Ivančić, besides the engagement with the formal levels of surfaces 
and the exploration of textures, recounts of sand, pebbles and stones 
stemming from rocks, indicating a unity which eludes our vision 
distorted by the fragmented appearance of things. On the verbal 
level of the title, Stilinović frames his film almost tautologically − 
Walls, Coats, Shadows, while Ivančić extrapolates the smallest unit of 
her motif and turns it into a simple yet all-encompassing sign: Sand. 
Given the fact that Stilinović generally continued on the 
materialist experiments of the GEFF circle,61 and admired the 
authors such as Pansini, Petek, and Gotovac,62 it is possible to 
conclude that his poetics fits perfectly within the modernist 
material-oriented narrative, privileging formal and media 
experiments over work which perhaps needs a more attentive and 
nuanced approach.
Authorial Self-Consciousness?
While reading the texts on SR Croatian experimental filmmakers, 
I noticed a recurring remark regarding intentionality and self-
conscious filmmaking as indicators of a valuable work.“ Yugoslav 
cinema of the 1920s (but later as well) does not correspond to the 
global experimental movement neither in terms of production nor 
cinematic/filmic self-consciousness”63 wrote film researcher Vanja 
59 Ana Janevski, “If you know exactly what avant-garde is and how to name it, it 
probably isn't very avant-garde, right? On the experimental films of Mladen Stilinović”, 
in Diana Nenadić (eds.), Mladen Stilinović, Primer 1, 2, 3, Experimental Films and Videos, 
1971-2006, DVD booklet, Croatian Film Association, Zagreb, 2012, p. 18. 
60 Ivi, p. 9.
61 Ibid.
62 Ivi, p. 18.
63 “U jugoslavenskom filmu 1920-ih (ali i kasnije), ne može se svjedočiti o nečemu 
što je proizvodno/filmski samosvjesno, identično svjetskom eksperimentalnom 
pokretu”. Vanja Obad, "Kratki prilog povijesti prve jugoslavenske filmske 
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Obad in his text on the early Yugoslav film avant-garde (emphasis 
added). “Although it is not an anthological work, Žemska/Gal [a 
film by Dunja Ivanišević] will play its part in the writing of the 
history of cinema in Split at least as a curiosity. It has already served 
to gender activists as an example of female self-conscious film with a 
Dalmatian domicile”64 concluded film critic Diana Nenadić in the 
monograph of the Ciné-club Split (emphasis added). “Of avant-
garde in Croatia in the second sense − of a tendency-movement − 
we can fully discuss only the period of the neo-avant-garde, that 
is the ‘second filmic avant-garde’. That period − end of the 1950s 
and especially the 1960s − is an era of a self-conscious appearance of 
‘experimental film’ in Croatia ... and here we also refer to it as the 
‘geff-period’”,65 stated film scholar Hrvoje Turković in his essay on 
the experimental film and video from SR Croatia (my emphasis). 
“In that work [by Vladimir Petek] there are no formal or theoretical 
points of contact with [Norman] McLaren, not in the first phase of 
transitory, undocumented films, nor later. Petek wasn’t working 
intentionally, but psychophysically”66 remarked Mihovil Pansini in the 
Ciné-club Zagreb monograph (emphasis added). 
If self-consciousness is an indicator of the significance of a 
film or a filmic movement, as these quotations seem to suggest, 
then why are the films of Vladimir Petek,67 who, according to 
avangarde", Hrvatski filmski ljetopis, 75, 2013, p. 9.
64 Diana Nenadić, “Splitska škola između klupske i osobnhih mitologija/'Split 
School' between club and personal mythology”, in Fradelić, Splitska škola filma–60 
godina, cit., p. 86.
65 “O avangardi u drugome smislu − pokreta tendencije − može se u Hrvatskoj 
govoriti s punim pravom tek u razdoblju neoavangarde, odnosno filmske ‘druge 
avangarde’. To je razdoblje − kraj pedesetih i osobito šezdesete godine − doba 
samosvjesne pojave ‘eskeprimentalnog filma’ u Hrvatskoj ... a o njemu se u nas još 
govori kao o ‘gefovskom razdoblju’”. Hrvoje Turković, “Hrvatski eksperimentalni 
film šezdesetih i videoumjetnost sedamdesetih kao avangardno krilo modernizma” 
[Croatian experimental film in the sixties and videoart in the seventies as an avant-
guarde wings of modernism], Academia.edu, <http://bit.ly/2GpLOv7> (3/2018).
66 “U tom radu nema nikakvih formalnih ni teorijskih dodira s McLarenom, 
ni u toj prvoj fazi prolaznih, nezabilježenih filmova, niti kasnije. Petek nije radio 
intencionalno, nego psihofizički”. Pansini, Pet razdoblja Kinokluba Zagreb cit., p. 7.
67 In the entire CFA’s textual and DVD production dedicated to the topic of 
SR CroatiIn the entire CFA’s textual and DVD production dedicated to the topic 
of SR Croatian experimental cinema, Vladimir Petek is represented with only one 
film (Encounters, 1963, on the DVD Early experimental film and video art in SR Croatia 
[2007]) and the monograph written Đorđe Janjatović (Vladimir Petek, Hrvatski 
filmski savez, 2001). Petek officially made 24 films within the frame of the Ciné-
club Zagreb, and his ouvre is tremendously important for the SR Croatian and 
Yugoslav experimental cinema. He made some of the first material experiments in 
the medium of film in the Yugoslav (and possibly international) context, and is one 
of the most exciting and prolific experimentalists of the 1960s, with his activities 
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his colleague Pansini, did not possess this level of self-conscious 
intention, omnipresent in the overviews of Croatian experimental 
film from the socialist period? We could easily claim that, according 
to an interview Ivančić gave to the film magazine Sineast68 in 
which she displays extreme awareness of the technical aspects 
of the medium of film, her work undoubtedly bears a high level 
of self-conscious filmmaking. Why has that not been enough to 
include her work in the overviews of the SR Croatian or Yugoslav 
experimental cinema? The interview which her son Aleksandar 
Ivančić gave to the authors of a documentary (unfinished at the 
time of this article’s submission) on the history of the Ciné-club 
Zagreb elucidates the position of Ivančić within the ciné-club circle.
She was quite often being awarded, and the people who had 
pretensions to become filmmakers … there was a certain amount 
of jealousy. .... But I know she had a lot of problems with her 
position in this amateur film because she was of course a woman, 
but her style was different from the style that was probably trendy 
back then, so I think she was never accepted as an equal member 
in the Ciné-club Zagreb, because these members had completely 
different pretensions and ideas and I think that she even got her 
own ciné-club made especially for her, Ciné-club Studio ... but 
precisely due to these bad relationships she worked within the 
Ciné-club Studio in the last phase of her activity.69
Besides the fact that her films obviously did not fit the 
preconceptions of experimental films of the 1960s and the 1970s, 
as has been confirmed by Aleksandar Ivančić, it seems as if Tatjana 
Ivančić’s ciné-club colleagues had a hard time dealing with the fact 
that she was not only creatively independent but also successful in 
the amateur film circle.
spanning well into the 1990s. Petek is chosen as an example of an author whose 
work is almost without exception included in the programmes showcasing SR 
Croatian experimental cinema in an international context, yet he still does not have 
a monographic DVD, while his work according to his contemporaries fails to meet 
the (necessary) standards of self-conscious creating.
68 Tatjana Ivančić in Bojko, Vratiti žanrove, cit., p. 274.
69 ”Ona je često dobivala nagrade a ljudi koji su imali pretenzije da postanu 
filmaši zapravo su .... postojala je jedna ljubomora određena. ... Ali znam da je 
imala dosta problema sa svojom pozicijom unutar tog amaterskog filma jer je 
bila naravno žena, ali i njezin stil je bio drugačiji od stila koji je tada valjda bio 
u trendu, pa mislim da ona u Kino klubu Zagreb nikad nije bila prihvaćena kao 
ravnopravni član, jer su ti članovi imali potpuno druge pretenzije i ideje i mislim 
da je zbog nje osnovan čak klub koji se zvao Kino klub Studio ... ali upravo zbog 
takvih relativno loših odnosa je djelovala u zadnje vrijeme svoje aktivnosti kroz taj 
kino klub Studio”. Aleksandar Ivančić, unpublished transcript, n/a. 
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Disrupting Historicity by “Lost and Found Scholarship”
In her text “Women’s Art. A Manifesto” Austrian experimental 
filmmaker VALIE EXPORT wrote the following (opening and 
closing) words: “THE HISTORY OF WOMAN IS THE HISTORY 
OF MAN. .... THE FUTURE OF WOMEN WILL BE THE HISTORY 
OF WOMAN”.70 In this short, sharp, and direct programmatic 
text she argues against the normative image of woman, which has 
been created and perpetuated by men, and invites women to take 
control over the media “as a means of social struggle and social 
progress”71 in order to reassess and revise these traditional (male, 
artistic) values. EXPORT wants women to inscribe and insert 
themselves, along with their personal artistic visions of the world 
and themselves, and in any chosen media into the existing cultural 
and social order, and reclaim these preconceived normative spaces 
of creation. It seems as if Tatjana Ivančić, uncompromisingly 
following her authorial vision and persisting in her unorthodox 
poetics, managed to do precisely what VALIE EXPORT asked 
for at the time. However, although her films were undoubtedly 
noticed in the 1970s, the present institutional position of her work 
has caused it to become invisible for the international audience. By 
perpetuating the dominant male values and norms of the 1960s and 
1970s experimental cinema, Croatian Film Association continued to 
privilege male authorship and male authorial poetics, which it now 
seemingly differ from what Ivančić was trying to do in her work. 
Since we live in a thoroughly institutionalised system, uncovering 
the institutional blind spots and misguiding information was a 
necessary first step in the attempt to recover women’s experimental 
film history of the 1970s Yugoslavia. But considering the fact that 
the artwork in question was film what needs to be done in order to 
efficiently disrupt the unimpeded flow of history? 
As it has already been mentioned, the films of Tatjana Ivančić 
were shown in an (independently run) art gallery in Zagreb, 
in May 2016. Several film critics and film scholars attended the 
screening, wrote favorably of her work,72 and it wasn’t long before 
70 VALIE EXPORT, “Women’s Art. A Manifesto”, in Kristine Stiles and Peter 
Selz (eds.), Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art. A Sourcebook of Artists’ 
Writings, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, p. 755.
71 Ibid.
72 Damir Radić, “Ženski spol i alternativni pol”, <https://www.portalnovosti.
com/enski-spol-i-alternativni-pol> (4/2018); Ejla Kovačević, “Eksperimentatorice 
u jugoslavenskom alternativnom filmu”, <https://bit.ly/2KatxmP> (4/2018); Sonja 
Leboš, “Jugoslavenske eksperimentatorice izlaze iz sjene”, <https://bit.ly/2qTdO3I> 
(4/2018). 
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her films began a small regional tour. In 2018 one of her films, 
The City in the Shop Window (1969), was shown in the Museum of 
Arts and Crafts in Zagreb, as a part of a large exhibition dedicated 
to the important artistic and cultural achievements of Croatian 
modernism from the Yugoslav period. 
Taking care of a film collection therefore means keeping it 
constantly alive and active; films which remain closed in DVD 
boxes or left forgotten on archival shelves will continue to remain 
invisible. Taking care of women’s intellectual and artistic legacy 
implicates incessant struggle against dominant narratives and 
tireless promotion of differences. That is the reason why Jennifer 
Baumgardner and Amy Richards in their Third Wave Manifesta 
insisted on the “access to our intellectual feminist legacy and 
women’s history; ... and to have women’s history taught to men as 
well as women as a part of all curricula”.73 Disrupting historicity for 
Tatjana Ivančić meant confronting the Present with a Difference, 
while disrupting historicity in my case meant extracting that (now 
historical) Difference from its institutional archival tomb and 
confronting the dominant narratives by repeating and explaining 
it. As Griselda Pollock astutely remarked, to merely insist on the 
corrections of the existing canons is not sufficient: ”[w]e need 
to challenge the entire apparatus and its underlying ideological 
function that distorts all of our understandings of who we are 
and who we can be”.74 This might be precisely what American 
film scholar Lauren Rabinovitz defined as the ‘lost - and - found 
scholarship‘75, that is, the work on women’s artistic legacy by 
which we are at the same time ”refashioning film theory and 
historiography”.76 
As it seems, feminism became a fashionable mainstream.77 
Using this heightened mainstream interest in all things female 
as an opportunity to both theoretically and historiographically 
promote women’s cinematic legacy obviously can make a change, 
but whether this change will last and what impact it might have 
when the it moment of feminism passes still remains to be seen.
73 Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, “Manifesta. Young Women, 
Feminism, and the Future”, in Freedman, The Essential Feminist Reader, p. 425.
74 Pollock, A Lonely Preface, cit., p. xxvii.
75 Lauren Rabinovitz, “The Future of Feminism and Film History”, Camera 
Obscura, 21, 1, 2006, p. 42.
76 Ibid. 
77 Cleo Levin, ”Feminism Is the Latest High-Fashion Trend”, <https://slate.
me/2ls6l9O> (4/18); Selene Oliva, “The New Feminism Choose Fashion to 
Communicate”, <https://bit.ly/2K6Dhyu> (4/2018); Madeline Fry, ”Feminism Is in 
Fashion, but It’s a Questionable Style”, <https://bit.ly/2K7sa8w> (4/2018).
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Bitch Better Have My Money: Female 




This paper intends to propose an analysis of the connection 
between (hyper)sexualisation, (pseudo)feminism, and aggression in 
contemporary mainstream pop music made by and for women. It reads 
the implications and potential repercussions that these discourses have 
in regard to their vast young fan base, questioning what the political 
significance of such a commodified version of feminism might be, and 
whether it can lead to substantial changes in perception and culture. 
The main question is whether and in what way the mass feminism of 
contemporary young generations will prove to be a mode of a feminist 
reclaiming of the future. 
 
SIDE A
Track 1: Intro 
In order to write on this topic,1 I must deal with an intellectual/
emotional clash similar to the one that Susan Sontag describes 
when opening her notes on Camp one is strongly drawn to 
it as much as offended by it: “That is why I want to talk about 
it, and why I can. For no one who wholeheartedly shares in 
a given sensibility can analyse it; he can only, whatever his 
intention, exhibit it. To name a sensibility, to draw its contours 
and to recount its history, requires a deep sympathy modified by 
1 This article was written at the beginning of 2017, and references recent events 
that happened following the 2016 American presidential elections. 
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revulsion”.2 When it comes to pop music, I can say the same; that 
exact mixture of attraction and indignation is the reason why I 
want to talk about it, why I can, and why, in a way, I must. If I 
look back at the beginning of my academic career, when my first 
contacts and interests concerning art and feminism began, I find 
out that what has shaped me most is popular culture, especially 
music. It seems to me that I will never again be in such a unique 
position that is close enough to the youth culture I want to discuss, 
as well as far enough from it. I am writing about the millennial 
audience, raised with social media and Internet; a public with a 
short attention span, used to scrolling instead of reading, watching 
TV shows rather than movies, dividing concentration between a 
large number of simultaneously opened tabs, at the same time 
oddly nostalgic of artefacts dating a not-so-distant past, which 
they now declare vintage. Even if, in these circles, there is much 
talk about feminism, and it seems to be cultivating an interest 
in topics and views related to it, the question to answer is how 
feminism is re/presented and perceived, and, given the input of 
young generations today, what kind of future awaits it.
Track 2: Girls Just Wanna have Fun-damental Human 
Rights 
The first cassette I ever bought growing up was one by Spice 
Girls (1996), a British group whose poetics is based on the concept 
of female friendship and girl power,3 before moving on to Britney 
Spears (1999), with her Republican-Christian roots and music 
obsessed with heterosexual love relationships, presented as if they 
were at the core of personal identity and worth. Spears’ individual 
sexual revolution happened in her third album (simply titled 
Britney), where she entered the adult world dominated by the 
male gaze, as the sexual object par excellence. Her transition into 
adulthood was basically from a Catholic schoolgirl/barely legal/
soft porn image to a fully grown (meaning, fully sexual) young 
woman; the transition hit was called Slave 4 U (sic!). At the same 
2 Susan Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp’”, 1964, p. 1. See <https://monoskop.org/
images/5/59/Sontag_Susan_1964_Notes_on_Camp.pdf> (01/2017). See also Tim 
Souster, “Notes on Pop Music”, Tempo, 87, 1968-1969, pp. 2-6. 
3 It is worth noting that Spice Girls were an important moment in the 
constitution of the market for young girls as we know it today, since they were 
the first all-girl global sensation that induced public hysteria in the way solely 
male performers had done up until then. Also, the introduction of an idea of 
female gangs, based on solidarity and sisterhood that is much more important 
than romantic interests (as well as a pallette of possible identities to choose from), 
was a big breakthrough in popular culture by women for women-in-the-making. 
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time came Destiny’s Child and Alicia Keys; at eleven years old, I 
was hypnotised by their album titles, Independent Women, Survivor 
and A Woman’s Worth. For a while, in elementary school, I would 
proclaim myself a feminist, having in mind images of strong, 
tough, superhero-like women, something along the lines of the 
re-made Charlie’s Angels. I was not really concerned with the fact 
that these women were called angels (ethereal, one-dimensional, 
inherently sidekick creatures) but with the fact that they were, 
indeed, Charlie’s. 
My adolescence was, on the other hand, mostly defined by 
an alternative music in which I found refuge from conventional 
femininity, yet along a topos that (I only later perceived and 
questioned) was male-dominated, where female performers 
represented an exception rather than the rule. In that respect, 
it was not exactly an alternative cosmos. It seemed that pop 
music, in its narrower sense, made place for femininity only in 
a controlled, restricted and conventional form, which enforced 
in girls who were searching for another environment, aesthetic 
and worldview, the perception that pop was, at the same time, 
feminine (girlie) as well as low quality, non-intellectual, lacking 
provocation and inspiration for those with intellectual ambitions. 
I would claim that it was forming a subtle interiorised misogyny, 
instilling in those girls a kind of pop/feminine/apolitical/banal 
vs. alt/masculine/political/ intellectual dichotomy. The presence 
of few role models such as Kim Gordon, Siouxie Sioux, PJ 
Harvey, and Patti Smith, in my case only strengthened the idea 
that truly powerful women artists, questioning conventional 
femininity, de-constructing and re-constructing it in their terms, 
were only exceptions to the patriarchal rule. Any kind of feminist 
engagement, solidarity, the feeling of collective experiences to be 
established, shared and questioned among women, was simply 
not possible. Still, there was a subversive element to these acts; 
the music was loud by definition, a sound full of distortions and 
subversive lyrics, which also opened the gateway for me to female 
aggression expressed in ways that I had been taught were not 
appropriate or acceptable. It was only when much older that I 
grasped the subversive importance of these artists. Female voices 
making specifically female stories audible (with their implicit or 
explicit political dimension) were appearing in music with the 
evolution of alternative artists, peaking in the nineties with the 
feminist punk movement called riot grrrl. These predominantly 
female bands welcomed interaction between female artists in a 
male-dominated scene that felt very unwelcoming to women; they 
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spoke of sexuality, female aggression,4 sexual violence, domestic 
abuse and rape, and patriarchal pressure in general; they spoke 
in anarchist, anti-capitalistic and anti-consumeristic terms. They 
opposed racism, homophobia and ableism, problematising class 
issues not only artistically but also in DIY publications, political 
pamphlets and conventions in which these issues were freely 
discussed.5 It is more than symptomatic that soon the movement 
crumbled under media hyper-exposure and manipulation; 
mainstream producers found commercial potential in some 
aspects of the movement, and so the riot grrrl’s girl power became 
the slogan of the hardly feministic commercial product Spice 
Girls (to the initial founders’ frustration, as they deemed that no 
commercially driven artist could be truly representative of their 
subversive idea(l)s). 
Track 3: Mediating Women’s Experience 
It is interesting that Kathleen Hanna, one of the initiators of 
riot grrrl and singer for Bikini Kill, stresses media misconceptions 
and pressure as a key factor in the decomposition of the 
movement. Their aims and methods were based on anarchist 
direct action and free interpersonal information flow, which 
could not survive in contemporary mass media culture. What 
was especially traumatic was that the media representation 
of their work focused on the content of some of their songs, 
choosing to interpret them as reactions of ‘sexually abused and 
disturbed young women’, as opposed to their programmatic 
intention to voice collective experiences that all women could 
relate to.6 Riot grrrl communicated through handmade fanzines 
4 Dana Crowley Jack, Behind the Mask. Destruction and Creativity in Women's 
Aggression, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 
5 “For more and more subcultures (youth or otherwise), the ability to intertwine 
politics and style is a risky and necessary tactic in cultural-historical period 
marked by the ‘logic of late capitalism’ in which the commodification of resistance 
is a hegemonic strategy. The hybrid political texts and distribution networks 
produced by feminists like Riot Grrrls are significant in the formation of Third 
Wave movement cultures; they are both ‘popular’ and subcultural, they provide 
spaces for youth-controlled conversations, and they can operate as an interface 
between different Third Wave cohorts (they connect Riot Grrrls to one another 
but also to other feminists and women)”. Ednie Kaeh Garrison, “U.S. Feminism-
Grrrl Style! Youth (Sub)Cultures and the Technologics of the Third Wave”, Feminist 
Studies, 26, 1, 2000, pp. 141-170. 
6 Forcibly reading women's art as autobiographical, especially when it speaks 
of various traumas, is one of many modes of neutralising the potential power of 
those artists' voices, their call to share feeling and experiences, questioning of 
women's daily experience with patriarchal micro-fascism, making it visible. By 
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that were distributed hand-to-hand.7 They organized multi-
media events, often including round tables and discussions on 
various feminist topics, as well as open mics for women to share 
their thoughts, experiences, poetry or music, and acts of political 
activism. Today fanzines paradoxically exist online, many of 
them specifically concerned with feminist content, alongside 
blogs, web portals and social networks. The network community 
is broadening, also developing its rhetoric, gaining more and 
more importance, its potential being explored and used in 
journalism, advertisement, propaganda and art. For the first 
time ever, thanks to Twitter and Instagram, there is a virtual/real 
space in which public figures communicate with their audience, 
increasing the illusion of knowing one’s pop icon. More than 
ever, through artificially manufactured social media personas 
and avatars, everyone feels as if they are both intimately close 
and chillingly isolated. 
In the past year I have been working in a non-profit artistic 
association as production assistant (my main task being social 
media management), and writer for the online edition of a well-
known women’s magazine. Every organisation that wishes to 
communicate with a broader audience needs Internet sites as 
well as Facebook pages, Instagram profiles and Twitter accounts, 
that need to be updated several times a day, and where the only 
imperative you are given is: You need clicks. This means you need 
attractive headlines, the newest information found on other social 
media, popular names and peeks into the personal lives of the 
rich and famous. Most of the news is simply sensationalised 
social network content; no research is needed; everything has to 
be produced and consumed at an extremely fast rate. 
We have to acknowledge that this condition both reflects 
and generates new modes of communication and perception; 
everything is being processed and recycled so quickly that any 
feeling of personal responsibility for what is being said, is erased 
just as fast. On a more positive note, and although there is a great 
deal of manipulation in play, the plurality of voices has never 
been more overt and obvious, and, interestingly, talk on feminist, 
racial and LGBTQIA+ issues, is omnipresent, as if everything 
appearing in the public space has to pass through those filters. 
reducing the significance of this type of artistic work to an individual case, the 
(hostile) public is reducing subversive and activist potential the art could have. 
Riot grrrl bands were also represented as man-hating, unfeminine, and delusional. 
7 Michelle Comstock, “Grrrl Zine Networks. Re-Composing Spaces of 
Authority, Gender, and Culture”, JAC , 21, 2, 2001, pp. 383-409.
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SIDE B
Track 4: Aggressive Erotica 
It is difficult to challenge patriarchal (mis)conceptions of 
women without extensively dealing with the perception and 
representation of female sexuality. When it comes to its presence 
in mainstream popular music, we can extract several gendered 
possibilities: a) idealised women to be worshipped in male 
discourse (in a Platonic, Petrarchesque manner); b) women in love 
(in an early Britney Spears kind of way, as she sings I was born to 
make you happy); c) heartbroken women (in another early Britney 
Spears kind of way, as she sings that her loneliness is killing her); 
d) nameless women used as exclusively sexual objects or props 
in male hip-hop culture (serving as an important indicator of the 
alpha male position of power); e) scorned, angry and vengeful, 
women (a version of the demonised witch or succubus). 
Female alternative musicians have always been heavily preoccupied 
with sexuality, heterosexual and queer, reclaiming the discourse 
they felt had been exclusively reserved for men. They position 
themselves as active sexual beings, distinct from the pornographic 
blow-up dolls plaguing the mainstream pop scene. Similarly, by 
inhabiting an active position and becoming the sexual subject, as 
opposed to an object of (male) desire, a significant number of female 
pop icons recently have taken a feminist stand for themselves. 
At least, many of them claim so. While the aforementioned punk 
feminists significantly underlined their refusal to be seen as sex 
symbols,8 pop music feminists are embracing the same imagery, 
presumably ‘on their own terms’, in order to refuse to disappear 
into a symbol of and permanently remain linked to sex. Moreover, 
their sexuality is being expressed more aggressively than ever, the 
gaze violently turned back to voyeurs.
However, many feminists stress the importance of acknowledging 
the need to draw critical distinctions between feminist refusal 
of patriarchal discourse, and performances circulating the signs 
of refusal, while actually expressing complicity with patriarchal 
discourse. The list of contemporary female pop musicians that could 
fall into this description is long. For instance, one could devote pages 
to Lady Gaga’s overt sexuality that, at one moment, turned into 
explicit LGBTQ advocacy, exploring sexual fantasies and perversions 
8 Charles Shaar Murray, “No pop, No Style, Poly Styrene is Still Strictly Roots”, 
Web Archive, <https://web.archive.org/web/20091027102504/http://www.geocities.
com/vintageinterviews/xrayspex.html> (01/2017).
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in an artistically as well as politically self-conscious, neo-avant-garde 
way.9 As a seemingly less complex author, Nicki Minaj has received 
much attention with her hit song Anaconda and the sexualised video 
released along with it. As one in a relatively long list of odes to 
her own body, sexuality, and, especially, her ‘behind’, Anaconda is 
interesting in that it uses and parodies a hit song from 1992, by a 
Sir Mix-a-Lot, entitled Baby Got Back, charmingly subtitled: I Like Big 
Butts. The original song uses, as leitmotiv, the verse “My anaconda 
don’t want none unless you’ve got buns, hun”, which Nicki cites, 
cuts and subverts.10 This postmodernist parody technique, along 
with brutally ironic lyrics that place men in objectified positions, 
makes the song much more than just another sexy pop song. 
Obviously, in addressing feminism in pop music, one cannot 
overlook the institution named Beyoncé, who extensively uses 
postmodernist11 techniques, especially in her recent work; 
playing with autobiography, teasing the audience peeping into 
her personal life, as well as quoting her earlier work, sampling 
existing songs, collaborating with artists in various media, 
collaging political speeches and documentary video footage, 
making elaborate and complex products such as her HBO movie-
album Lemonade, praised as the peak of contemporary popular 
music as well as an overtly political statement connected to pro-
sex black feminism (for a critique of its political value, see hooks, 
2016). Nigerian writer and feminist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, 
the author of the TED talk turned into the short book entitled We 
Should All Be Feminists,12 was sampled in Beyoncé’s song Flawless. 
9 Lady Gaga has also spoken publicly of her experience of rape that happened 
early in her career, revealing the very vulnerable position many young women 
face when starting their professional life, be it celebrity life or not. As a matter of 
fact, many women of the entertainment industry have spoken out about surviving 
sexual assaults in the wake of the recent presidential election in USA, to which I 
will devote some space later in this article, although the #metoo movement and 
TimesUp initiative will peak later in 2017, and continue to grow through 2018. 
10 Both songs, Sir Mix-a-lot's as well as Nicki's, are also significant as celebrations 
of the curvy body shape, which is linked to the African-American body-aesthetic, 
as opposed to the skinny white girl ideal in dominant culture. This is a topic in itself 
that has been and still is present in black feminist criticism, which I am not nearly 
equipped to tackle. However, I do believe it to be quite important to have in mind 
that many of the contemporary pop artists I am talking about here are quite self-
consciously representing more than one marginalised group and many of them 
problematise racial issues in various ways and extents. 
11 For other examples of postmodern poetics in pop music, see Tony 
Mitchell, “Performance and the Postmodern in Pop Music”, Theatre Journal, 41, 3, 
[Performance in Context], 1989, pp. 273-293.
12 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, We Should All Be Feminists, Fourth Estate, 
London, 2014.
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When interviewed, Adichie vaguely and reluctantly commented: 
“Anything that gets young people talking about feminism is a 
very good thing”. Later, responding to the critiques of Beyoncé’s 
feminist credentials, the writer asserted that “Whoever says 
they’re feminist is bloody feminist”.13 On the other hand, bell 
hooks is less inclusive when stating that, though she appreciates 
some of Beyoncé’s work, the overtly sexualised songs and videos 
(such as Partition) remain “part of the tropes of the existing, 
imperialist, white supremacist, patriarchal capitalist structure of 
female sexuality”.14 
It is difficult to find space for the expression of female sexuality 
that avoids reiterating exploitative tropes, and not only those since 
women are systematically and exclusively exposed to patriarchal 
(imperialist, white supremacist, capitalist) views on female 
sexuality. Imagining and implementing an alternative to these 
concepts is the all-encompassing task of an entire civilisation. 
However, it is important to take into account the socially and 
historically determined givens of the world as we know it, those 
that form the psychological basis for sexual affinities, appetites, 
as well as perversions (in the psychoanalytical, morally neutral 
sense of the word) as the result of the (affirmative or negative) 
interiorisation of socially constructed assumptions. Much talk 
could be devoted to the myth of female masochism, and the way it 
is introduced into various discourses, especially of art and culture. 
In this sense, I find interesting the work of FKA Twigs, a schooled 
dancer only recently turned into a singer, who devotes most of 
her songs to the body (not surprisingly, since her life has been 
devoted to exploring bodily expressions) and to (heterosexual) 
sex. The way she treats this topic is quite different in regard to the 
aforementioned trends. She often uses the motive of the male gaze, 
in order to re-frame it; she often embodies the masochistic fantasy, 
but it is her own fantasy, where she constitutes the masochistic/
submissive sexual position as part of a balanced dynamic between 
13 Danielle Britni, “Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie Defends Beyoncé: ‘Whoever 
Says They’re Feminist is Bloody Feminist’”, Clutch Magazine, <http://www.
clutchmagonline.com/2014/03/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-defends-beyonce-asks-
shouldnt-women-sexuality/> (01/2017.) Relatively recently, Adichie admitted that 
she was reluctant to comment on her part in Queen Bey’s song and video because 
she felt uncomfortable with the attention it has gotten her. She also felt that 
Beyoncé’s feminism was different from her own feminism in that Bey “gives quite 
a lot of space to the necessity of men”. It seems that if we are all to be feminists, it is 
possible that everyone will develop his/her own personal feminism.
14 Kat Stoeffel, “bell hooks Was Bored by ‘Anaconda’”, The Cut, <http://nymag.
com/thecut/2014/10/bell-hooks-was-bored-by-anaconda.html>, (01/2017).
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partners, fully empowered and empowering as well as sensual 
and erotic.15 Labelled with an odd generic determination, avant-
pop, FKA places herself on the margins of pop, programmatically 
concerned with setting an opposition to what she deems crude 
porn-like aggressive displays of sexual relationships.16 
Track 5: Eroticised Aggression 
A very different artist, Rihanna, entered the pop realm with 
typical dancy pop songs of love and having fun. The first twist 
to her persona was made with the album Good Girl Gone Bad in 
which the songs have explicit sexual allusions, opening up space 
for female aggression, and continuing to even more explicit 
content in songs such as Rude Boy and S&M. Her inhabiting of the 
presumed masochistic female position in the sexual relationship is 
active, aggressive and unapologetic. There is nothing submissive 
in the way she proclaims her masochistic sexual preferences, 
or anything else for that matter. Years before, she found herself 
in an abusive relationship with a pop star, which escalated (at 
least once) to extreme physical violence. Photos of her abused 
body were leaked to the press as she became the poster child 
for domestic abuse, as well as the butt of all politically incorrect 
jokes on violence against women. Riot grrrl bands devoted much 
space to violence against women, all kinds of abuse, as well as 
patriarchal micro-fascism, which are not topics that easily fly in 
pop, given their unattractiveness for a public in search of easy 
entertainment. Still, Rihanna issued multiple songs on abusive 
relationships, female rage and vengeance against the abuser 
(especially in Man Down), all of which became hits, followed by 
public attention and discussion.17 Female aggression, rage and 
riot, present in alternative music, have slipped into pop, instantly 
perceived in the public eye as feminist, as if feminism is inherent to 
15 Daisy Jones “Why ‘M3LL155X’ is FKA twigs’ strongest feminist statement”, 
Dazed and Confused, <http://www.dazeddigital.com/music/article/25916/1/why-
m3ll155x-is-fka-twigs-strongest-feminist-statement> (01/2017); Watson, Stephanie, 
“The Surreal and Startling Power of FKA Twigs”, Bitch Media, 2015, <https://
bitchmedia.org/article/surreal-and-startling-power-fka-twigs> (01/2017).
16 Liz Ryerson, “Away From Being Told Who I Am: on FKA twigs, double-
standards of online pop feminism, and transcendent art”, Medium, <https://
medium.com/@ellaguro/away-from-being-told-who-i-am-f38fbc3fa9db#.
xuabjsyha> (01/2017). 
17 I must mention that the extent and overall relevance of this public discussion 
is quite limited, but I still find it an interesting moment, especially since Rihanna 
embraced the interest the public has given her trauma and responded with a series 
of songs and videos basically dealing with sex/love and violence in different ways. 
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female aggression, and female aggression is inherent to feminism 
(both being well-known, though highly misguided stereotypes). 
Rihanna’s recent hit Bitch Better Have My Money contains 
several aspects worthy of analysis. It was released with an 
elaborated video that must be regarded as an extension of the 
song, not merely a means of getting the music on TV channels. 
The video opens with a vague shot of a large chest with a pair of 
female legs hanging from its side and covered in blood. It cuts to 
a beautiful blonde in a fancy beige apartment, getting ready to 
go out with her pet-puppy-prop under her arm. In the elevator, 
she is kidnapped by Rihanna, who is wearing an elaborate, almost 
Roma girl-like outfit. As the video proceeds, Rihanna and her two 
female associates strip and torture the woman, while apparently 
blackmailing her husband: “Your wife in the back seat of my 
brand new foreign car, Don’t act like you forgot, I call the shot-
shot-shots”. As the video comes to a close, it becomes obvious 
that the husband owes money to the Rihanna-character, and 
has no intention of returning it, despite his wife’s threats; to be 
represented as disgusting as possible, he spends this money on 
strippers. Understanding that the man has no love or respect for 
his wife, let alone the other women in the video, Rihanna murders 
him quite brutally, returning us to the initial frame of the video 
only to find out that it is, in fact, Rihanna lying (1) naked, (2) in 
a chest full of money, (3) covered in the man’s blood, (4) lighting 
what appears to be a joint. 
There are many interesting motives in this short film, which is 
in a way based on Rihanna’s personal experience of being robbed 
by her accountant (which was, in real life, settled in a legally far 
more acceptable way). Firstly, the bitch who better have her money is 
a man, which is a well-known mode of feminist re-appropriation 
of misogynist discourse.18 The genre that extensively uses this 
term in reference to women, as well as one heavily preoccupied 
with violence, murder, money and crime, is hip-hop, especially 
its gangsta rap subgenre: Rihanna incorporates all these elements, 
while placing herself at the centre of the narrative as a kind of 
drug dealer/loan shark/person of the underworld, as opposed 
to women exclusively represented, in these genres, as hoards of 
18 What can be deemed problematic in this case specifically is that calling a man 
a bitch (done by men also) still partially remains inside the patriarchal structure, 
implying, in a way, that an insult traditionally meant for women is all the more 
insulting for a man (implying femininity and submissiveness). As far as I could 
gather, the most popular determination women are prone to give themselves these 
days in pop is – bad bitch. 
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twerking props. The video provoked both feminist praise and 
critical backlash about women on women violence and reverse 
racism as the tortured woman is white.19 Perhaps, the sexualised 
torture sequences can be regarded as problematic, in terms of 
their playing into the objectification and victimisation of women, 
but I believe that there is a dimension to the kidnapping that 
is almost like an initiation, rescuing the woman from a beige 
life in a picture-perfect unhappy marriage, and welcoming her 
to a decadent female-club lifestyle. The racial moment might 
feel uncomfortable, but it is supposed to be so; the division of 
perspective cannot be erased, however politically-correct we try 
to be. If we read the video as a kind of feminist manifesto (which 
is far-fetched, but not exactly out of left field), it is important that 
the woman in question is white, conforming to beauty standards, 
belonging to a high class, even if seemingly financially dependent. 
Track 6: Selling (out) Feminism?
It is interesting to note that the only sexual (not to say, love) 
relationship that Rihanna portraits in the video is one with money. 
One cannot escape the fact that feminism in popular music is 
inextricably connected to capitalist and consumerist ideology; the 
independent women of pop are financially independent, their success 
being measured in money. In a hypertrophied version of Virginia 
Woolf’s cry for a room of one’s own, these women have mansions of 
their own, and they are proud of it. From the already cited speech 
of bell hooks: “There’s a lot of booties out there that are glamorous 
but not connected to the fantasies of wealth and we equate wealth 
so much with freedom”.20 We must not forget that American 
feminism has a different history than that of ex-socialist countries, 
presenting a longer and deeper connection to capitalism in its 
populist extensions. In a capitalist regime, the primary [white] 
feminist issue used to be, exactly, becoming financial independent, 
and identifying with the consumer in his/her own right. In this 
structure, everything is linked to perpetuating the social/political 
system that eventually devours feminism as a crucial point of 
resistance. If riot grrrl attempted to address working class issues, 
19 I strongly hold the position that reverse racism as well as reverse sexism 
and reverse cultural appropriation does not exist, as the terms are tightly linked 
to a hegemonic dynamic; the group that does not hold power in a specific culture 
cannot practice systematic discrimination towards the group that is in the dominant 
position, and the very introduction of such ideas in discourse is reactionary and 
disrupting. 
20 Stoeffel, bell hooks Was Bored, cit. 
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the same is (unsurprisingly) missing from pop music, while the 
concept of work is weirdly incorporated into pop songs. For 
example, Work Bitch by Britney Spears, Work by Rihanna, or the most 
recent Work from Home by X Factor created group Fifth Harmony, 
are songs which are not only disconnected in every possible way 
from the working class, but also relate work with sex. In her text 
“Women, Pop Music and Pornography”, Meredith Levande quite 
bluntly links profit from conspicuous pornography with what 
she deems pornographic imagery in mainstream pop music (also 
manufactured primarily for profit).21 There is something moralistic 
in her view as well as an uncontained frustration that she, as a 
musical artist herself, feels in connection to music industry. While 
she suggests pornographic visuals and behaviour are being 
transferred to the realm of pop music, I find that pornography 
follows trends just as any other business concentrated on profit. 
It does not surprise me to find similar motives in pornography 
as I see in advertisement, film and music. Representations of sex 
have always been present and attractive to people; liberal society 
found ways to make it more explicit; and capitalism found ways 
to exploit, package and sell it, which means that the porn industry 
itself did not create the misogynistic misconceptions, but it merely 
feeds on them.22 What this author misses is the fact that artists, 
whose image she is so concerned with, target an audience that is 
different from the one which pornography is sold to, in bulk their 
music is heavily and mostly consumed by young girls. If we can 
agree that mass production rests on the supply–demand principle, 
there is obviously a demand for feminist discourse as well as 
modes of actively expressing female sexuality and anger. What is 
problematic is that, in packaging these discourses in marketable 
and hardly subversive products, it enforces existing stereotypes 
and perpetuates the status quo. However artistically questionable, 
this is what young people are raised with, and every trend is an 
answer to an existing demand. Of course, not all pop stars are 
entering the discussion about feminism in popular culture, but the 
most powerful women in pop (and I do not use the term lightly), 
and those with most creative control over their work, are playing a 
significant part in the discussion. 
21 Meredith Levande, “Women, Pop Music, and Pornography”, Meridians, 8, 1, 
[Representin'. Women, Hip-Hop, and Popular Music], 2008, pp. 293-321.
22 That is not to say that this should not be challenged, but I find it crucial to 
criticise these problems from a viewpoint devoid of conservative and moralistic 
prejudice. The pro-sex vs. anti-porn discussion is still alive and well, and as heated as 
ever, however it is near impossible to place oneself fully on either side of the spectrum. 
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Thinking back on my own past, in my young age I was 
searching for modes of expressing my uncanalised anger, 
aggression and sexuality. I delved into popular music long before 
exploring literature, visual and performative arts, and theory. 
Today’s generations have access to significantly more content that 
can answer their needs. They have something I didn’t have at the 
time: social networks, flooded with various interpretations of the 
material one is exposed to. The main problem I see here, is the lack 
of systematic guidance in following this over-exposure. Education 
in the field of feminism, racism, LGBTQIA+ issues, as well as in 
popular culture, is confined to college education that is too late 
and too specialised. College courses on Beyoncé and Rihanna are 
being taught in several Universities in the USA and Canada, and 
theory of pop culture and media play a great part in a variety of 
fields in the humanities and social sciences. However, the influence 
of these pop stars is extended to a far greater audience than the 
one linked to study programs, and the younger generations lack 
the critical and analytic knowledge and tools to process this 
material, causing misunderstanding, and reducing the potentially 
subversive power of existing pop art.23 To cite Gayle Wald, in her 
analysis of No Doubt’s song Just a Girl from 1997: “The point here 
is not merely that girlish innocence sells records but that Stefani’s 
sarcastic discourse of helpless, innocent girlhood simultaneously 
functions as a strategy of feminism and a strategy of commerce 
(where feminism and commerce exist in a complex and shifting, 
rather than a simple and binary, relation to one another)”.24 More 
importantly, further in the text, she maintains that: 
As the foregoing analysis of various contemporary female rockers 
suggests, however, women - especially those who benefit from 
their privileged national, racial, or economic status - will need to 
stay alert to the necessity of interrogating, in an ongoing and self-
critical fashion, the conditions that govern their access to social 
and cultural agency. If I am sounding a note of particular urgency, 
it is because I believe that youth music cultures continue to offer 
girls important sources of emotional sanctuary and vital outlets 
for the expression of rage and pleasure, frustration and hope.25 
23 Which results in moments like when members of a self-proclaimed feminist 
group Fifth Harmony, producing trashy songs whose feminist quality is lost even 
with the most benevolent of viewers, constantly and clumsily refer to feminism 
and “the female empowerment thing” in interviews. 
24 Gayle Wald, “Just a Girl? Rock Music, Feminism, and the Cultural Construction 
of Female Youth”, Signs, 23, 3, [Feminisms and Youth Cultures], 1998, p. 589. 
25 Ivi, p. 608. 
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While facing a change of government in Croatia along a 
conservative, right-wing, nationalistic and Catholic church-
oriented vein that threatens to apply fascist methods and blatant 
media censorship in its attempts to suppress the plurality of voices, 
I have begun to find comfort in the uncontrollable Internet culture 
and social networks that sometimes provide more information 
than traditional media outlets, hoping that girls (and not only 
girls) raised listening to programmatically aggressive artists, will 
be ready to riot if and when the need arises.26 
Bonus Track 1: Curbing My Own Enthusiasm 
The following is written in addition to the essay I read on the 
conference in May 2016, as a reaction to the events that developed 
in the socio-political field, both in Croatia and globally, in the 
following months. Somewhere between the Croatian Catholic 
right-wing establishment (questioning abortion laws, and 
trying to force universities in bed with religious institutions), 
the incessant manipulation of Middle Eastern warzones created 
by neo-imperialist contest between superpowers, and Donald 
Trump as USA’s president, my morale and hope have sunk in 
terms of trusting modes of defiance. Though I have expressed 
hope that the Internet culture might provide a mode of resistance 
to the rise of highly regressive ideologies that are developing all 
around the world, I must stress the other side of that optimistic 
coin, as armchair activism may even have negative consequences 
(as opposed to no consequences at all), in that it allows people to 
think that liking and sharing of posts as a daily dose of activism 
is enough in itself; the illusion of the effort makes it less probable 
that the real effort will arise. 
Croatian Cosmopolitan magazine has recently released an 
issue in which the fourth wave of feminism is trending, and it is 
allegedly hot and fun and definitely men-inclusive.27 We cannot 
26 “Strong feminist art might or might not be obviously political; by virtue of its 
expression of an oppressed cultural experience, it will always in fact be political. In 
the most directed of such art its purpose (and contrary to the myth of functionless 
art as high art, it does have a purpose) is to provide information about women's 
experience, invite an exchange with its audience on the issues raised, and ultimately 
to transform culture. Feminist art is always concerned with communication with 
its audience. It cannot rest on prior assumptions or conventions about the nature 
of art; it must create its own basis for audience understanding”, Suzanne Lacy, 
“’Three Weeks in May’. Speaking Out on Rape, a Political Art Piece”, Frontiers. A 
Journal of Women Studies, 2, 1, 1977, pp. 64-70, p. 70.
27 Which has driven Maša Grdešić, the Croatian scholar preoccupied primarily 
with feminism and popular culture, whose doctoral thesis and first book is a 
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afford for feminism to be hot and fun, and whatever we want it 
to be, not just yet, not while women are being killed and raped, 
misrepresented and untrusted, while their/our reproductive rights 
are being challenged, while the feminist legacy is being used to 
sell products as well as to start wars. 
On that note, a blogger named Jessica Valenti (Feministing.
com) has made a substantial effort to introduce feminism to 
young generations of women, firstly through her blog, later with 
a book entitled Full Frontal Feminism.28 As opposed to Adichie’s 
We Should all Be Feminists, Valenti declares that we all already are. 
Written in a way that is presumably attractive to young women, 
with slang and swear words, dealing primarily with sexual 
liberties, Full Frontal Feminism is a short guide through depressing 
statistics about patriarchal oppression, informative in some 
respects, but obsessed with being likeable, persuading high school 
girls to call themselves feminists without any relevant guidance as 
to what that should mean. My reproaches echo those of author 
Nina Power, who in her book The One-Dimensional Woman, by 
referencing Marcuse,29 has cleverly pin-pointed many ways 
in which feminism was, and still is, exploited by the capitalist 
system, mentioning Valenti and her book, gloves-off, as a symptom 
of impotent and counter-productive pop feminism: 
Stripped of any internationalist and political quality, feminism 
becomes about as radical as a diamante phone cover. Valenti ‘truly 
believes’ that feminism is necessary for women ‘to live happy, 
fulfilled lives’. Slipping down as easily as a friendly bacteria 
yoghurt drink, Valenti’s version of feminism, with its total lack of 
structural analysis, genuine outrage or collective demand, believes 
study of women’s magazines and especially Cosmopolitan (see Maša Grdešić, 
Cosmopolitika. Kulturalni studiji, feminizam i ženski časopisi, Disput, Zagreb, 2013), to 
write a sort of farewell letter to the publication. Grdešić was the first professor to 
introduce me to feminism and this was done through the academic exploration of 
’women's genres‘, popular culture and cultural studies, making one more decisive 
link in my life between feminism and theories of popular culture. But what I had 
found touching while reading Grdešić’s article is her frustrated abandoning of the 
topic she had worked hard on for years (not to say it is uncommon for a scholar 
to move on from his or her research topic). This was a gesture. Perhaps this is 
only my reading into the text itself, but I have felt it as a loss of patience, a feeling 
of almost treason by the magazine, an unwillingness to compromise and provide 
excuses for media that feed like parasites on feminist legacy, while doing more 
harm than good, with deteriorating quality and in a moment in time when there 
is a serious threat to everything relevant that this legacy has assured. See Maša 
Grdešić, “Cosmo i četvrti val feminizma”, Muf <http://muf.com.hr/2016/11/04/
cosmo-i-cetvrti-val-feminizma/> (01/17). 
28 Jessica Valenti, Full Frontal Feminism, Seal Press, New York, 2007.
29 Herbert Marcuse, Čovjek jedne dimenzije, “Veselin Masleša”, Sarajevo, 1968. 
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it has to compliment capitalism in order to effectively sell its 
product. When she claims that ’ladies, we have to take individual 
action’, what she really means is that it’s every woman for herself, 
and if it is the Feminist woman who gets the nicest shoes and the 
chocolatiest sex, then that’s just too bad for you, sister.30
The final frontier of Valenti’s ideology leads to the complete 
deterioration of the meaning of feminism, for “[i]f feminism is 
something you define for yourself, then what’s to stop it being pure 
egotism, pure naked greed? Absolutely nothing”.31 Furthermore, 
what Valenti proposes as the basis of feminism’s attraction, is 
almost frightening, as Power rightly underlines: “‘Feminism says 
that you have a right to enjoy yourself. An obligation, even.‘ An 
obligation to enjoy oneself? Few things are more menacing”.32 
Enjoyment, happiness, thrills, desires, commodified and made 
into something to pursue, referenced as a right to be celebrated, 
are all elements that take the focus away from the political issues, 
closing individuals in a one-dimensional world, where change 
equals a make-over. In order to make substantial impact, feminism 
has to be linked to anti-capitalist ideology, challenging all and any 
kind of hierarchy that forms and perpetuates an unjust system. 
What irritates me in valentiesque discourse is the fact that, in a 
way, it re-produces the feeling of fright that women live in their 
lives, perpetuating the false notion of a necessary compromise 
regarding feminism, as if basic human rights and equality were 
negotiable. This is not the time to denounce the tradition of radical 
feminism or be scared to be labelled a feminazi, a man-hater, a 
nasty woman if you will, to tuck ourselves in the comfort of the 
third/fourth wave’s inclusivity. It is not about feminism being 
the latest accessory or trend; is it really a positive phenomenon, 
if more and more women are calling themselves feminists while 
putting in brackets most of what feminism has been fighting for? 
‘Feminism’ has been used to force women into engaging in paid 
and unpaid labour, to relentlessly buy and style themselves in 
order to live up to today’s cool girl/powerful woman images, to 
divide, to side-track, even to start new imperialist wars and to 
enforce xenophobia.33
30 Nina Power, One-Dimensional Woman, Zero Books, Winchester, Washington, 
2009, p. 30. 
31 Ivi, p. 35. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Being quite the unapologetic leftist feminist whose diagnosis of the 
contemporary world spares nothing, Nina Power deserves a longer quote here: 
“The political imagination of contemporary feminism is at a standstill. The perky, 
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Recently, not only citizens of USA, but of the whole world, 
have spent the months glaring at the course of the election, and 
the parts of our lives that are, whether we like it or not, engaged 
in American popular culture and iconography, are receiving 
a frightening message: Trump’s campaign of bad jokes and 
dangerous clichés as arguments, gaslighting34 and cognitive 
dissonance as method, message of hate, division, fear, violence, 
all the while directly (his voters would generously say, ‘honestly’) 
expressing contempt towards women, POC, Mexicans, Muslims, 
LGBTQIA+, the differently abled is gaining enormous support. 
In the midst of the Catholic-conservative backlash on the 
rise in Croatia (making Croatia great again, I presume), as some 
have stressed, the ranting toupee becoming the President of USA 
should not be our primary preoccupation. Still, as Facebook news 
feeds turn trumpian orange, I cannot help but feel that this is a 
global call to arms, and an urgent wake-up call to acknowledge 
how the liberal progress has been in many ways fictitious, how 
much of the population has been left out, accumulating fear and 
frustration. I must say that even the celebrity propaganda,35 more 
active than ever in trying to compel voters not to support this 
capitalism incorporated figure, fail the cause, proving my earlier 
optimism to be unrealistic or, at least, premature.36 There is only 
upbeat message of self-fulfilment and consumer emancipation masks a deep 
inability to come to terms with serious transformations in the nature of work 
and culture. For all its glee and excitement, the self-congratulatory feminism that 
celebrates individual identity above all else is a one-dimensional feminism. It is 
the flip-side of the image of the one-dimensional worker who is expected never 
to let herself or her company down by dressing badly, not being enthusiastic or, 
worst of all, getting pregnant. The feminization of labour and the laborization of 
women will continue to run adrift on the major contradictions of capitalism and 
the opportunistic sexism that accompanies it, and no amount of sticking-plaster 
pleasures will compensate”. Power, One-Dimensional Woman, cit., p. 69. 
34 It is worth noting that an article expressing this notion of gaslighting in the 
context of Trump's campaign was printed in the magazine Teen Vogue, as author 
Lauren Duca pointed out that teenage girls are capable of critical thought and 
should be introduced to politics, since it is their present and future that is being 
decided. Lauren Duca “Donald Trump is Gaslighting America”, Teen Vogue, <http://
www.teenvogue.com/story/donald-trump-is-gaslighting-america> (01/2017).
35 To show just how urgent thinking about gender trouble has become (not 
to mention religious freedoms and racial issues), in January 2017, an article was 
published in American Cosmopolitan magazine bluntly entitled Celebrity Feminism 
has no Place in Trump's America by Eliza Thompson, <http://www.cosmopolitan.
com/entertainment/celebs/a8642654/celebrity-feminism-has-no-place-in-trumps-
america/> (01/2017).
36 Keeping in mind that millennials mostly voted against Trump (for better or 
for worse, I cannot exactly say – for Hillary Clinton), and a huge march was staged 
in Washington DC at the time of the inauguration to protest Trump's formally 
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hope that, in the midst of such global chaos, a front will truly rise 
to reclaim the future in the name of empathy and equality, and 
challenge contemporary demons, who can be exorcised truly and 
only by the extinction of the capitalist/neo-liberal/globalisation 
system, that makes it all happen – the worst and cruellest form of 
invisible warfare and imperialism in history. 
 
becoming POTUS. It seems there are plenty of women, especially young women 
willing to speak up and challenge the terrifying situation, not concerned with 
being depicted as, to use Power's formulation, ”deranged Jezebels hell-bent on 
fucking society up with their roaming womb-induced crazy-thoughts”. Power, 
One-dimensional Woman, cit., p. 35.
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The Crazy (Br)Other: Islam and the West 
Durre S. Ahmed
Summary
The paper draws on the ideas and writings of C. G. Jung, a 
foundational figure in Psychology. It is based on a meta-analysis of Jung’s 
analysis of the dream of a European patient in which the symbols of the 
cross and the crescent are deconstructed in the context of an unconscious 
psychological conflict. A textual analysis indicates that in fact, this 
conflict is consciously present in the doctor rather than the patient. The 
paper challenges Jung’s assumptions and suggests a different cultural, 
psychological and historical perspective which is more ‘feminine’ and 
anti-patriarchal regarding both Christianity and Islam.
A foundational figure in modern clinical psychology, Carl Jung 
was initially Freud’s star pupil; but eventually parted ways with 
his mentor primarily because of disagreements about the role 
of religion in the human personality. For Freud, in the modern 
age, religion was an illusion without a future.1 The hallmark 
of a mature, modern person was a well developed capacity for 
reason/rationality, which would lead her to discarding a childish 
reliance on religion as an ‘infantile neurosis’. In contrast, for Jung, 
religion functions almost as an instinct, remaining an inextricable 
aspect of the human psyche and its need for meaning. As such, 
it is important to understand both the psychology of a given 
1 See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, The Hogarth Press, London, 
1928.
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religion and the psychology of a religious person. (The two are 
not the same. In the context of his ideas underlying Analytical 
Psychology, Jung researched and wrote extensively on both. 
While remaining a practicing psychiatrist and a clinician, he also 
wrote extensively on different religions). For Jung, religion had to 
be understood beyond dogma in terms of individual experience/s 
and integrated into the adult personality. Denying/ignoring its 
reality as an individual and collective phenomenon would ensure 
that it remained powerfully unconscious, eventually leading 
to severe negative and destructive consequences. Given that 
religion is center stage today, Jung’s prescient ideas can be useful 
in understanding some collective dynamics underlying current 
tensions between Islam and the West.
***
An earlier, detailed empirical analysis of The Collected Works of 
C. G. Jung2 reveals both the problems and prospects of the complex 
relationship between Islam and West, and the results of that study 
form the context and background to this paper.3 In brief, the study 
shows that while the main focus of The Collected Works of C. G. 
Jung is the Judaeo-Christian tradition(s), considerable attention is 
also given to many others including the Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, 
Confucian, Taoist, as well as certain indigenous traditions such as 
those of Native Americans. However, in every area which can be 
considered as forming a sort of identifying ‘profile’ of a religion 
(e.g. founding figure, text, ritual, symbols, etc), Islam is given the 
least critical attention. In an opus spanning 22 volumes, there are 
only two substantive references to Islam which pale in comparison 
to the attention paid to all other religions/traditions. Generally, 
Islam is mentioned most frequently only in passing, usually as 
part of the monotheisms; but not discussed in any nuanced 
manner. Overall, Islam remains a sort of shadowy ‘absence’ in The 
Collected Works, visibly ‘present’ yet substantively absent. 
For example, in the context of symbols in Jungian psychology, 
the symbol of the cross has hundreds of references to it in Christian 
and non-Christian contexts, as does the ‘star’ of David. Yet, the 
2 Carl Gustav Jung, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, edited by Sir Herbert 
Read, Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler, translated by RFC Hull, 2nd edition, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979. Also published by Princeton University 
Press.
3 Durre Ahmed, ”Islam and the West. An Analysis of The Collected Works of 
C. G. Jung”, Journal of the Henry Martyn Institute for Interfaith Dialogue, 19, 1, 2000, 
pp. 5-62.
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prototypical symbol of Islam, the Crescent, is not referred to even 
once. Given the centrality of symbols in Jungian psychology, there 
are of course extensive references to the significance of the moon, 
particularly as a feminine symbol, but none of these is linked with 
Islam. Along with the general absence of any depth in discussing 
the psychology of Islam, The Collected Works contains quite a few 
negative and stereotypical references to it, such as Islam’s ’rigidity 
and fanaticism‘, and other derogatory remarks on Muhammad.4 
The study concludes that, as represented by Jung’s writings, 
between the absence and negativity vis-à-vis Islam, in Jungian-
cultural terms Islam can be seen as the ‘shadow’, the ‘other’ in 
Western un/consciousness.
The Best of the West 
The idea that Islam is indeed the ‘shadow/Other’ finds a vivid 
illustration in a series of 30 dreams of an individual who had 
come to Jung and which form the basis of Jung’s Seminar on Dream 
Analysis.5 Published posthumously more than two decades after 
Jung’s death, it is a verbatim transcript of a seminar conducted by 
Jung over a period of about two years (1928-1930). Many of the 
participants of the Seminar went on to become eminent Jungian 
analysts and authors, including Esther Harding, known particular 
for her work on women and the Feminine in Jungian psychology. 
The text provides “the fullest account of Jung’s method of 
amplification in the analysis of a patient’s dreams and the most 
detailed record of the treatment of a male patient by Jung himself”.6 
From the perspective of a Muslim and a Jungian, Seminar 
provides a fascinating glimpse into Jung’s analytic methods 
which, in turn, can enable a very different reading/interpretation 
of not only the dreams but also the discussions around them which 
form the bulk of the book. In order to stay within a more general 
level of discussion for the non-specialist lay person, I will consider 
just one dream which encapsulates certain key relevant themes. 
Before proceeding, a brief description of the dreamer is in order.
Like Jung himself, the dreamer can be seen as a personification 
and symbol of the ‘best of the West’. He is a forty five year old 
businessman, in Jung’s words: “intelligent, cultivated, prosperous, 
very polite”:7 
4 Jung, The Collected Works, cit., vol. 9, part 2, p. 175; p. 95, n. 102.
5 Carl Gustav Jung, Dream Analysis. Notes on the Seminar Given in 1928-30, vol. 
1, William McGuire (ed.), Routledge, London, 1984.
6 William McGuire, ”Introduction”, in Jung, Dream Analysis, cit., 1984, p. xvi.
7 Jung, Dream Analysis, cit., p. 6.
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As a child, he spent time in Egypt … a European born in Africa and 
had spent part of his life in exotic countries … had a successful business 
career, so much so that he could afford to retire … a nice family, nice 
children, nice fortune … had wide international exposure … widely read, 
has a very thorough mind … not neurotic, highly intellectual and cultured 
… had read philosophy and some psychoanalysis … was terribly bored 
with life in general and with his life in particular.8 
The dreamer exhibits no pathology, there is nothing lacking 
in his life, no traumas, no crises. He had come to Jung not for any 
specific treatment but to deal with a sense of ennui and a search for 
meaning, which in Jungian terms, is inevitably linked to questions 
of religion and spirituality. According to Jung, his problem was 
typical and he “did not really require ‘treatment’… so I said to 
him ‘we will see what your nature, physical as well as spiritual 
will produce. You have to be patient, as I have to be. There is no 
prescription’”.9 In short, the dreamer is not psychologically or 
‘mentally’ ill. He is a sophisticated, cosmopolitan, intellectually 
inclined, materially fulfilled, healthy person who comes to Jung 
in search of deeper meaning, what Jung calls a ‘subtle problem’. 
The Dream
He finds himself in a hut in Africa, somewhere in the upper part of Egypt 
…. Then his younger son brings him a kettle containing all sorts of peculiar old 
things. He takes up a whole bundle of small scythes, made not of steel, but of sheet 
iron – simulacra, not the real thing. Below that in the kettle he finds handles of 
old swords, made of metal but the blades were all broken off. Below that was a 
statue of Christ, made of sheet iron, with a sword as long as the figure, and he 
notices that one can easily remove it from the statue. He wants to carry the kettle 
away with all its contents, but a native suddenly appears and declares that one 
would use all those scythes, banked up on the wall of the hut between small lamps 
in a sort of ceremonial. Then it dawns upon him that the hut is by no means 
ordinary but a kind of mosque, and that the scythes are crescent moons, and he 
realizes that the handles of the swords are Coptic cross symbols.10
Jung begins the analysis by providing the dreamer’s own 
associations of key images:
Jung: Associations: the upper part of Egypt (which of course means the more 
southern part) is to him a symbol of his own upper region, his most spiritual part, 
his superior man. About his youngest son, he says that he has often dreamed of 
him and has taken him as a symbol of rejuvenation, his hope for the future. It was 
he who found the kettle. Concerning the contents of the kettle, he says that scythes 
symbolize crops, production, and the sword symbolizes destruction. The crescent 
8 Ivi, p. 86.
9 Ivi, p. 301.
10 Ivi, p. 317.
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moon would be productive, while the Cross, the sword would be destructive. 
Within the last years, he has often thought of the extraordinary intolerance 
of the Christian Church, suppressing, even destroying, everyone who did not 
share the same opinion. But he never consciously credited Islam with a great 
productivity. On the contrary owing to its dogma of Kismet, the domination of 
fatality, he thought that Islam belonged to the old iron, something to be thrown 
away. He had a feeling in the dream that he was attributing an archeological 
value to those contents. The lamps in the hut he associates with those that you 
see in Islamic countries, in the mosques at the feast of Ramadan and other 
nocturnal ceremonies. He is astonished that this house is a mosque, a house of 
God, with different religious symbols that seem to be of more archeological value 
than materials for a cult. They are as if out of use, thrown together in a pot, 
regardless of their origin; the cross and the crescent would not be found together 
naturally, they exclude each other, but here they do not hurt each other through 
their incongruity.11
***
Without going into details of the massive amounts of 
interpretive material that Jung and his students bring to this one 
dream; its significance can be gauged from the fact that while the 
book analyzes 30 dreams in 706 pages, discussions on just this one 
dream cover 115 pages far more than any other dream. Which is 
not to say that the text as a whole, or subsequent to the dream, gives 
due significance to what comes up in the interpretive process, and 
this will become evident shortly. The main point at this stage is 
that the dreamer himself finds this dream as being of “tremendous 
importance to him personally”12 and the analyst/s too give it the 
most significance in terms of the breadth of information that is 
brought to understanding its main symbols, namely the cross and 
the crescent. In order to conduct the research into these symbols, 
the group is divided into two and each presents/discusses vast 
amounts of information collected about the two symbols. In sum, 
all agree with the dreamers’ (and Jung’s) understanding that the 
crescent is the symbol of Islam and the cross of Christianity.
For Jung, the symbols of the cross/Christianity and crescent/
Islam are “obviously pointing to two attitudes of mind”. The hut is 
the spiritual place of re-birth, the crocodile pertains to primordial 
spiritual origins, something deeply unconscious “which is not 
influenced by will power”. The son is the “rejuvenated self, the 
hope for the future”, bringing the kettle/cauldron of the crosses and 
the crescents which have to be ‘cooked’ for spiritual nourishment. 
“In the cauldron things are cooked together, out of things strange 
11 Ivi, p. 318.
12 Ivi, p. 321.
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to each other, irreconcilable, something new comes forth, this is 
obviously the answer to the paradox, the impossible impasse”.13
Discussing the symbol of the cross, Jung echoes the dreamer’s 
reservations of violence and ‘extraordinary intolerance’ of 
Christianity:
Dr. Jung: Now the figure of Christ with the long sword of sheet iron, as long 
as the figure itself, what do you make of that?
Mrs. Sigg: it is a symbol of the cross.
Dr. Jung: yes, the sword has always symbolized the cross …. They 
(Christians) prayed to the sword before a battle, made their vows, pledged their 
word by the sword, with the advantage of old Germanic idea that it had a soul.
Miss Wolff: There is an old Germanic poem where Christ is presented as a 
hero with the sword, doing great deeds.
Dr. Jung: Yes, he is presented there as a healer and also as the healer and 
the warrior. It is peculiarly applicable to our Christian nations, just emerging 
from the Great War. We are most of us very unconscious about it. To one born 
in the East it is convincing and impressive that a Christian people could use the 
sword to that extent. It is the German war-like quality, the primitive berserker 
rage that is in the Western man in general. So this man’s Christ is equipped with 
a long sword, that most peaceful redeemer …. And the sword is detachable, an 
impression that would not originate in the Western Christian mind, only in the 
one born outside, to whom the European is not the model of virtue. As soon as I 
was outside our white civilization, I saw what Europeans are like. We look awful. 
The Chinese call us devils and it is true, thin cruel lips, and our wrinkles are 
uncanny. And we are always intent on something that no devil can understand. 
What are we seeking?…. Wherever the white man went, there was hell for 
other nations; one has to be outside to understand. The white man is a very 
beast devouring the earth, the whole world trembles at him. Such Christianity 
is a compensation, a hellish lie …. so these people born outside of Europe have a 
critique, and a certain detachment; it produces a different situation.14 
The discussion of the Islamic crescent is, interestingly, treated 
with far less criticism:
Dr. Jung: This man was not lamed by being born among primitives. He was 
born among the Moslems, and there was a time when the Islamic mind was the 
leader of thought, the only light of consciousness in the deep medieval gloom. We 
used to go to school there. (Universities of Saragossa and Cordova.) And now the 
native man is coming in, explaining that his symbolism is still alive: the scythes, 
the crescents, which are to be hung among the lamps in the mosques at Ramadan, 
the highest feast of the Islamic cult. Islam is living in the native side of him. The 
Christian religion is no longer alive to him. So this man consists of two, a native 
of that country, and, on the other side, a European, but with a strong emphasis 
on the native.15
13 Ivi, pp. 325-329.
14 Ivi, pp. 337-338.
15 Ivi, pp. 338-339.
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Jung implies the important historical and cultural linkage of 
Islam being part of the Western unconscious. Like the dreamer, 
the West too, at an early ‘age’, ‘went to school’ in an Islamic milieu. 
Similarly, Jung’s observations on Islam are interesting insofar as 
he criticizes the hostility which existed even during that time. 
One can say that the situation of the dreamer ‘being born among 
Muslims’, is today an existential and cultural reality for numerous 
Westerners. Similarly, if one accepts modern depth psychology’s 
emphasis on the importance of what happens in childhood, one 
could say that the encounter with Islam that took place in the 
dreamer’s childhood symbolically encapsulates the encounter 
with Islam during the West’s cultural and civilizational infancy 
(‘we went to their schools/Universities: Sargossa and Cordova’). 
Finally, as Jung’s comments show, these currents about Islam 
run not only deep in the Western unconscious but are also rather 
negative. As such, the situation today is a historical, unconscious 
continuity.
Continuing with his analysis of the symbols of the crosses and 
crescents:
Dr. Jung: One would rather assume them to be in his consciousness, but 
they have been cast aside-broken scythes, disused rubbish, no good any longer. 
They have been thrown down into the kettle, below consciousness, this is exactly 
what is the matter with him, as with millions of Christians, the living symbols 
have already fallen into the unconscious and they don’t know it. People here say, 
“I am not a Christian, I don’t believe in those old things”, and yet their whole 
psychology is Christian. They don’t know that they are suffering from a lack of 
religious function. These symbols are already in the kettle to be made over as soon 
as someone puts a fire under it.16 
Brothers and Others
We now approach the main point of the analysis. The dreamer’s 
dilemma is set out, namely, the opposites (as Jung saw them) of 
the unconscious, yet powerful presence, of Islam and Christianity. 
To repeat, the dreamer himself saw this dream as being of 
‘tremendous importance to him personally’.17 He is relying on 
Jung to go beyond what are basically self-evident (to the dreamer) 
symbolic motifs of the cross/Christianity and the crescent/Islam. 
The task is to ‘cook’ them, ‘melt together’ in the kettle, the ‘raw 
material’ of the cross and the crescent; in short, to reconcile and 
integrate (‘blend’) them meaningfully into the dreamer’s psyche/
consciousness. Can the analyst(s) show the way?
16 Ivi, p. 336.
17 Ivi, p. 321.
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Dr. Jung: Here, then, are two determining but contradictory factors. They 
are incompatible things: swords, scythes, the figure of Christ etc., all thrown 
together in disorder, and naturally they cannot blend unless they are put through 
a reconciling process. These two strong imprints, the Islamic and the Christian, 
should blend, there is an arrested development of personality because they won’t 
blend – these two standpoints so utterly different that they cannot possibly blend, 
he is at a standstill, he cannot move forward, it is as if his legs are going in different 
directions, so he remains stationary. The irreconcilable nature of Christianity and 
Islam must be reconciled, he is unable to do it consciously, and I also am unable.18
There it is. Interestingly, on the one hand Jung is almost 
vehement about the “’impossibility‘ of what is required (“they 
must be reconciled” yet “they won’t blend”). Even more puzzling 
is that he goes on to say shortly later, almost as vehemently: “But, 
you see, this man’s intuition foresees the necessity of bringing 
these two objects together”.19 This unconscious imperative, along 
with the fact that even in his session the patient had told Jung 
how the dream had “tremendous personal importance”, indicates 
the significance of the task facing both dreamer and his doctor(s) 
regarding the resolution/reconciliation of the psychological 
conflict. But as Jung himself admits, he too, like his patient, is 
‘unable’ to offer him any way forward towards a harmonious 
resolution of that which ‘must be reconciled’.
A ‘Disguised’ Muslim
Contrast this paralytic inability to ‘reconcile’ Islam and 
Christianity in two well educated Westerners – and more if we 
take the group of analysts – collectively representing the best of 
the West; with the attitude of a poor, probably illiterate, Somali 
Muslim’s encounter with Jung in Kenya. In The Collected Works 
Jung recounts how, while traveling through North Africa, his 
Somali herdsman-guide assured me that …. I was, as he put it, Mty-
ya-kitabu, a man of the Book, meaning the Koran. He had gathered from 
our talks that I knew the Koran better than he did (which was, by the way, 
not to say a great deal). For this reason, he regarded me as ‘islamu’.20 
That is, the Somali saw Jung as a Muslim.
Recounting the same episode in his autobiographical Memories, 
Dreams, Reflections,21 Jung says ‘They termed me as a “Man of the 
Book” because of my knowledge of the Quran. To their minds I was 
a disguised Mohammadan. Beyond the questions posed by the 
18 Ivi, p. 336 (my emphasis).
19 Ivi, p. 337.
20 Jung, The Collected Works, cit., vol. 9, p. 143.
21 Carl Gustav Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, edited by Aniela Jaffe, 
translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Pantheon Books, London, 1963, p. 265.
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dreamer, and Jung’s inability to reconcile Islam and Christianity, 
the question arises: If the two religions are in fact as irreconcilable 
as Jung claims, how could a Somali herdsman accomplish such 
a reconciliation? Instead of the view of Islam as so utterly ‘other’ 
that it is (consciously) irreconcilable with Christianity, the Somali 
is in effect saying, ‘you are like me, I see though your disguise, you 
are not an ‘other’ but a br(other), like myself, a Muslim’ (‘islamu’).
Jung’s explanation can imply that this was because of his 
(perceived) familiarity with the Quran and is really not adequate 
especially since, it is possible that he took the term ‘Man of the Book’ 
literally and personally. The Quran (and Muslims) frequently refer 
to the Jews and Christians as ‘people of the Book’ in the context 
of those who had been given a sacred scripture, namely the Torah 
and Gospel. In either case, even in the context of a monolithic, 
stereotypical Islam, the seeds of this reconciliation are present in the 
Somali’s statement and the Koranic embrace, albeit within limits, of 
Judaism and Christianity and the ‘people of the Book’. While valid, 
this explanation is inadequate in light of Jung’s perception that he 
was seen by the Somali as a “disguised’ Mohammadan.
The fact remains that the Somali did not see Jung as an 
irreconcilable ‘other’. Possibly, this had to do more with the fact 
that he was, according to Jung, of the ‘Sufi faith’ and which, as 
Jung says later in the Seminar, is not only widespread, but Islam’s 
‘secret backbone’.22 In short, the difference between the herdsman 
and Jung is in the differing ways each interprets/understands 
Islam (and each ‘other’).
Patients and Healers
Apart from the Quran itself, it is among the pluralistic 
epistemologies of Sufi Islam that this reconciliation between 
what are ‘obviously two attitudes of mind’23 is most evident. It is 
important to note that what is today referred to ‘Sufi’ Islam was 
in fact normative Islam till at least the early decades of the 20th 
Century.24 
As a whole, the theoretical foundations of Jung’s ideas are 
strongly anchored in his remarkable insights into the archetypal 
and hence, commonly shared, psycho-spiritual dynamics of many 
religions. In a way, Jung managed to psychologically reconcile 
many other, seemingly very different religions, and given the 
22 Jung, Dream Analysis, cit., p. 336.
23 Ivi, p. 321.
24 See Karen Armstrong, Islam. A Short History, Random House, New York, 2000.
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generally positive statements about Islam during the Seminar, one 
would have thought he would be able to show the patient some 
way out of the ’impasse‘. The main reason why Jung was unable 
to do so was perhaps mainly because of an ignorance about Islam. 
As indicated in my earlier research, basically there is a void when 
it comes to even an elementary grasp of the Islamic idiom and its 
psycho-symbolic universe. This ignorance-prejudice is all the more 
striking considering that Islam is part of the monotheisms, and to 
that extent, is closer to its co-religions (in terms of prophets, stories 
and the monotheistic message) than, for example, Buddhism and 
Hinduism.
But perhaps it is the similarities which stand in Jung’s 
way. He basically assumes all the negative problematics (as he 
understood them) of the Judaeo-Christian tradition as ‘naturally’ 
similarly part and parcel of Islam. Simultaneously, his ignorance 
of Islam makes him unable to see the differences, thereby 
doubly reinforcing the assumption that there are no remarkable 
differences worth considering. Given his frequent impatience and 
critique of Judaeo-Christianity, Islam implicitly becomes part of 
this critique. As just one crucial example: The creation and role of 
Eve in the Biblical fall from paradise and the steady stigmatizing 
of the Feminine is a well established Jungian (and feminist) 
critique of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In the Koranic version 
this is radically different. Eve is neither derived from Adam’s rib 
and nor is she the seductress and culprit in the fall. In fact, her 
name is not even mentioned; and if anything, it is Adam who is 
seduced by Satan and subsequently he “and his spouse” are both 
expelled from Paradise.
Thus, there is very little indication of a rudimentary 
knowledge regarding crucial differences between Islam and 
the other monotheism in The Collected Works. When perceived, 
the differences are less grounded in facts and more in opinions 
coming from a modern Christianist consciousness. For example, 
Mohammad’s ‘primitive cast of mind’, ‘Islamic fatalism’, and the 
Quran as ‘incoherent’, having ‘no mind to it’. To reconcile such a 
spectrum of negative elements is obviously impossible, hence the 
impasse faced by both patient and doctor/s. In the Seminar, Jung’s 
largely positive comments on Islam are, ironically, more political 
than psycho-theological.
For real differences to be perceived, there has to be some 
fundamental idiom belonging to the ‘other’ which can be 
articulated and then serve as a basis for comparison. But since 
no real differences have been articulated, no real reconciliation is 
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possible. Whereas in The Collected Works, negativity is assumed on 
the basis of seeing no difference, in the Seminar it seems there is 
nothing in common, apart from a rather stern, vengeful Yahweh-
esque God. Everything else is unconscious, hence the difficulties 
and the ‘impossible’ nature of the task confronting the analysts.
Returning to the Seminar and the dreamer’s/analyst’s dilemma, 
the situation becomes even more intriguing. One can note here 
in passing that the dream prior to the one being discussed was 
about a mandala, a Jungian spiritual symbol par excellence. As 
such, the next dream is a more vivid representation of what 
exactly needs to be done, the heart of the matter, so to speak, and 
which the dreamer finds of ‘tremendous personal importance’. 
Having declared the dilemma, the Seminar turns its attention to 
a thorough analysis of the two main symbols: the cross and the 
crescent.
More than a hundred pages are devoted to this exercise, 
especially the symbolism of the moon. However, other than the 
self-evident observation that the crescent moon forms part of 
the design of the flag of many Muslim countries, no substantive 
connection is made with Islam. Presented by Esther Harding, 
much of the material was subsequently incorporated in her 
Women’s Mysteries.25 The only attempt made to link the symbolism 
of the moon with the psychology of Islam and the Feminine is 
at best largely negative stereotypes and worse, factually totally 
incorrect: 
The taboo on women is carried to its greatest extreme under Islam, where 
the crescent moon stands as the symbol of the whole religious culture. Here 
women are not only secluded during menstruation, but must live their whole 
lives behind the veil. It is as though in the Islamic system woman is only known 
in her moon aspect and therefore dangerous at all times. In accordance with 
this we find that Islam teaches that woman has no soul of her own. The Prophet 
says: “The woman is a man’s garment”. That is, she is recognized only as the 
personification of the man’s anima, and is accorded a place in heaven only as the 
spouse of her husband. It is interesting to note further that, whether as cause or 
effect, women in seclusion in harems and zenanas do as a matter of fact only live 
for the erotic side of life.26
The paragraph is a microcosm of the Western understanding 
of Islam: sweeping generalizations of a religion that encompasses 
vastly diverse cultures, western stereotypes of the veil and 
sexuality which Raana Kabbani has written about in Imperial 
25 See Esther Harding, Women’s Mysteries. Ancient and Modern, Shambhala, 
Boston, 2000 (first edition 1955). 
26 Jung, Dream Analysis, cit., p. 375.
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Fictions. Europe’s Myths of the Orient27 and a partial, inaccurate 
quotation from the Quran. 
The fact is that in the large majority of areas in the Islamic 
cultural world women have never been secluded during 
menstruation, nor do they ‘live their whole lives behind the veil.’ 
Harding’s notion that ‘Islam teaches that woman has no soul of her 
own’ is entirely unsubstantiated. Similarly, the saying attributed 
to the Prophet that the ‘woman is a man’s garment’ which leads 
Harding to conclude that ‘her only place is as a personification of 
the anima’. In fact, this is a partial quote from the Quran. The full 
text reads: “they (wives) are as a garment to you and you are as a 
garment to them” (Q: 2:188). These are the only linkages - if one 
can call them that - that our Jungians can make between Islam and 
the enormous material that was generated by the group on the 
complex and significant symbol of the moon.
Keep in mind that the dreamer is searching for spiritual 
meaning and regarded the dream as personally important since it 
posed the all important question of how to reconcile the seeming 
irreconcilability of Islam and Christianity. But given the Jungian’s 
own ignorance/prejudice about Islam, the dreamer’s needs are 
simply ignored. 
It is towards the end of more than a hundred pages of analysis/
discussions about the symbolism of the cross and the crescent that 
the impasse is ‘resolved’. Not through intellectual/analytic effort, 
but rather, through synchronicity.
Towards Reconciliation
The first move towards bringing the analysis and Seminar back 
to the main problem, comes from outside the group. One of the 
participants brings a drawing done by her five year old child: of a 
house, the mother, crosses and a crescent.28 
Jung sees this as a sort of psychic ‘leakage’, given that the child 
was far too young to comprehend the group’s intellectual concerns 
and to which the child had had no exposure. Yet again, the group 
goes into a long digression on symbolic astrology, eventually leading 
to the concepts of Yin and Yang as conceptual representations of the 
energies representing the crescent and the cross respectively. 
“It is not in vain”, says Jung, “that in the dream the crosses 
and crescents are thrown together in the same cauldron where 
27 Rana Kabbani, Imperial Fictions. Europe’s Myths of Orient, Pandora Press, 
London, 1994.
28 Jung, Dream Analysis, cit., p. 401.
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they should obviously blend, and that for a certain purpose. The 
purpose is the important thing. If the Yang and Yin came together, 
the result is a release of energy which might be symbolized in 
different forms. It might be emotional energy in the case of the 
dreamer or … as inspiration or a great vision”.29
The breakthrough (though not for the patient) occurs shortly 
after Jung has drawn parallels between the symbols of the cross 
and the crescent with the Taoist Yang and Yin symbols respectively. 
Interestingly, yet again, the crescent moon/Yin/Islam triad and its 
connection with the Yin-Feminine in Jungian psychology is not 
attended to in depth even though, again, one could say that it was 
Jung’s reclaiming of the Feminine in psycho-theology which was 
one of his most important contributions to the field of analytic 
psychology.
Shortly, after the Yin/Yang discussion, Jung presents another 
drawing as evidence of how the unconscious operating in the 
group had anticipated the vision of the meeting of the opposites, 
that is, of the Yin/Yang together denoting a state of harmony, 
balance, in short, in reconciliation. It is a drawing made by a 
member of the group prior to any discussions concerning the 
union of the symbols of the cross and the crescent:
Dr. Jung: Here is the cross, then the crescent, and they are peculiarly 
together, and then instantly comes a tremendous outburst, a release of energy 
in the form of an enormous sphere of light .... Here is the whole theory that 
when the opposites come together there will be a great manifestation of energy 
of some sort. Now that peculiar light engendered by the cross and the crescent is 
a new enlightenment, a sort of revelation. If the truth of the crescent be united 
with the truth of the cross, it would produce that enlightenment, the combined 
truth of Islam and Christianity. If it were possible to extract the essential 
truth of each and blend them, then out of that clash would come an enormous 
illumination which would amount to a new conviction. Both Islam and 
Christianity are psychological methods of treating 
diseases of the human soul. They prescribe 
methods of living, attitudes, moral codes as well 
as dogmatic explanations of why things are as 
they are, how man misbehaved and God saw 
himself forced to do something about it, sending 
sons or prophets to cure the evils of man. Christ 
was essentially the healer. .... If I told a patient 
that his religion ought to cure him, he would 
think I was stark mad. But in the beginning it was 
effective. .... these methods are quite simple. Then 
they become more and more removed from the 
29 Ivi, pp. 417-418.
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human sphere. .... But one can hardly talk of it without blushing, on account 
of the false ideas that have been pumped into it, big words hollowed by two 
thousand years of suggestion. For a long time now, the Christian religion has 
not worked, so it became a Church of great splendor and power to increase 
its influence by suggestion. .... Now this picture shows a new light. Such an 
outburst is an anticipation of new understanding, new vision, a unity which 
gives new expression to the world and to man. Everything appears in a new 
light. That is renewal, re-birth .... Such a vision is quite impersonal. For the time 
being it is in the unconscious. .... it takes people tremendous time to realize the 
simplest deduction.30
One can note here again, that had it not been for two 
unconsciously inspired drawings by a child and adult, neither Jung 
nor any other participant-analyst would have been able to arrive 
at these insights. Having diagnosed contemporary Christianity’s 
inability to heal, the group as a whole remains unable to heal 
the dreamer’s spirit/soul seeking to reconcile the cross and the 
crescent. This task is accomplished through synchronicity: First 
the drawing of a child and then a flash of intuition in a participant 
prior to the intellectual analysis of key symbols. If the analysis 
itself failed the process of reconciliation, it is because it failed 
to bring any substantive, conscious understanding of Islam and 
stayed within stereotypical Orientalist assumptions, reflective of 
Jung’s own understanding of Islam in The Collected Works.
At the same time, within Seminar and The Collected Works, one 
can glimpse how Islam ‘comes through’ in precisely those elements 
which, from the Jungian perspective, need to be reclaimed for 
Western spiritual renewal. Among them, according to Jung, are 
the loss of eros as a function of relatedness and linked to it, the 
denigration of the notion of the Feminine. I can only hint at some 
connections: visiting the Taj Mahal, Jung wrote of its beauty and 
saw in it, the architectural manifestation of the ‘Islamic eros’ which, 
as he put it, remains a jealously guarded ‘secret’. While he does not 
elaborate on this, one can speculate that it may be something in the 
form of the Taj Mahal, especially its dominant dome(s) which are 
undoubtedly the most sensuous of forms, overflowing with eros. 
Not to mention that the structure is ultimately a monument to the 
idea of Love. The strong historically evident links of Islam and 
culture is itself an indication that ‘Islam’ (like the ‘West’) cannot 
be simplified into a monolith. As Edward Said correctly observed, 
there are in fact innumerable Islams.31 Neither Jung or his students 
30 Ivi, pp. 418-420.
31 See Edward Said, “Impossible Histories. Why the Many Islams Cannot be 
Simplified”, Harper's Magazine, July 2002.
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seem to be aware of this. In case of the Islamic eros as evident in 
the Taj Mahal, it is product of South Asian Islam which is a unique 
culturally inspired synthesis of what can be considered Indo-
Persian Islam, the seeds of which go back at least seven centuries 
and of which the Taj can be considered its architectural zenith. 
***
Recall that the dreamer is surprised to discover that the place 
of the dream is a mosque. Harding’s comments on the seclusion 
of women in Islam living only ‘for the erotic side of life’, is a 
literalized reading of this ‘secret’ of the spiritual Islamic eros and 
the archetypal Feminine. These elements gain further intensity 
when linked with the complex symbolism of the moon/crescent, 
which, in spite of its bisexual character, has dominant Feminine 
associations particular in Jungian psychology. Identifying, 
articulating and highlighting these archetypal aspects of Islam, 
would lead to a very different understanding of the religion. But 
this can only be done from within Islam and requires setting aside 
the assumptions of the West’s religious and cultural malaise in 
which, according to Jung, the Feminine and eros itself has all but 
disappeared. 
The Seminar took place during the 1920’s, a time when Western 
colonial power was at its peak. It is frequently forgotten that, as a 
whole, the colonial project encompassed almost the entire Muslim 
world. This encounter itself is significant for the impact it must 
have had for not only Islam/s, but also the West. In any case, at 
that time, as Jung says, ‘it is in the unconscious’, as indeed it had 
always been, since the West’s civilizational infancy (‘We went to 
their schools.’)
In Jungian analysis, the movement from the unconscious into 
consciousness is frequently a traumatic upheaval. The harbinger 
of this change is frequently the ‘shadow’, that is, the dark, 
unknown side to the psyche. In dreams (of males) it frequently 
appears as a stranger (the other) or a brother. Seventy years after 
the Seminar, the shadow that was/is Islam is erupting into Western 
(un)consciousness. In the process creating collective anxiety and 
paranoia on all sides. No longer colonized/tamed/dormant, in a 
sense it has had to go ‘crazy’ in order to be acknowledged. The 
entire edifice of Western psychotherapy rests on the study of 
pathology. As such, Islam’s present dominant, and considerably 
ugly face, may well lead to a deeper understanding and 
appreciation of how it is both different and similar to Judaism and 
Christianity. Theologically, historically and culturally, perhaps it 
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is time that the West recognizes that the presently crazy ‘other’ is 
actually its (br)other.
Today, the lack of understanding of Islam can have serious 
consequences for the Muslim individual in the Jungian 
therapeutic context. Given the deep links between culture and 
religion, and rising global tensions between Islam and the West, 
the implications are equally serious for the Western psyche. In 
the present situation, the Jungian scholar and analyst can play a 
major therapeutic role, not only as a healer of cultures but also 
in terms of moving towards the vision of ‘a new understanding 
… renewal, rebirth’ which was anticipated in the Seminar in the 
reconciliation of Christianity and Islam. Even at the individual 
level, this task needs to be initiated urgently. Not only for the vast 
number of Westerners, who like our dreamer (and Jung) have a 
direct experience of Islam through travel and as direct contact as it 
now exists in the West, but also for the almost 20 million Muslims 
living in Europe and the North America. Many of them are highly 
educated individuals, quite likely to seek out a Jungian analyst at 
some point in their lives. Is the Jungian therapist equipped to cope 
with the individual and collective suffering of the time and show 
the way to the future?
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Starting with a sociological research carried out via qualitative 
methodology, I present the experiences of some migrant women writers 
in Italy. I suggest to interpret their practice of writing as an example 
of agency which serves multiple functions: it allows the women I 
interviewed, to deal with the suffering due to migration, and with the 
difficulties caused by the receiving society; it acts as a tool of cultural 
belonging to – and social participation in – the Italian society, allowing 
these authors to defy the collective unconscious dealing with migrants 
and women at the same time. 
Alternative Narratives
How does one communicate the pain of loss in a foreign language? 
Why bother? 
Can one love again away from home? 
(Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia) 1
In contemporary Europe, migration is perceived as a pressing 
social problem: migrants are often considered either as weak 
people who need protection, or as threatening individuals who 
must be marginalised, even prevented from entering the country. 
These preconceived notions are common in Italian media debates, 
entangling migrants in hegemonic narratives and commonsense 
1 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, Basic Books, New York, 2002, p. 251.
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assumptions.2 My critical point is that, although the concept of 
migration seems endlessly interwoven with ideas of poverty, 
passiveness, and dangerousness, rarely are migrants devoid of 
agency. 
Stereotypical constructions circulating through media debate 
and ordinary talks have cultural roots. In this regard, Balibar 
talks of ‘neo-racism‘, which is no longer based on biological 
assumptions but on cultural differences.3 Embracing an 
intersectional perspective, we should also consider to what extent 
gender stereotypes are involved in cultural constructions of the 
migrant. If migrant men are often seen as dangerous or even 
as criminals, migrant women are usually depicted as passive 
subjects, or as victims. More specifically, migrant women seem to 
serve as the quintessential representations of otherness: they keep 
being trapped in opposite stereotypes, related, on the one hand, 
to exoticism and the sexual field, and, on the other, to the care of 
people.4
The circularity between public discourse and daily racism 
must be understood in relation to the Eurocentric and Westernist 
matrixes of modernity. As Gurminder Bhambra maintains, at 
the origins of the idea of modernity lies the identification of a 
temporal fracture with the pre-modern world and the existence 
of a spatial difference between Europe and the rest of the world. 
This perspective has produced a Eurocentric vision of modernity, 
which she defines in these terms:
Eurocentrism is the belief, implicit or otherwise, in the world historical 
significance of event believed to have developed endogenously within the 
cultural-geographical sphere of Europe. In contesting Eurocentrism, I 
contest the ‘fact’ of the ‘specialness of Europe’ – both in terms of its 
culture and its events; the ‘fact’ of the autonomous development 
of events, concepts, and paradigms; and, ultimately, the ‘fact’ of 
Europe itself as a coherent, bounded entity giving form to the 
above.5
2 Emma Bond et al. (eds.), Destination Italy. Representing Migration in 
Contemporary Media and Narrative, Peter Lang AG, Bern, 2015.
3 Etienne Balibar, Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous 
Identities, Verso, London, 1991.
4 Manuela Coppola, Sonia Sabelli, “‘Not a Country for Women, not for 
Blacks’. Teaching Race and Gender in Italy between Colonial Heritage and New 
Perspectives”, in Brigitte Hipfl, Kristín Loftsdóttir (eds.), Teaching ‘Race’ with a 
Gendered Edge, The European Association for Gender Research, Education and 
Documentation, Utrecht and Central European University Press, Budapest, 2012.
5 Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity. Postcolonialism and the Sociological 
Imagination, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 5.
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 It is not only a matter of recalling a past whose effects are still 
active in the present, but also of choosing how to make sense of 
the past, as this has important effects on the understanding of the 
present:
The way in which we understand the past has implications for 
the social theories we develop to deal with the situations we live 
in today. Through recognizing the constituted ‘other’ as always 
and already present in history and participating in its production, 
but written out of it, we can begin to reconceptualise forms of 
theoretical discourse and political practice today. If theory has 
been largely predicated on an idea of the uniqueness of Europe 
then calling that into question upends most theory. This, then, 
provides a clearing from which we can begin to look at the world 
again and begin to create new forms for the future.6
In the light of these remarks, I believe it is interesting to question 
ourselves on narrative modalities other than those of Eurocentric 
matrix, that take shape not elsewhere, but within Occident itself. 
Therefore, I would draw attention to the case of migrant women 
writers, who provide, for me, the example – one among many – of 
a cultural practice which defies the collective consciousness about 
migrants, and women at the same time, reminding us that they are 
not people who can be talked about, but people who can talk about 
themselves. My starting hypothesis is that the writing of migrants 
is relevant because of the quality of the texts, which I cherish, and 
because writing acts as a practice through which the person who 
writes, is able to express his/her subjectivity as a human being, in 
spite of the fact that Italian society denies them social and cultural 
recognition, treating them as a ‘collective subject.’ 
Through these interpretative lenses, I would suggest that the 
potential of the writing practices that migrant women put in place, 
consists in their ability to decentralize the universalist narration of 
history. Even if we cannot consider the totality of their texts as 
counter-narratives, especially because some are not intentionally 
conceived as such by the authors, we are undoubtedly faced with 
narratives that prove alternative and different from the dominant 
ones. We can hypothesize that the universe of meaning which 
finds expression in their writings, is not founded on Eurocentric 
and Occidentalist assumptions. According to this perspective, the 
ability of the literary medium to broaden the imaginary might 
stimulate an interesting re-articulation of the commonsense 
6 Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity, cit., p. 11.
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(mis)conceptions typical of Italian society, by inviting readers to 
develop alternative forms of thought.
If the European history of the others has been written in terms 
of lack, the need to break this narrative into multiple stories by 
writing it from other points of view, and taking the floor in the 
first person, becomes increasingly widespread.7 This is exactly 
the case within the gender perspective: together with the need to 
provincialize history, there urges the re-telling of the story from the 
point of view of women. In a long conversation / interview with 
Renate Siebert, Assia Djebar expresses herself along these lines:
I decided to stop investigating on my individual story and on 
Algerian history. Considering that the integralists were preparing 
for putting themselves on the line, at least on the cultural and 
social level; considering that, in two or three years, they were 
giving an absolutely caricatural image of the origins of Islam, I 
had no choice but do as I did about our colonial past. That is, I had 
to reread the sources about the first times of Islam and write about 
it as a woman, starting from the women.8
A similar view is to be found in the epilogue of the novel 
written by one of the women I interviewed:
The whole male Vuković genealogy, which she had known by 
hearth since ever, as it were a painful nursery rhyme to which she 
did not have access, was there, accompanied by the women. Those 
women, who had stayed anonymous in the tales she had drank in 
her life as a daughter, inhabited her by birth right. The spaces that 
appeared empty in the family tree, drafted long before her birth to 
the world, and which had inevitably turned up on her, were full 
of women. She understood that it is the women who bear fruit on 
the men’s trees.9
7 See Geneviève Makaping, Traiettorie di sguardi. E se gli altri foste voi?, 
Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2001.
8 “Decisi di smettere di investigare sulla mia storia privata, sulla storia 
dell’Algeria. Poiché gli integralisti si preparavano a tornare in forze nel gioco, 
per lo meno sul piano culturale e sociale; poiché, a distanza di due o tre anni, 
stavano dando un’immagine completamente caricaturale delle origini dell’Islam, 
a me non restava che fare come avevo fatto per il nostro passato coloniale. Dovevo 
cioè rileggere le fonti sui primi tempi dell’Islam e scriverne la storia da donna, a 
partire dalle donne”. Renate Siebert, Andare ancora al cuore delle ferite. Renate Siebert 
intervista Assia Djebar, La Tartaruga edizioni, Milano, 1997, p. 130 (my translation).
9 “L’intera genealogia dei Vuković al maschile che lei conosceva a memoria da 
sempre, come fosse una filastrocca dolorosa alla quale non poteva accedere, era 
presente, accompagnata dalle donne. Quelle donne, rimaste anonime nei racconti 
di cui si abbeverava nella sua vita di figlia, l’abitavano per diritto di nascita. Gli 
spazi che apparivano vuoti nell’albero genealogico compilato molto tempo prima 
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Writing becomes the place where writers express the multiple 
positions they play in their lives, as people who experienced 
migration, and as women as well, following the explanation of 
one of the women I interviewed:
I think I have always hidden I am a woman when I write. Probably 
it is not accidental that I created mostly male characters … I used 
to think that a female character is not neutral. Because she is a 
woman, you know? This is my analysis of my past perception. 
In fact, when you write about a woman people say ‘Why do you 
write about a woman?’. You write about a man and no one asks you 
anything. He is a character, a man, he does something... It was a 
kind of internalized male chauvinism I had for a long time without 
realizing it. I didn’t question myself. I took for granted that writing 
about women meant talking about women’s problem, as a female 
character and a male one couldn’t do the same things. However, 
is a female character plausible without female problems? I don’t 
know. … So writing 24 scatti was a change for me. I didn’t hide 
this aspect and I lost myself in this female character. I let her think 
and say everything she wants, have her experiences and her worries 
which are female and also human because women are one part of 
humanity. It was very enjoyable (Anna Belozorovitch).
This research investigates the link between the experiences 
of migration, migrant women, writers and writing. I chose to 
interview women and collect their life stories using a sociological 
approach with a qualitative research methodology. Therefore, 
my study does not focus on analysing the texts within a literary 
framework, but on investigating the meaning that each writer 
gives to her experience of life, migration, and writing.10 Through 
the interviews I carried out, I present a facet of the life journey 
of the women I met: their capacity to look at the collective future 
starting from their own stories.11 Their tool is the act of writing. 
della sua venuta al mondo e sciaguratamente finito su di lei, erano pieni di donne. 
Capì che sono le donne a dare i frutti sugli alberi degli uomini”. Tijana Djerković, 
Inclini all’amore, Playground, Roma, 2001, p. 196 (my translation).
10 Numerous literary studies on migration literature in Italy have been 
carried out. See Daniele Comberiati, Scrivere nella lingua dell’altro. La letteratura 
degli immigrati in Italia (1989-2007), Peter Lang Editions, Bruxelles, 2010; Chiara 
Mengozzi, Narrazioni contese. Vent’anni di scritture italiane della migrazione, Carocci, 
Roma, 2013. 
11 Because of the space limits of this publication, in the following pages I 
will present only some extracts from the interviews I carried out in my research. 
However, I would like to underline that, in my research work, I listened to the life 
stories of these women, here minimally recalled, after having read their texts, and in 
long encounters which then originated long-lasting relationships. In this sense, the 
interviews’ short passages here quoted, are a small part of a wider and deeper work 
312 — DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE
Working Through the Past, Creating Cultural Belonging
According to the renowned theory of Sayad, migration can 
be defined as a ‘total social fact’, meaning that it affects every – 
economic, social, political, religious, and cultural – aspect of the 
migrant life. One interviewed writer saw such a theory become 
reality in her own life:
I had never been so disoriented as I was when I arrived here, even in 
Bosnia during the war, even in the refugee camp. Living in Bosnia 
among people who were suffering as much as me... All of us lived 
the war; all of us were displaced people, so we were a community. 
But arriving in Italy in a very small town where the last war was in 
1945 and attending the school with many young people who knew 
nothing about what I was going through... I mean I was the strange 
girl. I was the stranger in a society that worked perfectly, where 
my peers had teenage problems. Integrating into that society was 
very difficult (Elvira Mujčić). 
This testimony proves the migration experience as more 
alienating than experiencing war in everyday life: as Elvira 
explains, her loneliness and disorientation were caused by 
migration itself. More precisely, these feelings originated in the 
sudden perception of not belonging to a community. In line with 
Sayad, the one who migrates goes through a twofold experience: 
he/she is at the same time, an immigrant and an emigrant, 
which means that he/she is not only someone who arrives in the 
receiving society, but also someone who leaves his/her country 
and culture. The discrepancy between the familiar world left 
behind and the unfamiliar society ahead is a major feature of the 
migration experience. In other words, migrant life does not begin 
with migration. Migration is a considerable part of the wider story 
of their life, something that divides it into a ‘before’ and ‘after’. 
Though migration reveals itself as a strong experience, we should 
not forget that, before emigrating, migrants were people living 
an ordinary life, the traces of which mark deep wounds, in terms 
of memories and nostalgia, in their new life. Indeed, the stories I 
have collected show that writing may act as a way of dealing with 
an emotionally distressing past, at least in the early days:
of collaboration. Furthermore, the women writers were involved in the subsequent 
step of my analysis, that is, the transformation of our conversations in written texts 
where we tried to preserve the orality of their spoken language. Since the language 
of the interviews was Italian, and all quotations are given in my translation of the 
original, I am aware that some nuances, especially those related to orality and 
relationality, might be not completely perceived in all their complexity. 
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I understood I couldn’t escape from my past. Repression wasn’t a 
real option because things always come out one way or another. So, I 
took my first steps in questioning myself and finding some answers. 
I started thinking that I could fix everything through the writing 
process (Elvira Mujčić).
The migration is the hardest experience I ever had. It was so hard 
that at a certain point in my life I used to feel physically sick. I 
had an incessant migraine for twenty years ... until I wrote my 
first book. After that I never had a migraine anymore. I realized 
that everything I had inside me needed to come out somehow, 
but I didn’t allow myself to do this thing because my writing 
language was French (Marinette Pendola).
Because migration, especially a forced one, separates people from 
their motherland, it necessarily engenders a need of memory so as to 
maintain contact with something believed lost.12 The extracts above 
show how writing can elucidate a suffering experience. Naming the 
wounds coming from the past makes it possible to live the present, 
which does not imply forgetting the traumatic experience but, 
rather, incorporating it into one’s identity.13 The following extracts 
suggests that it is not just writing, but writing in a language which is 
not the mother tongue, to serve an important function:
Writing in Italian helped me because it was a kind of filter between 
my emotions, the suffering and the act of writing. There are a few 
pages about my father, the prison, a few pages... but I made a 
great effort to write them. Plus, I was writing in Italian. Maybe I 
couldn’t do it in Croatian (Vesna Stanić).
I need a language which has nothing to do with my childhood. 
Obviously, a foreign language separates me from my childhood, 
Italian doesn’t speak with my childhood and it has nothing to 
do with it. On the contrary, Albanian wakes up my childhood 
demons, my memories. I needed to keep this part of my life out, 
or at least distance myself from it (Ornela Vorpsi). 
While opening past wounds, migration gives the resources to 
heal them: a new, ‘neutral’, language which makes it possible to 
go back into the past and, at the same time, to distance from it. 
12 Julia Creet, “Introduction. the Migration of Memory and Memories of 
Migration”, in Julia Creet, Andreas Kitzmann (eds.), Memory and Migration. 
Multidisciplinary Approaches to Memory Studies, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 2011. 
13 Anna Lisa Tota, Trever Hagen, “Introduction. Memory Work – Naming 
Pasts, Transforming Futures”, in Anna Lisa Tota, Trever Hagen (eds.), Routledge 
International Handbook of Memory Studies, Routledge, London, 2016.
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So far, I have presented cases in which migration, as a sort of 
universal experience, causes an uncertainty which can be handled 
through writing. However, the sense of not belonging can only 
be partly attributed to initial cultural instances of disorientation; 
experiencing the exposure of their being and person to prejudices 
and stereotypes plays a relevant role. In this respect, writing 
becomes a central resource when facing both the difficulties caused 
by migration itself, and those perpetrated by the host society. It 
also may contribute in an active way to regaining a sense of self-
confidence and self-awareness within the receiving society, as the 
following story shows:
When I came here I was just a girl, the first black girl in town 
and then I also wrote a book... I mean, people said: ‘I want to see 
what this African girl is able to write’. So everyone came [to book 
presentation] and the room was full every time because they were 
so curious … When I did my first presentation in town all those 
people, who used to whisper when they saw me in church came 
to listen to me. That time I got my satisfaction (Amilca Ismael).
Writing starts as a way to fix something coming from the past 
and strengthen one’s identity in the present. And what is more 
relevant, writing does not only compensate for the drawbacks of 
migration; it also acts as an effective tool of social and cultural 
inclusion, symbolizing belonging to the host society. When I 
asked Laila whether there was a moment she understood that the 
migration to Italy had become a long-term choice, she replied: 
It was when I decided to write in Italian. Because it was then that I 
said to myself: ‘I want to take part [in Italy]. I don’t want to use the 
language, I want the language to use me’. It was then that I decided 
to make a sort of investment. That was the moment... Writing as 
being part... Yes, sure … I am a very lucky person because I found 
my voice. Italy gave me this opportunity (Laila Wadia).
These examples lead me to assume that writing may act as a 
practice of cultural citizenship, lessening feelings of exclusion. 
Citizenship is grounded not only in the juridical level and the 
associated rights and obligations, but in “feelings of belonging, 
values, principles, myths, real and imagined communities”.14 On 
the one hand, citizenship is bestowed by the State in accordance 
14 Evangelia Tastsoglou, Alexandra Dobrowolsky (eds.), Women, Migration and 
Citizenship. Making Local, National and Transnational Connection, Ashgate, Aldershot, 
2006, p. 14.
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to legal requirements; on the other hand, it is negotiated by the 
people who own it partially. Partial ownership of citizenship 
concerns people who are legally citizens but, who are not 
culturally considered part of the community. Laila herself 
described the writing act as essential to her decision about taking 
part in Italian society, and she ultimately made it only when she 
had the upsetting experience of applying for citizenship: 
I’ll never forget the moment I showed up at the prefecture with 
my documents after waiting seven years to get married. I was told 
it was a marriage of convenience... to get the citizenship. Those 
were maybe the worst words I was told in my life. I mean I have 
never feel so humiliated. That moment, I think, was a wakeup 
call because I hadn’t started writing yet, I let them mistreat me... I 
didn’t have the resources to... I realized that language is a defence 
tool and I couldn’t stand up for myself (Laila Wadia).
In line with a multi-layered concept of citizenship, which 
entails passive aspects (access to rights), and active practices 
(participation in society) alike, migrant women may be able 
to “strive to validate their cultural capital as national capital to 
achieve inclusion and belonging”.15 Acquiring citizenship does 
not simply mean obtaining the recognition of rights, but also 
and mainly, being involved in the society. I interpret writing and 
publishing Italian literary texts as a way of being involved. Laila’s 
story reminds me of the ‘contaminate subjects’, the people able 
to turn a situation of vulnerability, which the migrant condition 
is, into an occasion for personal change, without losing identity 
but opening it to cultural hybridization.16 This journey of personal 
change may lead the writers to claim that they belong to Italy:
 
Speaking of taking part in a place, [writing in Italian] is a way 
to enter the ‘Italianness’ without going through the official 
documentation process, without going through bureaucracy. It is 
like entering the front door without asking for permission (Kaha 
Mohamed Aden). 
My first tale is not just a tale, it is rather me yelling about my 
unrecognized ‘Italianness’. In that period people talked a lot about 
‘L’Italia sono anch’io’, a campaign aimed to make public opinion 
15 Umut Erel, Migrant Women Transforming Citizenship. Life-stories from Britain 
and German, Ashgate, Farnham, 2009, p. 153.
16 Elena Pulcini, “Contamination and Vulnerability. The Self in the Global Age”, 
in Silvia Caporale Bizzini, Melita Richter Malabotta (eds.), Teaching Subjectivity. 
Travelling Selves for Feminist Pedagogy, ATHENA3 in Women’s Studies in Europe, 
Utrecht University and Centre for Gender Studies, Stockholm University, 2009.
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aware of Italy’s changes. … I needed to lay a claim: ‘I am Italy as 
well!’. Because people just keep asking me: ‘Where are you from?’ 
or: ‘You speak Italian very well’. It is quite annoying if you grew up 
here (Rahma Nur).
Wider Horizons 
By developing a sense of belonging to the receiving society, 
writing may become a way to participate in society. Writing 
about oneself means writing about other people’s experiences, 
especially in a migration context when these texts represent a 
shared perception of individual identity.17 My interviews seem to 
confirm this argument going one step further: there is a recurring 
statement of giving voice to someone who has none and who 
has lived similar experiences. The following example is only one 
among several I encountered: 
I think writing my first two books happened by chance because 
there was a lot of autobiographical staff... I deeply needed to 
talk about my past, my story. I don’t feel this need anymore. 
My need is wider. I want to talk about a community and I think 
it is important to give a voice to the Italians of Tunisia because 
they never had a voice (Marinette Pendola).
The societal issues that these women seem to be interested 
in, develop in diverse directions. Many women are interested 
in issues concerning the host society. As an example, one of the 
writers wrote an entire novel on the increasing invisibility and 
loneliness of the elderly in western countries: 
I used to work in an elderly care home where I met so many 
people. I like listening to people, especially the older ones. 
They told me many stories about their youth and I saw they 
had so much to tell... So I said to myself that I could write 
these stories down and I started writing without stopping … 
I like writing because I can give voice to people who haven’t 
a voice. I want to tell stories that nobody knows... I know I 
can’t change the world, but I would like to contribute (Amilca 
Ismael).
There are then those who want to tell something about 
their country of origin so as to question both stereotypes and 
international issues:
17 Silvia Caporale Bizzini, “I Remember, Therefore I Write. The Voices of 
Contemporary Italian Canadian Women Writers”, in Caporale Bizzini, Richter 
Malabotta (eds.), Teaching Subjectivity, cit.
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The bombing of Serbia was an unjustifiable criminal act, which 
is still unpunished, a barbaric and cowardly act. This explains 
why it is usually forgotten, underplayed and justified. I felt the 
need to fix the memory of that terrible spring. I went to Belgrade 
three times under the bombs and I decided to recount those three 
journeys because I didn’t want to forget them and I didn’t want 
people to forget them. It was very difficult for me, as Serbian, to 
live in Italy in that period. I survived thanks to the writing which, 
as a mirror, reminded me who I was (Tijana Djerković).
Not only is writing a way of participating in society, but also 
a political act in that it enters the public sphere. The interviewed 
women explicitly claim that the writing act needs to take on a 
social function:
Writing is also a way to be politically involved. Think about my 
tale My name is fingertip 5423. It is a way to participate in politics 
because it questioned a law, the Bossi-Fini law, whose goal was 
to fingerprint every migrant. So I imagined that every fingertip 
detached from the migrants’ hands and they went to the central 
police station to protest. This is one of the most important 
functions of literature: participating in the social and political life 
in the place where you live (Christiana de Caldas Brito).
We consider this conception of the writer’s role as an 
example of the concept of “the capacity to aspire” articulated by 
Appadurai.18 According to the scholar, aspirations are cultural 
and social abilities which make people act in the present so as 
to affect the future. As I have tried to show, in the experience of 
migrant women writers, the first steps in writing are often driven 
by individual needs which gradually become societal-oriented, 
making them develop an interest in the collective future. After all, 
whoever desires to participate in a society, as through writing, 
is someone who wants to change the future. Therefore, some of 
them consciously start producing texts which can impact the 
society. Indeed, the migrant women writers’ interest in other 
people’s stories and/or in collective issues, is not separate from 
their need to work on their past story, as I discussed in the 
previous section. The two are intertwined: working on their own 
stories is exactly what allows them to see a wider picture. Using 
writing to work through their memories helps them acknowledge 
18 Arjun Appadurai, “The Capacity to Aspire. Culture and Terms of 
Recognition”, in Vijayendra Rao, Michael Walton (eds.), Culture and Public Action, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004.
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their own experience and conceive their whole life as a journey 
full of meaning rather than a set of experiences independent 
from each other. As Jedlowski pointed out, experience is more 
than what everyone lives in his/her biography, to be understood 
as a process of self-reflection which consists of both living and 
understanding life.19 This process, he explains, can be initiated for 
different reasons (experiencing migration may be one of those), 
but in any case, it requires a certain distance from one’s own life to 
question and understand one’s own story. I suggest that writing 
can provide the opportunity to observe oneself from the outside. 
Understanding who a person used to be, and what he or she went 
through, affects the way in which the present is understood and 
makes the purposes of the current actions clear.20 In other words, 
opening up the past makes it possible to act in the present, rather 
than being stuck in memories that cause suffering:
I do believe that the key of the future is in the past. The key of 
the individual future depends on our capacity to get over the 
past. Broadly speaking, the key of the collective future is in the 
lessons we can learn from the past, in the things that the past 
somehow should pass down to us. So, I think that the past is very 
important because it is the only certainty we have, the only thing 
that has already happened … The future is unknown... I am not 
afraid of the future; actually, I am an optimistic person. I fear the 
past because it keeps tricking me. Every time I solved some past 
problem, my present and accordingly my future became light and 
more pleasing to live and to imagine (Elvira Mujčić). 
The concept of ‘reflexive nostalgia’ offers an interesting 
reading of this passage. In line with Boym, nostalgia is not always 
retrospective; it can be prospective as well, a way of remembering 
the past without forgetting the future. 21 The purpose of this 
kind of nostalgia is not to come back ‘home’, but to understand 
the past; it helps people regain a sense of self-awareness which 
is essential to thinking about the future. And the future is often 
focused on the collective. Indeed, things change over time, and the 
women writers, after facing their past, express the need to have 
a wider horizon of meaning. Past and future can be linked in the 
present by the concept of ‘responsibility’, which is related to the 
past through reflexivity, which “transforms what is known and 
19 Paolo Jedlowski, Il sapere dell’esperienza. Fra l’abitudine e il dubbio, Carocci, 
Roma, 2008.
20 Ibid.
21 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, cit.
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adapts it actively and creatively to the needs of the present”.22 In 
doing so, reflexivity makes people themselves want to improve 
the society in which they live and is thus oriented to the future:
So, having the chance of doing something I enjoy [writing], is 
something I have always seen as a responsibility, something that 
you should do if you have the opportunity. We are all responsible 
for our actions, so if you have the chance to do something, you 
shouldn’t give up. I mean... We should make some efforts to improve 
the world in which we live … In that moment I felt I had the chance 
to say something about Italian public life that was talked about a lot: 
migration. Today, like yesterday, migration is continuously talked 
about, but it is not actually understood. We mainly receive technical 
details, journalistic opinions, but... people don’t directly know what 
migration means, what migration is (Ingy Mubiayi). 
Contaminated Narratives 
I would like to overturn the relationship between migration 
and writing as I have presented it so far. I have shown that writing 
helps the migrant women handle the difficulties caused by their 
migration experience, and moreover represent active elements 
in the receiving society. We may ask whether the writing act, 
in its turn, is transformed by migration itself, in a certain sense. 
Experiencing migration means dealing with cultural differences 
and cultural plurality in everyday life. Especially for those 
who emigrated during their childhood or adolescence, as Livia 
did, living among cultures and different realities is part of their 
identity. This affects not simply the choice of writing and the 
topic, but also the fundamental logic of the texts, which mirrors 
the cultural hybridization experienced by the author:
In my tale Trame I talk about connection between different 
realities. There is always something that creates a relationship... It 
happens also when I write a poetry. This is the trigger: two things, 
which till that moment were not related to each other in my 
mind, suddenly are somehow connected. It can happen through 
a story, a poetry, a new feeling, a sort of epiphany which makes 
me understand how those things are connected. This is the reason 
why a text arises: there are two or three things, different poles, 
which reach a common point (Livia Bazu).
The connection between migration and writing experienced by 
the interviewees can be interpreted as a ‘third space’. In line with 
22 Carmen Leccardi, “Memory, Time and Responsibility”, in Tota, Hagen 
(eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies, cit., p. 114.
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the Croatian sociologist Melita Richter, who personally emigrated 
to Italy, the ‘third space’ is a creative, mental place, which is 
directly related to migration since the latter offers migrants a 
new cognitive dimension as a result of being a stranger.23 In this 
space writing becomes a resource in managing an increasingly 
multifaceted identity, since “the job of adding and not losing is 
substantial, a constant burden in the migrant’s life”.24 As Tijana 
put in other words: 
Living outside my place of origin partly changed me. It affected 
my way of dealing with the surrounding world. It’s normal when 
you change perspective and your horizon widens. I think this 
should be true for everyone. However, my essence is still the same 
and I’m proud of it. The new experiences enriched my personality. 
Living elsewhere, in Italy, contributed to my development, helping 
me smooth things over and soften my harsh Balkan attitude. It 
also influenced the topics and the settings of my writing. I feel free 
to write also about the Italian topics, not only about the Serbian 
ones... simply because they both belong to me (Tijana Djerković).
While the change experienced by these women can be 
interpreted, as I have discussed so far, as a subjectification 
practice, it can have wider implications, since it is expressed 
through literary writings which aim at being published. I would 
like to suggest that a relevant potentiality of their texts consists 
in overturning the western standpoint from which history has 
been told and imposed on the rest of the world. Such an intent is 
particularly clear in Laila’s literary purposes: 
I have thought about this a lot... What do I want to transmit? Why 
do I have to be stereotyped and tell only ‘migrant’ stories. Is it 
because I am a migrant? I want to be free to write about everything 
and to be only a writer or a story-teller, not a migrant writer or a 
writer with different origins. Obviously, what I write is inevitably 
contaminated by my non-Italian origins. However, I want to 
recount Italy to Italians. Because I thought that up until now so 
many western people, anthropologists, sociologists and writers 
have told the other’s stories from their point of view. They talked 
about India from their white people point of view. I would like 
to do the opposite. I would like to tell stories about Italy, about 
my Italian family, with the eyes of a different person. This is my 
challenge (Laila Wadia).
23 Melita Richter Malabotta, “In Search of the ‘Third Space’”, in Caporale 
Bizzini, Richter Malabotta (eds.), Teaching Subjectivity, cit.
24 Ivi, p. 88.
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What Laila says, concerns the need for provincializing Europe, 
as Chakrabarty would put it, which is undoubtedly a necessary 
and important step but only the first one.25 It produces a counter-
stance which, if not transformed in something else, remains 
nothing but a re-action: “All reaction is limited by, and dependent 
on, what is reacting against”.26 Indeed, some other considerations 
expressed by Laila suggest that these women are able to convey 
a non-hegemonic point of view not simply because of their not-
western origins, but also because, in migration, they experience 
uprooting, where to learn straddling cultural differences: 
I like playing with words and syntax and I enjoy contaminating 
Italian language, which I love, with metaphors and diverse 
colours. … I like mixing everything up because I think that 
one of literature’s aims consists in mirroring your personality. 
I mean, when you write, the characters and the plot matter, 
but the fundamentals are your personal experience and your 
personality, your ego. And at that level the hybridization and 
the desire of mixing, contaminating and experimenting comes 
up... not to astonish but to transmit who you really are, that is 
a person with a double or multiple identity. In my view, this 
is very important because I think this is our future... a trans-
linguistic Babel. I mean, if I have to define myself right now, 
I believe I am a post-national trans-linguistic writer (Laila 
Wadia). 
Through writing, we can perceive that the space inhabited 
by these women is not only the place of individual creativity, 
as Melita Richter describes it, but also the instance of cultural 
contamination and hybridization that, with Homi Bhabha, can be 
said to the essence of our time: “It is that Third Space, though 
unpresentable itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions 
of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and the symbols of 
culture have no primordial unity of fixity; that even the same signs 
can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and red anew”.27 
The ‘Third Space’ is the location from whom migration writings 
speak; therefore, it is the subversive place which deconstructs 
and breaks up the ‘ultimate’ worldview, the one belonging to the 
western white man.
25 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000. 
26 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands. La Frontera. The new mestiza, Aunt Lute Books, 
San Francisco, 1987, p. 78.
27 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Routledge, London and New York, 
1994, p. 37.
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Being migrant and being woman enable authors to use writing 
in order to deconstruct intersectional labelling and discriminatory 
processes acting in the receiving society, as I have shown, and 
in the sending society, as well. The position from which these 
women writers observe societies is the stand of people who have 
personally experienced both cultural and gender differences. This 
location causes multiple forms of discrimination and conflict in 
societies. Differently, experiencing multiple and intersectional 
points of view makes writing as the creative act that looks for a 
peaceful coexistence of differences: 
In my view the tragedy of Somalia was caused by a specific way 
of living in the clans. … I noticed that the clan’s genealogy follows 
the male line: my father, my grandfather, his father... I said: ‘What 
if I change the subject? ‘. Because we should do something about 
this war [the civil war in Somalia]. I was wondering what I could 
do in writing a tale... So, I said: ‘I’ll change the subject, I’ll talk 
about grandmothers’. But I also wanted... Another problem is that 
you cannot run away from this genealogical tree based on blood 
because the blood defines which clan you belong to and other 
people might kill you only because you belong to that clan by birth. 
I wanted to send a message about the blood line and I added a third 
grandmother, so my grandmothers are not two, my mom’s mother 
and my dad’s mother, there is another one, who is an elective 
grandmother and who symbolizes a cure to our obsession with 
belonging to ethnic and blood groups I wanted to send a message: 
everyone may have a ‘chosen grandmother’ who can be a writer 
you like or a neighbour who took care of you... it is a bond which 
doesn’t depend on blood. It is something that also Italians can do... 
because I had two problems, the first was the patrilineal Somali 
issue, the second one was the Italian citizenship that I had difficulty 
to acquire because of the relevance of the blood, the so-called ius 
sanguinis issue. So, I changed the subject and I added a subject 
(Kaha Mohamed Aden). 
Such views are essential for war-torn countries, and, indeed, 
also for the future of the receiving societies. I have shown that 
these women have personally experienced the difficulties, even 
the suffering, due to the nostalgia of the past and the encounter 
with otherness. Nevertheless, they do not refuse to open their 
lives to the culture of the receiving societies, and, in doing so, they 
refuse to completely assimilate to that culture. They fulfil cultural 
hybridization by using the Italian language in a creative way, 
able to make connections among cultures and different ways to 
see the world. I believe their literary work is to be interpreted as 
a step forward towards new ways of imagining the future and 
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thereby of constructing it differently. A future which is, as Gloria 
Anzaldúa suggests, aimed at a new ‘mestiza’ consciousness, able 
to overcome the insurmountable dichotomies through which we 
have recounted, and are still recounting, history:
En unas pocas centurias, the future will belong to the mestiza. 
Because the future depends on the braking down of paradigms, 
it depends on the straddling of two or more culture … The 
answer to the problem between the white race and the colored, 
between males and females, lies in healing the split that originates 
in the very foundation of our lives, our culture, our languages, 
out thoughts. A massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the 
individual and collective consciousness is the beginning for a long 
struggle, but one that could, in our best hopes, bring us to the end 
of rape, of violence, of war.28
28 Anzaldúa, Borderlands, cit., p. 80. 
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Neo-Avantgarde and Feminist Under-
pinnings Of Post-Yugoslav Literature 
and its Utopias: A Comparative Reading 
of Judita Šalgo and Slobodan Tišma
Tijana Matijević
Summary
The topic of the paper is the exploration of the ‘woman’s woman’ identity, 
as desired and conceptualized by the protagonist of Slobodan Tišma’s novel 
Bernardi’s Room, further analysed over its relation to the unwritten history 
of the post-Yugoslav literature. I tried interpreting what kind of a poetical 
and political identification that is and why it would be important to identify 
in such a way in the context of post-Yugoslav literature. To be a ‘woman’s 
woman’ points at a tradition, that is at inheriting or continuing what comes 
to be defined as womanly, understood as a sexual, textual and a literary 
possibility, or becoming. Therefore, the effects of a comparative reading of 
the two novels by Vojvodinian authors Judita Šalgo and Slobodan Tišma 
enable observing the continuities among late Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav 
literatures, disclosing their Neo-avant-gardist and feminist underpinnings. 
While those aspects integrate in the imagination of a utopia, which bears 
upon the gendered bodies and territories, the paper also aims at responding 
to the universalist/particularist dilemma which accompanies the process of 
establishing a literary text inside a respective literary filed. 
Mislim da žene treba da odustanu od borbe.
Treba da se povuku na pusto ostrvo, na pusti kotinent o kakvom 
šapuću, sanjare one hiljade luetičarki ujedinjenih tela i umova, 
mislim da žene treba da napuste svetsko bojište, da pobegnu, povuku 
se iz istorije, da odbiju da rađaju.
Žene treba da pokažu ni manje ni više kako mogu da zaustave, promene svet.
(Judita Šalgo, Put u Birobidžan)1
1 “I believe women should give up the fight. They should leave to the desert 
island, desert continent which is already in the murmurs and dreams of those 
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Nema polova, ja sam žena žene, svi muškarci su žene a žene su samo 
žene! .... Iz inata, odlučio sam da ubuduće govorim u ženskom rodu. 
Nije me uopšte bilo sramota.2
(Slobodan Tišma, Bernardijeva soba)
Introduction: (Dis)continuities of the Literary Field
This paper is the exploration of the “woman’s woman” 
declaration from the quote above and its connection to the 
unwritten history of post-Yugoslav literature. I will try to interpret 
how it addresses literary and historic continuities among late 
Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav literatures. 
A dynamic marking the development and the 
conceptualization of Yugoslav literature corresponds to the 
wavering universalist and particularistic models of organizing 
and understanding a respective literary field of the East-
Central European “literary cultures”.3 Its name is in fact 
just one of the few possible designations of the literary field 
coinciding with the Yugoslav state: depending on the principle 
which prevailed in the categorization (universal Yugoslav 
or particular national) either Yugoslav literature, Yugoslav 
literatures or individual national Yugoslav literatures, 
like Croatian, Serbian, or Macedonian were practically 
simultaneously circulating. Recent debates on the post-
Yugoslav literature somewhat paradoxically legitimize it by 
claiming that even Yugoslav literature never really existed, 
or at best that it started dissolving long before 1991. Yet, the 
good news is that the withering away of the field “has never been 
concluded”,4 and that the true gist of any common framework 
thousands of the luetic whose bodies and minds unified, I believe women should 
leave the world’s battlefield, they should flee, withdraw from history, refuse 
to reproduce. Women must show how they can stop, how they can change the 
world.“ (Judita Šalgo, Put u Birobidžan, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 1997, p. 153). All 
translations in this essay are mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 “There are no sexes, I am the woman’s woman, all men are women and women 
are simply women! .... Out of spite I decided to speak about myself from the female 
perspective, by using the feminine grammatical forms. I was not the slightest 
bit ashamed.“ (Slobodan Tišma, Bernardijeva soba. Za glas (kontratenor) i orkestar, 
Kulturni centar Novog Sada, Novi Sad, 2012, p. 31).
3 The difference between the “pan-European” and the “national emphasis” in 
XIX century East-Central literary cultures illustrates well this argument (Marcel 
Cornis-Pope and John Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East-Central 
Europe. Junctures and Disjunctures in the 19th and 20th Centuries, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2004, p. 8).
4 Svjetlan Lacko Vidulić, “Književno polje SFRJ-a. Podsjetnik na tranziciju 
dugog trajanja“, in Virna Karlić et al. (eds.), Tranzicija i kulturno pamćenje. Zbornik 
radova, Srednja Europa, Zagreb, pp. 27-43, p. 28.
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is “in certain common situations and contexts, like those 
linguistic or artistic, strong enough to ‘bond’ the territories”.5
Yet, despite the organic connections and common “situations 
and contexts”, the reality of war is what influences the narratives 
of disjunction: “The trauma of the war-time in the beginning of 
1990s that sharply divides these two systems [Yugoslav and post-
Yugoslav], engenders the narrative about a discontinuity and the 
two incompatible worlds, as if they were never inhabited by the 
same people”.6 Thus the argument about the Yugoslav (or South 
Slavonic) cultures preceding and outliving the Yugoslav state7 
allows for the more scrupulous and coherent conceptualization of 
the common post-Yugoslav literary field.
Another possibility is to read the post-Yugoslav literature 
as a minority literary discourse. As the feminist theoreticians of 
the (post)Yugoslav literature argue, literature written by women 
develops outside the canon: “Are the so-called small cultures able 
to generate parallel canons, except when the women’s writing 
is at issue?”8 Furthermore, a transnational feminist perspective 
in studying the post-Yugoslav literature identifies the existence 
of “paranational communities”,9 best represented in the “[s]elf-
conscious or feminist oriented women’s literature”.10
A “woman’s woman” desired identity, Tišma’s protagonist’s 
choice of the female body and voice is a gesture of entering the 
space of women’s literature, or more precisely, of one particular 
woman’s writing – Judita Šalgo’s. Both Judita Šalgo (1941-1996) 
and Slobodan Tišma (1946) are the protagonists of the Yugoslav 
Vojvodinian Neo-avantgarde: bringing back Šalgo and her 
fiction is a Neo-avantgardist signal, a feminist choice. The bond 
Tišma makes is constitutive to an alternative or a counter-canon 
of an “alternative herstory of women’s writing”.11 Importantly, 
Tišma’s return to Šalgo’s writing and the Yugoslav past occurs as 
a Benjaminian “revolutionary appropriation of the past”.12 While 
5 Predrag Brebanović, “Jugoslovenska književnost. Stanovište sadašnjosti“, in 
Karlić (et al.), Tranzicija i kulturno pamćenje, cit., pp. 57-64, p. 61.
6 Maša Kolanović, Udarnik! Buntovnik? Potrošač... Popularna kultura i hrvatski 
roman od socijalizma do tranzicije, Naklada Ljevak, Zagreb, 2011, p. 24.
7 A claim supported by many researchers of the Yugoslav social and cultural 
history, among others Dubravka Stojanović, Dragan Markovina, Mitja Velikonja, etc.
8 Dubravka Đurić, “Teorijsko-interpretativni modeli u postjugoslovenskim 
pesničkim kulturama“, Sarajevske sveske, 32/33, 2011, pp. 333-363, p. 334.
9 Seyhan in Jasmina Lukić, “Rod i migracija u postjugoslavenskoj književnosti 
kao transnacionalnoj književnosti”, Reč, 87, 33, 2017, pp. 273-291.
10 Lukić, Rod i migracija, cit., p. 286. 
11 Ivi, p. 289. 
12 Brebanović, Jugoslovenska književnost, cit., p. 62.
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the avant-garde “negation of the linear and naively progressive 
temporal consciousness”13 might suggest a negative, non-historical 
“aspiration to somehow attain happiness past main historical roads 
and ruptures, past history all together”,14 it also enables the new 
‘social imagination’. Essential figurations in Šalgo’s and Tišma’s 
novels – female utopias – are at once the avant-gardist projections 
and the spaces of women’s bodily and communal performances: 
“the true explosion, the activation of the reality comes into being 
only after the events have been written down. The writing induces 
the events, the happenings, the history”.15 A comparative reading 
of Šalgo’s and Tišma’s fiction reveals the junctures constitutive of 
the post-Yugoslav literary field: its (Neo)avant-garde and feminist 
underpinnings which integrate in the utopian imagination. 
Hysteria and History. Bodily and Utopian Transitions in 
the Post-Yugoslav Fiction
Judita Šalgo’s novel Put u Birobidžan (A Journey to 
Birobidzhan, 1997) narrativizes the founding/finding of a 
female continent, a women’s utopia. The initial concept has 
been the historical Birobidzhan, the district for the Jewish 
people in the Soviet Union, which in the fable of the novel 
translates into a haven for the ill – syphilis infected, prostitutes 
and deprived women – and eventually for all women. Bertha 
Papenheim (Freud’s Anna O.) travels to the Balkans and the 
Middle East in search of the female continent; spending some 
time in Budapest’s hospital “for venereal diseases, therefore, 
exclusively for prostitutes”,16 she is drawn to go deeper to the 
south-east by a rumour of the “movement or the state of mind” 
which intuited a “utopia of the great global refuge for women, 
the Female continent”.17
However, the initial mention of Birobidzhan is set within the 
genesis of the Jewish family Rot and their essential relationship 
to Birobidzhan as the historical and symbolic haven; the topos is 
re-actualized in the outbreak of the Yugoslav war as a suggested 
asylum for one of the Rot family members: ”It is difficult to predict 
how important would Birobidzan be in the future, but in the times 
of great tremor when worlds swoop down to the past, nothing 
13 Ibid.
14 Judita Šalgo,“Smrt utopija i svetski duh”, in Jednokratni eseji, Stubovi kulture, 
Beograd, 2000, pp. 170-175, p. 173.
15 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 69.
16 Ivi, p. 71.
17 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 66.
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else is there anyhow”,18 for ”Birobidzhan is the land without 
killing .... Birobidzhan as an ideal city (utopia) .... B. as the spare 
homeland“.19 After a few episodes the story retrospectively draws 
back to the beginning of the century, Bertha’s visit to Belgrade and 
acquaintance with the Rot family. 
Judita Šalgo built her narrative about the female utopia on 
the insights of the psychoanalytical theory of hysteria and the 
medicinal discourses which influenced it, but also on their perpetual 
contestation and ironizing. She explored the regimes of female 
bodies and sexuality by making direct references to the “idea, 
found in Hippocrates and discussed by Plato, of the wandering 
womb– the extraordinary belief that the uterus, when deprived of 
the health-giving moisture derived from sexual intercourse, would 
rise up into the hypochondrium (located between the stomach and 
the chest) in a quest for nourishment”.20 The astonishingly precise 
imagination of the ancient medicine resulting in this predictable 
route of the uterus is converted into a quite improbable journey in 
the imagination of Judita Šalgo. Since a “[w]oman wanders through 
life the way the womb wanders inside the woman’s body“21 and “on 
her travel Bertha herself feels like the womb which is wandering in 
the body“,22 women are defined by and identified with their bodies. 
Yet, “when the womb gets tired and stops, then a woman herself 
continues the travel”.23 In Šalgo’s discourse women ‘emancipate’ 
themselves from their bodies, by reclaiming them in their attempt 
to reach the “promised land”: “A continent discovered by women 
guided by their uteri. A promised land which one reaches ... by 
incident, through a hysterical messianic cry, revolt and spasm, a 
scream“.24 The listed symptoms of hysteria don’t relegate women 
to the place held in reserve for them by those in control of the 
femininity discourse, but quite the contrary, they are the symptoms 
of a riot and, most importantly, of the women producing their 
own discourses about their experiences, bodies, about themselves. 
Though one of the most prominent discourses of the feminine is 
precisely the psychoanalytical theory Šalgo appertains to, the 
18 Ivi, p. 16.
19 Ivi, p. 63.
20 G. S. Rousseau, “A Strange Pathology. Hysteria in the Early Modern World, 
1500-1800“, in Sander L. Gilman et al. (eds.), Hysteria Beyond Freud, University of 
California Press, Los Angeles, 1993, pp. 91-221, p. 118.
21 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 77.
22 Ivi, p. 105.
23 Ivi, p. 90.
24 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 94.
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“fanciful geography of hysteria”25 transforms in Šalgo’s novel 
into the women’s expansion onto the new territory, geographical, 
political, and bodily.
Though Anna O.’s identity had been suppressed and 
Freud had never even met her, she contributed greatly to the 
“psychoanalytical theory and technique“.26 Hunter offered “a 
psychoanalytic-feminist reading” of Bertha’s behaviour and her 
inability, that is her refusal to use the regular speech which shown 
her need to liberate from “integration into a cultural identity [she] 
wanted to reject”.27 What Hunter shows is that Bertha herself 
produced “the knowledge of the unconsciousness”, she has 
invented the “talking cure”; men (Bruer and Freud) later theorized 
what Bertha herself performed. Bringing attention to the active 
role Anna O.’s suppressed and silenced sexuality and her revolt 
against the patriarchy had for the creation of the psychoanalytical 
discourse results in a modern feminist reclaim of the hysteria seen 
as “feminism lacking a social network in the outer world”.28 
Yet, the theme of reaching the female continent remains open; 
it is the matter of speculation, intention (“[i]f/when the female 
continent is discovered, it will be, it is, the emotional fact-the truth 
of emotion”).29 The ambiguity is inscribed in Šalgo’s understanding 
of the feminist worldview, together with other discourses she 
incorporates into the novel’s narrative,30 paradoxically enabling 
the discourse of utopia, for “if there is anything certain, that 
is Birobizdhan“.31 The uncertainty of the novel’s discourse is 
completed by the fact that the novel hasn’t been finished; effects 
of this are the self-evident openness of the ending, but also the 
multiplication of the author (two editors) and the entanglement 
of the real and the fictional. Judita Šalgo’s biography had become 
an aspect of the text in a bodily sense: the end of her life coincides 
with the end of the novel, enabling an auctorial postscript. What 
25 Rousseau, A Strange Pathology, cit., p. 118.
26 Dianne Hunter, “Hysteria, Psychoanalysis, and Feminism“, in Katie Conboy 
et al. (eds.), Writing on the Body. Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 257-276, p. 258.
27 Ivi, p. 260.
28 Israël in Hunter, Hysteria, cit., p. 272. In this respect important is the book: 
Sander L. Gilman et al. (eds.), Hysteria Beyond Freud, University of California Press, 
Los Angeles, 1993.
29 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 151.
30 Rosić wrote about this issue in her article: Tatjana Rosić, “Autopoetika kao 
antiutopija - motiv ‘nove zemlje’ u romanima Vojislava Despotova i Judite Šalgo“, 
Sarajevske sveske, 13, 2006, pp. 265-289. 
31 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 174.
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has been a narrativization of the text as the body now becomes 
the body as the text. The unintended inscription of her own 
body into text is the ultimate (Neo-)Avant-garde gesture: while 
exploring the “possibilities of conceptual and performative art 
practices, Vojislav Despotov32 and Judita Šalgo had come upon 
The Body, that is simultaneously the object and the instrument of 
the cognition; … body is territory, but also a medium; the base for 
writing and the writing itself”.33
Šalgo’s work and this novel in particular recur as a common 
topic in present-day literary research, especially in the field of 
feminist theory and women’s writing.34 The circulation of the 
figure of the “female continent” as a metonymy of women’s writing 
and women writers illustrates a cult status of the book, as a rule 
perceived as epochal and ground-breaking.35 Nevertheless, the 
influence of the Birobidzhan is not consumed by these tributes: the 
most critical – though not recognized so far – is its reappearance in 
Slobodan Tišma’s novel Bernardijeva soba (Bernardi’s Room, 2011). 
Constructing his novel as a multiple reference to Šalgo’s book, the 
author reiterates the Birobidzhan narrative by adding the telling 
ending: unlike the Birobidzhan chronicle, in Bernardi’s Room the 
protagonist actually reaches the utopian female continent.
In Tišma’s novel the story revolves around the protagonist 
remembering of the (Yugoslav) better past, but the Yugoslav war 
and the dissolution are also facets of the narrative. The title refers 
to the Yugoslav modernist designer Bernardo Bernardi36 and the 
furniture he designed, a metaphor of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia as 
the past). Yet, the figure also points at the status of this past and 
this country in the contemporary discourse: the furniture set is 
an aestheticized reminder of the obsolete former times. Hence, 
Šalgo’s and Tišma’s novels bring up the historical reality of 
the Yugoslav war, in both novels narrativized by its relation to 
32 A prominent Vojvodinian Neo-avantgarde poet.
33 Rosić, Autopoetika, cit., p. 268.
34 One of the researchers coins the term “Šalgology“ (šalgologija; Dragana V. 
Todoreskov, Tragom kočenja. Prisvajanje, preodevanje i raslojavanje stvarnosti u poetici 
Judite Šalgo, Zavod za kulturu Vojvodine, Novi Sad, 2014, p. 38).
35 An anthology of the Serbian contemporary short stories written by women is 
edited by Ljiljana Đurđić, Ženski kontinent [Female continent], Prosveta, Beograd, 
2004); Vladislava Gordić Petković’s book of essays Na ženskom kontinentu [On the 
female continent], Dnevnik, Novi Sad, 2007), etc.
36 Member of the Exat 51, group of painters and architects “who presented 
a living connection to the activist heritage of the historical avant garde” (Iva 
Ceraj, “Bernardo Bernardi – The spiritus movens of Early Design in Croatia”, art 
BULLETIN, 63, 2013, pp. 98-119, p. 99).
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territories and bodies, either non-existing or imaginary (a former 
country, a utopia). 
Bernardi’s Room is a story about a young man, Pišta, who started 
dwelling inside the old car wreck after an unsuccessful attempt 
at a ‘male’ commune, in fact a shared flat with a mixed group 
of his friends and acquaintances. His maturation is preceded by 
a crisis which culminates after he sells the designer furniture 
(“Bernardi’s room”) – his last belongings – to a dealer who pays 
with counterfeit money; the protagonist ends up in jail after trying 
to pay for something with it. The plot resolves when his long-
absent mother helps him get out of prison, bringing him with her 
to a remote farm in the wilderness. There he undergoes a type of 
rite of passage and an initiation into the woman’s commune. He 
continues to live with his mother and other women inhabitants of 
the commune on the farm in south-eastern Serbia. His mother takes 
him where Šalgo’s protagonist never managed to really arrive: the 
journey ends and I would like to offer a possible explanation for 
such an unpredictable twist.
Psychoanalytically marked figures of parents, allusive rhetoric, 
a mysterious female protagonist from the past and finally Pišta’s 
claim for his femininity form an expressive discourse of body and 
desire, which also shapes his remembering of the past. Comparable 
to Šalgo’s approach, Tišma debunks the psychoanalytical 
understanding of femininity. The protagonist Pišta often imagined 
to be somebody different and actually intended to change his 
sex due to the already existing “preconditions”;37 Pišta himself 
witnesses that “there was an empty space, a void between [his] 
legs”.38 Initially travestying Freud’s penis envy, Tišma complicates 
his ‘gender challenge’ by ironizing the “form of biology rooted 
in classical Antiquity, where sexual difference was construed 
as difference of degree”39 which in fact allows illustrating the 
structural similarities and thus the “mutability40 of male and 
female bodies”.41 Namely, “[m]en and women are, in this model, 
not different in kind but in the configuration of their organs …. 
Turn outward the woman’s, turn inward, so to speak, and fold 
37 Tišma, Bernardi, cit., p. 30.
38 Ivi, p. 12.
39 Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco, “Normal Bodies (or Not)“, in Mariam 
Fraser et al. (eds.), The Body. A Reader, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 145-149, 
p. 145.
40 Emphasis added.
41 Thomas Laqueur, “Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive 
Biology“, in Fraser et al., The Body, cit., pp. 151-157, p. 154.
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double the man’s, and you will find the same in both in every 
respect”.42 Yet, what Tišma does is that he uses this topology 
against the standard misogynist theories: it is possible to be both, 
or to choose to be either a man or a woman. 
Therefore, Pišta’s ‘imperfection’ conflicts the “Freudian notion 
of castration, by which female difference is defined as lack rather 
than Otherness”.43 Pišta favours this otherness: “I want to be a 
woman’s woman because I am attracted to women, I am attracted 
to womanliness, I want pure essential womanly love .... I as a 
woman’s woman need the compassion of the woman’s woman“.44 
This choice of the female sex/gender, in effect qualifies Pišta’s 
admission to the female continent. After his mother takes him to 
the female commune and he undergoes the rite of passage, the 
women in the commune complete a performance of crucifying 
him to a cross placed on the five-pointed star, after which the 
protagonist becomes a woman (the performance involves the 
sexual indications of the devirginating; also, after he wakes up 
they give him women’s clothes to put on).
While Šalgo’s utopia is beyond reach, in Tišma’s novel it is 
‘colonized’. Confirmation of this homecoming is underscored by 
the latently erotic scene in which Pišta shoots from the air gun 
into the target together with the “three graces”: “Hitting in the 
centre, yes! What I was always missing”.45 The lack (“missing”) 
permits hitting in the centre, which is quite a precise metaphor of 
the protagonist’s gender teleology (his womanly lack helps him 
reach the goal). 
A Lacanian46 argument that the “gap in some sense belongs to 
the object, identification is always imperfect”47 helps associate 
Freudian imagination of sexuality and the feminist understanding 
of the identity (of writing): “The instability of ‘femininity’ as 
female identity is a specific instability, an eccentric relation to 
the construction of sexual difference, but it also points to the 
fractured and fluctuant condition of all consciously held identity, 
42 Galen in Laqueur, Orgasm, cit., p. 153.
43 Mary Jacobus, “The Difference of View (Women Writing and Writing About 
Women)”, in Mary Eagleton (ed.), Feminist Literary Theory. A Reader, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1990, pp. 216-219, p. 217.
44 Tišma, Bernardi, cit., p. 30.
45 Ivi, p. 112. 
46 It is difficult not to touch upon Lacan, present in Tišma’s text both as a 
suggestion and its feminist revision or ridicule. 
47 Thomas Brockelman, “Lacan, Jacques (1901-81)”, in Edward Craig (ed.), 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, Routledge, London, 1998, pp. 336-338, 
p. 336.
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the impossibility of a will-full, unified and coherent subject”.48 
Similarly, besides being about ‘feminine subjectivity’, hysteria has 
been recognized as “an expressive discourse” by the surrealist 
artists Aragon and Breton,49 while the French feminist theoreticians 
– Julia Kristeva in particular – associate the Avant-garde art and 
the écriture féminine. 
Performances of Utopia: Vojvodinian Neo-avantgarde 
and the Post-Yugoslav Literature 
Publishing her first poetry collection in 1962, Judita Šalgo 
continued experimenting with poetic language and publishing 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Her Neo-avantgarde textualism 
entailed the “gestural, bodily, oral, visual … performing of the 
text”.50 Šalgo’s performances also evidence the inseparability of the 
language and body, that is of the text production and the role the 
body plays in it.51 Body and its artistic and political configurations are 
revisited in Tišma’s sexual/gender ‘performances of the protagonist’s 
body’. Though most often ironized, references to the performances 
he or members of his group carried out are amalgamated in the fable 
of the Bernardi’s Room,52 together with the final episode of the novel 
occurring as a performance of the protagonist’s transition. 
One of Tišma’s most famous actions, performed in 1970 ─ Kocka 
(the cube) ─ is translated into text through a network of complex 
geometrical symbolism. The cube is a very important figure in the 
novel (as a perfect sublime form); Bernardi’s room as the central 
narrative object is precisely in the shape of a cube. An opaque 
inscription Aesthetics the protagonist sees in the female commune 
is a textual replica of one famous photograph performance in 
48 Cora Kaplan, “Speaking/Writing/Feminism (On Gender and Writing)”, in 
Eagleton (ed.), Feminist Literary Theory, cit., p. 181.
49 Hunter, Hysteria, cit., p. 272.
50 Maja Solar, “Tradicija je otvorena, tradicija je u zatvoru“, Polja, 53, 449, 2008, 
pp. 63-67, p. 66.
51 One of most impelling is her performance Položaji književnosti (Literary 
positions) in which by positioning her body variously Šalgo negotiates her 
auctorial position but also the position of women in the language and in the 
literary and cultural hierarchies, <https://www.youtube.com/results?search_
query=polozaji+knjizevnosti+judita+Šalgo>.
52 Vojvodinian Neo-avantgarde groups: textualists (Judita Šalgo, who was 
also the director of the cult cultural center Tribina mladih), Januar and Februar, 
Bosch+Bosch, Kôd (Slobodan Tišma) and ($ were active in textual experiments as 
well as in processual and conceptual art in the end of the 1960s and beginning of 
the 1970s; information about the actions and programs of the Vojvodinian Neo-
avangardists is collected from Miško Šuvaković, “Neoavangarda, konceptualna 
umetnost i krize socijalističkog modernizma“, Republika, 430-431, 2008, <http://
www.republika.co.rs/430-431/19.html> (11/2016).
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which the illuminated advert of the construction company was 
photographed. Furthermore, the sea figures as an important 
symbol in the text as either the Adriatic (the Yugoslav sea) or as a 
denser image of the Ocean, drawing back to Lautreamont’s work 
Les Chants de Maldoror (The Songs of Maldoror); the motto of the 
novel is the verse from Lautreamont’s poem: “Pozdravljam te, 
stari Okeane!” [I salute you, old Ocean!].53 It is also an intertextual 
reference to Šalgo’s usage of the figure of ocean in her Birobidzhan 
and another direct citation of the performance by Slobodan Tišma 
and Miroslav Mandić More – Antimore (Sea/Anti-Sea) in front of 
the Novi Sad cathedral in 1970. 54
Finally, the female commune is a textual reappearance of the 
commune the members of the Neo-avant-garde groups Kôd and ($ 
founded in a house in Novi Sad. Božidar Mandić transferred the 
idea later to the mountain Rudnik,55 creating a village commune still 
active nowadays Porodica bistrih potoka (Family of Clear Streams). 
A performance representing the crucifixion on the five-pointed 
star is a persiflage of one of the most well-known performances 
of Marina Abramović Rythm 5 (performed in the Student Cultural 
Centre (SKC) in Belgrade in 1974) indicating ’mental and physical 
purification‘; yet, after she laid down inside the burning five-
pointed star shaped structure, she lost her consciousness due to 
lack of oxygen. Tišma’s evocation is an ironic reminiscence of 
the Yugoslav cultural production and its affected subversion, or 
simply a pun on the ‘mainstreaming’ of avant-garde art.
Without attacking its own body utopian Avant-garde art is 
impossible: ”the attack on the institution of art is the condition 
for the possible realization of a utopia in which art and life are 
united”.56 Artistic practices of the Vojvodinian Neo-avantgarde 
aimed at transgressing the borders between art and reality, and 
the performance as the format of this transgression placed the 
body as the physical reality and as the medium in the centre of this 
action: “Performing is the material social practice which is being 
carried out in the reality and whose effects are the features of 
53 A book favoured by the members of the Situationist International, which 
influenced the Vojvodinian conceptualists, Slobodan Tišma included.
54 This kind of interdiscursive play has infinite effects: the Ocean is also a fact 
quote of the song Okean by Tišma's band La Strada.
55 Mountain in eastern Serbia, comparable to the female commune on the farm 
in south-east Serbia in Tišma’s novel.
56 Peter Bürger, “Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-Garde. An Attempt to Answer 
Certain Critics of Theory of the Avant-Garde”, New Literary History, 41, 2010, pp. 
695–715, p. 696.
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that reality”.57 Reproduced historical performances are narrative 
signals of the reality in the text, which is the ultimate artistic 
possibility discerned within the Neo-avantgarde discourse: 
The discourse of the Neo-avantgarde is ... marked by the 
affirmation of the text as a second-degree discourse, which in itself 
does not produce solely the meta-position of an artist, but makes 
explicit the preceding concept, the context (intertextual relation, 
fact quotes etc.) .... Quotations of the Neo-avantgardists are made 
of flesh and blood, not because they resemble life, but because 
they embody life itself.58
A dissent from the ruling cultural discourse and the harsh 
response of the state (“misinterpretations, resistance, bans 
and even arrest of some artists”)59 link the late Yugoslav Neo-
avantgarde and the avant-gardist nature of the post-Yugoslav 
art and literature, which are in conflicting relationship with the 
mainstream nationalist cultures throughout the region; clearly, a 
“[p]olitical mobilization requires politicization, but politicization 
cannot exist without the production of a conflictual representation 
of the world”.60
The propensity of post-Yugoslav discourse to politicize culture, 
its transformative interest beyond the formal issues identifies it 
as an avant-gardist movement: “the avant-garde denotes supra-
stylistic or extra-stylistic radical, excessive, transgressive, critical, 
experimental, projective, programmatic, and interdisciplinary 
practices in art and culture”.61 Though post-Yugoslav discourse 
rarely involves radical and incident writings and acts, its supra-
stylistic, interdisciplinary, programmatic and transgressive 
quality define its avant-gardist position. Moreover, it relates to 
historical Yugoslav Avant-garde which was a “special geopolitical 
and geo-aesthetic set of artistic and cultural phenomena”,62 in fact 
a transnational and transcultural field “defined by the internal 
dynamics and interrelations of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
57 Ana Vujanović, “Performativ i performativnost. O događajnosti, učinkovitosti 
i nemoći izvedbe kao čina“, in Aleksandra Jovićević et al. (eds.), Uvod u studije 
perfomansa, Fabrika knjiga, Beograd, 2006, pp. 119-140, p. 133.
58 Dragana Beleslijin, “Muško, žensko, embrion, knjiga - quattro corpi in cerca 
d’autore”, Polja, 464, 2010, pp. 123-129, p. 123.
59 Šuvaković, Neoavangarda, cit.
60 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (Thinking in Action), Routledge, New York, 
2005, pp. 24-25.
61 Miško Šuvaković, “Avant-Gardes in Yugoslavia”, Filozofski vesnik, 37, 1, 2016, 
pp. 201-219, p. 204.
62 Ivi, p. 201.
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and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and by the external 
dynamics, cosmopolitan relations, and internationalizations 
of local artistic excess and experimentation with international 
avant-garde practices”.63 Likewise, a multinational society64 
and a multilingual structure of the Vojvodinian art scene65 are 
vital to the Yugoslav Neo-avantgarde, also marked by the 
intense communication among the artist from different parts of 
Yugoslavia.
The feminist analysis of the Yugoslav war and dissolution 
equally recognizes the multiplicity of the Yugoslav culture, 
opposing it to the gender and ethnic homogenous cultures of 
nationalism and war: 
In most of the writing of former Yugoslavia’s feminist theory the 
reality of war and the discourse of nationalism is gender identified 
.... What also runs like a thread through these writings is the need 
for these feminist authors to ground themselves in the sanity of 
peace, absolute rejection of any nationalism, and a reminder of 
multicultural frameworks of the former Yugoslavia.66
Feminism politicizes the reliance on Yugoslavia: post-
Yugoslav discourse is seen as the platform of resistance67 and a 
utopia necessary in imagining the new post-Yugoslav cultural 
and political space.68 
Šalgo’s indefinable utopia reflects her attitude about the 
possibility of its embodiment: “Utopian thinking is puritan: it 
does not allow duality … Utopia is fundamentally discriminative; 
it seeks perfection, or nothing”.69 However, it supports the utopian 
imagination: “A vision must be inhabited swiftly, one must 
organize a life in it, turn it into an image, a clear idea, if necessary 
– a fixed idea – a durable and solid object of an imagination“.70 As 
Tišma has demonstrated, only if a utopian locus is an intersection 
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Solar, Tradicija je otvorena, cit.
66 Daša Duhaček, ”Eastern Europe”, in Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young 
(eds.), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, Blackwell, Malden, Massachusetts, 1998, 
pp. 128-136, p. 134.
67 Svetlana Slapšak, ”Twin Cultures and Rubik’s Cube Politics. The Dynamics of 
Cultural Production in Pro-YU, Post-YU, and Other YU Inventions“, Südosteuropa. 
Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft, 3, 2011, pp. 301-314, p. 311.
68 Slapšak in Tatjana Rosić, “Feministički esej u srpskoj književnosti i raspad 
Jugoslavije“, Književna istorija, 47, 2015, pp. 233-254, p. 244.
69 Šalgo, Smrt utopija, cit., p. 171.
70 Šalgo, Birobidžan, cit., p. 101.
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of a vision and corporeality, a feminine embodiment, ‘the target 
is hit’: “a moving target, a moving fleeing homeland, wandering 
promised land”71 is reached.
A female utopia is a proper figuration at once absorbing 
gender bias and embodying gender “perfection”. In itself a 
radical project, it corresponds to the “utopian character of the 
Avant-garde project”.72 Judita Šalgo’s and Slobodan Tišma’s 
novels intertwine and add to the discourse of post-Yugoslav 
literature via feminist and feminine aspects of their literary 
realities, which communicate through the shared cultural and 
artistic space of Yugoslav Vojvodinian Neo-avantgarde. They are 
the constituent parts of a literary tradition whose trajectory leads 
to post-Yugoslav literature. The Yugoslav Neo-avantgarde and 
feminist literature ‘commission’ the post-Yugoslav literature as a 
transnational, différance and a utopian discourse whose token is 
the female continent.
71 Ivi, p. 104.
72 Bürger, Avant-Garde, cit., p. 696.
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The Génie of Nnedi Okorafor’s Oeuvre: 
Genre, Gender and the Generosity of 
Writing 
Silvana Carotenuto
Dedicated to the sisters of Feminist Futures
… le génie, c’est-à-dire…
la vie (car le génie, son nom l’indique, témoigne toujours… la vie).
(Jacques Derrida)
Summary
In what follows I focus on the ‘life’ or genie of Nnedi Okorafor’s 
science fiction in order to illustrate the singular and metonymic, original 
and universal, ‘bond’ it establishes between the transgression of the limits 
of its genre, its creative intervention in the question of gender, and the 
inventive thrust into the generosity of its future writing.1 
I delineate the interconnecting forms of this ‘bond’ in a general/generic 
survey of the poetics of Okorafor’s speculative works; I then concentrate 
on the ‘novel for youth’ Zahrah The Windseeker as the originary and original 
example of how writing can disrupt its genre’s (order of) ‘belonging’ by 
constructing the agent of this disruption as the figuration of an African, 
albino, brave and magic girl who is determinate to offer her ‘gift/talent/
bless’ to deconstruct all dialectics between the ‘Known’ and the ‘Unknown’, 
while searching and reaching out for the ‘antidote’ that will save her friend. 
1 Referring to the ‘invisible elements’ embedded in the natural imagery of 
Okorafor’s novels, Alice Curry, in “Traitorousness, Invisibility and Animism. 
An Ecocritical Readings of Nnedi Okorafor’s West African Novels for Children”, 
International Research in Children’s Literature, 7, 1, 2014, p. 39, thinks they are 
“metonymic of the porous boundaries between the earthly and spiritual, living 
and dead, human and nonhuman that often underpin the worldviews of West 
African traditional culture”. In my reading, the ‘metonymy’ of Okorafor’s African 
worldviews is linked to the desire for a new global Literature, the achievement of 
its literary expression through a process of writing which is both an ‘investigation’ 
and an ‘invention’ of Literature. 
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I hope that the crossing of the genericity/ generality of my survey and 
the singularity of Okorafor’s textual generosity will invite the reader to 
expose herself to the ‘act of literature’ offered by writing as its ‘gift’ to the 
world of the future, or to the future of the world.
The Search for Literature
Okorafor’s novel signs the original and complex example 
of ‘Organic African Literature’: “[w]riting stories set in Nigeria 
and in other parts of Africa was not a conscious decision. It was 
organic. And I have never questioned it. I write where the energy 
is. I follow my muse and my muse is definitely from my father’s 
hometown of Arondizougu, Nigeria”.2 ‘Organicity’ is the energy 
that animates the writer in her literary life; ‘Africaness’, on its part, 
is what constitutes the root – the original inspiration – linked to the 
enriching result of present and future ‘technology’, in a crossing 
that, as Okorafor laments in her concern with the destinies of the 
continent, is invisible and marginalized in contemporary literature: 
When I travelled to Nigeria, I would see Nigerians interacting with 
technology in a way that I was not seeing reflected in literature. I 
was not seeing Africa as a whole reflected in writing about the 
future.3 
Organic technological Africa, and the advent of the future: what 
matters to Okorafor’s inspiration and goal is that these elements 
are meant to show their absorbed participation to the practices of 
Literature tout court, their active involvement in the analysis of the 
Laws and the Missions of Literature (the anticipation would here be 
that Okorafor’s ‘mission’ discards the linear itinerary of ‘History’ 
to access the rhizomatic disseminations of ‘Nomadology’). In 
Okorafor’s oeuvre, writing is actively engaged in the fight raved 
by Literature against ancient and contemporary evil, differentiated 
in forms but equally inscribed in violent African and Western 
2 Okorafor in Nathaniel Bivan and Risqah Ramon, “Nigerian writers shouldn’t 
focus on fame, money,” Daily Trust, Sep. 24, 2016, <https://www.dailytrust.com.
ng/nigerian-writers-shouldnt-focus-on-fame-money-nnedi-okorafor.html>.
3 Okorafor in Hope Wabuke, “Nnedi Okorafor Is Putting Africans at the Center 
of Science Fiction and Fantasy”, The Root, Dic. 29, 2015, <https://www.theroot.com/
nnedi-okorafor-is-putting-africans-at-the-center-of-sci-1790862186>. For useful 
overviews, see Moradewun Adejunmodi, “Introduction. African Science Fiction”, 
Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Inquiry 3, 3, 2016; Nick Wood, “Academia and the 
Advance of African Science Fiction”, Omenana, March, 2015, <https://omenana.
com/2015/03/05/academia-and-the-advance-of-african-science-fiction/>; Deirdre C. 
Byrne, “Science Fiction in South Africa”, PMLA, 119, 3, 2004 [Special Topic: Science 
Fiction and Literary Studies: The Next Millennium]. 
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landscapes, all expressed in the organic, systemic and poetic re-
invention/re-flection/re-‘vision’ of the essential traits of literary 
creation: the novel’s title, the name/s of the character/s, le récit, the 
perspectives of the plot, the question of authorship, the insurgence 
of choral work...
In its practices of innovation, according to the progress of 
its birth, growth and maturity, Okorafor’s writing gradually 
manages to forge the ‘Book’ of Literature à sa maniere, the literary 
act envisioned and announced in the exposure, increase and 
acceleration of its ‘generosity’. The Book refers to other books, 
other narrative examples of African technè that function as 
guides, letting themselves be ‘rewritten’ according to generative 
legacies and to the inventive hybridization of genres and canons, 
continuously regenerating beyond the barriers of communication 
so as to allow the understanding of the other/s across languages.4 
By moving from one to the other, in ‘experience’ (Freud signifies 
the term as fort/da, ‘from-to’), these ‘books-within-the-Book’ 
constitute the ‘gifts’ of Literature which prove to be able to 
protect friendship, change the destinies of humankind, celebrate 
difference among the species, and finally announce the opening of 
writing to the future-to-come.
The Laws of Genre and Gender
Each novel that I write helps me hone my craft that much more...
(Nnedi Okorafor)5
The génie of Okorafor’s oeuvre can be followed in some novels 
that mark the times and the forms of its literary life: Zahrah The 
Windseeker (2005), Who Fears Death? (2010), The Book of Phoenix 
(2015), Binti (2016) and Binti: Home (2017).6 These works articulate 
an inventive capacity whose literary passion threads specific phases 
of birth, growth and maturity. These are narrative movements often 
described as ‘Literature for Youth’, ‘Literature for Young Adults’ 
4 ‘Hybridity’ marks Okorafor’s life or génie as a Nigerian-American writer: 
“That hybridity, the conflicts, the similarities – the fusion of these two cultures 
combining and conflicting – that is why I am who I am and why I write what I 
write”. Okorafor in Wabuke, Nnedi Okorafor Is Putting Africans at the Center, cit. 
5 Okorafor in Jeremy L. C. Jones, “If It Scares You, Write It: A Conversation with 
Nnedi Okorafor”, Clarkesworld Magazine, 39, 2009 < http://clarkesworldmagazine.
com/prior/issue_39/>.
6 Okorafor, Zahrah The Windseeker, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, 2005; 
Who Fears Death?, DAW/Penguin, New York, 2010; The Book of Phoenix, DAW/
Penguin, New York, 2015; Binti, Tor.com, 2016, <https://www.tor.com>; and Binti: 
Home, Tor.com, 2017, <https://www.tor.com>. 
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and ‘Literature for Adults’ by the commercial labels or the editorial 
interests that, in 2016, assign the Hugo Award to Okorafor’s 
‘novella’ Binti. In what follows, differently, these labelling markers 
are employed at the service of some ‘organic’ images which prove 
‘internal’ to Okorafor’s search for the act of Literature.
In The Great Foreigner, Michael Foucault reckons that “What is 
Literature?” is the question that ‘excavates’ the origin, the growth 
and the maturity of Literature.7 On its part, Okorafor’s inventive 
engagement writes, and writes again, of a ‘cave’ that stores parts 
of ruined technology. Indeed, in abandonment and dusty smell, 
this ‘cavity’ maintains, and continues to maintain, the mystery, 
the secret and the fascination of the process of producing the story 
(in one occasion, the cave hosts spiders intricately intent in their 
patterns of ‘weaving’). The ‘cavity of interrogation’ calls for the 
identification of what and who creates the story (always the same 
story, always already different from itself, and from the stories 
that precede and follow it) of the ‘Law of Genre’ by exposing it to 
the ‘Law of Gender’, which is acted out by the female, feminine 
and feminist ‘silhouette’ of its metaphorical, embodied, and legal 
figuration: 
… the Law, in its female element, is a silhouette that plays. At what? 
At being … born, a being born like anybody and no body. She plays 
upon her generation and displays her genre, she plays out her 
nature and her history, and she makes a plaything at an account. 
In mock-playing herself she takes into account the account: she 
recites; and her birth is accountable to the account, the récit, one 
could even say to her (to la voix…) the narrative voice, him, her, I, 
we, the neuter genre that subjects and merges itself while giving 
birth to her, who lets himself be captivated by the law and escapes 
her, who she escapes and whom she loves. She lets herself be put 
in motion, she lets herself be cited …8
The Law of Genre imposes its orders, rules and limits, 
simultaneously exposing itself to the disruption of all imposing 
and ordering functions. In Zahrah The Windseeker, the separation 
between the ‘Known’ and the ‘Unknown’, the realms set in an 
7 Michel Foucault, La grande straniera. A proposito di letteratura, translated by mf/
materiali foucaultiani, Cronopio, Napoli, 2015. All translations from Italian into 
English in this essay are mine.
8 Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre”, Glyph, 7, translated by Avital Ronell, 
1980, p. 226. For the essential traits of ‘feminist science fiction’, see Alcena Madeline 
Davis Rogan, “Alien Sex Acts in Feminist Science Fiction. Heuristic Models for 
Thinking a Feminist Future of Desire”, PMLA, 119, 3, 2004, pp. 442-456 [Special 
topic: “Science Fiction and Literary Studies: The Next Millennium”].
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opposing dialectics that is provoked by ignorance and which 
provokes ignorance, constitutes the nucleus of the adventure 
of the ‘Jungle’. In Who Fears Death, the Law defines the limits of 
purity in terms of ethnic cleansing and abuse of women, asking 
for the responsible re-action of the brave and courageous ones. In 
The Book of Phoenix, the limits between life and death, associated 
to the manipulation, subjugation and exploitation of humanity, 
are exposed to instances of ‘global warming’ counter-signed by 
the ‘burning’ that attests the rebellion and the revolution of all 
subalterns in the world. In Binti, finally, the limits between ‘here’ 
and ‘there’, the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’, delineate the original 
place for the female character to decide, freeing herself from its 
enclosing borders, to reach for ‘outer space’... 
What matters in this play of limits is that transgression 
happens by means of the birth, the growth and the maturity of 
a girl, a woman, the ‘alien’ creature who shows (‘monstrosity’ 
plays here the powerful show of a new life, a different relation to 
death, the unexpected emergence of future worlds) the lineage of 
other geneses and other genealogies. Indeed, it is the inscription 
in Okorafor’s oeuvre of the geneses and the genealogies of the 
female Other. Emerging from elemental panoramas (the Jungle, 
the Desert, the Middle Passage, the Threshold, the Return Home), 
the heroine, placed at the center of the literary action,9 assumes 
different figurations. She is born Dada, who originates in the 
African mythology which has long been forgotten by peoples. 
She becomes Ewe, ‘the child of rape’, who interprets the ‘wound’ 
that hurts Africa, mirroring itself in the conflicts and gendered 
violence inflicted on the entire globe. She develops as ABO, the 
‘Accelerated Biological Organism’, who knows how to burn up all 
mortal fatalities of global power, manipulation and exploitation. 
Her last appearance is Binti, the ‘genius’ of mathematics in her 
confrontation with the alien people of Medusa. These female 
figurations are all meant to offer their incredible, impossible and 
incomprehensible ‘gifts’ to the Law of Genre: the capacity to 
levitate and fly, the prodigy of bringing back to life, the ability to 
be reborn, the talent at ‘harmonizing’ – the cosmos, and writing 
with it, if Okorafor’s ‘novella’ syntheses all traits of her previous 
experiential/ experimental writing.
9 Okorafor explains that her ‘heroines’ are often created in intimacy and 
recognition: “… à partir de femmes, notamment nigériennes, que je connais – 
famille, amies, connaissances”. See “Interview Nnedi Okorafor sur Qui a peur 
de la mort?”, Actusf, 31/10/2017 <https://www.actusf.com/detail-d-un-article/
article-17963.html>.
344 — DISRUPTING HISTORICITY, RECLAIMING THE FUTURE
It is to the geniality of this female gift, alien puissance or 
superhuman capacity, that writing entrusts the mission, the journey, 
the passage, and, at the end of its ‘nomadology’, the un-folding of 
the secret of Literature. In the originality of Okorafor’s quest, the 
path does not present any linear progress, but rather evolves in 
the diffraction and rhizomatic unfolding of infinite ramifications. 
Beyond any individual enterprise, at stake is the narration of 
fictional experiences that constitute ‘bonds’ of ‘love’ – thanks to 
the “small but beautiful thing” of good company, or the alliance of 
the “family in struggle”, as if to convince the reader, with Jacques 
Derrida’s critique of genre, that the dialectics between ‘I/we’ must 
be deconstructed by “me the genre, we genres … the ‘I’ is a species 
of the genre ‘we’”.10 Indeed, the rhizomatic and collective unfolding 
of the story does not aim at the resolution of the plot, but at gaining 
l’ovule d’ecriture11 which, in Okorafor’s experimental imaginary, 
becomes the ‘egg’ of the Jungle’s fabulous animal met in Zahrah The 
Windseeker; the ‘Seed’ that brings abundance to African farmers in 
The Book of Phoenix; the ‘edan’ or ‘computational mechanism’ found 
in the desert in Binti, whose ‘secret’, forever locked in its enveloping 
aura, allows understanding among species... 
The ‘egg’ of writing is to be left intact and integral; the ‘secret’ of 
Literature is not to be unveiled. Open to the process of becoming, 
it comes to the surface only to allow the observation – Okorafor’s 
visual poetics12 – of its power of generation and germination. 
The pleasure of the egg’s touch, the yolk, the lines and circles it 
contains, the vibration it provokes, the silent and magic language 
of its functioning, represent the ‘antidote’ (the term is often 
employed in Okorafor’s oeuvre) to ancient and contemporary evil, 
the pharmakon that, in its ever-possible chance of contamination, 
allows the realization of the story. On one side, there is the politics 
of writing; on the other side – which is the same side – there is the 
inscription of the inventive interest. The crossing is powerful: the 
‘antidote’ saves the friend, hybridizes all claims to purity, burns 
those who think of obtaining immortality through manipulation 
10 Derrida, The Law of Genre, cit., p. 203.
11 Cf. Derrida, Genèses, généalogies, genre et le génie. Les secrets de l’archive, Galilèe, 
Paris, 2003.
12 Referring to the ‘grasshopper’ she once saw on Chicago University campus, 
Okorafor articulates her ‘vision’ of ecological wonder: “This is a creature that we 
see all the time but when you look at it, really look at it, you see its exotic beauty. 
I still maintain a sense of wonder when I look around me, I guess. I’ve been like 
this since I was a kid. I tap into this when I write and describe things. I am drawing 
from observation I’ve made of things in real life”. Okorafor in Jones, If It Scares 
You, Write It, cit.
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and exploitation, finally facilitating pacts of harmony throughout 
the cosmos. While the ‘gift’ operates its ‘generosity’, writing reflects 
(‘seeing far’, with ‘points of view’ and ‘visions’ turned toward 
l’à-venir) on the ‘whole’ and the ‘parts’ (the reference goes to the 
question of ‘belonging’ or apartenir) of Literature, its title, name, 
récit, perspective, authorship, collaborative work, the harmony of 
its graphy... 
‘Harmony’ is what, at the end of Okorafor’s experimental path, 
signs the generosity of writing.13 In the analysis of its ‘whole’ and 
‘parts’, the Book guides, re-writes and, in the end, writes the ‘novel-
la’ Binti as the final inscription of the feminine genre of ‘Organic 
African Literature’. The signature of success, however, does not 
seal its reach, if, on the last step on the ‘ladder of writing’,14 the 
words ending the sequel of Okorafor’s novella, Binti: Home, leave 
the scene open to the future: “We will see” is the echo of what is 
left behind the always-possible-continuation of the story.15 Indeed, 
the generosity of Okorafor’s stories of vision or vision of stories, is 
to leave the unfolding of Literature’s birth, growth and maturity 
open to the advent of the future, to the promise of l’à-venir.
Wonderful ‘Expansion’
The question of the literary genre is not a formal one: it covers the 
motif of the law in general, of generation in the natural and symbolic 
sense, of birth in the natural and symbolic senses, of the generation 
difference, sexual difference between the feminine and masculine genre/
gender, of the hymen between the two, of a relationless relation between 
the two, of an identity and difference between feminine and masculine. 
 (Jacques Derrida)16
Zahrah The Windseeker dates the foundational instance of 
Okorafor’s oeuvre considering that the experience of its construction 
teaches the young writer of literary experimentation, the use of the 
“first person”.17 Held in agential constitution, the novel assumes the 
13 In Derrida, writing reveals a “generous force of engenderment or generation 
– physis, in fact – as with race, familial membership, classificatory genealogy or 
class, age class (generation) or social class” (The Law of Genre, cit., p. 208). These 
elements are central to Okorafor’s literary life or génie, inscribing in her oeuvre all 
fictional vertiginous classifications and genealogic-taxonomies.
14 Cf. Hélène Cixous, Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing, translated by Sarah 
Cornell and Susan Sellers, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.
15 Okorafor, Binti: Home, cit. (I am quoting from the e-book of the novel, which 
does not present page references). Binti: Home is followed by Binti: The Night 
Masquerade, the third sequel published in 2018 by Tor.com.
16 Derrida, The Law of Genre, cit., p. 70.
17 Okorafor in Jones, If It Scares You, Write It, cit. 
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physiognomy that will grow and reach the maturity of Literature 
according to what is here inscribed by its writing. 
The origin of the process lies in the most superficial edge of the 
Book and in its most elemental fabula, where the external margin 
mirrors in the internal fold of the story. The originary element 
attaches its value to the novel’s ‘title’. Jean-Luc Nancy believes 
that the title of a book brings with itself “that whole of differential 
traits that composes the form … the place and singular fold (tour) 
in which the idea takes body”.18 As it will become clear in the 
progress of the story, the ‘idea’ embodied by the title Zahrah The 
Windseeker announces that the proper name ‘Zahrah’ must join the 
‘title’ of the ‘windseeker’, who carries on winds and breezes, so 
as to allow, in the assumption of one by the other, and vice versa, 
Zahrah The Windseeker to entitle itself. The hymen is traced by the 
traits inscribed, at its opening, by the novel’s “Dedication”:
To the late Virginia Hamilton
Who showed me that people can fly,
And my father and mother, who gave me the means to soar
---
The eyes of eagles see far
In this inscription, the ‘show’ of flight, its ‘extension’ in the sky, 
and the birds that see ‘far’, all play determining roles. It is the 
question of a ‘monstrosity’ – the physiognomy of the future19 – in 
search of its ability to fly, the ‘gift’ that might have been common 
to everybody in the past, but that can now only be imagined in 
its im-possibility, to be re-gained perhaps in the future by means 
18 Jean-Luc Nancy explains that “the ‘Idea’ or the ‘unity of inflection’ (tournure) 
of the book marks its original and/or genial character, its distinctive trait or specific 
imprint, by following “le tour, les tours, contours et détours de cette tournure”. My 
attempt here is to demonstrate that Okorafor’s literary life follows all the ‘tours, 
contours and detours’ of the search of the Book. See Jean-Luc Nancy, Del libro e 
della libreria. Il commercio delle idee, translated by Graziella Berto, Cortina, Milano, 
2006, pp. 18-20. 
19 Derrida binds the element of ‘monstrosity’ to the question of the ‘future’: “The 
future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the future, that is, that which can only 
be surprising, that for which we are not prepared, you see, is heralded by species 
of monsters.... All experience open to the future is prepared or prepares itself to 
welcome the monstrous arrivant”. The philosopher specifically emphasis that “the 
monster … simply … shows itself [elle se montre] – that is what the word monster 
means – it shows itself in something that is not yet shown and that therefore looks 
like a hallucination, it strikes the eye, it frightens precisely because no anticipation 
had prepared one to identify this figure”. Derrida, “Passages – from Traumatism to 
Promise”, Points ...: Interviews, 1974-1994, translated by Peggy Kamuf and Others, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, pp. 386-387.
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of the ‘extension’ of the levitating effort. It is an ‘extension’ that 
echoes in the rhythm of the novel, its pages incising what Hélène 
Cixous defines as the ‘guide-word’ or the ‘magic-word’ of the 
text:20 the term ‘far’, signifying distance, enlargement, difference 
and excess, marks the development of the novel in the resounding 
prose of “too far”, “farther”, “farther up”, “how far”, “as far as”, 
“far away”, “as far as”, “the farther”, “any farther”, “far”, “far 
away”, “farther enough”, “this far”, “so far”...21 
“Dedication” is followed by the most literary element, the 
‘Letter’ that announces the ‘extended’ form of its imaginative 
puissance. In italics, the missive calls for the acknowledgement of 
its ‘difference’ from reality, the right of the story to a ‘just’ form of 
communication, its ‘other’ signature:
Dear Reader, 
... That’s not journalism. ... No, I am not a witch, a jinni, or a ghost posing 
as my living self ... my story will tell you what really happened. And no matter 
where you’re from, I want you to understand it well.
Sincerely,
Zahrah Tsami.22
‘Difference’ marks the birth of Literature, vindicating the 
reality of its signs, the volume of its writing, and the address to 
its shared partage. The signature belongs to Zahrah Tsami, born in 
coincidence with the opening of the récit: “When I was born, my 
mother took one look at me and laughed”.23 The mother laughs 
in recognizing the generation of her daughter in the realm of 
difference, alterity, and specialty. Is it only a diversity of ‘surface’, 
considering that, at the beginning of the novel, what strikes is the 
uncanny growing of vine leaves in Zahrah’s hair? Monstrosity 
shows, in fact, a deeper meaning: pushed by currents of air, the 
girl is able to ‘levitate’, the magic ‘thing’ that surprises her, and, 
together, the reader. The uncanny discovery is associated to fear, 
20 Cixous, Three Steps, cit., pp. 90-98.
21 Okorafor, Zahrah The Windseeker, cit., pp. 8, 32, 40, 90, 133, 141, 147, 167, 190, 
190, 242, 246 (italics in the original).
22 Ivi, p. iv. Writing’s reality is foundational in Okorafor’s oeuvre: “The 
characters are real to me. I hear their voices. Their actions affect me: the places I 
write about exist. I have felt the sting of their sand storms and smelled their forests: 
The creatures really do bite, snarl, sing, spit, sting, etc. When I am writing, I’m 
there and I enjoy being there”. Okorafor in Jones, If It Scares You, Write It, cit. The 
‘reality of writing’ transforms into the ‘writing of reality’ when Okorafor uses 
precise references to historical or contemporary events.
23 Okorafor, Zahrah The Windseeker, cit., p. vii. 
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unbelief and terror: it is “so odd and impossible”.24 Confronted 
by generalized prejudice, in order to understand the happening, 
Zahrah needs to share her secret. When her ‘only and best friend’ 
Dari witnesses her show of levitation, remaining ‘without words’, 
silence is filled with her determination to know: “I wanted to 
understand”.25
Needing information on the ‘prodigy’, Zahrah and Dari 
decide to visit the Great House of Knowledge, the Library built 
by the architect Cana with glassava, a transparent plant made of 
‘language’ – which, as Foucault maintains, is “the transparent 
system thanks to which, when we speak, we are understood”.26 
24 Ivi, p. 17. The enterprise resounds with philosophical emphasis: “Le 
génie qui est tu excède et le symbolique et l’imaginaire, il est aux prises avec 
l’impossible”. Derrida, Genèses, cit., p. 88. In Okorafor’s oeuvre, the narrated 
mission is “impossible” in Zahrah The Windseeker, cit., p. 283; the journey is ”more 
than” impossible in Who Fears Death, cit., p. 191; and, in The Book of Phoenix, cit., p. 
109, the ”middle passage” is ”beyond” the impossible.
25 Zahrah has another friend, Papa Grip, the ‘Mystical Negro’ who shows 
wisdom and dignity. Okorafor is strongly critical of the ways in which this 
figuration – “Wiser and spiritually deeper than the white protagonist” – is used by 
American Literature as a plot device that helps the white protagonist out of troubles 
(see Okorafor, “Stephen King’s Super-Duper Magical Negros”, Strange Horizons, 
25, October 2004, <http://strangehorizons.com/non-fiction/articles/stephen-kings-
super-duper-magical negroes/>).
26 The ‘Library’ is at the core of the philosophical interest in the functioning 
of Literature, the interpretation of the Book, and their intricate relation to Death. 
For Derrida, Genèses, cit., p. 20, the – written, erected, monumentalized and 
capitalized – allegory of the Absolute Library marks the tomb and the monument 
of conservation, destined “to guard the secret by losing it”, and where to utter 
“adieu and salut, salut à La Littérature et salut de Littérature, survivance and 
survive d’une Litérature”. Foucault, La grande straniera, cit., p. 64, speaks of the 
‘recuperation of the library’ as “the space of books that accumulate, that lean 
one upon the others, and of which each has only the crenelated existence which 
cuts and repeats it ad infinitum on the sky of all possible books”. On his part, 
Nancy, Del libro, cit., p. 37, p. 46, writes of the solid being of the library as the 
passage beyond death: “Libraries and bookshops are the depository, the reserves 
and expositions of those caskets of which one has to force the locks before 
closing them with new locks”. For Nancy, the universal library or bookshop is 
“the Idea of the book as exposed substance, as subject that shows and present 
itself, and that pronounces its cogito” that obeys only “its own law, the law of 
its proper (its character, its idea, its form, its style, its motion and its emotion)”. 
In Okorafor’s oeuvre, the Glass House of Knowledge in Zahrah The Windseeker, 
the magic house full of books in Who Fears Death, and the Library of Congress 
in The Book of Phoenix, include the archives of ‘ecocriticism’, ‘cosmocriticism’ (cf. 
Cécile Dolisane-Ebossè and R. H. Mitsch, “Jacques Fame Ndongo: An Interview 
with Cécile Dolisane-Ebossè”, Research in African Literatures, 41, 1, 2010, pp. 166-
71) and ‘eco-bio-communitarianism’ (cf. Godfrey B. Tangwa, “Some African 
Reflections on Biomedical and Environmental Ethics”, in Kwasi Wiredu Malden 
(ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy, Blackwell, Massachusetts, 2004, pp. 387-
95). I thank Curry, Traitorousness, Invisibility and Animism, cit., for these archival 
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Inside the Library’s rooms, they find uncertain and unreliable 
news in a fashion magazine; at the same time, on the extraordinary 
Library’s shelves, they also find the ‘revolutionary’ digi-book The 
Forbidden Greeny Jungle Field Guide, written by the Great Explorers 
of Knowledge and Adventure Organization. This finding 
transports the novel’s textual event on the plane of its fabula: the 
digi-book invites the readers to cross the limits of the ‘Jungle’, the 
forbidden place that borders with the town, and whose perimeter, 
as believed by popular prejudice and ignorance, can be trespassed 
at the risk of one’s life. 
If Derrida remarks that “as soon as genre announces itself, one 
must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, one 
must not risk impurity, anomaly or monstrosity”, simultaneously, 
the Law imposing (the order of) ‘incontamination’ produces its 
‘Counter-Law’ or “Essential disruption: … an internal division 
of the trait, impurity, corruption, contamination, decomposition, 
perversion, deformation, even cancerization, generous 
proliferation or degenerescence”.27 In Zahrah The Windseeker, 
the double bind develops its own matter of deconstruction. 
Dari reckons the Jungle as the place for his friend to practice, 
undisturbed and free, her flying talent; Zahrah, horrified but open 
to her friend’s suggestion, accepts to visit the forbidden place. 
Holding hands while trespassing the edge of the Jungle, on the 
threshold, they witness the insurgence of difference: “I stepped 
over the border…. Nothing really happened. Nothing outside 
myself … Different”.28 This is not a discreet change, in that, after 
a series of visits to the Jungle, the element of ‘chance’ – which 
is without order and/or counter-order – unexpectedly falls onto 
the path of writing: Dari is beaten by a war snake, whose poison 
precipitates him into a state of deep sleep. In order to rescue the 
boy from coma, there only exists the antidote of “the yoke of an 
unfertilized Elgort egg”. 29 
From now on, the mission of Okorafor’s literary enterprise is 
exposed to the Law of ‘genre’, and to the ‘gender’ of its invention. 
Desiring to save her friend, Zahrah performs what is against all 
sense, advice and wisdom, taking the ‘edgeless’ decision which, 
for Derrida, “borders perhaps only on madness”,30 and that 
arrives to Zahrah as natural as impossible: “It was like a seed 
references.
27 Derrida, The Law of Genre, cit., pp. 202-3.
28 Okorafor, Zahrah The Windseeker, cit. p. 97.
29 Ivi, p. 115.
30 Derrida, The Law of Genre, cit., p. 218.
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spouting, only growing and taking over my mind”.31 Alone and 
unaware of the extent of her ‘gift’, the girl assumes the dangerous 
task of searching for the ‘antidote’, the ‘egg’ of the wild animal 
that will save her friend. The mission proves the contamination of 
(the order of) genre: the “mythical Alice in Wonderearth tales”32 are 
rewritten in the hymenic relation with ‘the ‘Book of the Jungle’, 
their crossing marking the difference of Okorafor’s invention of 
African Literature from Kipling’s original text of adventures.33 
The re-writing – which reveals, as remarked by Jean-Luc Nancy, 
“the condivision of a loving and uninterrupted rewriting of 
the enigma”34 – takes place along the disseminated lines of the 
path that, without mooring or hold, is guided by the Digi-book 
along an itinerary that proves “sinuous, uncertain, linear and 
discontinuous, fragmentary, unplanned, in itself multiple and, 
together, closed on itself, but interminable in one or other way”.35 
Terrified but moving, Zahrah encounters the ‘life-forms’ 
inhabiting the ‘Unknown’. Among tall palms trees, mystic 
mangos, and immense baobabs, she meets huge spiders, giant 
birds, and bush cows. Beaten by a whip scorpion, she is helped by 
a giant tortoise; to get her strength back, she is offered honey by 
the bees belonging to the ‘wood wit’. Panthers, carnigourds, and 
wild dogs attest Okorafor’ love for ‘weirdness’ and ‘nonsense’:
Carnivorous hummingbirds … An enormous wormlike creature 
moving beneath the sands who is obsessed with the number ten 
… Spontaneous forests. Sparkling lizards that can infest a house 
giving it unlimited electricity but also the problem of constant 
static. A mosque made of glass and solar cells which blooms with 
fragrant periwinkle daises on its root at midnight every night.36
Along the path of her impossible mission, Zahrah experiences 
two weird encounters. She first meets the Modern People consisting 
of the welcoming and peaceful speaking monkeys, that host and 
31 Okorafor, Zahrah the Windseeker, cit., p. 116.
32 Ivi, p. 141. 
33 In the range of narrative inspirations, Okorafor privileges the writings of 
contemporary authors such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Ben Okri, Stephen King, Roald 
Dahl. See Marguerite Abouet and Tove Jansoon, “Nnedi Okorafor sur qui a peur 
de la mort?”, Les Projects Standpoint, 2014, interview available at <http://www.
actusf.com/spip/article-17963.html>. For the interest of my reading, I here evoke 
her interpretative confrontation with some Western Urtexts of the ‘adventure’ 
genre.
34 Nancy, Del libro, cit., p. 9.
35 Ivi, p. 36.
36 Okorafor in Jones, If It Scares You, Write It, cit. 
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feed her, healing her wounds up the moment when she is ready 
to proceed to the nest of the ‘Elgort’. The other encounter happens 
just before confronting the monster, and involves the Speculating 
Speckled Frog – whom the girl has already met without knowing 
that “it leaves on a higher place of consciousness, within the past, 
present and future: it knows all before and after it happens”.37 The 
Frog is a spiritual being, sometimes male and sometimes female, 
who represents the “genre, genius or spirit of another law”.38 He 
replies only when he is posed the right question; Zahrah asks the 
question, and he accepts to direct her in her final advancement. 
The scene of the ‘nest’ shows terrifying signs of destruction.39 
Zahrah enters the ‘cave’ – which Michel Foucault associates to 
the question that interrogates “What is Literature?”, meaning 
“a cavity which has been opened in Literature, a cavity where 
Literature should place itself and gather all its being”.40 Again 
allowing the chance to chance, Zahrah chooses, among the many 
signs of the beast’s generative reproduction, the ‘unfertilized’ egg. 
This action signs the mad instance of truth: with the ‘antidote’ in 
her hands, running away from the scene and hunted by the Elgort, 
Zahrah finally understands the puissance of her ‘gift’: “I am not 
born to die like this … I am not born to die like this … I took to the sky. 
Yes, I knew how to fly”.41 
The mission is realized, celebrated by the Frog’s congratulations 
to the gifted girl: “You have done the impossible”.42 The ‘antidote’ 
saves Dari. Success seals the ‘commerce’ of the book, if, from now 
on, the story will be told over and over again. Zahrah’s mother 
understands the ‘reality’ of what has been carried out by her 
talented daughter– “I thought she was just telling stories … But 
they weren’t just stories, even if they sounded like there were. It’s 
real”43 – and, on its part, the Digi-book announces the ‘future-to-
come’ of the novel: “Inform the rest of the world, for what good is 
knowledge if it’s not shared?”.44 Zahrah recounts her experience 
to Dari; his radical ideas coupling with her tales of adventures, 
37 Okorafor, Zahrah The Windsekeer, cit., p. 235.
38 Derrida, The Law of Genre, cit., p. 224.
39 Okorafor explains the relation established between ‘destruction’ and 
‘writing’: “I have an obsession with chaos and destruction. Tornados, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, sudden, unexpected horrible change. Writing is my way of facing it”. 
Okorafor in Jones, “If It Scares You, Write It”, cit.
40 Foucault, La grande straniera, cit., p. 57.
41 Okorafor, Zahrah The Windsekeer, cit., p. 260. 
42 Ivi, p. 262.
43 Ivi, p. 279.
44 Ivi, p. 286.
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they both offer their versions of the story to the journalists. Now 
and here, the legend grows everywhere: “the Book has saved both 
their lives”.45 
Zahrah the Windsekeer closes the Book on this saving act 
of generosity, to be offered, again and again, to what urges 
Literature, since its beginning, to the desire of changing the world 
in/by the ‘wonderful extension’ of writing. It is the precious ‘gift’ 
of women claiming the puissance of love and transformation: “As 
if the world were expanding … as if nothing was what it seemed 
anymore”.46
45 Ivi, p. 248.
46 Ivi, p. 308.
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Women Novelists and Love as a Tool of 
Changing Historical Perspective 
Svetlana Slapšak
Summary
 Through the analysis of the concepts of speculative fiction and science 
fiction the two are classyfied in the same typology. The utopian element 
is defined in gender perspective as the crucial feature of the genre. The 
notion of chronotopos allowed to include the historically determined love-
adventure novel into the gender-genre model. The meeting point of all 
these genre varieties, beside more or less expressed feminist goals, is 
episteme, or the knowledge defined poetics.
In a recent debate, Margaret Atwood defined her novel A 
Handmaid’s Tale as a speculative fiction, while Ursula K. Le Guin 
insisted it was science fiction. The confusion between the two 
terms goes much further: some think that the notion of speculative 
fiction is larger than science fiction, while others think quite the 
opposite. In my opinion the message by now departed Ursula K. Le 
Guin is that any reflexive perspective, historical or futuristic, has 
its bearings on thinking of gender and how it is constructed. Very 
often it is related to the author’s gender and gives an important 
insight into gender constructs of (relative) contemporaneity of the 
author and his/her work, floating between concepts of history and 
the imaginary of the future. Women authors, since the rise of the 
novel, insert more of the utopian or dystopian ideas concerning 
gender positioning in the past or in the future, including the 
changing and dynamic ‘floating’ of their gender chronotopos. 
This is due to the constant presence, threat from and wish to 
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(re)gain their freedom from patriarchy, or to find a way to live 
with it. Patriarchy is the most enduring social ‘arrangement’ in 
known human history: as far as we know, matriarchy existed 
in ‘pockets’ of time and space – that is chronotopoi – and never 
obtained the global expanding force od patriarchy. Patriarchy was 
and is still capable of blending with almost any ideology, belief 
or religion: it reappeared in socialist countries of the Soviet block 
and even quicker in much more liberal Yugoslavia, it rushed in 
taking horrifying forms and devastated all human rights with 
special forms of vengeance against women in all transitional 
countries after 1989. We live in patriarchy today as if almost 
nothing happened in human minds between the 18th and the 21st 
century. Therefore, patriarchy is certainly the deepest trauma 
and the underlying motive for all women’s and others’ writing in 
speculative fiction or science fiction. Overcoming patriarchy, even 
in smallest portions, demands a serious amount of knowledge 
and responsible understanding of biology, archaeology, ancient 
cultures, historical anthropology, contemporary anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, history, philosophy, arts and culture, 
education, etc. To make a long list short, it demands episteme in 
its basic meaning, methodologies which correspond both with 
the history of sciences as with running schools of thought, and 
argumentative discourse acceptable both in academia and in the 
world of culture. Women in the bigger, Eastern part of Europe had 
a bitter pill to swallow and to learn that nothing is gained for ever 
(or much shorter time) earlier and faster: now it is the moment for 
women of the West, including the USA, to experience the extreme 
speed of the process of re-establishing patriarchy and to react. 
Predicting such a turn many years ago, Margaret Atwood had 
to observe, analyze, display, imagine, conclude and go through 
an extremely demanding epistemic process in order to make her 
novel convincing and eventually so timely and appropriate. That 
is a primary science fiction writing procedure. But at the same 
time, insisting that her work belongs to the speculative fiction, 
the author might have claimed a multi-dimensional time and 
re-thinking of history. This is my interpretation: I would like to 
introduce chronotopoi as a distinctive notion which puts together 
and on the same typology level speculative and science fiction. 
Speculative fiction and science fiction have the same 
transparency of literary procedures: myths of creation do not 
apply to the genres which have to be scholarly (or mock-scholarly), 
convincing, didactic. The (truly) imagined societies in these genres 
have to rely on historical models of societies, their fragments, 
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parodies, or contrasted, twisted but never totally unrecognizable 
social structures, even when ‘human’ is not on the list of literary 
personae. Therefore, the invention of the future is related to the 
invention of the past. My intention is to give several examples of 
historical novels which challenge the patriarchy and were written 
by women. In their distribution of male and female roles and their 
attribution of ethical standards to genders, these novels present 
a vast choice of scientific procedures, logical argumentation and 
other scholarly features. And at the same time, these procedures 
form different kinds of utopias and dystopias and all are oriented 
toward a demise of patriarchy. 
I have to trace some transformations of an ill-defined but 
very successful and in this debate the most pertinent genre, the 
love-adventure novel. Most researchers today agree that the 
origins of the European and American love-adventure novel lie 
in the Greek novel of the Hellenistic period. Although this genre 
inspired parodies, it was thought so little of by ancient authors 
that there is not even a name for this type of narrative. Modern 
discussion aligns the ancient novel with female readership but, 
despite the now well-established discipline of ancient women’s 
studies, little research has been undertaken in this area. From the 
beginning, the genre has been defined by its readership and the 
name roman denotes its relationship to the demotic tongue in the 
territory of the Romance languages in medieval times; the new 
name, novel, was borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon area. The term 
which perhaps sheds most light on the concept of the genre is 
the modern Greek term mythistorima, connecting the imaginary 
(mythos) with the narrative (istorima, story rather than history). 
The Greek term denotes the novel as a genre, entirely losing the 
meaning of the love-adventure novel as a bastard-genre (due to its 
popularity with the masses, its triviality and lack of relevance to 
value-systems). If, however, the term is removed from the Greek 
language context, it could encompass some important elements of 
a possible definition of the adventure novel: mythical stereotypes, 
a similarity to the fairy tale, a loose connection with history, the 
seductiveness of the narration. 
The most significant chronotopic feature of the love-adventure 
novel is the relation between the individual and the history, which 
is always spatial. The hero of the love-adventure novel faces an 
alien world and some kind of a metaphysical guarantee of ethics 
in the adventure time. This is the stage on which history and the 
individual meet and invent each other in the love-adventure novel. 
The narrative strategy of the love-adventure novel modulates 
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the rhythm of events and incidents with descriptive passages 
concerning the alien world: costumes, make-up, decoration, 
food, technology, attitudes, lore, exotic language. The standard 
descriptions of places, temples, pictures and sculptures in the 
ancient novel correspond with the modern descriptions of old 
ships or invented future technologies, in all imaginable varieties, 
but the principle objective of the narrative remains the same: to 
slow down the pace while holding the reader’s interest, which 
curiously corresponds to some erotic jouissance techniques. Even 
the dullest passages of explanation, sometimes highly technical 
(how the battleship functions, how to decipher an old manuscript, 
how the alien technology works, how to tend the goats, how to 
make glass from the sand on a desert island and such extremely 
refined constructs as the Klingon language) operate within this 
equivocal framework of pleasure denied. Is the narrative coined 
mimetically after the reading/pleasure pattern? This could be the 
hallmark of narrative strategies in the love-adventure novel. An 
analysis of this phenomenon would show it to be gender-based, 
as in the study of Janice A. Radway. The hero must regard love as 
the most important achievement, even if he is reluctant to accept 
it. He enters history, masked as adventure time, and leaves it at 
the moment in which his love is about to begin its ‘real’ historical 
time. Even if the heroes are married, the adventure time is a period 
of revival or temptation in their love, and after the adventure time 
they will resume their everyday relationship. The position of the 
hero and his beloved is distinct from that of the other characters 
in the novel, especially the historical ones, and sometimes the 
characters from history are much more vivid.
We see the persistence of the basic model as established in the 
ancient novel: a couple in love in an alien world, peripeteia, and 
then a settling back into mythical anonymity and an individual 
Utopian happiness. In this way the adventure novel is a rather 
impressive model of linking the mythical with critical thinking. 
It gives transparency to the transition from narrative to discourse 
and back. It stands in opposition to the two rhetorics, fictionary 
and factionary and, by doing so, reveals one of the principal 
procedures of any manipulation. This is the most remarkable 
and the most subversive arena for ideological intervention in 
the genre. It proves equally successful in both directions, either 
presenting new ideological models or denouncing them. We first 
recognise the ideological invention in the character construction 
of the love-adventure novel hero. The hero of the love-adventure 
novel finds himself with a heroine, leaving the adventure time 
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and entering the time of everyday life. The adventure time may 
also be represented as national history, littered with temptations, 
battles and hazards, and the present time brings this to a symbolic 
culmination, introducing the private as the collective and so 
relegating the heroes to the capsule of the nation’s moneme, 
family, and its basic function, that of reproducing the nation.
The nineteenth century novel excelled in the destruction 
of human hope: heroism is impossible, honour is always 
destroyed by ambition, love is sublime if never consummated. 
The adventure shatters this repressive model, which limits men 
to work and prayer, and opens the horizons of freedom and 
the healthy suspension of responsibility. Ernst Bloch was a rare 
case of a philosopher who saw the primary political energy 
of the love-adventure novel, or Kolportageliteratur (this term, 
like Trivialliteratur relates to the way in which these novels are 
sold) as emerging from the very fact that this kind of writing is 
not unsullied literature. In this way, the love-adventure novel 
subscribes to the concept of hope, of change, of breaking with the 
past. The reader of the love-adventure novel acquires a fantasy 
power and thus compensates for his/her everyday impotence; 
false bourgeois ideas about individual freedom collapse and the 
construct of social and political conditions is clearly revealed. 
Ernst Bloch’s praise of the love-adventure novel may be seen as 
a component of a postcatastrophic revival project, but it is also 
an important element in the contemplation of a prospective 
revolution. Bloch is horrified at the possibility of the expansion 
of bourgeois inertia and individual invisibility. With his view of 
the love-adventure novel, the occasional interest of philosophers 
in the genre moves towards an ideology, as an area for the proper 
functioning of the genre. 
Ernst Bloch condemned the censorship, especially in the case 
of Karl May’s novels, which were popular among boys. But what 
about heroines? She is spectacular for her lack of physical strength 
or experience in fighting, as she is more often compelled to use 
her brains, her rhetorical skill and her female strategies to escape 
danger. In addition, she is socially determined to be dominated. 
The hero does not always arrive in time to save her, they may 
spend most of the time in separate adventures. She may even be 
the cause of the hero’s adventures and his consequent problems; 
she may control and manipulate changes in his attitudes and 
beliefs and even prescribe conditions for her relationship with him. 
When we compare some ancient heroines and their adventures 
with some modern heroines in less elevated love-adventure 
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novels, the difference is staggering. We must also ask ourselves if 
heroines have really been lacking from love-adventure narratives 
for the boys since the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, there is a 
great deal of romantic interest in Dumas’ novels: there is a number 
of self-aware heroines ready to endure physical challenges in 
the novels of Jules Verne. It is almost impossible to find a love-
adventure novel in which the love interest is just left at home, or 
introduced at the end of the adventure. The genre is dominated 
by love relations as much as by adventure itself. Therefore, 
consideration of the genre as being for boys is more pertinent to 
possible changes in the novels’ readership. An explanation might 
be found in the social and cultural changes which accompanied 
the industrial revolution. The introduction of public schools gave 
no particular advantage to women, because they had a tradition 
of being privately educated and, if they were admitted to an 
institution, it was in a gender segregated system, under which 
boys were certainly privileged. Whether officially or not, under 
the school system, women became the persistent readership of 
love-adventure novels. The system underlined gender differences: 
boys were prepared for access to power, while education had a 
somewhat more superficial meaning for girls, who gained little 
from it. With access to power, the phantasms for boys were 
snatched from the girls, and this new readership appealed to 
writers. The world had become much smaller due to the vast 
colonising projects and these future masters of that world, armed 
with practical, industrial and bourgeois knowledge and marked 
by respect for the sciences, were a new challenge for the writers: 
they could write not only about history (and adventure) but also 
about sciences (and adventure), raising the prestige of the genre 
considerably. So it is perfectly arguable that Jules Verne wrote 
for boys, young and old. Previously the writer of love-adventure 
novels had counted on a faithful and financially dependable 
female readership with a tradition of buying books. With the 
coming of the industrial revolution and the state-controlled school 
system (which began as early as the 18th century), such a writer 
was writing for an audience which was generally not capable of 
purchasing books on its own account, but only with the assistance 
of parents, teachers, school administrators and so on. In other 
words, the writer had now to take into consideration censorship, 
various versions of Ad Delphinum restrictions, the interest of the 
church in the school system, family morals, bourgeois rules and 
standards, the sensitivities of the wielders of power and so forth, 
not to mention those critics who functioned as defenders of public 
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morals and the publishers who had to defer to all of these. In this 
new cultural situation there was also a place for anti-establishment 
writing and reading, with all the predictable risks. Ernst Bloch’s 
description of Karl May’s books being removed from beneath the 
Christmas trees of Germany after a destructive criticism in a daily 
newspaper is very compelling in this respect. As the public school 
system also understood the use of national languages throughout 
Europe, the ground was now almost completely prepared for 
an obligatory ideological investment, or at least control over the 
writing of the adventure novel. Because of this I consider the debate 
over boys as writers and readers of the adventure novel irrelevant. 
The structural change in the reading public and gender was 
certainly a factor in this change at the beginning of the industrial 
era, and the subordinate position of literary production, induced 
a situation in which, from all possible perspectives, the role of 
ideology has been crucial ever since. Authors responded with 
alacrity, protesting outside the school system against these new 
limitations and defending the autochthony of literary production, 
but there was no returning to the liberal and libertine publishers, 
authors and readers of the eighteenth century. Women, silently 
and secretly like Emma Bovary, retained their propensity for 
lower literature, but the world of literature was now segregated.
In many popular historical novels (more or less blending 
with the love-adventure genre type) love is an unpredictable plot 
element, fostering happy ending or a happiness of an individual 
in history as an arbitrary outcome, more dependent on a genre 
convention than on credibility. If love is realized, it stays out of 
history and the couple ‘retires’ from the world as a rule. Compared 
with Alexandre Dumas, Paul Féval, Walter Scott, James Fenimore 
Cooper, Rafael Sabatini or Alexandre Poushkin, some women 
novelists stand out in their plot constructing, which presents 
love as a crucial force/motivation or a decisive type of behavior 
initiating and defining the action in history thus establishing an 
important place in social structuring. Such basic discrepancy can 
be analyzed in the novel Gadfly (1897) by Ethel Lilian Voynich and 
La bicyclette bleue by Régine Deforges (1981) and its nine sequels 
(till 2007). Gadfly became influential in a global sense (several 
millions of issues printed), becoming the compulsory reading 
in all the socialist countries, from USSR and China, including 
the early Yugoslav socialism (translations in the 1950s). Beside 
the social-political obligation, the novel was genuinely popular 
among young people. In the work of Régine Deforges, the initial 
pastiche of Gone With the Wind by Margaret Mitchell (1936) serves 
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as a convincing vehicle for proposing another perspective - the 
one in which both members of a couple in love have to ’perform‘ 
their relation in different social and political environments, 
proving that love both creates political and social reality and is 
created by it. In both cases, authors form an argument which 
interacts with revolutionary movements and left-oriented political 
positions. The third case is a Yugoslav Vera Obrenović-Delibašić 
with her novel Kroz Ničiju zemlju (Through the No-man’s Land), in 
which through action and risk a Muslim woman’s emancipation 
is accomplished. Being labelled a Soviet sympathizer, the author 
spent several years as a political prisoner, and the reprints of her 
novel re-surfaced more than 30 years later: her career was limited 
to translation.
I want to compare women authors in the same genre, who 
managed to write-in national or other than revolutionary-left ideas 
into their work (Emmuska Orczy, M. J. Zagorka, Erica Jong and 
others) in order to argue that the revolutionary-left positioning 
coincides well with contemporary emancipatory movements and 
ideas incorporated in them. However, this distinction does not 
exclude evident emancipatory meanings in other women authors’ 
work. The comparison should serve to map a much larger map of 
emancipatory interventions by women authors in their inclusion 
into popular genres and the system of power and cultural 
authority. In this contribution I will limit the comparison to two of 
the novels I mentioned. In her novel Scarlet Pimpernell, Emmuska 
Orczy presents an odd couple: married in a passionate affair in 
Paris at the time of revolution, an actress and an English aristocrat 
move to England, to his rich lifestyle. Suspicious of her treason 
of some of his French aristocratic friends, he distances from her, 
maintaining his identity at home as a petty nobleman, interested 
only in fashion, horses and sports. The numerous adventures in 
the novel are, in fact, a background for two emotional adventures: 
Marguerite discovers that her husband’s real personality is worthy 
of her love, and Sir Percy discovers his wife to be a brave and honest 
defender of human rights. The husband loves desperately, his wife 
is disappointed in the marriage. She begins to explore his psyche, 
tries to change him, reeducates him in how to become a person 
again and then unconditionally supports his new integrity. There 
are no grounds for speculation on Orczy’s feminism, but her text 
represents a kind of feminist Utopia: how to make a man out of a 
boy, how to construct a satisfactory partner, and how to share the 
adventure with him. Without that adventure, Marguerite is pining 
away in a socialite marriage, and Sir Percy is growing more and 
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more depressed, suspicious and superficial. By going in search of 
each other, they escape the curse of a stereotypic marriage and 
save each other for a real, active, adventurous life. Where, then, 
is Orczy’s alleged conservatism? This is, in fact, a type of novel 
which corresponds exactly to Ernst Bloch’s project.
In the Ethel Lilian Voynich’ novel Gadfly, a woman’s role in 
forming a revolutionary man is crucial: due to a miss-information, 
a young woman Gemma accuses her love interest Arthur to be 
a traitor, and at the same time, the enthusiastic young thinker, 
deeply in theology and philosophy, discovers that his mentor, a 
Catholic bishop, is in fact his father. Destroyed in both spiritual 
and real life, Arthur disappears and reappears several years 
later as a mysterious and experienced revolutionary fighting 
for the independence of Italy. Gemma does not recognize him 
and is fascinated by his bravery. Arthur is caught, and after 
unsuccessful attempt to turn his father to the side of revolution, 
he is executed, keeping his heroic attitude. Arthur in fact shakes 
off the patriarchal authority and everything that goes with it, and 
comes back to fight for Gemma’s aim a revolutionary liberation of 
the people. Her ethical attitude has liberated him from the traps 
of patriarchal masculinity. In the socialist world, Arthur is a hero 
both for fighting hypocrisy and standing by an ethically perfect 
revolutionary woman whose attitude towards men is open and 
sincere. 
In both cases, a very active heroine molds the chosen man 
in a socially dynamic situation which demands the engagement 
for the humanity. Their common goal is not (only) an individual 
fullness formulated as happiness, but the liberation and happiness 
of multitudes. In both cases, I could read-in the features of 
the feminist utopia of changing patriarchy. Successful on the 
individual level, the re-education of men should give the example 
how patriarchy could be deconstructed from bottom up. This 
stepping into the world of new gender relations and positions is 
facilitated by reading, learning and active participating in social 
movements, that is based in epistemic growth and progress: the 
case of positive feminist utopia differs from dystopia mainly in 
the lack and deprivation of knowledge and information, like in 
Atwood’s novel. 
The introduction of chronotopos helped to put closer the 
speculative fiction and the science fiction and to determine their 
common typology. It also enabled me to include the historical 
love-adventure novel into this typology. 
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